What could make morality objective?

[FlashDangerpants]

If I look at the vase and it has the properties ["dirty","boring","cheap","£0.45"]
But somebody else looks at the same vase at the same time and sees ["smudged","inspirational","vauable","£700"]
The vase now holds at one and the same time, the mutually exclusive properties of "boring" and "inspirational"?

What do you mean when you say that the vase is "boring"? Boring to whom? Similarly, what do you mean you say that it is "inspirational"? Inspirational to whom? "Boring" and "inspirational" refer to how someone emotionally reacts to something. They do not merely describe the object itself, they describe a relationship. If you mean that the vase is boring to you but inspirational to that other person, then there is no contradiction here; there's merely an illusion of contradiction. In that case, the vase possesses two different non-mutually-exclusive attributes: boring to you and inspirational to that other person. And both attributes are attributes of the object, by definition. The fact that they do not describe a relationship rather than merely the physical constitution of the object they belong to does not change that fact.

In this case, evaluative properties such as moral and aesthic qualities are at best relative, or are they just entirely subjective? Nobody is wrong when they evaluate anything, it's all just "this vase is ugly for me and not ugly for you"....... Personal truths.

[Magnus Anderson]

I don't know how Peter Holmes would respond to that, but I would respond by saying that the subjectivity of morality is in its definition, and therefore morality does not fall into the category of things that can be proved to have a truth value. The only way a moral precept could be proved true, is by giving the term, morality, a different definition to the one I accept as the correct definition.

The word "morality" is commonly used to refer to one of the following:

1) what's right and what's wrong to do
[ probably the original and certainly the most relevant concept of morality ]

2) a set of beliefs pertaining to what's right and what's wrong

The former has no truth value, the latter does.

The reason the former has no truth value is because it is not a collection of propositions.

The reason the second has truth value is precisely because it's a collection of propositions. According to the second definition, morality is a set of beliefs held by someone pertaining to what's right and what's wrong. Since it is a collection of beliefs, and since beliefs are propositions, and since every proposition has truth value, it follows that it is something that has truth value. And if you wonder what these beliefs are about, they are about what's right and what's wrong, i.e. they are about the thing denoted by the first sense of the word "morality".

Whether you should lie or not in order to attain your goals is NOT an arbitrary decision that can be left to your whims. Either lying helps you attain your goals or it does not. And that's what makes morality objective ( but not necessarily universal, a different thing. )

[Magnus Anderson]

In this case, evaluative properties such as moral and aesthic qualities are at best relative, or are they just entirely subjective? Nobody is wrong when they evaluate anything, it's all just "this vase is ugly for me and not ugly for you"....... Personal truths.

They are relative in the sense that what is of value to one is not necessarily of value to another. But it's also important to note that that does not prevent the existence of universal values, i.e. it does not prevent the possibility of something being equally valuable to everyone.

But you can be wrong about pretty much anything . . . even your likes and dislikes. "I like cake" is not automatically true just because it expresses a personal preference of the speaker. But more importantly, values aren't about personal preferences; they aren't about likes and dislikes. Value denotes how useful something is to someone and it's extremely easy to be wrong about that sort of thing.

[Immanuel Can]

Did you say what a moral property is in those answers, or did you just give a reason why you shouldn't have to?

I'm not bothering with your misdirection.

If the unicorn exists, and you can point to a horse with a horn and show that it is indeed a unicorn, then Pete's refusal to believe in unicorns would be demonstrably mistaken. You don't need to address Pete's lack of unicorn faith before you can show him a unicorn.

Why can't you do that with moral properties?

Let's see if he can. Or, if you think you can explain how to do it, go ahead.

[Magnus Anderson]

All "perception" is happening in the head, so it doesn't mean much when people say that they perceive something as valuable. It doesn't follow at all that the value is an inherent property of the external object.

I think you're downplaying the role of language in perception, a mistake made by many in the past ( Locke, Berkeley, Kant, et al. ) It's a mistake typically made by people who lean too much on the side of empiricism.

There is no arguing with the fact that value is a property of physical objects. Why? Because it's something established by language. It's like arguing that there are bachelors who are married or squares that are circles. It's futile.

You can, however, argue that value does not merely denote the physical constitution of the objects it belong to -- something that FDP already did. That's true. Value describes the relation between the object and the subject. It denotes how useful something is to someone. However, that does not disprove the fact that value is a property of physical objects.

Some of our perceptions are created from a mixture of external and internal input, and some of perceptions are created from internal input only. Value is most likely in the latter category. It's entirely internal in origin, and then gets assigned to other perceptions that may have external inputs too. The brain/mind does this process automatically, so it seems as if the value was an inherent property of the external object, but that's probably just an illusion.

It does not matter how our perceptions are made. What matters is what the word "value" means. And that's an issue of language, not an issue of epistemology and / or neuroscience. And what the word "value" represents is a property of an object denoting how useful that object is to someone. How useful something is to someone has nothing to do with what anyone thinks about it. Water isn't useful to you because you think it is useful; it's useful because its physical constitution helps you survive and attain your goals.

[FlashDangerpants]

I'm not bothering with your misdirection.

If the unicorn exists, and you can point to a horse with a horn and show that it is indeed a unicorn, then Pete's refusal to believe in unicorns would be demonstrably mistaken. You don't need to address Pete's lack of unicorn faith before you can show him a unicorn.

Why can't you do that with moral properties?

Let's see if he can. Or, if you think you can explain how to do it, go ahead.

Currently you are asking for a map to Never Never Land, iirc you aim for the second star on the right and straight on till morning.

What sort of properties are moral properties? We can give you pretty helpful tips on how to identify colours, resorting if need be to wavelenghts of light. Or weights, we know a lot about how to measure that sort of property. Same goes for all of the other things we would normally consider an objective property inherent to something or supervenient upon something of that sort and so on.

So what are we trying to do with moral properties? Why do you need Pete to believe in them before you can persuade him they are real? Do they die like Tinkerbell when nobody believes they are real?

[FlashDangerpants]

In this case, evaluative properties such as moral and aesthic qualities are at best relative, or are they just entirely subjective? Nobody is wrong when they evaluate anything, it's all just "this vase is ugly for me and not ugly for you"....... Personal truths.

They are relative in the sense that what is of value to one is not necessarily of value to another. But it's also important to note that that does not prevent the existence of universal values, i.e. it does not prevent the possibility of something being equally valuable to everyone.

But you can be wrong about pretty much anything . . . even your likes and dislikes. "I like cake" is not automatically true just because it expresses a personal preference of the speaker. But more importantly, values aren't about personal preferences; they aren't about likes and dislikes. Value denotes how useful something is to someone and it's extremely easy to be wrong about that sort of thing.

I can value something based entirely on how much I like it without any consideration of usefulness. All you have to do is evaluate a thing and then you have valued it in whichever terms you did the evaluating. A man can value freedom so much that he dies in order to help others gain theirs.

Values are very often a matter of personal preference, at least this is true of the small number that we have any responsiblity for. When they aren't preferences, they are in general a matter of cultural osmosis. Everybody on this site holds far moire of their values in common with everyone else than they have invented. But that's because we are monkeys that apply heuristics and memesis in so many situations that we don't even notice we are just choosing what is familiar, what has worked in the apst for us, or what our peers are doing when decide what to do next in any given circumstance.

We are almost always on autopilot, using a set of values that were gifted to us so that we can get on with the task at hand, just eating while we walk. Almost everything that we say we dislike is just something that comes as an unwelcome surprise that interrupts our grazing and causes an uncomfortable amount of thinking.

[Immanuel Can]

Currently you are asking for a map to Never Never Land,

Nope. I'm just showing that Peter's view is presuppositional.

[FlashDangerpants]

Currently you are asking for a map to Never Never Land,

Nope. I'm just showing that Peter's view is presuppositional.

That wouldn't matter if the properties in question were real.

[Immanuel Can]

Currently you are asking for a map to Never Never Land,

Nope. I'm just showing that Peter's view is presuppositional.

That wouldn't matter if the properties in question were real.

Sorry...apparently I can't make it simple enough that you can understand it. You'll have to figure it out on your own.

[Skepdick]

Why can't you do that with moral properties? Why do you need to argue ad hominem against Pete before you can point to a moral property to show?

Because you have also a priori rejected (or rather - severely constrained) what amounts to an objective demonstration.

A thought experiment is NOT a demonstration to you.

Telling you to imagine 7-5 is not a demonstration of 2's existence in your head.

[Magnus Anderson]

I can value something based entirely on how much I like it without any consideration of usefulness.

"I like X" means "I perceive X as valuable".

When you like something, your brain is perceiving it as something that is valuable to you.

And "valuable" means the same thing as "useful".

Likes and dislikes are perceptions. And because perceptions can be wrong, likes and dislikes can be wrong just as well.

[Skepdick]

That wouldn't matter if the properties in question were real.

You are just moving the goalposts.

"Realness" or "real" expresses an adjective e.g a property.

Which property or a setof properties ammounts to your "realness" property?

Are you real? Prove it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The only thing that could make morality objective is the existence of moral facts.

Unable to produce one example of a moral fact, moral objectivists are forced to reject the existence of what we call facts - to reject the distinction between what we call facts and what we call opinions.

I have argued your "what is fact" that is independent of the human conditions is grounded on an illusion.
I have challenged you to prove your 'what is fact' is really real, but you have not done so.

Thus your claim;
"The only thing that could make morality objective is the existence of moral facts."
has no credibility because it is grounded on an illusion.

Your 'what is fact' in this case is your personal subjective opinion, belief and judgment.
It is has no objective grounds to deny other claims are not objective, i.e. objective moral facts.

By contrast, VA invokes philosophical antirealism, as though that has any more credibility than the supposed philosophical realism with which he charges those of us who reject moral objectivism. The idea is that, since reality is a human invention, we can invent moral facts - such as that homosexuality is morally wrong.

Strawman, I have not argued specifically "homosexuality is morally wrong".

• Philosophical Realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

The main principle and definition of Philosophical Realism is the above, i.e. things are independent of mind, i.e. the human conditions.
Show me how is your definition of 'what is fact' not in alignment with the above?

If you insist your definition of 'what is fact' is not within the ambit of philosophical realism, then your definition is your own personal subjective opinion, beliefs and judgment.

'Strawman!' - cries VA. 'The moral wrongness of homosexuality is just a matter of opinion - whereas an actual moral fact is the wrongness of humans killing humans.' But VA can't explain the distinction between a moral fact and a mere moral opinion. The invocation of 'evil', 'as defined', fails to clarify the distinction. Why is homosexuality not 'to the net detriment of the individual and society'?

I have explained the moral opinion is a personal judgment or collective judgment which is not a FSK-ed or Hume's sort of matter-of-fact.
I have argued the objective moral fact conditioned upon a human-based moral FSK of the 'ought-not-ness to kill humans' is equivalent to a scientific-fact conditioned upon the human-based science FSK.

see:
Hume's Matters of Fact is Unique
viewtopic.php?t=40916

I stated above;
"Strawman, I have not argued specifically "homosexuality is morally wrong"."

A note for morons: I don't think it is. I'm trying to expose the nasty absurdity of the claim and belief that morality is objective. Objectivist morons, confronted with the fact that people have rationally justifiable but absolutely opposed moral opinions on issues such as abortion, capital punishment and eating animals, have no defence for their position. They just dodge and weave - and invent fatuous arguments.

You are dumb on this.
It is so evident linguistically, any opinions [moral or otherwise] cannot be a matter-of-fact, thus cannot be FSK-ed objective.

Re Morality, we cannot lump up the various moral variables e.g. abortion, capital punishment, homosexually and eating animals, to make a serious conclusion on morality.
Each individual moral element/variable must be considered in relation to morality.
Morality is confined to humans only, thus the 'eating of animals' is not a specific moral element nor issue.

Whatever is claimed by an individual or a loose group of unorganized peoples are subjective opinions and belief. This cannot be objective at all.

Whatever is objective [FSK-ed] is conditioned within a human-based FSR-FSK with is constitution and conditions.
To consider whether a moral claim is objective, we need to review the specific human-based FSR-FSK and the specific moral element/issue. [A]

Take for example Christianity Moral FSK, because it is constituted by the Bible and have billions of members, it qualify to be objective, but its objectivity is very low because it is grounded on an illusory God.
However, the moral element within Christian, e.g. 'Thou Shalt not Kill, Period!' itself whilst intuitive, can be proven to be an objective moral fact.

The same review based on A is applicable to all other moral FSKs.

[Skepdick]

Nobody is wrong when they evaluate anything

And yet you seem to make True/False evaluations. SO weird!

It's not rational for this to work that way round.

Is it true that it's not rational?

If nobody is wrong when they evaluate anything then you are not wrong to evaluatae that it's not rational.
And I am not wrong to evaluate that it's not true that it's not rational.

Cool bananas!