What could make morality objective?

[FlashDangerpants]

What you are describing there is not a property of the vase, it is a system relationship property between valuer and the valued.

It's a property of the vase, by definition. It's merely not a property that describes something that is fully contained within the physical constitution of the vase.

It's similar to how position is the property of every physical object even though it says nothing about the physical constitution of the object it belongs to.

If I look at the vase and it has the properties ["dirty","boring","cheap","£0.45"]
But somebody else looks at the same vase at the same time and sees ["smudged","inspirational","vauable","£700"]
The vase now holds at one and the same time, the mutually exclusive properties of "boring" and "inspirational"?

Talk of an object having it's own properties are nonsense if these properties are dependent upon observers. To say it holds the property of being boring for flash but inspirational for Wendy simply kicks the can down the road. These are private properties that nobody can ever be right or wrong about.

[Harbal]

I do not see a single test that Peter would ever concede to "make morality objective," as this OP requires. If he has one, he could stipulate it; but I'm reasonably confident there's simply not one single thing, not one kind of evidence at all, that Peter would accept as proving that a moral precept was, indeed, objective. And that means that he's fixed the match. He's cooked the books. He's made it impossible for anybody to refute his claim that morality is merely subjective, because there are no terms upon which he would accept another view. His skepticism is non-evidentiary; it's merely presuppositional, and for that reason, unbeatable: no evidence against his disbelief will ever count.

I don't know how Peter Holmes would respond to that, but I would respond by saying that the subjectivity of morality is in its definition, and therefore morality does not fall into the category of things that can be proved to have a truth value. The only way a moral precept could be proved true, is by giving the term, morality, a different definition to the one I accept as the correct definition.

[Skepdick]

I don't know how Peter Holmes would respond to that, but I would respond by saying that the subjectivity of morality is in its definition, and therefore morality does not fall into the category of things that can be proved to have a truth value.

This debate isn't about categories; definitions or semantics.

Re-defining yourself as an airplane and moving yourself from the category of "non-flying" to "flying" doesn't aecually make you fly.

This is the error we keep getting warned about, no?

The description is not the described.
Outside of language reality is not linguistic.

So outside of language what goes on in people's heads is not linguistic.

The only way a moral precept could be proved true, is by giving the term, morality, a different definition to the one I accept as the correct definition.

Just define morality as immorality and it's all solved.

[FlashDangerpants]

You see, if it's something like "unicorns," which both Peter and I presumably agree are fictive, then he or I can stipulate very straightforward criteria for the proof of their existence. For example, if there is a horse, even one, with a horn naturally growing on its forehead, then I, and presumably Peter too, would be prepared to concede that something like a unicorn does indeed exist. (We can leave aside all the magical properties, colours, symbolic baggage, and so forth, for the purposes of present argument.) And if it had more of the expected features of a unicorn, well, then, against our earlier skepticism, we'd both concede that there is such a thing as a unicorn, even though we hadn't believed in such before.

That's a very easy example. However, I do not see a single test that Peter would ever concede to "make morality objective," as this OP requires. If he has one, he could stipulate it; but I'm reasonably confident there's simply not one single thing, not one kind of evidence at all, that Peter would accept as proving that a moral precept was, indeed, objective. And that means that he's fixed the match. He's cooked the books. He's made it impossible for anybody to refute his claim that morality is merely subjective, because there are no terms upon which he would accept another view. His skepticism is non-evidentiary; it's merely presuppositional, and for that reason, unbeatable: no evidence against his disbelief will ever count.

But you just showed how to do it. You identified the properties that make an object a unicorn as the combination of those that make it a horse with those that make the thing on its head a horn. The object either holds the properties of horsey and horney (minus gluey) or else, through observation of the rpoperties of said object you can determine it not to be a member of the set Unicorn.

Now do the same with moral properties. The set of properties which makes a choice, situation, action, outcome or whatever right or wrong are.... what sort of property?

[Skepdick]

Now do the same with moral properties. The set of properties which makes a choice, situation, action, outcome or whatever right or wrong are.... what sort of property?

Yoou don't know the answer to this question ?!? Yet you keep exercising admission control on various parts of speech?!?

What sort of property makes speech false?
What sort of property makes a speech-act a lie?

This is exactly IC's point. You keep playing, a "moral skeptic" with moral standards in your back pocket that everyone can see yet you refuse to admit they are there, and when you get challenged on what would sway you from your position you default back to burden-shifting instead of being intellectually honest.

You could simply say "I am dogmatic. My beliefs are true by definition so no evidence would satisfy me."

And that would be intellectually honest. Instead you keep going for the absolutely immoral option: wasting everyone's time playing a game you've rigged to be unwinnable.

Congratulations. Your philosophical position is "15 year old who trolls the YouTube comment section"

[Immanuel Can]

I would respond by saying that the subjectivity of morality is in its definition,

Except it's not. Historically, people have thought in moral objectivist terms. Subjectivism is a conceit of the modern and postmodern eras, and one that can't be sustained.

The only way a moral precept could be proved true, is by giving the term, morality, a different definition to the one I accept as the correct definition.

Then you've done much the same trick as Peter: you've tried to eliminate morality a priori. He's done it presumptively, and you've tried to do it with an arbitrary personal definition. But in both cases, what you've done is only to eliminate all basis of justification from consideration, then claim the fact that you can't find justification should make us believe in subjectivism.

But I wonder: do you, like him, think we're objectively wrong if we dismiss your strategy?

[Immanuel Can]

You see, if it's something like "unicorns," which both Peter and I presumably agree are fictive, then he or I can stipulate very straightforward criteria for the proof of their existence. For example, if there is a horse, even one, with a horn naturally growing on its forehead, then I, and presumably Peter too, would be prepared to concede that something like a unicorn does indeed exist. (We can leave aside all the magical properties, colours, symbolic baggage, and so forth, for the purposes of present argument.) And if it had more of the expected features of a unicorn, well, then, against our earlier skepticism, we'd both concede that there is such a thing as a unicorn, even though we hadn't believed in such before.

That's a very easy example. However, I do not see a single test that Peter would ever concede to "make morality objective," as this OP requires. If he has one, he could stipulate it; but I'm reasonably confident there's simply not one single thing, not one kind of evidence at all, that Peter would accept as proving that a moral precept was, indeed, objective. And that means that he's fixed the match. He's cooked the books. He's made it impossible for anybody to refute his claim that morality is merely subjective, because there are no terms upon which he would accept another view. His skepticism is non-evidentiary; it's merely presuppositional, and for that reason, unbeatable: no evidence against his disbelief will ever count.

But you just showed how to do it. You identified the properties that make an object a unicorn as the combination of those that make it a horse with those that make the thing on its head a horn. The object either holds the properties of horsey and horney (minus gluey) or else, through observation of the rpoperties of said object you can determine it not to be a member of the set Unicorn.

Now do the same with moral properties.

That's what I'm asking Peter to do. I can't do it for him. I can't tell him what evidence HE would accept.

But if I can specify the evidence for a unicorn, even though I don't believe in unicorns, then why can't he specify the evidence he'd accept for objective morality?

Are you following yet?

[FlashDangerpants]

You see, if it's something like "unicorns," which both Peter and I presumably agree are fictive, then he or I can stipulate very straightforward criteria for the proof of their existence. For example, if there is a horse, even one, with a horn naturally growing on its forehead, then I, and presumably Peter too, would be prepared to concede that something like a unicorn does indeed exist. (We can leave aside all the magical properties, colours, symbolic baggage, and so forth, for the purposes of present argument.) And if it had more of the expected features of a unicorn, well, then, against our earlier skepticism, we'd both concede that there is such a thing as a unicorn, even though we hadn't believed in such before.

That's a very easy example. However, I do not see a single test that Peter would ever concede to "make morality objective," as this OP requires. If he has one, he could stipulate it; but I'm reasonably confident there's simply not one single thing, not one kind of evidence at all, that Peter would accept as proving that a moral precept was, indeed, objective. And that means that he's fixed the match. He's cooked the books. He's made it impossible for anybody to refute his claim that morality is merely subjective, because there are no terms upon which he would accept another view. His skepticism is non-evidentiary; it's merely presuppositional, and for that reason, unbeatable: no evidence against his disbelief will ever count.

But you just showed how to do it. You identified the properties that make an object a unicorn as the combination of those that make it a horse with those that make the thing on its head a horn. The object either holds the properties of horsey and horney (minus gluey) or else, through observation of the rpoperties of said object you can determine it not to be a member of the set Unicorn.

Now do the same with moral properties.

That's what I'm asking Peter to do. I can't do it for him. I can't tell him what evidence HE would accept.

But if I can specify the evidence for a unicorn, even though I don't believe in unicorns, then why can't he specify the evidence he'd accept for objective morality?

Are you following yet?

Wait, you don't have any idea of what a moral property is until Pete tells you what it should look like? That doesn't sound like Pete's problem to me.

[Immanuel Can]

But you just showed how to do it. You identified the properties that make an object a unicorn as the combination of those that make it a horse with those that make the thing on its head a horn. The object either holds the properties of horsey and horney (minus gluey) or else, through observation of the rpoperties of said object you can determine it not to be a member of the set Unicorn.

Now do the same with moral properties.

That's what I'm asking Peter to do. I can't do it for him. I can't tell him what evidence HE would accept.

But if I can specify the evidence for a unicorn, even though I don't believe in unicorns, then why can't he specify the evidence he'd accept for objective morality?

Are you following yet?

Wait, you don't have any idea of what a moral property is until Pete tells you what it should look like?

Of course I can. But you've lost the train of thought, so let me put you back on it.

Here's what I wrote:

But the problem is presuppositional. And it's very, very easy to show that it is. All you have to do is ask yourself the following question:

"If there were justifications for morality being objective, what in what form would a justification that I would believe come?"

So what I'm showing is that Peter's disbelief in objective morality is presuppositional.

[FlashDangerpants]

That's what I'm asking Peter to do. I can't do it for him. I can't tell him what evidence HE would accept.

But if I can specify the evidence for a unicorn, even though I don't believe in unicorns, then why can't he specify the evidence he'd accept for objective morality?

Are you following yet?

Wait, you don't have any idea of what a moral property is until Pete tells you what it should look like?

Of course I can.

So what is it?

[Immanuel Can]

Wait, you don't have any idea of what a moral property is until Pete tells you what it should look like?

Of course I can.

So what is it?

I've already answered that, multiple times. And i'm disinclined to be sidetracked, at the moment.

In any case, whatever you think I can or cannot do manifestly has zippo to do with what Peter can do. So let's hunt this trail before we take on any others.

[FlashDangerpants]

Of course I can.

So what is it?

I've already answered that, multiple times.

Did you say what a moral property is in those answers, or did you just give a reason why you shouldn't have to?

[Immanuel Can]

So what is it?

I've already answered that, multiple times.

Did you say what a moral property is in those answers, or did you just give a reason why you shouldn't have to?

I'm not bothering with your misdirection.

[FlashDangerpants]

I've already answered that, multiple times.

Did you say what a moral property is in those answers, or did you just give a reason why you shouldn't have to?

I'm not bothering with your misdirection.

If the unicorn exists, and you can point to a horse with a horn and show that it is indeed a unicorn, then Pete's refusal to believe in unicorns would be demonstrably mistaken. You don't need to address Pete's lack of unicorn faith before you can show him a unicorn.

Why can't you do that with moral properties? Why do you need to argue ad hominem against Pete before you can point to a moral property to show?

It's not rational for this to work that way round.

[Magnus Anderson]

If I look at the vase and it has the properties ["dirty","boring","cheap","£0.45"]
But somebody else looks at the same vase at the same time and sees ["smudged","inspirational","vauable","£700"]
The vase now holds at one and the same time, the mutually exclusive properties of "boring" and "inspirational"?

What do you mean when you say that the vase is "boring"? Boring to whom? Similarly, what do you mean you say that it is "inspirational"? Inspirational to whom? "Boring" and "inspirational" refer to how someone emotionally reacts to something. They do not merely describe the object itself, they describe a relationship. If you mean that the vase is boring to you but inspirational to that other person, then there is no contradiction here; there's merely an illusion of contradiction. In that case, the vase possesses two different non-mutually-exclusive attributes: boring to you and inspirational to that other person. And both attributes are attributes of the object, by definition. The fact that they do not describe a relationship rather than merely the physical constitution of the object they belong to does not change that fact.