Free will is wholly deterministic

[henry quirk]

Free will means that one can choose to do something not only freely in the face of external forces - the gun, societal rules and the like - but also freely in relation to one's own wants, desires, goals, and so on.

No. Libertarian free will (bein' one) means one's choices are not necessarily rooted in history or circumstance. It does not mean one is free of one's self (and why would one want to be?).

I am always at the center of my choices. Choice is not license, nor rootless.

[Iwannaplato]

Free will means that one can choose to do something not only freely in the face of external forces - the gun, societal rules and the like - but also freely in relation to one's own wants, desires, goals, and so on.

No. Libertarian free will (bein' one) means one's choices are not necessarily rooted in history or circumstance. It does not mean one is free of one's self.

I am always at the center of my choices. Choice is not license, nor rootless.

And causes are causes. So your decisions will come out of your goals, desires, values and affected to some degree by circumstance and what you think the situation is. Given that you have roots, values, temperment, desires, what you choose is caused by what has gone before/what is before in you. That fits within determinism.

A determinist does not believe that we can't do anything about a gun toting thief or about tyranny or about seeing a tsunami on the horizon coming this way. A determinist does not in any way shape or form have to believe in passiveness, or in not fighting for what one wants, or that one must give in to threats and so on.

[Walker]

“No good deed goes unpunished.”

Example: Many folks feel compelled to punish Christians, even though the Christians have done nothing criminal by communicating the goodness of Christianity.

The punishments vary according to the situation. The punishments for Christians range from death to words, and in between … all variations of the same intent … intent being what folks call choice.

That’s why a bolt of lightning and not words is often required to change the view of Christian punishers ... those who must punish Christians.

[henry quirk]

your decisions will come out of your goals, desires, values and affected to some degree by circumstance and what you think the situation is.

You talk of these -- goals, desires, values -- as though they were items I acquire, that are some how apart from me.

I value, I desire, I goal-set. These are things I do.

And, yes, history and circumstance inform my choices, but they do not determine my choices (my choosing).

Given that you have roots, values, temperment, desires, what you choose is caused by what has gone before/what is before in you.

I am not obligated by biology, psychology, or the laws of physics to fear dogs becuz I was bitten by one. The event informed me, it didn't, necessarily, infirm me. I choose where I stand when it comes to dogs. Not the unfortunate event.

A determinist does not have to believe...

A necessitarian, if necessitarianism is true, doesn't actually believe anything anymore than the free will, if neccessitarianism is true, is actually free.

if necessitarianism is true, we're all utterly mired in causal chains. Our thoughts, which seem original to us, couldn't be anything other than what they are. Our choices aren't choices at all. They're events issuing forth from events.

[henry quirk]

Many folks feel compelled to punish Christians...

No. They choose to.

Having an appetite obligates no one to sate it.

[Walker]

Many folks feel compelled to punish Christians...

No. They choose to.

Having an appetite obligates no one to sate it.

Judas had no choice about betraying Christ, and Christ knew it, however Christ's knowing before the action was not required for betrayal.

[henry quirk]

Many folks feel compelled to punish Christians...

No. They choose to.

Having an appetite obligates no one to sate it.

Judas had no choice, and Christ knew it, however Christ's knowing before the action was not required for betrayal.

Well, if the story is true, that was a special case. And if it's not true...

Anyway, I'm not Christian.

[Walker]

Well, if the story is true, that was a special case. And if it's not true...

No. The need to betray is the cause of every betrayal, and the causes of the need to betray vary by individual and circumstance.

[Immanuel Can]

If you were insane, incapable of understanding, or completely unaware of what you were doing, then you don't only not go to jail; you don't even get charged. The insane go to a care facility, the incapable are put under the supervision of parents, and the completely unaware are let walk free.

Those are options for what to do with such folks. Jail is not only way to deal with those who won't or can't toe the line.

We don't do that...and with good reason. It's inhumane and unjust to blame somebody who cannot do otherwise than they (were forced to) do.

[Immanuel Can]

Even in a human court, if a person simply had no other choice than to do what he/she did, there is no criminal possibility involved.

To be responsible for all of one's actions does not require that those actions be criminal.

No, because there are good actions and plausibly neutral ones, as well as evil ones that are not criminal (such as abortion) and criminal ones that may not be evil (such as when a government criminalizes free speech).

But in a just system, the ability of the accused to have chosen to do otherwise is a requirement of culpability.

[Immanuel Can]

However, conscience doesn't "compel." It only pleads.

Conscience compels action for those who do as conscience dictates.

"Compel" is the wrong word. "Motivates"? Perhaps. But what's clear is that people do not have to do what their consciences tell them to do. Their conscience may tell them one thing, and the incentives from external antecedent conditions tell them quite another.

This is obvious. If a man steals and conceals his theft, it's because though his conscience tells him it's wrong, the incentives from the theft are what he considers more important.

[Immanuel Can]

However, conscience doesn't "compel." It only pleads. Our sociological experience of that is that we can choose to listen to conscience or violate it...as often as we wish, in fact. Very few phenomena are so commonly reported as that a human being felt the twinges of conscience about something, and then decided to do it anyway.

So conscience is obviously not Deterministic. If there is any Determinism involved, it would have to come purely from what has been called "antecedent conditions," meaning the physical-material arrangements of brain and body chemistry, not from the pronouncements of some ghostly urging known as "conscience."

So what does lead to the choice to do A and not B, if anything does?

Volition. Will. I can choose to obey my conscience, or I can choose to disobey it.

"Antecedent conditions" set up what choices I have, what range of options are possible to me, and which are not: but it does not do more than that.

For example, if I am tempted to steal, it's only because "antecedent conditions" have set up things so that certain properties are options for me to grab. I can't steal what I can't get to. But I can steal anything that is within grasp, or forbear to steal because my wit or my conscience advises me not to steal. "Antecedent conditions" do not determine which option I will take. That's up to me.

[bahman]

Free will is the ability of an agent to act by endogenous forces that determine that action free from the compulsion of other people.

Are you free to act when a thief puts a gun on your head and asks you to open your safe?

Duh no. Obviously

I think I am.

[Walker]

If you were insane, incapable of understanding, or completely unaware of what you were doing, then you don't only not go to jail; you don't even get charged. The insane go to a care facility, the incapable are put under the supervision of parents, and the completely unaware are let walk free.

Those are options for what to do with such folks. Jail is not only way to deal with those who won't or can't toe the line.

We don't do that...and with good reason. It's inhumane and unjust to blame somebody who cannot do otherwise than they (were forced to) do.

No, it is not inhumane to appropriately assign responsibility to those who perform an action. However, it is inappropriate action towards the actor as a response, that has potential to be inhumane. But, I already told you that. The need to tell you again arises from the intent to clarify the obvious confusion in your response.

[Walker]

However, conscience doesn't "compel." It only pleads.

Conscience compels action for those who do as conscience dictates.

"Compel" is the wrong word. "Motivates"? Perhaps. But what's clear is that people do not have to do what their consciences tell them to do.

Those who do need to do what their consciences tell them are compelled to do so, and not everyone is so compelled, so those who are not don't need to do what their consciences tell them. These people are also responsible for their actions.