Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B306-B315]

[Veritas Aequitas]

I noted many people are very confused with the Kantian terms 'Phenomena' and 'Noumena' which are often interpreted from hearsays and not reading the CPR directly.
Here are the relevant texts from the CPR related to the terms 'Phenomena' and 'Noumena'.

Notes: To facilitate easier understanding,
'Understanding' replaced with “Intellect”
'Categories' replaced with Innate Programs
'Intuition' replaced with Objectifying-Faculty [of sensibility, empirical]
In [..] {..} are mine


......The texts.............
Kant Critique of Pure Reason; Normal Kemp Smith Translation;

THE GROUND OF THE DISTINCTION OF ALL Objects-In-General INTO PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA [CPR B306 - B315]

1. B306 …, if we entitle certain Objects, as Appearances, Sensible entities 2 (Phenomena),
then since we thus distinguish the Mode in which we intuit them from the nature that belongs to them in-themselves,
it is implied in this distinction that we place the latter [in-themselves], considered in their own nature,
although we do not so intuit them, or that we place other Possible Things, which are not Objects of our Senses but are Thought as Objects merely through the Intellect,
in opposition to the former [Phenomena, Sensible entities],
and that in so doing we entitle them Intelligible Entities 1 (Noumena).

2. The question then arises, whether our Pure Concepts of Intellect have meaning in respect of these latter [Noumena], and so can be a way of knowing them.2

3. At the very outset, however, we come upon an ambiguity which may occasion serious misapprehension.
4. The Intellect, when it entitles an Object in a {certain} Relation mere Phenomenon,
at the same time forms, apart from that Relation, a Representation of an Object-in-itself; and so comes to represent itself as also being able to form Concepts of such Objects. B307

5. And since the Intellect yields no Concepts additional to the Innate-Programs,
it {Intellect} also supposes that the Object-in-itself must at least be Thought through these Pure Concepts [Innate-Programs],
and so is misled into treating the entirely indeterminate Concept of an Intelligible entity, namely, of a something-in-General outside our Sensibility,
as being a Determinate Concept of an entity that allows of being known in a certain [purely Intelligible] manner by means of the Intellect.

6. If by 'Noumenon' we mean a Thing so far as it is not an Object of our Sensible Objectifying-Faculty, and so abstract from our Mode of Sensing it, {then} this is a Noumenon in the negative sense of the term.

7. But if we understand by it [the thing] an Object of a non-Sensible Objectifying-Faculty,
we thereby presuppose a special Mode of Objectifying-Faculty, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the Possibility. This would be 'Noumenon' in the positive sense of the term.

8. The Doctrine of Sensibility is likewise the Doctrine of the Noumenon in the negative sense, that is, of Things which the Intellect must think without this reference to our Mode of Objectifying-Faculty, therefore not merely as Appearances but as Things-in-Themselves. B308

9. At the same time the Intellect is well aware that in viewing Things in this manner {as things-in-themselves}, as thus apart from our Mode of Objectifying-Faculty, it cannot make any use of the Innate-Programs.
10. For the Innate-Programs have meaning only in Relation to the Unity of Objectifying-Faculty in Space and Time; and even this Unity they can determine, by means of general a priori connecting Concepts, only because of the mere Ideality of Space and Time.
11. In cases where this Unity of Time is not to be found, and therefore in the case of the Noumenon,
all employment, and indeed the whole meaning of the Innate-Programs, entirely vanishes;
for we have then no means of determining whether Things in harmony with the Innate-Programs are even Possible.
12. On this point I need only refer the reader to what I have said in the opening sentences of the General Note appended to the preceding chapter. 1 [above, p. 252.]

13. The Possibility of a Thing can never be proved merely from the fact that its Concept is not Self-contradictory, but only through its being supported by some corresponding Objectifying-Faculty.
14. If, therefore, we should attempt to apply the Innate-Programs to Objects which are not viewed as being Appearances,
we should have to Postulate an Objectifying-Faculty other than the Sensible,
and the Object would thus be a Noumenon in the positive sense. [as an Object of a non-Sensible Objectifying-Faculty]

15. Since, however, such a type of Objectifying-Faculty, Intellectual Objectifying-Faculty, forms no part whatsoever of our Faculty of Knowledge, it follows that the employment of the Innate-Programs can never extend further than to the Objects of Experience. B309

16. Doubtless, indeed, there are Intelligible entities corresponding to the Sensible entities;
there may also be Intelligible entities to which our Sensible Faculty of Objectifying-Faculty has no Relation whatsoever;
but our Concepts of Intellect, being mere Forms of Thought for our Sensible Objectifying-Faculty, could not in the least apply to them {intelligible entities}.
17. That, therefore, which we entitle 'Noumenon' must be understood as being [re intelligible entities] such only in a negative sense.

18. If I remove from Empirical Knowledge ALL Thought (through Innate-Programs), no Knowledge of any Object remains.
19. For through mere Objectifying-Faculty {only} nothing at all is Thought, and the fact that this affection of Sensibility is in me does not [by itself] amount to a Relation of such Representation to any Object. A254
20. But if, on the other hand, I leave aside all Objectifying-Faculty, the Form of Thought still remains that is, the Mode of determining an Object for the Manifold of a Possible Objectifying-Faculty.

continue pt 21-40 ...

[Veritas Aequitas]

21. The Innate-Programs accordingly extend further than Sensible Objectifying-Faculty,
since they think Objects-in-General, without regard to the special Mode (the Sensibility 1) in which they [Innate-Programs] may be Given.
22. But they [Innate-Programs] do not thereby determine a greater sphere of Objects.
23. For we cannot assume that such Objects can be Given, without presupposing the possibility of another kind of Objectifying-Faculty than the Sensible; and we are by no means justified in so doing. B310

24. If the Objective Reality of a Concept cannot be in any way known,
while yet the Concept contains no Contradiction
and also at the same time is connected with other Modes of Knowledge that involve Given Concepts which it [Concept] serves to Limit,
I entitle that Concept, Problematic.

25. The Concept of a Noumenon that is, of a Thing which is not to be Thought as Object of the Senses but as a Thing-in-Itself, solely through a Pure Intellect is not in any way contradictory.
26. For we cannot assert of Sensibility that it [Sensibility] is the sole possible kind of Objectifying-Faculty.

27. Further, the Concept of a Noumenon is necessary, to prevent Sensible Objectifying-Faculty from being extended to Things-in-Themselves, and thus to Limit the Objective Validity of Sensible Knowledge. A255

28. The remaining Things, 1 to which it {Sensible Objectifying-Faculty} does not apply, are entitled Noumena, in order to show that this Knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything which the Intellect thinks.

29. But none the less we are unable to comprehend how such Noumena can be Possible, and the domain that lies out beyond the sphere of Appearances is for us Empty.

30. That is to say, we have an Intellect which problematically extends further,
but we have no Objectifying-Faculty,
indeed not even the Concept of a Possible Objectifying-Faculty,
through which Objects outside the field of Sensibility can be Given, and
through which the Intellect can be employed assertorically {something is the case, factually} beyond that field. B311

31. The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.

32. At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility.

33. The division of Objects into Phenomena and Noumena,
and the World into a World of the Senses and a World of the Intellect, is therefore quite inadmissible in the Positive sense, 2
although the distinction of Concepts as Sensible and Intellectual is certainly legitimate.
34. For no Object can be determined for the latter {intellectual} Concepts, and consequently they cannot be asserted to be Objectively Valid. A256

35. If we abandon the Senses,
how shall we make it conceivable that our Innate-Programs, which would be the sole remaining Concepts for Noumena,
should still continue to signify Something,
since for their Relation to any Object
more must be Given than merely the Unity of Thought -- namely, in addition, a Possible Objectifying-Faculty, to which they may be applied.

36. None the less, if the Concept of a Noumenon be taken in a merely Problematic sense, it is not only admissible, but as setting Limits to Sensibility is likewise indispensable.
37. But in that [problematic sense] case a Noumenon is not for our Intellect a special [kind of] Object,
namely, an Intelligible Object;
the [sort of] Intellect to which it might belong, is itself a problem.

38. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the Possibility of an Intellect which should know its Object, not Discursively through Innate-Programs, but intuitively in a non-Sensible Objectifying-Faculty. B312

39. What our Intellect acquires through this Concept of a Noumenon, is a negative extension;
that is to say, Intellect is not limited through Sensibility;
on the contrary, it {Intellect} itself Limits Sensibility by applying the term Noumena to Things-in-Themselves (Things not regarded as Appearances).

40. But in so doing it [Intellect] at the same time sets Limits to itself, recognising that it cannot know these Noumena through any of the Innate-Programs, and that it must therefore think {of} them only under the title of an Unknown Something.

cont- 41-60

[Veritas Aequitas]

41. In the writings of modern philosophers I find the expressions mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis * used with a meaning altogether different from that of the ancients -- a meaning which is easily understood, but which results merely in an empty play upon words. A257
42. According to this [modern] usage, some have thought good to entitle the Sum Of Appearances, in so far as they are intuited, the World of the Senses, and
in so far as their Connection is thought in conformity with Laws of Intellect, the World of the Intellect. B313

43. Observational 1 astronomy, which teaches merely the observation of the starry heavens, would give an account of the former [the World of the Senses];
theoretical astronomy, on the other hand, as taught according to the Copernican System, or according to Newton's Laws of gravitation, would give an account of the second [the World of the Intellect], namely, of an Intelligible World.
44. But such a twisting of words is a merely sophistical subterfuge; it seeks to avoid a troublesome question by changing its meaning to suit our own convenience.

45. Intellect and Reason are, indeed, employed in dealing with Appearances;
but the question to be answered is whether they have also yet another employment,
when the Object is not a Phenomenon (that is, is a Noumenon);
and it is in this latter sense {as Noumena} that the Object is taken,
when it is thought as merely Intelligible, that is to say, as being Given to the Intellect alone, and not to the Senses.

46. The question, therefore, is whether in addition to the Empirical employment of the Intellect to its {the Object’s} employment even in the Newtonian account of the structure of the universe - there is likewise possible {for} a Transcendental employment, which has to do with the Noumenon as an Object. This question we have answered in the negative.

A258 B314
47. When, therefore, we say that
the Senses represent Objects as they appear, and
the Intellect Objects as they are,
the latter statement [‘as they are’] is to be taken, not in the Transcendental, but in the merely Empirical meaning of the terms,
namely as meaning that the Objects must be represented as Objects of Experience,
that is, as Appearances in Thoroughgoing inter-Connection with one another,
and not as they may be apart from their Relation to Possible Experience (and consequently to any Senses), as Objects of the Pure Intellect.

48. Such Objects of Pure Intellect will always remain Unknown to us; we can never even know whether such a Transcendental or exceptional l Knowledge is Possible under any Conditions -- at least not if it is to be the same kind of Knowledge as that which stands under our ordinary Innate-Programs.

49. Intellect and Sensibility, with us, can determine Objects only when they are employed in conjunction.
50. When we separate them, we have Objectifying-Faculties without Concepts, or Concepts without Objectifying-Faculties -- in both cases, Representations which we are not in a position to apply to any Determinate Object.

51. If, after all these explanations, any one still hesitates to abandon the merely Transcendental employment of the Innate-Programs, let him attempt to obtain from them a Synthetic Proposition.

A259
52. An Analytic Proposition carries the Intellect no further;
for since it is concerned only with what is already Thought in the Concept,
it leaves undecided whether this Concept has in-itself any Relation to Objects, or merely signifies the Unity of Thought-in-General -- complete abstraction being made from the Mode in which an Object may be Given.
53. The Intellect [in its Analytic employment] is concerned only to know what lies in the Concept; it is indifferent as to the Object to which the Concept may apply.


54. The attempt must therefore be made with a Synthetic and professedly transcendental Principle, as, for instance,
'Everything that exists, exists as Substance, or as a Determination inherent in it', or
'Everything contingent exists as an Effect of some other Thing, namely, of its Cause'.

55. Now whence, I ask, can the Intellect obtain these Synthetic Propositions, when the Concepts are to be applied, not in their Relation to Possible Experience, but to Things-in-Themselves (Noumena)?

56. Where is here that third something, which is always required for a Synthetic Proposition, in order that, by its {third something} mediation, the Concepts which have no Logical (Analytic) Affinity may be brought into Connection with one another?

57. The [synthetic] Proposition can never be established, nay, more, even the possibility of any such Pure assertion cannot be shown, without appealing to the Empirical employment of the Intellect, and thereby departing completely from the Pure and non-Sensible Judgment.
58. Thus the Concept of Pure and merely Intelligible Objects is completely lacking in all Principles that might make possible its application.
59. For we cannot think of any way in which such Intelligible Objects might be Given.

60. The Problematic Thought {re noumena as intelligible Object} which leaves open a place for them {Intelligible Objects} serves only, like an empty Space, for the Limitation of Empirical Principles,
without itself containing or revealing any other Object of Knowledge beyond the sphere of those {Empirical} Principles. A260

[Veritas Aequitas]

To get a greater understanding of the difference between Phenomena vs Noumena, we can refer to the Triune Brain as a very basic model.

• The triune brain consists of
  1. the reptilian complex (basal ganglia),
  2. the paleomammalian complex (limbic system), and
  3. the neomammalian complex (neocortex),
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triune_brain#

In our case, we will not take the above as independent sections but there are some overlapping.



Similarly, Kant's CPR can also be divided along the same lines as the Triune Brain, i.e.

1. Sensibility - Pure Sensibility [Space and Time] reptilian and limbic; Phenomena
2. Intellect - Pure Intellect lower neocortex - intellect;
3. Reason - Pure Reason [limbic-intellect]; Rational Reason prefrontal cortex.

Pure in this case is 'Primal' while Refined and Rational are more evolved.

The Phenomena and noumena are confined to the following;

1. Phenomena - Reptilian & limbic -sensibility + innate elements + intellect = object of experience.

2. Noumena - only the Intellect, Pure Reason - the intelligible object.

What is the real thing is Phenomena [object of experience] which is a culmination of the processes within the reptilian and limbic system + sensibility + innate elements + intellect + consciousness [I-Think] [grounded on 13 billion years old Big Bang and 200K of human evolution].

What is noumenal is merely an intelligible object of thought, i.e. an empty shell which is used to limit the phenomenal in the negative sense.

The noumenal can be viewed in the positive sense, but only as an empty shell or an intelligible object of thought.

[Harbal]

I wonder what Peter Holmes will make of this, assuming he is foolish enough to read it.

[Impenitent]

the noumenal is more than naked turtles and homeless clams (other crustaceans aside)...

-Imp

[Veritas Aequitas]

I understand what Kant was doing much better than you do. Answer my questions.
If there are no noumena, then of what are phenomena phenomena?
If one pole of a dichotomy doesn't exist, why is it still a dichotomy?
Or keep dodging these questions by telling me to read Kant.

If you understand Kant more than I do, why don’t you refer to the texts from Kant [conveniently numbered and posted for you] to support your point.

Don’t make yourself an intellectual fool, read the thread I posted.
Generally,

Phenomena are objects of experience, conditioned by the senses plus space and time.

Noumena are Intelligible Entities, objects of thoughts, conditioned only by pure intellect and pure reason; they are not conditioned by the senses.

• 1. B306 …, if we entitle certain Objects, as Appearances, Sensible entities (Phenomena),
  then since we thus distinguish the Mode in which we intuit them from the nature that belongs to them in-themselves,
  it is implied in this distinction that we place the latter [in-themselves], considered in their own nature,
  although we do not so intuit them, or that we place other Possible Things, which are not Objects of our Senses but are Thought as Objects merely through the Intellect,
  in opposition to the former [Phenomena, Sensible entities],
  and that in so doing we entitle them Intelligible Entities (Noumena).
  viewtopic.php?f=5&t=39987

Kant explained why for noumena when relative to phenomena, the noumena can only be used in the negative [empty thought] sense as limiting the sense faculty.

• 16. Doubtless, indeed, there are Intelligible entities [noumena] corresponding to the Sensible entities [phenomena];
  there may also be Intelligible entities to which our Sensible Faculty of Objectifying-Faculty has no Relation whatsoever;
  but our Concepts of Intellect, being mere Forms of Thought for our Sensible Objectifying-Faculty, could not in the least apply to them {intelligible entities}.
  
  17. That, therefore, which we entitle 'Noumenon' must be understood as being [re intelligible entities] such only in a negative sense.

From the way you post of Kant’s idea, I am very certain you have not understood [not necessary agree with] Kant’s CPR fully.
Read all that I had posted to get an idea of how phenomena is distinct from noumena and how they are related.

To understand the distinction more properly you will have to read the whole of Kant’s CPR fully and thoroughly.

[Averroes]

the noumenal is more than naked turtles and homeless clams (other crustaceans aside)...

-Imp

I too believe that the noumena is more than empty concepts and so did Kant. From reading Kant, it is clear that he was a firm believer in Christianity and who also denied the Trinity and labeled the latter as "useless"[his words]. May I please ask you what you think about the noumena? You may or may not quote scriptures if you want. There are beautiful passages of the CPR that you will never find quoted on a philosophy forum!! Well, that's about to change, if God wills.

[Impenitent]

the noumenal is more than naked turtles and homeless clams (other crustaceans aside)...

-Imp

I too believe that the noumena is more than empty concepts and so did Kant. From reading Kant, it is clear that he was a firm believer in Christianity and who also denied the Trinity and labeled the latter as "useless"[his words]. May I please ask you what you think about the noumena? You may or may not quote scriptures if you want. There are beautiful passages of the CPR that you will never find quoted on a philosophy forum!! Well, that's about to change, if God wills.

that's just it... that to which we have access are sensory impressions (the phenomena) ... is there something beyond the impressions? it isn't sensed ...

I am of the opinion that when something isn't in my direct perception, it doesn't exist as an appearance... does anything exist beyond appearances? one would like to believe so... but belief isn't certainty...

-Imp

[Averroes]

that's just it... that to which we have access are sensory impressions (the phenomena) ... is there something beyond the impressions? it isn't sensed ...

That would imply that the noumena are "homeless clams" then, doesn't it?

I am of the opinion that when something isn't in my direct perception, it doesn't exist as an appearance... does anything exist beyond appearances? one would like to believe so... but belief isn't certainty...

-Imp

Well, the Second World War was not and could not have been in my direct perception as I was born after, so that would imply that it should not exist as an appearance for me! I could be prosecuted for even thinking that in many European countries such as Germany and France! Should I thus not be certain of WW2?

[Skepdick]

Well, the Second World War was not and could not have been in my direct perception as I was born after, so that would imply that it should not exist as an appearance for me! I could be prosecuted for even thinking that in many European countries such as Germany and France! Should I thus not be certain of WW2?

It just means that you should shut up about your uncertainty.

Alternatively, you could lie about your certainty that it happened.

[Averroes]

Well, the Second World War was not and could not have been in my direct perception as I was born after, so that would imply that it should not exist as an appearance for me! I could be prosecuted for even thinking that in many European countries such as Germany and France! Should I thus not be certain of WW2?

It just means that you should shut up about your uncertainty.

That's funny. But it's the sad truth in many European countries. One cannot question the official version of the events like WW2 without fear of prosecution. Even for academic historians.

[Impenitent]

that's just it... that to which we have access are sensory impressions (the phenomena) ... is there something beyond the impressions? it isn't sensed ...

That would imply that the noumena are "homeless clams" then, doesn't it?

"homeless clams" in a sense... more like the existence of my house when I am at work (as I don't work from home)...

I am of the opinion that when something isn't in my direct perception, it doesn't exist as an appearance... does anything exist beyond appearances? one would like to believe so... but belief isn't certainty...

-Imp

Well, the Second World War was not and could not have been in my direct perception as I was born after, so that would imply that it should not exist as an appearance for me! I could be prosecuted for even thinking that in many European countries such as Germany and France! Should I thus not be certain of WW2?

you can be somewhat certain of the stories and accounts of those that were there... if thousands of people witnessed and tell the same story, as confirmed by their contemporary accounts, photos and films, you may find it more believable- not necessarily as believable as currently sensed event- but you may place some faith in it... other stories, maybe not so much...

the stories of 4 people (who spoke in a dead language) which were translated into a dead language from another archaic language, retranslated and retranslated into something that is accepted as gospel...

certainty may not be where one finds it

-Imp

[Veritas Aequitas]

the noumenal is more than naked turtles and homeless clams (other crustaceans aside)...

-Imp

I too believe that the noumena is more than empty concepts and so did Kant. From reading Kant, it is clear that he was a firm believer in Christianity and who also denied the Trinity and labeled the latter as "useless"[his words].
May I please ask you what you think about the noumena?
You may or may not quote scriptures if you want. There are beautiful passages of the CPR that you will never find quoted on a philosophy forum!! Well, that's about to change, if God wills.

Averroes, Happy Eid wishes to you.

Kant came from the Pietist tradition [a sort of fringe Christianity] which Kant subsequently abandoned and turned against religion, especially Christianity.

Kant has long been seen as hostile to religion.
Many of his contemporaries, ranging from his students to the Prussian authorities, saw his Critical project as inimical to traditional Christianity.
The impression of Kant as a fundamentally secular philosopher became even more deeply entrenched through the twentieth century, though this is belied by a closer inspection of his writings both before and after the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), i.e., what are commonly referred to as his “pre-Critical” and “Critical” periods.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/

Kant's views of the 'noumena' are expressed in 'his words' [CPR B306- B316 translated above] in the OP pages and supported by his whole of the CPR.

To Kant [see OP texts] the idea of the noumenon is an empty concept [mere thought] without any essence or substance.
While Phenomena are within space and time as objects of experience [verifiable and justifiable as real],
noumena, on the other hand, are not conditioned by space and time, thus are merely intelligible objects of thoughts and logic.
Ultimately within the CPR, Kant demonstrated that 'noumena' are merely illusions but nevertheless useful illusions.

• 16. Doubtless, indeed, there are Intelligible entities [noumena] corresponding to the Sensible entities [phenomena];
  there may also be Intelligible entities to which our Sensible Faculty of Objectifying-Faculty has no Relation whatsoever;
  but our Concepts of Intellect, being mere Forms of Thought for our Sensible Objectifying-Faculty, could not in the least apply to them {intelligible entities}.
  
  17. That, therefore, which we entitle 'Noumenon' must be understood as being [re intelligible entities] such only in a negative sense.

If the noumena is to be referred in the 'positive sense', then we have to assume it is from an intellectual mode of objectification, which is an impossibility.

• 7. But if we understand by it [the thing] an Object of a non-Sensible Objectifying-Faculty,
  we thereby presuppose a special Mode of Objectifying-Faculty,
  namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the Possibility.
  This would be 'Noumenon' in the positive sense of the term.

In this case, the noumena in the positive sense is an illusion [impossible to be real] but it is nevertheless a useful illusion. This useful illusion is also finally attribute to GOD which is useful for salvation and for Kant, an illusory ground for morality.

If you think otherwise, show me the references from Kant in its full contexts within the CPR?

Btw, do you have any comments on my mentioned thesis in this post?
viewtopic.php?p=636979#p636979

[Averroes]

you can be somewhat certain of the stories and accounts of those that were there... if thousands of people witnessed and tell the same story, as confirmed by their contemporary accounts, photos and films, you may find it more believable- not necessarily as believable as currently sensed event- but you may place some faith in it... other stories, maybe not so much...

Please, correct me if I am getting you wrong. Are you saying that we cannot be as certain of the official version of the events of WW2 as one would be of direct perception; and that doubts about the official version will not be unreasonable to you for someone who did not witness those events directly?