Draft I Part XIV

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Eodnhoj7
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Draft I Part XIV

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Substance can be defined as ‘that which underlies form’ or ‘that which underlies appearance’ according to the respective definitions of Aristotle or Spinoza. To give a broader definition, for this argument, it will be defined as ‘that which underlies phenomenon’. An example of this, which can be applied to any of the above definitions, is clay. Clay is the substance which underlies a statue. It also is the substance which underlies a vase. No matter which form or appearance the clay takes the substance stays the same thus it is ‘that which stays the same no matter what changes occur’. Substance is assumed as axiomatic and from this an absence of questioning occurs and this leads to faulty reasoning considering substance is not fully justified as phenomenon. In many respects it is an interpretation of the origin of things and if it is to have any weight, as a interpretation, paradoxically the interpretation must have substance underneath it as well thus resulting in a revolving circle; substance defines substance.

Substance can be questioned, however, and these questions lead to contradictions. Considering it underlies phenomena, and phenomena differ through contrast, a contradiction results. The nature of substance contradicts itself, through this aforementioned the contrast of phenomena, as the phenomena which contrast are composed of the same substance. In these respects, through the act of contrast or where one phenomenon stands apart from another, substance is divided against itself and any form of substance monism which is argued in turn results in substance multiplicity. An example of this is the phenomena of air and water both being composed of substance and yet these phenomenon are fundamentally different. The one substance is divided against itself. This is a contradiction and the contradiction furthers in the respect that a multiplicity of substances necessitates an underlying substance within these substances considering the multiplicity of substances shares the same nature of ‘being’ or ‘substance’; ‘being’ as axiomatic, if it can be said as such, is ‘being’ as ‘substance’ considering both share an axiomatic state in the respect they underlie all phenomena.

To view the above argument from a set of different terms it may be said that:

1. Substance monism, i.e. one substance underlying everything, is a contradiction in the respect that the multiplicity of contrasting phenomenon which stand apart from each other necessitates the underlying substance of these phenomenon being divided as these phenomenon are divided. This results in ‘substance multiplicity’ as the one substance is divided through time and space and is no longer one substance because of said time and space.

2. Substance multiplicity, i.e. multiple substances underlying everything, is a contradiction in the respect that these multiple substances all share within it the quality of ‘substance’, or ‘being’ for that matter. This shared quality results in a ‘substance monism’ as the many substances are united because of time and space, a shared quality, and are no longer many substances as time and space both share the same substance considering both are inseparable as they are two ways of looking at the same thing.

‘Everything’ is fundamentally substance considering substance underlies all phenomena, yet this is a contradiction as this act of ‘underlying’ results in two distinctions that while seemingly connected are fundamentally different, due to this aforementioned act of distinguishing them. These two distinctions are the ‘substance’ and ‘that which the substance underlies’. Phenomena, or form and appearance for that matter, are composed of substance and yet are the very same limits which put an end to said substance considering the substance does not go any further than the phenomenon through which it composes. In other terms it may be said that phenomena are the limits of substance and the beginning of substance, i.e. the form, is where substance ends. Where there are limits there is ‘substance’ and when the limits stop so do the substance yet the limits are the substance; it begins and ends with itself thus containing its own contradiction.

This contradicts the distinction of ‘substance’ and ‘that which the substance underlies’ as both are the same thing as fundamentally connected and yet the distinctions remain considering the ‘substance’ and ‘that which the substance underlies’ necessitates the ‘substance’ as a substance and ‘’that’ which the substances underlies’ as another substance as well. The ‘substance’ and the ‘that’ are both distinct substances thus resulting in a multiplicity of substance. However this contradiction continues as the multiplicity of substances result in an infinite regress of one substance resulting in another then the other substance resulting in the previous substance. This is considering the ‘that which the substance underlies’, or just the ‘that’, can be seen in reverse as a substance which underlies the substance which underlies it. This is in the respect of the ‘that’ which defines the substance underneath it. The phenomenon is the substance of substance. In other terms you have the ‘substance’ and you have the ‘phenomena’ and both are substances as the substance is a substance and the limits of the substance are a substance. One substance, i.e. the ‘substance’, alternates which another substance, i.e. the ‘phenomenon’, and a regressive spiral results. This spiral is a contradiction in the respect that it leaves us with an indefinite answer as to not only what substance really is but also what a ‘phenomenon’, or form/appearance, is as well.

Substance as underlying everything must be absent of itself, through the limits applied to it, under the phenomenon which it forms. In other terms the limits of the substance are the end of substance thus substance contains within it its own absence as the substance is the limit and the limit is where a thing no longer is. This is contradictory and can be seen in the following paradox which mirrors this conundrum: “If 'everything' does not contain the phenomenon of 'absence' then it is not 'everything'. However if 'everything' does contain within it the phenomenon of 'absence' then it has an 'absence' and is not 'everything'. 'Everything' is a contradiction.” To elaborate on how this contradiction applies it may be said that ‘substance is everything’. However as ‘everything’ there must be a substance which underlies the absence of substance as this ‘absence’ is a phenomenon and all phenomena are composed of substance. In turn if substance does contain within it the phenomenon of ‘absence of substance’ then it is no longer ‘substance’.

Dually it may be stated that if substance is everything then it effectively it is nothing as everything, as a phenomenon, stands alone and is without comparison. This absence of comparison is an absence of form as form requires comparison considering forms are relative. In these respects the universality of substance makes it effectively formless which contradicts the prior points argued that substance is inseparable from form. Effectively it is no-thing under these terms and any discussion of it is mute. From this it may be implied that the root of ‘being’ in ‘substance’ is ‘being’ rooted in void. A contradiction ensues as the formlessness of substance is an absence of substance thus substance is absent of itself. All of the above arguments contradict each other yet are valid in form and function while being necessary for definition in a different respect.

In conclusion we cannot state what substance really is or is not. This is considering all arguments and definitions of it result in contradiction. It is an indefinite subject of discussion which leaves the observer with a sense of mystery and ambiguity rather than an answer.
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