Draft I Part X

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Eodnhoj7
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Joined: Mon Mar 13, 2017 3:18 am

Draft I Part X

Post by Eodnhoj7 »

To speak of form is to speak of limits as limits are what define form. To say ‘x’ has form is to state ‘x’ has certain limits that define it by what it is and what it is not. A dog, for instance, has the limits of a body composed of a head, torso and limbs. These limits define it for what it is. On the other hand a tree has the limits of leaves, branches and a trunk. These limits also define it for what it is. These very same limits which define the dog and tree also define it for what it is not. In the limits of the dog not being the same limits as the tree the dog is defined by not having the same limits of a tree and respectively the tree is defined by not having the same limits of a dog. Under these terms the nature of form, through the synonymous term “limit”, is twofold observation of contrasting opposites (i.e. a contradiction): it defines a phenomenon for what it is and defines a phenomenon for what it is not.

Regardless of this contradictory dualism within the nature of form the question arises as to the underlying essence of form given there is a multiplicity of forms. We see this in the form of a house or a river or a cat. This multiplicity points to form as having a contradictory state given its many differing expressions. To delve deeper in the rabbit hole, “form as limit” is a form as it is a ‘limit within vocabulary’ therefore is subject to very same quality of multiplicity in nature as observed in other forms. In other terms, it is subject to further definitions thus can be viewed as a very simplistic interpretation and leads to further questions when analyzed further. These questions arise when looking into the synonymous nature of limit. If ‘limit’ is taken axiomatically we can see it in any defined phenomenon taken strictly ‘as is’. The limits of the orange are the orange, the limits of a man are a man and the limits of the number 1 are the number 1. Limit is inseparable from any defined phenomenon we observe through the senses either empirically or abstractly. This is assumed we take it axiomatically however.

It is this axiomatic nature of limit which becomes a problem. It is this very nature of limit which becomes paradoxical when applied to itself given anything taken strictly ‘as is’ leaves a certain degree of self-referentiality given ‘as is-ness’ necessitates us taking the phenomenon strictly for what it is without any real comparison. The form under these terms exists through itself as the form occurs through form. “Form through form” on one hand leaves us empty of any real meaning as to what form is given there is no contrast to make it stand apart as a defined phenomenon. On the other hand it is in these respects that this empty self-referentiality of form points us to a necessary quality within form, that of contrast, if form would be defined in any attempt.

Contrast is comparison and comparison results in a phenomenon of certain qualities standing apart from another phenomenon of other qualities. This “standing apart” occurs where the qualities of one phenomenon are not found in another, therefore emerge from it, thus causing the aforementioned “standing apart”. In other terms this “standing apart” through contrast is the emergence of one phenomenon from the respective void, of those very same qualities within the first phenomenon, found in another. In these respects form, and its synonymous ‘limit’, can be observed as strictly an emergence from void. Form/limit is emergence through contrast and as such necessitates the nature of form/limit as contrast thus a dualism.

This leads us to several problems. The first of which is defining form through contrast necessitates all form as dependent upon its opposite of ‘no-form’ or other terms ‘void’. In defining form for ‘what it is’ we are required to see it for ‘what it is not’ thus causing a problem of equivocation being ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’. This is a contradiction in terms as any further analysis leads to a non-sensical conclusion.

The second problem is in understanding ‘what is not’ or rather ‘void’. Given void cannot be defined, other wise it would be a phenomenon and not a void, the nature of form in contrast to void necessitates a dualism between that which has limit and that which has no limit. In other terms there is ‘that which is defined’ and ‘that which is not defined’ and ‘that which is defined’ is defined by ‘that which is not defined’ thus leaving ‘that which is defined’ as undefined given ‘that which is defined’ is ‘that which is not defined’. In these respects form occurs through void and becomes a respective void because of it, and we are left with the same equivocation of the first problem. However with the first equivocation problem the equivocation occurs by a ‘connection through contrast’ while with the second equivocation problem the equivocation occurs by a ‘definition through the opposite’. Because of this the first and second problem are fundamentally the same thing expressed in two different ways but this is of no problem given the multiplicitous nature of forms and arguments, in themselves, being intellectual forms.

The third problem, or technically second, is a reversal of the first/second problem stated above. In understanding ‘what is’, or rather ‘form’, we are required to see the negation of the contrasting opposite, i.e. void, rather than a dependency or relationship. Form is a voiding of void, it is the absence of absence or rather a double negation. This double negation is self-contradiction but this furthers the quality of contradiction in the argument as there is no ‘selfness’ in void from which to negate as void cannot self-contradict as void is not a thing. If void were a thing then void would not be. Thus to speak of the ‘voiding of void’ is not only a reliance on a contradiction for definition but it is a contradiction that cannot be and yet is necessary in defining form; form is dependent on contradiction at several levels. Now as to ignoring this multidimensional contradiction: from another angle this necessitates form as being a relative void or relative absence, relative in the respect that it is a void of void, thus a void, or rather an absence of absence, thus an absence. This leads us again to another problem of equivocation and the question of “form?” becomes non-sensical.

Regardless of the previous contradictions stated above there is a further one. If form is to be it must be continuous as any absence of continuity would be an absence of form. If form is to be absolute it must be infinite yet in being infinite it becomes indefinite in the respect that no beginning and no end is an absence of limit. Infinite form is a contradiction. Under these standards form cannot be absolute and only relative. As relative form is dependent upon its relationships to other forms thus making the quality of form universalized under the meta-form of the ‘loop’. This is given considering form exists through form in one respect, thus a loop occurs, while in another respect certain forms constantly repeat (as evidenced by a rain drop or leaf), thus another loop occurs. This relative nature of form being universally expressed through the loop is contradictory given the loop is an absolute with no beginning or end and yet the loop is the universal expression of the relative. Through analysis of form the relative becomes absolute and the absolute becomes relative, this is non-sense.

In conclusion, the discussion of form is grounded in contradiction upon further analysis. In one respect form is equivocable to its opposite of void while in another respect it results in the equivocation of the absolute and the relative. On these terms form is to be accepted for its ‘as-isness’ and not analyzed as analysis leads to absurdity.
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