moral relativism

[Immanuel Can]

The following was posted elsewhere:

Before we're very old, we start noticing that life isn't very fair. Someone else gets a bigger slice of chocolate cake. The teacher's pet gets picked for the team. We get blamed when it was someone else's fault. When things aren't fair, we get angry. We want some kind of balancing of the scales. I must be treated as I deserve. Some treatment is right, and some treatment is wrong.

This doesn't change as we get older. Just push in line in front of people who've been standing for hours, and see the universal sense of outrage and injustice come out. Everyone expects you to obey a certain rule of fairness, and won't tolerate your breaking of it. But why is this? Why do we not only want fair treatment, but expect it of others? We act as if there is a standard outside of ourselves, which everyone ought to know, and everyone ought to obey. This is a flat contradiction of the idea that morals are person-relative and that some things are "right for some people, and not for others" or that every person must "try to do his best in his or her heart, and not hurt other people". This is simply not how people act in the real world.

In reality, everyone believes in right and wrong. Even those who say they don't. Just confront a live-and-let-live moral relativist with a flaming Fundamentalist Preacher telling him what to do, and you will quickly see that our theoretical relativist believes the Fundamentalists are wrong, intolerant, bigots. He disputes their belief system. He thinks they're wrong. He is angry that they seem to be forcing it on others.

But his anger shows he doesn't really believe in his own system of moral relativism. Because if justice and morality is person-relative, then there should be no anger. Those Fundamentalists think it's OK to force their beliefs on others. That is their way of being true to themselves and doing what they believe is right. Narrow-mindedness is virtuous to them. According to the idea of moral relativism, this should all be OK, because these attitudes make up the personal morality of the Fundamentalist. A relativist should be completely okay with the Fundamentalist's intolerance, because he is just being true to himself.

The fact that our moral relativist gets defensive and angry at the flaming Fundamentalist shows that the two of them are actually very similar. The Fundamentalist believes in right and wrong and preaches to the relativist that he is wrong for being a moral relativist. The moral relativist believes the Fundamentalist is wrong, that his preachy behaviour is bad. And he doesn't meekly tolerate it, either. He wants the Fundamentalist to stop, to change. In other words, he expects the Fundamentalist to conform to some rules that he inwardly believes govern them both. He thinks there are rules for everyone, not just personal morality, but public, universal morality.

In other words, everyone believes in right and wrong. Some people preach it and call others to convert to their ways. Other people keep it to themselves until they feel others have interrupted their private world, then they make demands on others to live up to it, even if it means the demand "leave me alone". Even when the moral relativist says "people should live and let live", his use of the word should shows he believes there is a standard that everyone should respect. He is just as much a preacher as the Fundamentalist; it's just he carries the conceit that he is non-judgemental.

In fact, if justice is relative, then the world becomes absurd. If we all just decide our own moral paths, maybe in my personal world I decide that stealing is OK. When my personal world bumps into your personal world, I steal your stuff. You get angry. But let's say say you get your stuff back. You're still angry with me that I stole from you, even though the problem has been solved. Why should you be angry with me, if justice and morality are person-relative? I’m just obeying the rules of my personal moral world. In your personal moral world, it’s bad to steal. In my personal moral world, it’s good to steal.

The anger really comes because we believe the other person has broken another rule, a "Bigger Rule", which must govern us both – that we must not hurt each other. If my personal moral rules, which say that stealing is okay, and your personal moral rules, which say that stealing is wrong, must both submit to some Bigger Rule that says we must not harm each other, where does that Bigger Rule come from? And why does it govern more than one personal moral world? Because if I don’t have (or want) the Bigger Rule in my personal moral world, I don’t have to respect it. I can rob you and feel no remorse. You must be robbed and be fine with it, because you know the Bigger Rule is not part of my personal world.

So since some kind of universal morality prevails everywhere, how do we explain this, if the cosmos is impersonal and merely material?

-- from "Letters to an Agnostic," by David.

[Iwannaplato]

So since some kind of universal morality prevails everywhere,

There's an important to the topics contradiction in this part. And the behavior of some or even most moral relativists is only the behavior of some or most moral relativists. Others may hate the preacher, but hate does not necessarily a morality make.

[Immanuel Can]

...the behavior of some or even most moral relativists is only the behavior of some or most moral relativists....

That doesn't make sense.

Under pure relativism, a person can't be "moral." There's no such thing, because everything is only subjective and relative to percipient. There's no universal "moral" to which one can appeal in order to declare somebody a "moral" relativist.

[FlashDangerpants]

There's no universal "moral" to which one can appeal in order to declare somebody a "moral" relativist.

Nor is there any need for one.

[Iwannaplato]

...the behavior of some or even most moral relativists is only the behavior of some or most moral relativists....

That doesn't make sense.

Under pure relativism, a person can't be "moral." There's no such thing, because everything is only subjective and relative to percipient. There's no universal "moral" to which one can appeal in order to declare somebody a "moral" relativist.

The part you didn't respond to is

So since some kind of universal morality prevails everywhere,

Some kind!!! Some kind of universal morality is an oxymoron. If there is some kind of morality here and another one there, which is in fact the state of the world, there is no universal morality (and more importantly) let alone an objective one.

As far as what you did respond to. Yes, some moral relativists may well get moralistic under pressure. But some will just get scared or pissed off. Having emotional reactions to people one finds unpleasant need not entail an assumption the other has broken a universal (or objective) moral code. Dislikes,preferences, tastes do not a claim to a moral objectivity make.

And how should we decide between what you think objective moral are and those of a different religious group's members who you do not think are moral?

[Immanuel Can]

...the behavior of some or even most moral relativists is only the behavior of some or most moral relativists....

That doesn't make sense.

Under pure relativism, a person can't be "moral." There's no such thing, because everything is only subjective and relative to percipient. There's no universal "moral" to which one can appeal in order to declare somebody a "moral" relativist.

The part you didn't respond to is

So since some kind of universal morality prevails everywhere,

Some kind!!! Some kind of universal morality is an oxymoron.

No, it's not. It's just his concession to the fact that he has not (yet) even tried to specify what that morality might consist in.

...there is no universal morality (and more importantly) let alone an objective one.

I can see you don't believe that.

You accuse people of things like "dishonesty," which, according to relativism, can't actually be universally "bad." So you must have meant nothing at all, if you're a relativist. And here, you seem to be saying that it's "wrong" to say that there's an objective morality...which is an objective moral claim, in itself...or at least an objective epistemological claim.

And how should we decide between what you think objective moral are and those of a different religious group's members who you do not think are moral?

Start with the right conception of God.

[Immanuel Can]

...the behavior of some or even most moral relativists is only the behavior of some or most moral relativists.

Would he be "wrong" then, to say that?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Under pure relativism, a person can't be "moral." There's no such thing, because everything is only subjective and relative to percipient. There's no universal "moral" to which one can appeal in order to declare somebody a "moral" relativist.

Note under pure relativism, a person can be intelligent and there is a positive trend of the increase of intelligence of the average human since say 5000 years ago to the present.

Thus under pure relativism, a person can be moral [avoiding evil (as defined) to maintain good] but it is not efficient under the relative morality approach.
The problem with the moral relative approach is that there is a potential and danger for it to be like a ship heading for the rocks without a fixed lighthouse and compass, leading to the extinction of the human species.

As such we need morality to be based on objective moral facts [verifiable and justifiable empirically and philosophically], i.e. morality must be objective to facilitate progress and avoiding the worst of evils.

The Theological Moral Models based on God's command [whilst objective to a religion] are ultimately relative, i.e. it is relative to some God of various theists. Example the theological "moral" model of Islam is inherently promoting evil thus cannot be moral as defined.

The theological model of Christianity has its good pacifist maxims presumably from a God but has other negatives.
It is nevertheless a relative moral model, i.e. relative to the Bible & Gospels and human interpretations.
It cannot be ultimately objective because the God which is supposedly instituting morality is illusory, thus cannot be objective.

[Immanuel Can]

Note under pure relativism, a person can be intelligent

"Intelligence" can't be valued universally, or even generally. Like every other possible criterion, it's relative to the percipient. There's nothing to tell us that "intelligence" is an objectively "good" thing, if subjectivism is true.

Thus under pure relativism, a person can be moral [avoiding evil

Nope. If subjectivism is right, there's no evil. So there's nothing to "avoid." A mass-murderer who is right in his own eyes is just as "good" as a humanitarian. And neither is objectively good or evil.

The problem with the moral relative approach is that there is a potential and danger for it to be like a ship heading for the rocks without a fixed lighthouse and compass, leading to the extinction of the human species.

How do you even determine that extinction is "bad"? Are you saying it's an objectively evil outcome? If it were, then it's not relative or subjective, and there is at least one objective moral value.

morality must be objective to facilitate progress and avoiding the worst of evils.

Now you're claiming not just that there is universal value in "progress," but also a universal value of "the worst (another moral term) of evils." You're miles away from subjectivism.

The Theological Moral Models based on God's command [whilst objective to a religion] are ultimately relative, i.e. it is relative to some God of various theists.

But if there's only one God, then they're objective.

Example the theological "moral" model of Islam is inherently promoting evil thus cannot be moral

"As defined" by whom? By what standard? According to their Islamic standard, they're unimpeachably righteous. By what transcendent standard do you judge that they "cannot be moral"?

The theological model of Christianity has its good pacifist maxims presumably from a God but has other negatives.

Here again, you take for granted that whatever you take to be "positive" morally, like pacifism, objectively is. And you take "negatives" as designating a similarly universal category.

You're a moral objectivist and universalist, obviously. You just don't know you are. But all your moral judgments, as listed above, show that's what you really are. Or perhaps you just mistake your own preferences for moral universals, and are just clueless about how they can be justified against other schemes of "morality". Either way, you're an objectivist. That, one cannot doubt.

[Iwannaplato]

No, it's not. It's just his concession to the fact that he has not (yet) even tried to specify what that morality might consist in.

That's a very poor way to word it, then.

...there is no universal morality (and more importantly) let alone an objective one.

I can see you don't believe that.

You accuse people of things like "dishonesty," which, according to relativism, can't actually be universally "bad." So you must have meant nothing at all, if you're a relativist.

You can certainly see if I contradict my beliefs, but that doesn't then mean that morals are objective. But more importantly...people can be dishonest. That's a type of behavior. It can be a behavior I dislike. But further, it is a behavior people tend to dislike AND think is immoral themselves. So, it's a lovely point for me to make.

And here, you seem to be saying that it's "wrong" to say that there's an objective morality...which is an objective moral claim, in itself...or at least an objective epistemological claim.

It's incorrect. And I dislike that claim.

And how should we decide between what you think objective moral are and those of a different religious group's members who you do not think are moral?

Start with the right conception of God.

Show me how you demonstrate that in a specific moral case.

To point out that there are people claiming to know, as he or she did, all over the place is an accurate claim. But it's a terrible thing to point out, because those moralities are different from each other. They are precisely not universal and they think the others are not correct. It's a poor idea to bring up in this context and his wording is oxymoronic.

[Iwannaplato]

...the behavior of some or even most moral relativists is only the behavior of some or most moral relativists.

Would he be "wrong" then, to say that?

If a moral relativist makes a claim that someone is objectively immoral, that moral relativist is being a hypocrite. But, of course, they can dislike when people make false claims. They can express this dislike without being hypocrites. But I agree that there are people who are postmodern/moral relativists who are hypocrites. That doesn't resolve the issue remotely, though it may be fun or useful to call those individuals out.

[Skepdick]

...the behavior of some or even most moral relativists is only the behavior of some or most moral relativists.

Would he be "wrong" then, to say that?

If a moral relativist makes a claim that someone is objectively immoral, that moral relativist is being a hypocrite. But, of course, they can dislike people make false claims. They can express this dislike without being hypocrites. But I agree that there are people who are postmodern/moral relativists who are hypocrites. That doesn't resolve the issue remotely, though it may be fun or useful to call those individuals out.

Are you saying that hypocrisy is objectively wrong; or something?

If morality is not objective, then asserting hypocrisy is merely the act of asserting facts about people.

It may be fun or useful to call them out as hypocrites.
It may be fun or useful to call them out as having a head and two shoulders.

OK. You are describing them correctly on both counts. Congratulations, you are very observent in yoru call-outs.

And then what?

[Skepdick]

It's incorrect. And I dislike that claim.

If morality is not objective then there can be no such thing as "better" or "worse" choices; and by implication:

There's no material difference to holding correct over incorrect beliefs.
There's no material difference to true over false claims.
There's no material difference to liked over disliked claims.

All qualitative distinctions become redundant; thus choosing itself no longer matters.
You wouldn't even need the positive and negative linguistic connotation you attach to all of your distinctions.

Should we choose things we like; or things we dislike? Doesn't matter - flip a coin!

[Immanuel Can]

...there is no universal morality (and more importantly) let alone an objective one.

I can see you don't believe that.

Quite right. But a relativist has to. That is, if he's being logical at all.

You can certainly see if I contradict my beliefs, but that doesn't then mean that morals are objective.

No, but it means you, rather illogically, profess that all morals are relative, but then treat them as if they are not.

My response would be, "Pick a horse and ride it."

But more importantly...people can be dishonest. That's a type of behavior. It can be a behavior I dislike. But further, it is a behavior people tend to dislike AND think is immoral themselves.

Are they objectively right to dislike it? If not, then their "disliking" means nothing that anybody else has to care about...or even that they need to care about, themselves.

And here, you seem to be saying that it's "wrong" to say that there's an objective morality...which is an objective moral claim, in itself...or at least an objective epistemological claim.

It's incorrect. And I dislike that claim.

So it's not "wrong" to claim there is an objective morality?

Then you've got nothing to complain about.

And how should we decide between what you think objective moral are and those of a different religious group's members who you do not think are moral?

Start with the right conception of God.

Show me how you demonstrate that in a specific moral case.

If God believes "Murder is immoral," then murder IS immoral. It's that simple. He's the grounds of all reality.

...those moralities are different from each other.

Utterly irrelevant to the question of truth.

There are an infinite number of wrong answers to any question. That never even remotely implies there isn't a right one. A billion wrong answers don't invalidate the truth.

You seem to mistake honouring a person's right to hold a belief, with some kind of duty to tell them their belief is true...or rather, that your own is not more true than theirs. There's no such obligation. Our obligation is to the truth.

[Immanuel Can]

...the behavior of some or even most moral relativists is only the behavior of some or most moral relativists.

Would he be "wrong" then, to say that?

If a moral relativist makes a claim that someone is objectively immoral, that moral relativist is being a hypocrite.

Is being a hypocrite objectively "wrong"?

Biblically, it is. But you're not a believer in that, are you? So what objective code are you pulling on when you imply "hypocrisy" is a bad thing?