What could make morality objective?

[Skepdick]

I hope to be proven wrong.

What process/method/technique of proof would you accept?

Seeming as implication/causality is insufficient.

[Agent Smith]

Your preferred method will do just fine.

[Skepdick]

Your preferred method will do just fine.

It didn't. Hence the question.

[Agent Smith]

Your preferred method will do just fine.

It didn't. Hence the question.

Oh! Sorry, but surely there's another tool in your toolkit.
Muchas gracias for yer time mon ami. I might just stop responding, but absit iniuria.

[Skepdick]

Your preferred method will do just fine.

It didn't. Hence the question.

Oh! Sorry, but surely there's another tool in your toolkit.
Muchas gracias for yer time mon ami. I might just stop responding, but absit iniuria.

There are plenty tools in my toolkit... Hence the question.

Which tool would you prefer me using?

[CHNOPS]

Every knowledge is a believe. You believe something about the origin of the universe (axioms) and we make conclusions from that point to make knowledge (theorems).

That's not always the case. And in fact, it's almost never the case with empiricism.

People start with the theorems first and seek axioms to explain them. Sometimes they find axioms. Some times they keep finding more and better asioms. Sometimes they don't.

Let but two example suffice.

1. It has always been a theorem that apples fall from trees. The axioms only came about when people started asking "Why?". And in fact we have two sets of axioms which address the question - Newton's and Einstein's.
2. The universe exists is a theorem. We don't have the axioms which answer "Why?"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_mathematics

When you are learning with intuition, you can know a lot of things and then find what are the axioms of that.

Of course we always do this. I learn the axioms of mathematics in university, but I already knew the Pitagoram Theorem.

But that doesnt mean that this is the right way of constructing a knowledge.

You cannot start a building from the roof. You start from the begining...

[Agent Smith]

It didn't. Hence the question.

Oh! Sorry, but surely there's another tool in your toolkit.
Muchas gracias for yer time mon ami. I might just stop responding, but absit iniuria.

There are plenty tools in my toolkit... Hence the question.

Which tool would you prefer me using?

You'll have to give me a list of your tools. I'm many things but, for better or worse, not a clairvoyant.

[Skepdick]

You'll have to give me a list of your tools. I'm many things but, for better or worse, not a clairvoyant.

So when you asked to be proven wrong you didn't know what would work for you?

It's bizzare that your hopes depend on the inventory of my toolbox...

I hope to be proven wrong.

If you don't know what would falsify your very own position, then surely you must be cognisant of the fact that it's not even wrong.

[Agent Smith]

I'm sorry but I lost track of the conversation! I would love to know your loadout though, only if you don't mind that is.

[Peter Holmes]

Does anyone disagree with the following preliminaries to a discussion about moral objectivity? If so, please can you explain your disagreement?

1 Language

1.1 Words and other signs can mean only what we use them to mean. There is no other court of appeal. And this applies to the words truth, fact and objectivity.

1.2 The meaning of a noun is not the thing it names, but rather that we use it to name that thing.

1.3 Things do not identify, name or describe themselves. We do that when we think and talk about them.

1.4 What we mean when we say an assertion is true is what constitutes what we call truth.

1.5 We can describe a thing in different ways, for different purposes. So a truth-claim is always contextual and conventional, which means: given the way use these words and other signs, in this context.

1.6 What we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case, independent from opinion. But, confusingly, we also call a true factual assertion a fact.

1.7 What we call objectivity is dependence on facts, rather than beliefs and opinions. What we call facts and objectivity go together like a horse and carriage.

1.8 Philosophy’s so-called problems arise when we mistake what we say about things – the ways we name and describe them – for the way things are.

1.9 Outside language, reality is not linguistic. In this context, the truth is not out there, any more than falsehood is.

1.10 The rules of a logic – such as classical identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle – deal with language, not the reality outside language. A logic deals with what can be said consistently, without contradiction. Outside language, there are no contradictions – speakings against – in reality. Reality is no more logical than it is mathematical.

[Skepdick]

Does anyone disagree with the following preliminaries to a discussion about moral objectivity? If so, please can you explain your disagreement?

1 Language

1.1 Words and other signs can mean only what we use them to mean.

I am not disagreeing. I am agreeing.

Use is meaning. Signs can, and do only mean what we use them to mean; and so I am using the sign "objective" to say and mean THAT morality is objective. By 1.1 above morality is objective because I am using it to mean that.

What is confusing you about your own premise?

1.6 What we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case, independent from opinion. But, confusingly, we also call a true factual assertion a fact.

I use the word "facts" however I use the word "facts", and the above is definitely not how I use the word "facts".

1.7 What we call objectivity is dependence on facts, rather than beliefs and opinions. What we call facts and objectivity go together like a horse and carriage.

I use the word "objectivity" however I use the word "objectivity", and the above is definitely not how I use the word "objectivity".

1.3 Things do not identify, name or describe themselves. We do that when we think and talk about them.

You appear to have yourself a problem.

The things we call "ourselves" (having named ourselves "Skepdick" and "Peter Holmes") are attempting to describe themselves - and in particular: YOU are attempting to describe how we use the words "facts" and "objectivity".

Very weird that you are speaking on everyone else's behalf about their use of language...

[Agent Smith]

Morality is objective and to say it's not is to fail to distinguish reasons from random facts.

[popeye1945]

You need to ask what makes the subjective objective, to who, and by what means?

[Peter Holmes]

It's possible to reject the distinction we make between what we call facts and opinions, objectivity and subjectivity, truth and falsehood.

It's possible to use a non-classical logic, with no polar truth-values and therefore no excluded middle.

It's possible to use words and other signs in a non-standard way. (End of conversation.)

(But if you understand the above assertions, you are using these English words in a standard way - as am I.)

To reject and invoke a distinction is inconsistent. If there are no facts, then there are no moral facts. If there's no real difference between objectivity and subjectivity, then saying morality is objective is incoherent. When you've eaten the cake, it's gone.

Saying something is so doesn't make it so. And this applies to both factual and non-factual assertions. Saying water is H2O doesn't make water H2O. It either is or isn't H2O, regardless of what anyone says or thinks.

In the same way, saying X is morally right or wrong doesn't make X morally right or wrong. If moral rightness and wrongness are real properties of things and actions, then what anyone says is irrelevant. The 'this-is-how-I/we- use-these-words' argument for moral objectivity is ridiculous, as it would be for scientific objectivity.

Also ridiculous is the argument that anything that has real-world consequences is, therefore, objective. The belief that slavery is morally justifiable had real-world consequences. Did that make the moral rightness of slavery objective - an actually existing property of slavery?

[Skepdick]

It's possible to reject the distinction we make between what we call facts and opinions, objectivity and subjectivity, truth and falsehood.

It's possible to use a non-classical logic, with no polar truth-values and therefore no excluded middle.

It's possible to use words and other signs in a non-standard way. (End of conversation.)

(But if you understand the above assertions, you are using these English words in a standard way - as am I.)

This assertion is unwarranted and requires proof/justification.

The ability of two (or more) interlocutors to understand each other implies nothing other than them having developed a mutual understanding - a common dialect.

It DOES NOT imply that the interlocutors are "using these English words in a standard way". There is no such thing as a standards authority on language and linguistic use whch could possibly make, or rule on, that assertion!

Just as well, 430 pages of disagreement should be plenty of evidence that the participants in this dialogue aren't using those words in a "standard" way. Otherwise they would've understood each other; and agreed with one another.

It's precisely your heavily biased use of words that's the predominant cause of disagreement. The question in the OP implies that morality isn't already objective even though everything is. By default.

One could even say that "Everything is objective" is a tautology; and therefore universaly true. And if another interlocutor chooses to accept the tautology; then it trivially follows that "Everything is objective" becomes a statement of fact within that dialogue; and definitely no further than that dialogue.

e.g there could be statements considered as factual between you and I; yet those exact statements might not be considered factual between you and somebody else.

Because that's how contexts work.

To reject and invoke a distinction is inconsistent. If there are no facts, then there are no moral facts.

More bullshit. You don't even understand how language works. There is no need for moral facts to proclaim morality as objective.

We can say that 'there are no facts' in one moment for some contextual pragmatic purpose; and in the very next moment say that 'there are facts' for a different contextual pragmatic purpose. There is no inconsistency here because the utterances are contextually isolated.

Either way, the criterion/dependence of objectivity on facts was arbitrarily established by you. But you failed to justify that claim.

The most trivial way in which we can arrive at objectivity without needing facts is via ontology. Everything exists objectively and by default. If morality is not objective - then morality doesn't exist.

That doesn't mean you can't re-classify the objective as subjective in the course of a dialogue, but it does mean that the re-classification requires justification; and a buy-in from your interlocutors.

Why do you want to re-classify morality as subjective? Present your reasons - if you can convince me that you have good reasons for re-classification - then we can agree to re-classify morality as subjective. Otherwise it remains objective by default.

If there's no real difference between objectivity and subjectivity, then saying morality is objective is incoherent. When you've eaten the cake, it's gone.

Way to demonstrate that you don't actually understand how to use language!

What has been classified as "objective" in one dialogue, can be re-classified as "subjective" in another dialogue. Seconds later, by the same interlocutors and even in context of the exact same broader conversation.

This has no bearing on "The True Status as objective or subjective". The purpose of such distinctions is merely to improve communication and arrive at mutual understanding - a common dialect!

It doesn't mean that the things being are classified are "actually subjective"; or "actually objective"! Idiot.

What we say about things is not what they are! <---- YOU keep making this exact claim, and yet YOU don't even understand what it means.

Saying something is so doesn't make it so.

EXACTLY.

Saying something is subjective doesn't mean it's subjective.
Saying something is objective doesn't mean it's objective.

Saying something is objective now doesn't mean we can't say it's subjective later; and in a different context.
Saying something is subjective now doesn't mean we can't say it's objective later; and in a different context.

Distinctions and classifications have no permanence beyond a dialogue.

And this applies to both factual and non-factual assertions.

Asserting that something is factual now doesn't mean you can't assert it non-factual later.
Asserting that something is non-factual now doesn't mean you can't assert it factual later.

You don't actually understand the purpose of distinctions; or how to use them in practice.

Saying water is H2O doesn't make water H2O. It either is or isn't H2O, regardless of what anyone says or thinks.

False dichotomy.

I san SAY that water is H2O at this very instant - it doesn't mean water is H2O - what it means is that H2O is a sufficient description for water given the current pragmatic context.
I san SAY that water is not H2O at this very instant - it doesn't mean water is not H2O - what it means is that H2O is NOT a sufficient description for wate in the current pragmatic context.

None of this has any bearing on whether water is; or isn't H2O.

In one semantic theory (externalism) water is H2O.
In another semantic theory (internalism) water is not H2O.
In another semantic theory yet (holism) - whether water is or isn't H2O is a stupid, undecidable question!

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10 ... -3261-7_18

In this essay I have discussed an assumption of semantic externalist theories which I called the coordination principle. This is the idea that natural language kinds and scientific kinds line up or can be mapped onto one another one-to-one. A closer look at water shows that there is not this type of simple one-to-one match between chemical and ordinary language kinds. In fact, the use of kind terms in chemistry is often context sensitive and in cases where chemists want to ensure no ambiguity, they use a very complex and nuanced set of kind terms, none of which could be reasonably associated with the ordinary language kind term “water” alone. Since we cannot just turn to chemistry to find a single chemical kind that can be used to determine the extension of “water,” there is not any strict sense in which water is H2O, because exactly what water is depends on the context in which “water” is uttered.

In the same way, saying X is morally right or wrong doesn't make X morally right or wrong. If moral rightness and wrongness are real properties of things and actions, then what anyone says is irrelevant.

That's a circular argument! Realism begs the question.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemological_solipsism

The 'this-is-how-I/we- use-these-words' argument for moral objectivity is ridiculous, as it would be for scientific objectivity.

Scientific objectivity? What the fuck is that?

Also ridiculous is the argument that anything that has real-world consequences is, therefore, objective.

Why is it "ridiculous"? That is the exact epistemic criterion by which humans assert that gravity is objective.

There are no facts about gravity!

The belief that slavery is morally justifiable had real-world consequences. Did that make the moral rightness of slavery objective - an actually existing property of slavery? So ridiculous that you are doing precisely the same thing you are criticising us of doing.

The reduction of slavery throughout human history is measurable. Like apples falling from trees is measurable.
THe increase of slavery throughout human history is NOT measurable. Like apples flying up into the sky is NOT measurable.

What causess the reduction of slavery? Morality.
What causes the falling of apples from trees? Gravity.

They are both objective.