compatibilism

[phyllo]

Rationality is doing things for reasons or thinking things for reasons.

"Will that is cause of itself" is will without reasons.

It's literally irrationality or insanity.

That's usually not good for you.

[promethean75]

"You're confusin' event causation (determinism) with agent causation."

I'm saying they are both theories of determinism.

Agent causation is claiming that people are not events, but can cause events to happen. Event causationists - who would be materialists of some variety - would say that only physical things and forces exist, and that there is no 'person' that is not an event like everything else.

So it's a metaphysical argument at this point. It's because of the strangeness of the experience of self-awarness, the qualia like quality of being conscious, and the time lapse in the brain that results in a perceived chronological reordering of events (see Libet), that concepts like the 'self' and the 'will' even exist at all. After all it's these concepts that confused philosophers. Descartes built a whole philosophy on this confusion.

But we've already tried to do the substance dualism discussion and it didn't work out, so the point I'm driving here might not be understood. Not saying you couldn't understand it, but that I'm not saying it in a way that's understandable.

It is because I have failed you, Henry Quirk.

[Iwannaplato]

So it's a metaphysical argument at this point. It's because of the strangeness of the experience of self-awarness, the qualia like quality of being conscious, and the time lapse in the brain that results in a perceived chronological reordering of events (see Libet),

https://philarchive.org/archive/EVEWTR
and then sort of at an angle...
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/ob ... snt-exist/
and then from a philosophy of science perspective...
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.117 ... 4312460926

and to jump backwards...

and that there is no 'person' that is not an event like everything else.

If one truly believes this then this and any conclusion conclusion is a mere inevitable event. The line of reasoning is a line of determined events, like a bunch of fire crackers going off. There is no reason to assume any reason at all was used in reasoning that is utterly determined and simply happens. The 'that line of reasoning is correct' quale is just another quale.

And such a creature, i mean event, really has no reason to believe what might be true about itself applies to others. I mean, it might be right. And the firecrackers might make the letter A in the sky or not, how would they know.

quales cut both ways.

Which doesn't mean free will is the case. It just means, what the hell are materialist determinists on about? it's like they don't believe what they are saying themselves. I know, I know, they can't help it.

And the word 'material' and the word 'physical', they don't mean anything.

[iambiguous]

... you could have opted to do something other ...

If you wanted to do something else, then you would have done it. That's what you wanted at the time.

And in case you're tempted to post ... "A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants." - Arthur Schopenhauer

A person with free-will also has wants. Where do his/her wants come from?

Again...

...my argument here is always that we seemingly have no way -- scientifically, philosophically, theologically etc. -- to pin down definitively whether I could have opted to do something other than to type these words any more than we can pin down definitively whether you could have opted to do something other than to read them.

Why?

Because "somehow" lifeless, mindless matter configured into living, mindful matter configured into us.

And, to the best of my own current knowledge, no one here can actually explain how that happened or why that happened...ontologically? teleologically?

How does your point above make any of that go away? Unless, of course, both our points are inherent, necessary manifestations of the human brain wholly in sync -- "somehow" -- with the laws of matter going all the way back to what [who?] brought them into existence in the first place.

"Somehow"? Yeah, until scientists, philosophers and/or theologians do pin down the definitive explanation.

Have they? Link me to it.

Again, imagine you had a dream and an exchange of this sort unfolded between us. You wouldn't wake up and argue that you had free will then, would you? And I have had any number of dreams myself in which exchanges unfolded with others similar to ours. Perhaps your dreams are different.

Oh yeah. Having an explanation would change everything.

Wait. No. Cause everything would still work as it does now. An explanation would not be useful for anything.

Having an explanation here tells us nothing either ontologically or teleologically about whether the explanation itself is derived either from free will or determinism. Here we are still back to subjective, existential leaps of faith that our own assumptions are more reasonable.

Right?

Now, phyllo, in a way I have never been able to grasp believes in...God?

So, of course, that might be the explanation. When God created us, He created souls. And these souls are where the free will is housed.

Only many religious folks insist, as well, that their own God is omniscient. Then the part where we come upon these complex intellectual contraptions -- worlds of words -- that explain how an omniscient God is compatible with mere mortals having free will.

Not sure if phyllo, if he believes in God, argues that his God is all-knowing.

I didn't say anything about God or having free-will.

That's not the point. The point is that, like me, you have no scientific, philosophical or theological evidence that settles the matter once and for all.

Unless, of course, you do. And, if so, and it demonstrates that we do in fact have free will, then by all means get it "out there" to the world. How, if it is true, could that not be astounding news to the world? How would it not be what everyone was talking about in the scientific, philosophical and theological communities?

And you will either connect the dots between your own thinking about God and free will or you won't. After all, what's the big secret about how you do connect the dots between morality here and now and immorality and salvation there and then...if you do believe in free will?

Given particular contexts of interest to you.

Promo is an atheist and hard determinist.

Okay, but my point is still the same: how do we pin down conclusively, decisively whether he opted of his own free will to be these things or did not?

So Biggus is not talking to us any more. He's talking to the God folks now.

Given free will, I have absolutely no idea what on earth this is supposed to mean.

Any "God folks" here care to take a stab at it?

[iambiguous]

freewill is in fact a kind of determinism - agent causation - which is not the opposite of determinism. Indeterminism is the opposite... and agent causation is not an indeterminism.

This ain't right.

You're confusin' event causation (determinism) with agent causation.

It's lightning strikin' Joe vs Stan strikin' Joe: one is just mindless forces dischargin', part of a causal chain; the other is intentioned, a new causal chain (or, at the very least, an intentionally bent causal chain).

Bottom line: free will (libertarian agent causation) is a middle finger to determinism; it ain't in bed with it.

-----

"Free will is will that is cause of itself."

That ain't right either.

A free will is that which is the cause of its own actions, influenced, perhaps, by what comes before, but not determined by it. A free will begins, bends, and ends causal chains: it is not a mere link in one.

Again, with Henry, it's never what he argues so much as the manner in which he seems to argue that only a "dumb motherfucker" would dare to not argue the same.

If I pose this to him...

...my argument here is always that we seemingly have no way -- scientifically, philosophically, theologically etc. -- to pin down definitively whether I could have opted to do something other than to type these words any more than we can pin down definitively whether you could have opted to do something other than to read them.

Why?

Because "somehow" lifeless, mindless matter configured into living, mindful matter configured into us.

And, to the best of my own current knowledge, no one here can actually explain how that happened or why that happened...ontologically? teleologically?

...his arrogant, authoritarian mentality will still prevail.

Only he doesn't have the guts to go it alone. Instead, he has to conjure up his own "private and personal" rendition of the Deist God in order to have a "transcending font" to fall back on.

And if his Deist God ever changes His mind and comes back into our lives, the first thing He will do is to confirm that Henry is right about everything...from free will to abortion to the buying and the selling of bazookas.

[promethean75]

For something to exist it is not enough to say it is a cause, like the agent causationists are doing. Everything existing is also an effect, and/or effected by, other things, processes and forces.

This is precisely why the 'agent' must be an event, not an ontologically different immaterial thing, process or force presiding over the body that can't be characterized or accounted for by the sciences... some Cartesian ghost independent of the effects of the natural laws that everything else in the material universe is subject to.

[henry quirk]

I'm saying they are both theories of determinism.

And I'm sayin' they're not.

(see Libet)

You may wanna consult what Libet himself has to say about his own experiments and free will.

But we've already tried to do the substance dualism discussion and it didn't work out,

You and me? I recall no such discussion.

it's a metaphysical argument at this point...that concepts like the 'self' and the 'will' even exist at all.

Not entirely: there's evidence, right out of neuro-science and -surgery, sayin' mebbe brain and mind aren't the same thing.

[promethean75]

"A person with free-will also has wants. Where do his/her wants come from?"

And even the choice to deny oneself a desire or a 'want' is directed by and for the purpose of another over-powering desire or 'want'.

But it is a 'want' nonetheless.

All our choices are made after a violent battle between higher and lower brain functions, even tho we make the decision in a matter of seconds.

'Choosing' is something very complicated and extended. It's only because the human brain is so fast that the decision to raise my arm seems to be made so easily and quickly. And that's just an arbitrary act. Imagine making a decision about, say, a diet change based on certain philosophical views about health and/or animal rights... or a decision to be abstinent for personal religious and/or philosophical reasons... or a major career decision that would move your whole family across the country.

None of these are decisions made by or during an act of freewill. The final verdict is there again, the end result of this battle between drives that have developed over vast periods of time in your life as you come into your dasein. Even your decision to stay on the couch rather than go to the kitchen to get the tortilla chips, is an extremely complicated ruling. Do you have any idea how involved hormones are even in higher order activities like contemplating Kantian philosophy?

[Belinda]

Henry Quirk wrote:

there's evidence, right out of neuro-science and -surgery, sayin' mebbe brain and mind aren't the same thing.

True, mind and brain (i.e. matter extended in space) are not the same in several respects; not least because brain occupies space and mind doesn't occupy space.

However brain (together with all matter extended in space) is as it is because God or Nature caused it to be as it is. This is also true of mind. Mind is as it is because God or Nature caused it to be as it is.

[phyllo]

How does your point above make any of that go away? Unless, of course, both our points are inherent, necessary manifestations of the human brain wholly in sync -- "somehow" -- with the laws of matter going all the way back to what [who?] brought them into existence in the first place.

"Somehow"? Yeah, until scientists, philosophers and/or theologians do pin down the definitive explanation.

Have they? Link me to it.

Again, imagine you had a dream and an exchange of this sort unfolded between us. You wouldn't wake up and argue that you had free will then, would you? And I have had any number of dreams myself in which exchanges unfolded with others similar to ours. Perhaps your dreams are different.

We're not even talking about the same thing.

I'm interested in the practical implications of free-will and determinism.

You're interested in "the definitive explanation" of how something came into existence.

Having an explanation here tells us nothing either ontologically or teleologically about whether the explanation itself is derived either from free will or determinism. Here we are still back to subjective, existential leaps of faith that our own assumptions are more reasonable.

Right?

Again. We're not even on the same page.

That's not the point. The point is that, like me, you have no scientific, philosophical or theological evidence that settles the matter once and for all.

And again.

Okay. I understand that you have different interests. But you don't have to keep restating that we need evidence to settle it "once and for all".

I would like to see a discussion that progresses beyond that one point.

Okay, we don't have the ultimate, absolute evidence. What can we say based on what we do have and what we do know?

[henry quirk]

mind and brain (i.e. matter extended in space) are not the same in several respects; not least because brain occupies space and mind doesn't occupy space.

Careful, B: most in-forum don't even believe mind exists as anything other than brain function. You keep talkin' like that you might find yourself on the outs with your compadres.

[Iwannaplato]

For something to exist it is not enough to say it is a cause, like the agent causationists are doing. Everything existing is also an effect, and/or effected by, other things, processes and forces.

And on the other side you have the epiphenomenalists.who posit consciousness as having no effects, that it is a mere epiphenomenon affected by things but not affecting anything. A pure witness.

This is precisely why the 'agent' must be an event,

You claimed that everything must be affected by other things then used that assertion to justify that agents are events.

not an ontologically different immaterial thing, process or force presiding over the body that can't be characterized or accounted for by the sciences...

Well, so far it can't be characterized or accounted for by the sciences. Which doesn't mean it is immaterial. But then, what does immaterial mean? What does material mean?

[Iwannaplato]

mind and brain (i.e. matter extended in space) are not the same in several respects; not least because brain occupies space and mind doesn't occupy space.

Careful, B: most in-forum don't even believe mind exists as anything other than brain function. You keep talkin' like that you might find yourself on the outs with your compadres.

For me there is an irony in being a determinist and arguing in philsophy forums. If your every thought is determined and you yourself are an 'even' as prometheus says, also utterly determined. Then really you can have no idea if you are being rational at all. You might be, but the quale indicating you are making sense is utterly determined and not necessarily at all by your making sense. You would have no idea what is making you think what you think or think you are reasonable. Yet, they are so sure of themselves.

Now none of this means that free will is the case. I am just pointing out a silliness that doesn't seem to get noticed.

I am rational, this argument was rational, your argument doesn't work...

Well, if you are determinist, you oughta know, you got no way of knowing that.

[henry quirk]

I am just pointing out a silliness that doesn't seem to get noticed.

Oh, it's been noticed, and commented on, multiple times, in-forum, across multiple threads, by the two or three free willists who post here.

As I say: if we aren't free wills then we're just bio-automata and nuthin' we do or think or say amounts to anything more than canned responses.

I, obviously, don't believe this is the case.

[Iwannaplato]

I am just pointing out a silliness that doesn't seem to get noticed.

Oh, it's been noticed, and commented on, multiple times, in-forum, across multiple threads, by the two or three free willists who post here

Ah, yes. I meant by those who are asserting they are completely determined.