Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Sun Jun 20, 2021 12:40 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 8:28 am
Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 2:29 am
There's no other context in discussion but the times of Kant and his project in relation to metaphysics in the 18th century. I have provided now enough references as to make clear that he thought metaphysics as a philosophical discipline was possible and could be reformed to become a proper science.
Note what was "proper-science" to Kant was his own definition which not everyone in the 18th century accepted.
Note the following;
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/302356099.pdf
Abstract: The paper analyses the definition of science as an architectonic unity,
which Kant gives in the Architectonic of Pure Reason.
I will show how this definition is problematic, insofar as it is affected by the various ways in which the relationship of reason to ends is discussed in this chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Gabriele Gava
Kant’s Definition of Science in the Architectonic of Pure Reason and the Essential Ends of Reason
The paper submitted only shows that Kant's definition of science, just the same as many of the concepts he develops in the CPR, is problematic and full of contradictions. In any case, this doesn't go to the point of whether he wanted to raise metaphysics to the level of a science or not, or more importantly, whether he thought a scientific discipline of metaphysics is possible or not. In fact, the paper suggests, as all the other references I provided, that he thought it was possible. Note what this paragraph entails:
In order to account for these problems concerning Kant’s account of science in the Architectonic of Pure Reason, it is useful to consider together the different aims that he sought to accomplish in this relatively short chapter of the first Critique. First of all, Kant here gives an outline of the metaphysical system he plans to build, clarifying the place of the first Critique within this edifice. Moreover, he further develops some thoughts concerning the relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy, introduced in the Canon of Pure Reason, and he presents a cosmic concept of philosophy that gives priority to the practical. He also gives a teleological account of science as a goal-directed activity, according to which systematicity is an essential character of science.
It would be kind of strange that someone who rejected metaphysics altogether, wanted to outline a metaphysical system himself, don't you think?
Also note this from another Kantian scholar:
Stanford philosopher strengthens Kant's connection to natural science and Newton
As one example, Friedman lays out an argument that Kant viewed Newton’s theory of universal gravitation as “the only proper natural science” for which Kant hoped to provide a metaphysical foundation. In this context, Kant needed a framework that would let him conceptually reduce all motion and rest to absolute space. Absolute space defines a privileged, immovable frame of reference for the moving bodies (such as planets) that occupy it.
That was my point, the papers show Kant's definition of Science which is very wide, loose and general.
It is based on Kant's specific definition of Science that he claimed Metaphysics as Science is possible.
But note what Science during Kant time was already understood with the emphasis on empirical observations and testing re Bacon, i.e. 500 years before Kant;
- Roger Bacon (c. 1219/20 – c. 1292), also known by the scholastic accolade Doctor Mirabilis, was a medieval English philosopher and Franciscan friar who placed considerable emphasis on the study of nature through empiricism.
[...] He is sometimes credited (mainly since the 19th century) as one of the earliest European advocates of the modern scientific method. Bacon applied the empirical method of Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen) to observations in texts attributed to Aristotle.
Bacon discovered the importance of empirical testing when the results he obtained were different from those that would have been predicted by Aristotle.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Bacon
Thus when the question "Is Metaphysics as Science Possible" was raised it was with reference to the above Bacon's view of Science, i.e. empirical based.
As such, my point, based on this view, Metaphysics as a Science is not possible.
Then, what Kant did was to extend the definition to his specification to include a priori non-empirical elements.
Based on this new definition of Kant, he maintained that 'Metaphysics as a Science' is Possible, BUT only if it is confined to Practical [Morality] Philosophy.
Thus my point, there is no way I would simply accept the general view 'Metaphysics as Science is possible' [like you do] without the context and qualification.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 8:28 am
Your hasty generalization is fallacious.
Me as in Empirical Idealism do not agree with that.
My point still stand, materialists and realists believe in something equivalent to a soul [the actual person-in-itself] but those who are non-theists may not believe in a soul per se.
Without any generalization whatsoever, we can easily identify you as the proponent (perhaps implicitly, while not explicitly) of immaterial substances like a soul, aka disembodied consciousness.
You reject actual material bodies in themselves as carriers of consciousness, but nevertheless you stick to the reality of conscious experience and non-substantial human entities. The difference between that, disembodied consciousness and souls is nothing. That's what unites you and all the rest of idealists.
Your thinking in this lacks depth and width.
My views are based on what is the empirical evidences of the person, self, consciousness, etc. supported with critical philosophy of what is real. This is very scientific and where can I be wrong in this?
There is no need for me to speculate [like you do] on philosophical materialism and realism which are delusional and cannot be proven at all [note OP].
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 8:28 am
You still don't get it.
Modern materialists and realists do not have direct cognition of subjects-in-themselves like naive realists, but they ASSUMED there is a corresponding supposed-subject-in-itself.
This is why Meno's Paradox is applicable, if you will never ever know [impossible to have direct cognition] of the supposed-in-itself, how can you know there is a really real subject-in-itself?
I supposed you are relying on Science as the most credible and reliable method of inquiry, but as I have argued Science merely ASSUMED there is a supposed thing-in-itself.
You're the one still not getting it.
All knowledge frameworks rely on some assumptions at its base, but this in itself is not a discrediting feature, unless those assumptions remained purely theoretical.
Materialism predated modern science and while it was just the product of pure reflection, as in Greek philosophy, it was just another theory clashing with other doctrines in the field of metaphysics.
Materialist ontology, however, gained traction and became the inseparable companion of modern science because of the particular methodological features introduced by scientific practice, which allowed for a deepest and more reliable understanding of the real features of the world, much more than metaphysics alone could ever imagine.
Thus, the crisis in philosophy and religion that came about after the contributions of Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, etc., a crisis that set up the conditions for Kant's project to save metaphysics. Unfortunately for him, idealism is not fit to be a companion of modern science, they are not compatible.
Meno's paradox, again, is ridiculous sophistry, with no value to add to a serious philosophical discussion. [/quote]
That you simply brush off Meno's paradox in the above case indicate your lack of philosophical depth and width.
Yes, Materialism and non-materialism was already there before Science.
Then the emergence of Science in its early days gave prominence to realism but later the confidence in Scientific realism was eroded by the more realistic views from
-'the observers' effect, -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observer_effect_(physics)
-'theory of relativity' -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity
-QM
which contrasted the idea of an absolutely independent reality of classical Science.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 8:28 am
Note, many scientific theories which were once accepted as true and representing its respective thing-in-itself had been abandoned.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supersede ... in_science
Thus in general, the principle what is the thing-in-itself is not critical to Science, otherwise no scientific theories would have been abandoned totally.
A good amount of the listed superseded theories belong to the earlier days of modern science and hardly represent the state of scientific research since the 20th century. In any case, just the fact that they were discarded by scientific practice itself, shows that it is precisely the reliable methodology embedded in it that guarantees its success, and that success is directly linked to the reality of things in themselves. Otherwise, there would be no reason to discard any theory, as all the experiences related the objects and events we inquiry would have all the same factual value and a methodological empirical approach would be worthless.
You don't get it??
The general principle from the evident total abandonment of scientific theories is, whilst a theory may be useful, it is not necessary true absolutely nor represent whatever is in itself.
As such, what is accepted as a scientific theory convincingly at present may be totally abandoned in say 100, 150, 200, 500, 1000 or more in the future. You cannot deny this possibility!
Thus whatever is assumed or supposed to be the thing-in-itself is not critical for science.
Note this OP which I raised to address your request.
viewtopic.php?p=514602#p514602
I added the thing-in-itself you assumed is merely an instinctively invention.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 8:28 am
Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 2:29 am
This is the usual confusion of terms that make such description a complete mess. The supposed distinction between the "actual person" and the "empirical person" is that the latter one refers not to an ontological entity, but the experience a theoeretical entity would have, even though the actual entity cannot exist.
So it is the experience of a theoretical entity without the entity, which nevertheless includes the experience of life and death of such entity, all reduced to pure illusion, because the only real thing is the experience itself and supposedly, the conditions for there being any experience at all. That is your absurd proposition.
And then we are told the conditions for there being an experience reside a priori in all the cognizing entities, even though these entities actually don't exist. Clever.
Why is it absurd when I am presenting direct evidence of what is the self?
The "empirical" person is not a "theoretical entity" but based on something that is real and supported by empirical evidences.
"Something that is real" can only point to something that really exists. Whatever is a thing that really exists is by definition a thing in itself. This is the core of your contradictions, from which you try to escape by moving from the target point. So first you say "in reality there is no actual person-in-itself", but as soon as this is targeted, you move to "the empirical person is real and supported by evidence". And when this is targeted for the implication it has on your opening argument, you move again to "no actual person in reality". That is absurd.
Your thinking is too shallow and narrow in this case.
Nope!
Whatever is a thing that really exists is NOT by definition a thing-in-itself. That is merely your assumption.
What is supposed a real thing must be viewed from different perspectives.
It is very obvious there are different levels of reality that must be dealt with separately.
For example, for the same object, Newtonian Physics deal with its solidness, while for the same object, QM will deal with its sub-atomic particles.
At the basic physical level, a piece of diamond is a solid physical thing, but if one has an instrument that is fine enough that same piece of diamond is 99.9% space [or rather emptiness].
There is thus no such thing as a diamond-in-itself but only a diamond-in-perspective, i.e. relative to the specified perspective.
It is the same with the person which is a solid object to another person or other animals, thus the empirical self which exists as real. This is so evident.
Fundamentally there is only the empirical-related-self and nothing else.
What humans [the masses] is habitualized is to think of a person-in-itself as a thing-in-itself and I do not believe such a thing-in-itself is real.
As I had stated we should be not a slave to this habitualized and instinctively driven thinking of the thing-in-itself, but suspend it and view this point from the whole shebang of cognition, existence, self, consciousness, etc.
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jun 17, 2021 8:28 am
Btw, the empirical self and any real self will experience life, BUT never death at all.
Again this is what the theists will believe, i.e. they will experience physical death and from there will be transmitted to heaven or hell.
Actually it is a common theme of theists within the dualist tradition that conscious beings are eternal and only a disposable, temporary part of them, the material body, decays, while leaving their essential being intact in the form of an immaterial substance.
Radical monistic idealists go a step further and deny the existence of real, material, mind-independent bodies, just as you advocate.
Nope! Strawman again.
I had never denied "the existence of real, material, mind-independent bodies". I had accepted this view as only one perspective while claiming there is no such thing as absolute independence.