A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies

[RogerSH]

“Incompatibilism” is the claim that free will is incompatible with a deterministic world....

You cannot use a model to prove a case. All you are doing is using a model to describe a what you think is the case.

I certainly don't think the world is as simple as this! If a principle is alleged to be true in every case, it should be true in the simplest case, so a simple model can legitimately be used to disprove a claim. Conversely, a principle that works in a simple case might apply to a general case. If it doesn't, the challenge is to say what exactly the difference is that affects the principle, not just to say "that's only a model".

What happens when the parts of he model are made of elastic, so that the rhombus can be moved into any shape? Where parts of the system want to be determined but through act of free will can be moved about?
What would happen if the rhombus was only tenuously connected by gas or other fluid?
Take your pick!

That just makes the model harder to analyse, so less useful. (In fact, advanced mathematics would be necessary). One might as well take the whole world....
I do allow one link to be elastic in a later post. If more than that are elastic, or gaseous, or whatever, it cannot be used to illustrate the simplest kind of determinacy.

[RogerSH]

Yes, B is not fully determined for choice to be possible. For example, the world is (ex hypothesi) fully determined, but the mind (A) is part of the world, so B is the world with A excluded, which is not necessarily fully determined just because [A+B] is.

Huh?? It seems like you're equivocating what "the world" refers to there--like it keeps shifting.

I could have worded that better. B is everything that is in the world except what is included in A. I call it "the external world" as a shorthand, but that bothers you because it is not in fact a world. Ok, I'll try to avoid that usage.

[Sculptor]

“Incompatibilism” is the claim that free will is incompatible with a deterministic world....

You cannot use a model to prove a case. All you are doing is using a model to describe a what you think is the case.

I certainly don't think the world is as simple as this! If a principle is alleged to be true in every case, it should be true in the simplest case, so a simple model can legitimately be used to disprove a claim. Conversely, a principle that works in a simple case might apply to a general case. If it doesn't, the challenge is to say what exactly the difference is that affects the principle, not just to say "that's only a model".

Utter crap.
Your model is just a manifestation of your desire to prove a point. Determinism is not a fucking mechano set LOL.
Meccano strips are in no way analogous to the rest of the world

What happens when the parts of he model are made of elastic, so that the rhombus can be moved into any shape? Where parts of the system want to be determined but through act of free will can be moved about?
What would happen if the rhombus was only tenuously connected by gas or other fluid?
Take your pick!

That just makes the model harder to analyse, so less useful.

Only to you since it spoils your prejudiuce.

(In fact, advanced mathematics would be necessary). One might as well take the whole world....
I do allow one link to be elastic in a later post. If more than that are elastic, or gaseous, or whatever, it cannot be used to illustrate the simplest kind of determinacy.

This all sounds like " but its turtles all the way down
You asked why your model was a fallacy; i told you.

[Terrapin Station]

Yes, B is not fully determined for choice to be possible. For example, the world is (ex hypothesi) fully determined, but the mind (A) is part of the world, so B is the world with A excluded, which is not necessarily fully determined just because [A+B] is.

Huh?? It seems like you're equivocating what "the world" refers to there--like it keeps shifting.

I could have worded that better. B is everything that is in the world except what is included in A. I call it "the external world" as a shorthand, but that bothers you because it is not in fact a world. Ok, I'll try to avoid that usage.

You're not thinking that incompatibilists are saying that nothing is deterministic, are you?

[RCSaunders]

What I mean by physical is all that exists and has the nature it has independently of any human consciousness or knowledge of it. "Independently of," does not mean, "separate from," it means whether or not there is any human awareness or knowledge of it.

What I mean by non-physical includes everything that depends on human consciousness for it's existence and does not exist independently of human minds. All knowledge, knowledge methods (like logic, mathematics, and language) for example, only exist as human creations and do not exist independently of human minds.

You could define the terms that way, and it would work for what it's worth, but it doesn't map to any standard usage of the terms, and it makes the debates over whether consciousness is physical rather nonsensical, because obviously no one is debating on whether consciousness requires consciousness for its existence.

But sure, if you want to use terms unusually/highly idiosyncratically, you can do that.

"Highly idiosyncratic," really? It doesn't seem very different to me from these:

Lexico.com
Physical:
2. Relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind; tangible or concrete.
3. Relating to physics or the operation of natural forces generally.
‘physical laws’

Merriam-Webster
Physical:
1a of or relating to natural science
1b(1) of or relating to physics
1b(2) characterized or produced by the forces and operations of physics
2a having material existence : perceptible especially through the senses and subject to the laws of nature--everything physical is measurable by weight, motion, and resistance --Thomas De Quincey
2b of or relating to material things

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
Physical
3. Of or relating to material things: a wall that formed a physical barrier; the physical environment.
4. Of or relating to matter and energy or the sciences dealing with them, especially physics.

These are only dictionary definitions, and I do not base my views on any authority. I'm only pointing out, my view is hardly odd or idiosyncratic.

Philosophical discussions physicalism have truly odd descriptions of the physical, when they are included at all.

If you consult the entry for Physicalism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

You will see my views are hardly unusual or even new. You will also see that every serious assertion of physicalism is highly questionable. But since this is only what others assert, it certainly has no authority. I only mention it, because you seem to think my questions are unusual.

It is worthy of not, that in this serious discussion of physicalism, in the entire article, what exactly is meant by, "physical," is never explicitly explained. What is meant by physical is actually only mentioned at all in two places:

Under, "The Theory and Object Conceptions of the Physical," which implies it means whatever has, "physical properties," for which two different explanations (both spurious) are given, and under, "Circularity," which makes the brilliant comment: "Along with the concepts of space, time, causality, value, meaning, truth and existence, the concept of the physical is one of the central concepts of human thought. So it should not be surprising that any attempt to come to grips with what a physical property is will be controversial," followed by a discussion which does nothing to resolve the controversy.

You might find that some of my points are similar to those under the categories of, "The Case Against Physicalism," and, "Numbers and Abstracta," as well.

Please note I do not refer to these sources, (or any others) as authorities, only as examples of common reasoning about the nature of what it means to say something is physical in reference to assertion that everything is physical.
[quote="Terrapin Station" post_id=512575 time=1622496869 user_id=12582

I do not expect you to agree with this, since you apparently equate the meaning of the concepts, "exist," and, "physical."

I already addressed this above. That's not at all what I'm doing. In my view, it's rather contingently the case that everything extant is physical.

but I think even you would say, claiming the Phoenix exists physically is absurd.

I don't think it's absurd to say that concepts, imaginings etc. are physical. They're simply brain states. Brain states are physical.

But on your usage of the terms, sure, concepts, imaginings, etc. depend on consciousness. So on your usage, they wouldn't be physical, since you're defining "nonphysical" as "depending on consciousness."
[/quote]
I'll only address this: "I don't think it's absurd to say that concepts, imaginings etc. are physical. They're simply brain states. Brain states are physical."

It's not just concepts but consciousness itself which is not physically possible. This can be demonstrated in a number of ways, but, to my mind, the most dramatic is the fact that the field of consciousness is a single phenomenon that simultaneously and continuously experiences all that is being seen, heard, felt, smelled, and tasted, as well as experienced internally as interoception. [It also includes all that one is thinking, imagining, and feeling emotionally, but I'll ignore those for the moment.]

One of my fields is electronics, specifically information processing, both digital and analog. There are physical methods for detecting in some detail the presence and nature of light, sound, pressure, and chemicals. It is not physically possible for any electrical or mechanical process to turn any kind of detected light, sound, pressure, chemical presence (in gas, liquid, and solid mediums) simultaneously into a single physical, chemical, or electrical event or phenomenon.

Just consider sound. Advanced electronics can integrate multiple sources of sound into a single, "signal," from which the original sounds can be reproduced but only by means of signal analysis, which must re-separate the individual sounds by means of Fourier transfoms, for example. A human being can hear any variety of sounds simultaneously as sums and the distinct component sounds simultaneously. Unless you think there is one, "conscious cell," that experiences all perceptual phenomenon by some inexplicable method, experiencing all that is seen, heard, felt, smelled, and tasted as a single complex event, consciousness is physically impossible.

The neurological studies of the various, "senses," (which the individual perceptions are mistakenly called) can only discover separate events occuring in different parts of the neurological system and brain associated with specific perceptual experiences. There is no physical possibility for all those separate events to be integrated physically into a single phenomenon like consciousness.

[Terrapin Station]

"Highly idiosyncratic," really?

Again, so when we debate whether consciousness is physical in philosophy, do you think we're debating whether consciousness has something to do with consciousness or mentality?

[RogerSH]

Huh?? It seems like you're equivocating what "the world" refers to there--like it keeps shifting.

I could have worded that better. B is everything that is in the world except what is included in A. I call it "the external world" as a shorthand, but that bothers you because it is not in fact a world. Ok, I'll try to avoid that usage.

You're not thinking that incompatibilists are saying that nothing is deterministic, are you?

No, why would I? I don't see any connection...

[RogerSH]

Here is a more formal recap of the argument suggested by the Meccano model.
Purely for the sake of argument, I will assume the following:-
A1. Nothing exists but the physical world
A2. In particular, the mind is a manifestation of physical events, and its state is hence part of the state of the world.
A3. Einsteinian relativity doesn’t apply (to avoid complicating the definitions of antecedent & consequent)
A4. We do not speak of the multiverse, if there is such, but only of a single universe
A5. The material world is deterministic in the sense that for a given antecedent state of the world there is only one possible state at a subsequent time
[In fact, I believe that different assumptions on these questions lead to the same conclusions, but change the language that is necessary]

Some definitions:
D1: Physical freedom is defined for a given system as there being more than one state of that system possible, subject to specified given conditions.
D2: Given assumption 1, ontological freedom of the world is identical to physical freedom of the world. In particular, the sense of ontological freedom considered here is physical freedom of the world with regard to the state at an immediately subsequent time given the state at the preceding time (and given the laws of physics)
[Example: the whole world has ontological freedom if and only if it is not deterministic.]
D2A: I then introduce a new concept by a simple adaptation of the above concept: ontological freedom of part of the world is physical freedom of part of the world with regard to the state at an immediately subsequent time of that part of the world given the state at the preceding time of that part of the world (and given the laws of physics)
D3: A choosing system A makes a choice with regard to an object system B if, of a number of consequent states of B that are not precluded by any facts about the antecedent state of B, all but one are precluded by the state of A.
D4: System A has freedom of choice with regard to an object system B (which taken by itself is not fully determined) if, of the consequent states of B that are not precluded by any facts about the antecedent state of B, different states are precluded by different imaginable states of A.
D5: Freedom of will is freedom of choice exercised consciously. [Note: this means that I am using free will/freedom of will as the name for a capability, not for a special ingredient which some suppose is necessary for that capability to be possible. As I am arguing that the capability exists with no need for a special ingredient, the existence of any such is of no interest.]

The argument then goes like this.
1. Suppose that in fact there is ontological freedom of the whole world (which requires assumption A5 to be relaxed). For there to be ontological freedom of the world, there have to be distinct immediately subsequent states that are not precluded by any fact about the antecedent state.
2. Given assumption A2, the state of a choosing mind in the world must be part of the facts about the antecedent state of the world.
3. Therefore none of the distinct immediately subsequent states of the world can be precluded by the state of the choosing mind.
4. Therefore ontological freedom of the whole world does not enable a choice by the choosing mind to be effected.
Conclusion 1: Ontological freedom of the whole world would not enable free will. [Comment: by contrast, a non-material imaginary demon, not being part of the world, could be the cause of all but one of the distinct immediately subsequent states being precluded: in other words, could be a chooser between these possibilities].

5. A choosing system A (which may or may not be a conscious mind) cannot make a choice with regard to its own choosing state at the time of the choice. This is a logical requirement, irrespective of determinism: call it the no-self-reference requirement. [See my posts of Tues 18th May 7:03 & Fr 28th 11:40, for example] In other words, B must not overlap with A for B to be a meaningful object system with respect to choice by A.
6. If the object system B is equated to the whole world, this includes the choosing system, so the no-self-reference requirement is breached; so this does not give rise to a coherent concept of choice.
7. The no-self-reference requirement can only be met by equating B to part or all of “the rest of the world”, that is to say, all of the world except the choosing system A.
8. Thus the requirement for freedom of choice fails only if “the rest of the world” has no ontological freedom, or if it only has freedoms that are not causally related to the state of A.
9. If there is a cause->effect relationship between the state of A and some aspect of B, then by excluding A from the object system, the facts about B that would be determined by this causal relationship become undetermined, and so B necessarily gains ontological freedom accessible to A.
10. Thus freedom of choice by a choosing system is consistent with determinism.
Conclusion 2: From 10, considering the case of a conscious choosing system, freedom of will is consistent with determinism.

The key move is distinguishing ontological freedom of the whole world (denied by determinism) from ontological freedom of the rest of the world (necessary for free will).

So, what isn’t clear, what needs further justification, what explicit counter-arguments might there be?

[Terrapin Station]

I could have worded that better. B is everything that is in the world except what is included in A. I call it "the external world" as a shorthand, but that bothers you because it is not in fact a world. Ok, I'll try to avoid that usage.

You're not thinking that incompatibilists are saying that nothing is deterministic, are you?

No, why would I? I don't see any connection...

I'm just trying to figure out how, exactly, you're a compatibilist given the comments you've made so far. You don't seem to think that determinism is the case (for that side of compatibilism to obatain), but you also realize that incompatibilists aren't saying that nothing is deterministic.

[Terrapin Station]

In the other thread, by the way, you wrote:

"No, I'm a compatibilist because I think that free will would be compatible with a determinist universe if it turned out that we lived in one. That's what the Meccano model thread is all about. It more or less follows that free will is compatible with the universe described by current scientific orthodoxy."

How could there be free will in a deterministic universe? This makes no sense to me. Insofar as something extant is free it isn't deterministic (unless we simply change the topic by changing what those words refer to), and incompatibilists aren't saying that nothing is deterministic. Making any sort of ontological division (Re relations, locations, partitionings, models, etc.) doesn't work, because that would simply amount to not understanding what incompatibilists are saying.

From an incompatibilist perspective, compatibilism amounts to asserting a simple contradiction, and I don't see any way around that without changing what the terms are being used to refer to, but then that's simply changing the topic.

[Sculptor]

Here is a more formal recap of the argument suggested by the Meccano model.
Purely for the sake of argument, I will assume the following:-
A1. Nothing exists but the physical world
A2. In particular, the mind is a manifestation of physical events, and its state is hence part of the state of the world.
A3. Einsteinian relativity doesn’t apply (to avoid complicating the definitions of antecedent & consequent)
A4. We do not speak of the multiverse, if there is such, but only of a single universe
A5. The material world is deterministic in the sense that for a given antecedent state of the world there is only one possible state at a subsequent time
[In fact, I believe that different assumptions on these questions lead to the same conclusions, but change the language that is necessary]

What are A3 and A4 doing there?
Their inclusion seems rather redundant.

Some definitions:
D1: Physical freedom is defined for a given system as there being more than one state of that system possible, subject to specified given conditions.

This does not make sense. It is either a contradiction or just parses badly.

D2: Given assumption 1, ontological freedom of the world is identical to physical freedom of the world. In particular, the sense of ontological freedom considered here is physical freedom of the world with regard to the state at an immediately subsequent time given the state at the preceding time (and given the laws of physics)

What is this trying to achieve?
What is "freedom of the world?"

D2A: I then introduce a new concept by a simple adaptation of the above concept: ontological freedom of part of the world is physical freedom of part of the world with regard to the state at an immediately subsequent time of that part of the world given the state at the preceding time of that part of the world (and given the laws of physics)
D3: A choosing system A makes a choice with regard to an object system B if, of a number of consequent states of B that are not precluded by any facts about the antecedent state of B, all but one are precluded by the state of A.
D4: System A has freedom of choice with regard to an object system B (which taken by itself is not fully determined) if, of the consequent states of B that are not precluded by any facts about the antecedent state of B, different states are precluded by different imaginable states of A.
D5: Freedom of will is freedom of choice exercised consciously. [Note: this means that I am using free will/freedom of will as the name for a capability, not for a special ingredient which some suppose is necessary for that capability to be possible. As I am arguing that the capability exists with no need for a special ingredient, the existence of any such is of no interest.]

Your so-called "definitions" are just clouding the picture.

The argument then goes like this.
1. Suppose that in fact there is ontological freedom of the whole world (which requires assumption A5 to be relaxed). For there to be ontological freedom of the world, there have to be distinct immediately subsequent states that are not precluded by any fact about the antecedent state.
2. Given assumption A2, the state of a choosing mind in the world must be part of the facts about the antecedent state of the world.
3. Therefore none of the distinct immediately subsequent states of the world can be precluded by the state of the choosing mind.
4. Therefore ontological freedom of the whole world does not enable a choice by the choosing mind to be effected.
Conclusion 1: Ontological freedom of the whole world would not enable free will. [Comment: by contrast, a non-material imaginary demon, not being part of the world, could be the cause of all but one of the distinct immediately subsequent states being precluded: in other words, could be a chooser between these possibilities].

5. A choosing system A (which may or may not be a conscious mind) cannot make a choice with regard to its own choosing state at the time of the choice. This is a logical requirement, irrespective of determinism: call it the no-self-reference requirement. [See my posts of Tues 18th May 7:03 & Fr 28th 11:40, for example] In other words, B must not overlap with A for B to be a meaningful object system with respect to choice by A.
6. If the object system B is equated to the whole world, this includes the choosing system, so the no-self-reference requirement is breached; so this does not give rise to a coherent concept of choice.
7. The no-self-reference requirement can only be met by equating B to part or all of “the rest of the world”, that is to say, all of the world except the choosing system A.
8. Thus the requirement for freedom of choice fails only if “the rest of the world” has no ontological freedom, or if it only has freedoms that are not causally related to the state of A.
9. If there is a cause->effect relationship between the state of A and some aspect of B, then by excluding A from the object system, the facts about B that would be determined by this causal relationship become undetermined, and so B necessarily gains ontological freedom accessible to A.
10. Thus freedom of choice by a choosing system is consistent with determinism.
Conclusion 2: From 10, considering the case of a conscious choosing system, freedom of will is consistent with determinism.

The key move is distinguishing ontological freedom of the whole world (denied by determinism) from ontological freedom of the rest of the world (necessary for free will).

So, what isn’t clear, what needs further justification, what explicit counter-arguments might there be?

[RCSaunders]

"Highly idiosyncratic," really?

Again, so when we debate whether consciousness is physical in philosophy, do you think we're debating whether consciousness has something to do with consciousness or mentality?

Well, I'm actually not debating. I'm only explaining what I mean and know, not trying to dissuade or persuade you or anyone else. I really think the radical physicalist view evades the evidence of one's own consciousness, but see no way to argue against the view so long as it refuses to recognize that seeing cannot be physical, because it cannot be seen, or in any other way observed or detected as it would have to be if it were physical. The only way I know there is the conscious phenomenon of seeing, is because I do, and I take the word of others who claim the can see, but I certainly can never actually observe anyone else conscious experience of seeing to examine or study it.

The human mind is just the unique aspect of human consciousness which distinguishes it from the consciousness of all other organisms, that is, the volitional, intellectual, rational consciousness which is the mind. All higher organisms are conscious and their behavior is determined by what they are conscious of and their pre-programmed pattern of behavior called instinct. Human consciousness is like any organism's consciousness as directly perceived, but lacks, "instinct." Nothing about human nature beyond the biological functions is determined and must be consciously chosen (volition), which requires knowledge (intellect), and the ability to make judgments and ask and answer questions (rationality). Mind (or the mental) is the distinction of human consciousness.

There cannot be, "mentality," without consciousness; it is an attribute of human consciousness, the means by which human beings have knowledge about what is directly perceived.

[Terrapin Station]

Well, I'm actually not debating.

I'm not talking about you personally, lol. Whether consciousness is physical is one of the current "hot topics" in philosophy. I'm asking if you think that folks are debating whether consciousness has something to do with consciousness, because that's what your definitions of physical/nonphysical would suggest.

[RCSaunders]

Well, I'm actually not debating.

I'm not talking about you personally, lol. Whether consciousness is physical is one of the current "hot topics" in philosophy. I'm asking if you think that folks are debating whether consciousness has something to do with consciousness, because that's what your definitions of physical/nonphysical would suggest.

I'm sorry, I honestly do not understand what, "I'm asking if you think that folks are debating whether consciousness has something to do with consciousness," means. I don't know what others are debating, and I certainly don't know how X could not have anything to do with X, no matter what X is, consciousness or any other concept. I think you may have left something out of that question.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm sorry, I honestly do not understand what, "I'm asking if you think that folks are debating whether consciousness has something to do with consciousness," means. I don't know what others are debating, and I certainly don't know how X could not have anything to do with X, no matter what X is, consciousness or any other concept. I think you may have left something out of that question.

Aren't you interested in philosophy enough that you at least casually follow what's going on in the field? You give the impression of someone with at least a hobbyist's interest in philosophy, if not a professional interest. (And I'd expect the same of any regular participant on a board like this.)

The nature of the mind/body relationship has been one of the hottest topics in philosophy over the last 100 years. One of the primary disputes is over whether mind is physical or not, with countless infamous arguments being formulated on both sides of that dispute.

Well, if "physical" is defined as "all that exists and has the nature it has independently of any human consciousness or knowledge of it," this would imply that one of the primary disputes is over whether mind (or consciousness) "has the nature it has independently of any human consciousness or knowledge of it."

Obviously, that couldn't be right. People wouldn't be debating whether consciousness is independent of consciousness or knowledge.

So something is wrong there re "all that exists and has the nature it has independently of any human consciousness or knowledge of it" being the conventional usage of "physical" in philosophy.