A Meccano model of two Incompatibilist Fallacies

[RCSaunders]

If the determined universe unfolds in such a way that there is consciousness, ...

I love it when someone explains things in these terms that mean nothing, like, "unfolds in such a way." It's like those who try to claim consciousness, "just emerges form the chemical electrical behavior of the brain," or anything else one claims is or happens, "somehow," without explaining or even thinking it's necessary to explain what that, "somehow," is.

I have no idea what you think consciousness is (apparently something produced by something else) but nothing real just exists by some mystic unfolding of, well something, somehow.

[RogerSH]

No changes except the passage of time! That's surely quite a familiar concept?

It might be something people say and think makes sense, but it's incoherent. Again, time is IDENTICAL to change. If there are no changes, there is no time. Something has to be changing in order for there to be time. Time doesn't exist "on its own." It's simply the dynamic relations of matter.

I thought this was a side-issue, but I can see potential connections to the main issue, so I will pursue it.

Why cannot time be defined in terms of potential change? Scientific laws purport to describe all physically possible events, not just what actually happens. In a Newtonian universe, it is a true fact that a body would accelerate under the action of a force, even when in actuality there is no force being applied. So a second has elapsed when a mass of 1kg would have accelerated to 1 m/s under the action of a force of 1N, even if in fact nothing has moved or changed in any way. (This is why, of course, space and time are regarded as a given framework, ontological elements in their own right, in Newtonian metaphysics).

[RogerSH]

[Speaking generally] I don’t see that a string of ex cathedra assertions constitutes a very useful contribution to the PN forum, however tempting that practice is. Trying to understand each other’s premises and vocabulary seems more useful, so I will continue with that.

When I have another bit of free time, I’ll try to recap my original arguments in more formal terms using vocabulary that has been clarified in the dialogue with Terrapin Station as far as possible.

[Terrapin Station]

No changes except the passage of time! That's surely quite a familiar concept?

It might be something people say and think makes sense, but it's incoherent. Again, time is IDENTICAL to change. If there are no changes, there is no time. Something has to be changing in order for there to be time. Time doesn't exist "on its own." It's simply the dynamic relations of matter.

I thought this was a side-issue, but I can see potential connections to the main issue, so I will pursue it.

Why cannot time be defined in terms of potential change? Scientific laws purport to describe all physically possible events, not just what actually happens. In a Newtonian universe, it is a true fact that a body would accelerate under the action of a force, even when in actuality there is no force being applied. So a second has elapsed when a mass of 1kg would have accelerated to 1 m/s under the action of a force of 1N, even if in fact nothing has moved or changed in any way. (This is why, of course, space and time are regarded as a given framework, ontological elements in their own right, in Newtonian metaphysics).

That would also be potential time in that case. A second can't elapse if nothing changes.

[Terrapin Station]

Okay, but can you point to a scientific usage of "underdetermined" in the way you're using it? I'm not familiar with it being used in the context of anything but theorizing in the sciences, either.

I did have a quick browse so can at least answer that question!
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10 ... 01947-0_33

This contribution presents an optimization based inverse kinematics approach to determine solutions for under-determined systems.

or https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals ... 423FE857A4

…overdetermined and underdetermined kinematic problems are considered separately to derive consistent arm solutions….

It's not clear from either of those that they're not using the term to refer to theories or models rather than something about the world itself (outside of theories/models).

[Terrapin Station]

An 'intelligent' thermostat might well have a mathematical model of the immediate surroundings

How would it have that (to itself rather than to us, via our interpretation of something about the thermostat)?

This calculation - with the metaphorical "intention" of keeping the room temperature constant - would be indifferent to events like the arrival of a cosmic ray particle somewhere else.

Insofar as the intentional part goes, if that makes sense as a metaphor, we can't be saying that there's indifference. How would the metaphor work in that case?

(If we're going to be making philosophical claims about this stuff, though, we probably shouldn't be hinging our claims on metaphors rather than what's literally the case. Metaphors are going to be an issue of how an individual thinks about something, where different individuals think about things in different ways; if we're making claims hinging on metaphors, then, we're really making claims about how some individual thinks about things.)

[Terrapin Station]

There is empirical evidence of physical existents and no evidence of nonphysical existents.

Perhaps you don't mean exactly what that says, but if there are only physical existents and no nonphysical existents, you are equating physical with existence itself.

Not semantically or conceptually. Only contingently.

There are more nonphysical things that exist than physical things.

Again, there is no evidence of a single nonphysical thing. And the very notion of nonphysical things is incoherent (at least until someone makes some sense of it; but no one has so far, and almost no one even bothers trying.)

Physical existents are properly referred to as entities to distinguish them from all existents that are not physical.

No. "Entity" doesn't denote something physical, either.

If only the physical existed, there would be no knowledge, no history, no geography, no science, no philosophy, no ideas or concepts, no language, no logic, no reason, and no literature. There would be no fiction and none of the characters and events of fiction would exist--but of course they do exist, not as physical entities, not ontologically, but epistemologically and only psychologically in the conscious minds of human beings. When the last human mind ceases to exist, all those epistemological existents will cease to exist.

This is obviously not the case.

What do you take as evidence of or an argument for knowledge, history, etc. being nonphysical?

[Terrapin Station]

[Speaking generally] I don’t see that a string of ex cathedra assertions constitutes a very useful contribution to the PN forum, however tempting that practice is. Trying to understand each other’s premises and vocabulary seems more useful, so I will continue with that.

When I have another bit of free time, I’ll try to recap my original arguments in more formal terms using vocabulary that has been clarified in the dialogue with Terrapin Station as far as possible.

It's just that one needs to actually argue for claims being made against objections (and then continue to argue in light of further objections to attempts to meet objections). We have to try to understand what the other person is claiming, of course--and that's why I've continually asked for clarifications, etc.

If there's a philosophical, logical, etc. problem with something, or if something isn't clear, it's not clear that something is coherent, etc., we don't just gloss over it as a courtesy when we're doing philosophy.

[RogerSH]

I did have a quick browse so can at least answer that question!
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10 ... 01947-0_33
or https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals ... 423FE857A4

It's not clear from either of those that they're not using the term to refer to theories or models rather than something about the world itself (outside of theories/models).

Well, it seems to me that it is the thing being modelled that is being described as underdetermined. It's not the world, but it's a bit of the world, considered (as always for applied science) in a coarse-grained way.

[RCSaunders]

What do you take as evidence of or an argument for knowledge, history, etc. being nonphysical?

What I mean by physical is all that exists and has the nature it has independently of any human consciousness or knowledge of it. "Independently of," does not mean, "separate from," it means whether or not there is any human awareness or knowledge of it.

What I mean by non-physical includes everything that depends on human consciousness for it's existence and does not exist independently of human minds. All knowledge, knowledge methods (like logic, mathematics, and language) for example, only exist as human creations and do not exist independently of human minds.

I do not expect you to agree with this, since you apparently equate the meaning of the concepts, "exist," and, "physical." By your definition, the Phoenix must be physical, because the, "Phoenix," certainly exists as the concept for a mythical bird in ancient Egypt, but I think even you would say, claiming the Phoenix exists physically is absurd.

[Terrapin Station]

What I mean by physical is all that exists and has the nature it has independently of any human consciousness or knowledge of it. "Independently of," does not mean, "separate from," it means whether or not there is any human awareness or knowledge of it.

What I mean by non-physical includes everything that depends on human consciousness for it's existence and does not exist independently of human minds. All knowledge, knowledge methods (like logic, mathematics, and language) for example, only exist as human creations and do not exist independently of human minds.

You could define the terms that way, and it would work for what it's worth, but it doesn't map to any standard usage of the terms, and it makes the debates over whether consciousness is physical rather nonsensical, because obviously no one is debating on whether consciousness requires consciousness for its existence.

But sure, if you want to use terms unusually/highly idiosyncratically, you can do that.

I do not expect you to agree with this, since you apparently equate the meaning of the concepts, "exist," and, "physical."

I already addressed this above. That's not at all what I'm doing. In my view, it's rather contingently the case that everything extant is physical.

but I think even you would say, claiming the Phoenix exists physically is absurd.

I don't think it's absurd to say that concepts, imaginings etc. are physical. They're simply brain states. Brain states are physical.

But on your usage of the terms, sure, concepts, imaginings, etc. depend on consciousness. So on your usage, they wouldn't be physical, since you're defining "nonphysical" as "depending on consciousness."

[Sculptor]

“Incompatibilism” is the claim that free will is incompatible with a deterministic world.

Take four similar Meccano strips (or equivalent) and bolt them loosely together at their ends to form a rhombus. Bolt a fifth strip between two of the opposite corners. The resulting assembly has no degrees of freedom: it is determinate. Note, however, that different lengths of the diagonal strip result in different shapes of the assembly.

Consider this as a model for a world containing at least one mind. The mind is modelled by the diagonal strip, and the length of the diagonal represents its will.

Then we conclude that this world is determinate, but ALSO that the will of the included mind is able to determine the state of the world. This apparent contradiction arises because the determinism of the world equates to an absence of externally accessible freedom, whereas the freedom needed for a will to determine what happens is internally accessible freedom – accessible to a will whose state is itself a variable of the world state. The model illustrates that it is a fallacy that a lack of externally accessible freedom necessitates a lack of internally accessible freedom. This is the first Incompatibilist fallacy.

The standard reply to this kind of argument is that in addition to the ordinary kind of freedom – the freedom of a free-range chicken, for example – “freedom of will” requires the ability of the mind to choose its own state at the time of choice. This is impossible, it is claimed, because prior causes in the world provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine that state. Can anyone guess why I claim that this too is a fallacy?

You cannot use a model to prove a case. All you are doing is using a model to describe a what you think is the case.
What happens when the parts of he model are made of elastic, so that the rhombus can be moved into any shape? Where parts of the system want to be determined but through act of free will can be moved about?
What would happen if the rhombus was only tenuously connected by gas or other fluid?
Take you pick!

[Terrapin Station]

“Incompatibilism” is the claim that free will is incompatible with a deterministic world.

Take four similar Meccano strips (or equivalent) and bolt them loosely together at their ends to form a rhombus. Bolt a fifth strip between two of the opposite corners. The resulting assembly has no degrees of freedom: it is determinate. Note, however, that different lengths of the diagonal strip result in different shapes of the assembly.

Consider this as a model for a world containing at least one mind. The mind is modelled by the diagonal strip, and the length of the diagonal represents its will.

Then we conclude that this world is determinate, but ALSO that the will of the included mind is able to determine the state of the world. This apparent contradiction arises because the determinism of the world equates to an absence of externally accessible freedom, whereas the freedom needed for a will to determine what happens is internally accessible freedom – accessible to a will whose state is itself a variable of the world state. The model illustrates that it is a fallacy that a lack of externally accessible freedom necessitates a lack of internally accessible freedom. This is the first Incompatibilist fallacy.

The standard reply to this kind of argument is that in addition to the ordinary kind of freedom – the freedom of a free-range chicken, for example – “freedom of will” requires the ability of the mind to choose its own state at the time of choice. This is impossible, it is claimed, because prior causes in the world provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine that state. Can anyone guess why I claim that this too is a fallacy?

Reading this first post over now that we've gone back and forth a bit, it strikes me that there seems to be a serious lack of understanding of what incompatibilists are even saying.

One major oddity here is that they're certainly not saying something about dividing the world into anything like external and internal realms, or any other "dualism" like that.

As you claim to be a compatibilist, this appears to further cement that compatibilism always seems to be "achieved" by simply talking about something else, by reframing the terms, by reframing the discussion. That doesn't solve the issue that incompatibilists are talking about. It simply changes the channel.

[RogerSH]

“Incompatibilism” is the claim that free will is incompatible with a deterministic world.

Take four similar Meccano strips (or equivalent) and bolt them loosely together at their ends to form a rhombus. Bolt a fifth strip between two of the opposite corners. The resulting assembly has no degrees of freedom: it is determinate. Note, however, that different lengths of the diagonal strip result in different shapes of the assembly.

Consider this as a model for a world containing at least one mind. The mind is modelled by the diagonal strip, and the length of the diagonal represents its will.

Then we conclude that this world is determinate, but ALSO that the will of the included mind is able to determine the state of the world. This apparent contradiction arises because the determinism of the world equates to an absence of externally accessible freedom, whereas the freedom needed for a will to determine what happens is internally accessible freedom – accessible to a will whose state is itself a variable of the world state. The model illustrates that it is a fallacy that a lack of externally accessible freedom necessitates a lack of internally accessible freedom. This is the first Incompatibilist fallacy.

The standard reply to this kind of argument is that in addition to the ordinary kind of freedom – the freedom of a free-range chicken, for example – “freedom of will” requires the ability of the mind to choose its own state at the time of choice. This is impossible, it is claimed, because prior causes in the world provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine that state. Can anyone guess why I claim that this too is a fallacy?

Reading this first post over now that we've gone back and forth a bit, it strikes me that there seems to be a serious lack of understanding of what incompatibilists are even saying.

One major oddity here is that they're certainly not saying something about dividing the world into anything like external and internal realms, or any other "dualism" like that.

As you claim to be a compatibilist, this appears to further cement that compatibilism always seems to be "achieved" by simply talking about something else, by reframing the terms, by reframing the discussion. That doesn't solve the issue that incompatibilists are talking about. It simply changes the channel.

Absolutely no dualism intended. External and internal is not an ontological distinction but a difference in the relationship to the action of choosing, which I am saying incompatibilists OUGHT to make. I hope my recap, nearly ready, will make this clearer, though that's probably being highly optimistic

[Terrapin Station]

Absolutely no dualism intended. External and internal is not an ontological distinction but a difference in the relationship to the action of choosing,

This makes no sense. If it's some sort of distinction of relations and/or locations, it's an ontological distinction.

which I am saying incompatibilists OUGHT to make.

It's a distinction they ought to make why? If you're going to argue for compatibilism, you need to demonstrate that you understand what incompatibilists are claiming (which this thread doesn't demonstrate), and then you need to show why what they're claiming has a issues that allow compatibilism to work.