My dictionary gives three subsenses of the relevant sense of will: “the faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action”; “control or restraint deliberately exerted”; “a desire or intention”. The third is just data: a fact about the state of the faculty of will at some particular moment, and cannot be free or otherwise. The second is related to what I here call “psychological free will”, which is not your concern. The first is what formal free will is concerned with. As I see it, this faculty can also be described as “the conscious mind when engaged in decision making” (as distinct from, say, remembering, or attending to sensory input). This is why the remarkable capacity for novelty provided by human consciousness – exploiting a trillion-synapse connectome – is also available to the will.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat May 29, 2021 1:22 pmThat's what will is characterized by. Not consciousness overall. "Will" isn't the same thing as "consciousness."
The difference between formal and psychological freedom of will
Re: The difference between formal and psychological freedom of will
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 4548
- Joined: Wed Aug 03, 2016 7:18 pm
- Location: NYC Man
Re: The difference between formal and psychological freedom of will
In other words, insofar as my posting you're quoting goes, you're agreeing. "Will" isn't the same thing as "consciousness."RogerSH wrote: ↑Mon May 31, 2021 12:46 amMy dictionary gives three subsenses of the relevant sense of will: “the faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action”; “control or restraint deliberately exerted”; “a desire or intention”. The third is just data: a fact about the state of the faculty of will at some particular moment, and cannot be free or otherwise. The second is related to what I here call “psychological free will”, which is not your concern. The first is what formal free will is concerned with. As I see it, this faculty can also be described as “the conscious mind when engaged in decision making” (as distinct from, say, remembering, or attending to sensory input). This is why the remarkable capacity for novelty provided by human consciousness – exploiting a trillion-synapse connectome – is also available to the will.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat May 29, 2021 1:22 pmThat's what will is characterized by. Not consciousness overall. "Will" isn't the same thing as "consciousness."
Re: The difference between formal and psychological freedom of will
No. Your will is not free. In this case you are compelled to avoid immanent death and hand over the wallet. Were it the case in this instance that you wanted to gamble your life for your money that that too would be the determined outcome. Both acts, are an act of will, but it is not in any sense "free" since no act of will can be free of your self, your volition, your experience, and your current situation. There is no outside space you can escape to to make a decision that is beyond the cause of what and who you are.
In normal parlance being forced to act to save your own life, preserve your family or your dignity is the only valid use from which a lack of "acting freely" may be used. Such compulsions are cases of valid or mitigating activities in a legal or moral context....
Another distinction that causes confusion in the same context is between two distinct senses of “self-determination”. On the one hand there is a sort of metaphysical miracle that is equivalent to an algorithm that determines its own input data (a sure recipe for an infinite loop). (I describe this as the second fallacy in my discussion of the Meccano model). On the other hand there is the sense of self-determination that matters in psychological contexts: the construction of an evolving Self by a lifetime of ordinary choices that affect the future mental state of the chooser.
Re: The difference between formal and psychological freedom of will
Indeed not, but that is true irrespective of determinism. Only a person in such an 'outside space' would find their freedom of action constrained by the fact of being their self - and there is no such space. Your self being literally free of your self is an incoherent concept - such freedom is not lacking, just meaningless. It means no more to say a meaningless concept is absent from the world than to say it is present. This leaves the only coherent sense of freedom as that arising from the recognition that the will is precisely the creative integration of "your self, your volition, your experience, and your current situation", and the question is whether there are options available to such a will that would be possible if chosen. However, the point here is that the ability to exercise that formal freedom in a satisfactory way depends on a psychological self-identification that is very often lacking.
Re: The difference between formal and psychological freedom of will
I appears to be lacking, expecially when people seem to follow paths set out for them. Such people like any other can assume the myth of free will to convince themselves that they are not compelled.RogerSH wrote: ↑Tue Jun 01, 2021 11:50 pmIndeed not, but that is true irrespective of determinism. Only a person in such an 'outside space' would find their freedom of action constrained by the fact of being their self - and there is no such space. Your self being literally free of your self is an incoherent concept - such freedom is not lacking, just meaningless. It means no more to say a meaningless concept is absent from the world than to say it is present. This leaves the only coherent sense of freedom as that arising from the recognition that the will is precisely the creative integration of "your self, your volition, your experience, and your current situation", and the question is whether there are options available to such a will that would be possible if chosen. However, the point here is that the ability to exercise that formal freedom in a satisfactory way depends on a psychological self-identification that is very often lacking.
My feeling is that this pscyhological self identification as you call it, is present but not always applied. When it comes to the mundane decisions of life anyone is capable of chosing between a Mars bar and Snickers as long as they are alone. But often a simple task of chosing from a menu at a restaurant can be strongly influenced by what others are having.
It is present in all adults who at some point have broken away from the apron strings and had to make any decision for themselves, and this can be as simple as "I prefer Mars". But people choose to comply and to follow, because it is easier. And society is quite happy it seems to promote this sort of infantilism. This extends as far as "who am I supposed to vote for", down to stop at red lights. Some useful to society others a serious impediment to a mature society.