Conde Lucanor wrote: ↑Thu May 13, 2021 9:06 pm
Aequitas Veritas wrote:
You are shooting at your own strawman.
You have not read and do not understand Kant's full argument but yet arrogantly condemned Kant's doctrine as nonsense.
This is typical of the logical positivists [LPs] with their bastardized philosophies; the LPs will condemn any other philosophies that do not agree with theirs as nonsense, woo woo, metaphysical etc.
I have not explicitly endorsed nor implied Logical Positivism, so that's an straw man fallacy of yours. I have already stated that I'm more inclined towards Critical Realism, which is a position born in direct challenge to Logical Positivism.
In condemning TI, I'm not more arrogant than you condemning realism.
Somehow I missed this post.
I did not mean you adopted the LPs philosophies wholesale which is now defunct.
What I imply is you are adopting some bits of their views and their typical ideological stance in condemning others who do not agree with them, pejoratively, i.e. those they think are leaning toward the metaphysical.
The similarity is you are critical of my views [empirical realism and others] so arrogantly when your views [transcendental/material realism] are groundless.
Aequitas Veritas wrote:
At present, what is actual and real is confined to verification and justification empirically and philosophically within a credible specific framework and system of knowledge without any confirmation of any ontological independent entity.
At present the most credible FSK is the scientific framework and system. Thus at present, whenever people need to confirm whether a thing is real or not, they subject that thing to the scientific process to confirm its reality.
But then the scientific FSK is constructed by humans and relied on human consensus, thus what is most real at present is merely conditioned upon the human conditions.
Note what grounds scientific truth of the real is grounded on experiences, observation and the human conditions. Science [not all scientists agree with that] merely assumed there some thing independent of the human conditions but this assumption is not significant at all.
As all phenomenalists and idealists, you give the status of "actual and real" to mere constructions of language, to self-referential meanings, which end up being meaningless. That's why appealing to the "credibility" of science is one of the contradictory stances of idealism, which following its own doctrines, only leads to epistemological agnosticism and from there to the "anything goes" camp. The whole confusion stems from the epistemological assumptions of idealists: not making the appropriate distinction between what can be known and what can be. That we know what things actually are via human-conditioned epistemological constructions is not the same as things being human-constructed. Things ARE actual and real precisely because they ARE independent of humans conditions.
Somehow you are very obstinate and fixated in branding me as a phenomenalist and the typical idealist when I have stated so many times I am not.
As such that is your strawman.
I have told you a "million" times I am not the typical "idealist" but rather is an empirical realist or a transcendental idealist.
Aequitas Veritas wrote:
I had already stated and can confirm the following "humans, flesh and bone humans, exist as mind-independent objects." i.e. from the empirical realism perspective. In this case, you, I, other humans, objects in space are independent of each other.
BUT the above is subsumed within Transcendental Idealism.
What is the problem with the above?
The problem with the above is that you still refuse to answer directly and without giving resolution to the conditional clause.
You say "if X perspective, then Z is real, but X is subsumed within Y perspective".
And then when I ask what is real for Y perspective, you come back with "if X perspective, then Z is real, but X is subsumed within Y perspective".
When I ask: is Z real for Y perspective?, you repeat the same mantra.
I believe you missed my point due to your dogmatic view re transcendental realism.
Let me rephrase,
What is real-Z is only within the perspective of reality, but that is subsumed within Y.
Since there is only the perspective of reality [Kant Category of reality] there is no question of what is real-Z within perspective-Y.
To insist there is a real-Z within perspective-Y is chasing an illusion.
Aequitas Veritas wrote:
From the above it is implied, you the transcendental realist interpret the Outer Appearance of the moon as the moon-it-itself existing independent of the human conditions.
In the above view [transcendental realism] "inevitably falls into difficulties" thus has no certainty there exists also the Object corresponding to it.
In later chapters, Kant demonstrate this difficulty land the transcendental realists in clinging onto an illusion.
[...]
What I claimed is supported by texts from Kant's CPR as I have shown above, i.e. when transcendental realists claimed, say, the moon-it-itself exists as real and is absolutely independent of the human conditions, then the transcendental realist [you] is clinging on to an illusion.
No, that's the phenomenalist interpretation attributed to Berkeley.
And since it became clear that the first reception of the CPR assumed this to be Kant's position, he immediately set himself to correct it. We have gone over this before.
So, for Kant, what he calls the transcendental realist would see the Moon as a spatiotemporal object, thinking that this spatiotemporality is a property of the Moon itself, while Kant asserts is not, reducing such belief to an illusion (the object is not what it appears to be).
He's not saying there's no actual Moon or that it can be denied that an actual Moon exists, and then many interpretations depart from there about whether he thinks there must be an actual Moon for there being an appearance of a Moon or this being a mere epistemological stance, without any ontological commitment.
Show me evidence where did Berkeley,
"interpret the Outer Appearance of the moon as the moon-it-itself existing independent of the human conditions."
Berkeley interpreted outer-appearances are merely ideas in the mind from perceptions and they do not exist as thing-in-itself, thus moon-in-itself.
This is why to Berkeley, the moon do not exists if no one is perceiving but exists only in the mind of God.
Note the first critic of the CPR
wrongly assumed Kant's position to be the same as Berkeley.
Kant did not 'correct' his original position [transcendental idealism] but merely responded by making his original position clearer in the Prolegomena and elsewhere while at the same time denounced that particular critic as lazy [to understand the CPR thoroughly], ignorant and stupid.
Last few days I had been researching on the early critics of the CPR and there were critics and supporters of Kant's position in the early days while Kant was still alive.
The first review and critique was the Ferder-Garve Review which was actually a summarized version by Ferder of a more lengthy Garve's original review. Ferder deliberately presented Kant's view by associating the CPR as Berkeley's which at that time was condemned by realists.
Ferder invented such statement to make Kant look really stupid or bad [re Sassen];
Ferder-Garve wrote:From sensory appearances, which are distinguished from other representations only through the subjective condition that space and time are conjoined with them, the understanding makes objects. It makes them.
Kant never mean the bolded and it is stupid to imagine that and note the repetition "makes" to stress this stupid point.
And given that one of Kant's chief objections to the FGr was not that it got his views wrong but that it presented his conclusions in so brief and stark a fashion as to make them appear ridiculous,"
I have read the original longer Garve's Review and Garve never condemned Kant's position like what Ferder did.
Sassen commented,
Matters might have been different had Garve's version been the first review of the content of the Critique to be published, because it was written much more soberly, very much in the mode of a student who, admiring the teacher, tries to comprehend some new and difficult material.
Btw, did you read Kant retort in the appendix of the Prolegomena.
Here are some bits of it [suggest you read it yourself]..
Kant in Prolegomena wrote:I find myself, with my reviewer [1st review of the CPR – the Ferder-Garve Review], in quite another position.
He [my reviewer] seems not to see at all the real matter of the investigation with which (successfully or unsuccessfully) I have been occupied.
It is either impatience at thinking out a lengthy work, or vexation at a threatened reform of a Science in which he believed he had brought everything to perfection long ago, or, what I am unwilling to imagine, real narrow-mindedness, that prevents him from ever carrying his thoughts beyond his school - Metaphysics.
In short, he [the reviewer] passes impatiently in review a long series of Propositions, by which, without knowing their premises, we can think nothing, intersperses here and there his censure, the reason of which the reader understands just as little as the Propositions against which it is directed; and hence [his report] can neither serve the public nor damage me, in the Judgment of experts.
I should, for these reasons, have passed over this Judgment altogether, were it not that it may afford me occasion for some explanations which may in some cases save the readers of these Prolegomena from a misconception.
In order to take a position from which my reviewer could most easily set the whole work in a most unfavorable light, without venturing to trouble himself with any special investigation, he begins and ends by saying:
"This work is a System of Transcendent (or, as he translates it, of higher) Idealism."42.
A glance at this line soon showed me the sort of criticism that I had to expect,
much as though the reviewer were one who had never seen or heard of Geometry, having found a Euclid, and coming upon various figures in turning over its leaves, were to say, on being asked his opinion of it:
"The work is a text-book of drawing; the author introduces a peculiar terminology, in order to give dark, incomprehensible directions, which in the end teach nothing more than what everyone can effect by a fair natural accuracy of eye, etc."
...
The reviewer criticizes here and there, makes sweeping criticisms,
a mode prudently chosen, since it does not betray one's own Knowledge or ignorance;
a single thorough criticism in detail, had it touched the main question, as is only fair,
would have exposed, it may be my error,
or it may be my reviewer's measure of insight into this species of research.
A Judgment which seeks all that is characteristic of my book, first supposed to be metaphysically heterodox, in a mere innovation of the nomenclature, proves clearly that my would-be judge has understood nothing of the subject, and in addition, has not understood himself.
The reviewer, then, understands nothing of my work, and possibly also nothing of the spirit and essential Nature of Metaphysics itself; and it is not, what I would rather assume, the hurry of a man incensed at the labor of plodding through so many obstacles, that threw an unfavorable shadow over the work lying before him, and made its fundamental features unrecognizable.