Hume Not Consistent with his No OUGHT from IS

[Peter Holmes]

Ffs - Obviously you are wrong since you are the ignorant, dogmatic and bigoted one.

I won't say you are talking nonsense but you are ignorant in confining your views to merely kindergaternish perspectives, e.g. common sense and linguistic.

In the first place, as I had argued many times,
at a higher philosophical level,
there is NO "feature of reality"-in-itself outside language that does not have truth-value.
Whatever the 'feature of reality' it co-entangles with humans and do not exists independently by itself.

Look at the following words:

To confirm it is real, that feature of reality [fact, state of affairs, ] has to be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within credible FSK which has truth value.
E.g. the scientific FSK can confirm whether a claim is scientifically true or false.

Now, try thinking really, really hard.

Showing a feature of reality is real - that it exists, is a fact, is a state-of-affairs - is not a linguistic operation. It has nothing to do with language.

But to 'verify' or 'falsify' something is to show that it's true or false. So the question is: what kind of thing can be shown to be true or false? Can a feature of reality be - and be shown to be - true or false? Obviously not. It can only be shown to exist or not.

So the only things that can be shown to be true or false (verified or falsified) are factual assertions - linguistic expressions.

And, seemingly unaware, you acknowledge this when you say: 'the scientific FSK can confirm whether a claim is scientifically true or false.'

The use of 'verify' to mean 'confirm' is a nice demonstration of the myth of propositions at work, as in the JTB truth-condition: S knows that p iff p is true - which gets things back to front, and is, anyway, ridiculous.

But what matters is that your supposedly crucial condition - 'facts exist only within an FSK' - is irrelevant. Because, so what if they do? Showing that they exist is what matters, and that has nothing to do with language, and so nothing to do with truth and falsehood.

You say my approach is narrowly linguistic. But I'm just insisting on the difference and separation between the way things are and what we say about them.

You are VERY ignorant of reality and is stuck with your dogmatic, bigoted and ultimately metaphysical world of illusions.

1. You are merely assuming a feature of reality exists as real, that it is a fact and is a state-of-affairs even before proving it exists.
Therefore you are begging the question.

2. This is the Philosophical Realists' stance, i.e. [mine]

• [Philosophical] Realism about a certain kind of thing, is the thesis that this kind of thing has [absolute] mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

3. The most credible method to prove what you ASSUMED exists as real is to use the scientific FSK.
But what the scientific FSK conclude as real is merely based on POLISHED CONJECTURES which can be wrong at times with regard to what is supposedly real.

4. So what you had ASSUMED as real, i.e. a feature of reality exists as real, that it is a fact and is a state-of-affairs that is independent of the human minds cannot be proven AT ALL to be really-real and existing-by-itself.

5. Thus the only means a feature of reality as real, fact and is a state-of-affairs it that it co-entangled with human conditions via various FSRs & FSKs.

6. Whether the claim of reality is true or false can only be qualified to a specific FSR/FSK which is constructed by humans.

7. Your insistence and linguistic claim that a feature of reality is real - that it exists, is a fact, is a state-of-affairs, - is a linguistic operation. It has everything to do with the language you use. You are merely thinking of reality linguistically and ASSUMING an absolutely mind independent feature of reality exists as real.

Can a feature of reality be - and be shown to be - true or false? Obviously not. It can only be shown to exist or not.

8. To show whether a your ASSUMED feature of reality exists or not and verify & justify what you assumed is real, you will have to resort to 3, i.e. relying upon the most credible FSK, i.e. the scientific FSK which is merely a conjectures polisher and concluding with 'polished conjectures' [hypotheses].

9. Therefore your insistence a feature of reality is real - that it exists, is a fact, is a state-of-affairs, - is a linguistic operation only. You are merely making noises about the metaphysical illusions you ASSUMED as really real existing independently by itself.

Pay careful attention.

1 The features of reality I refer to are precisely those that are or can be empirically confirmed. I don't assume they exist. I insist that they must be demonstrable. So I insist that so-called moral features of reality must be demonstrated. And that demonstration, of course, has nothing to do with language.

2 I agree that any description of a feature of reality - any factual truth-claim - exists within a descriptive context - what you grandly call a system and framework of knowledge (FSK). There's no such thing as a context-free description.

3 But a description neither creates nor changes the thing being described. What - are we ontological idealists?

4 The denial that there are things-in-themselves is really the denial that there can be a context-free, absolute or complete description - which is correct. There can't be. Anxiety about things-in-themselves is the residue of a metaphysical delusion.

5 Diversionary flak about descriptive context, the non-existence of things-in-themselves and therefore facts-in-themselves does precisely nothing to establish the existence of moral features of reality - moral facts - which must be empirically confirmed to be credible.

[Skepdick]

1 The features of reality I refer to are precisely those that are or can be empirically confirmed. I don't assume they exist. I insist that they must be demonstrable. So I insist that so-called moral features of reality must be demonstrated. And that demonstration, of course, has nothing to do with language.

So, outside of language, how does Peter Holmes empirically comfirm to Peter Holmes that Peter Holmes is thirsty?

Maybe Peter Holmes could demonstrate the empirical confirmation for us?

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=491315 time=1611129917 user_id=15099]
Pay careful attention.

1 The features of reality I refer to are precisely those that are or can be empirically confirmed. I don't assume they exist. I insist that they must be demonstrable. So I insist that so-called moral features of reality must be demonstrated. And that demonstration, of course, has nothing to do with language.

2 I agree that any description of a feature of reality - any factual truth-claim - exists within a descriptive context - what you grandly call a system and framework of knowledge (FSK). There's no such thing as a context-free description.

3 But a description neither creates nor changes the thing being described. What - are we ontological idealists?

4 The denial that there are things-in-themselves is really the denial that there can be a context-free, absolute or complete description - which is correct. There can't be. Anxiety about things-in-themselves is the residue of a metaphysical delusion.

5 Diversionary flak about descriptive context, the non-existence of things-in-themselves and therefore facts-in-themselves does precisely nothing to establish the existence of moral features of reality - moral facts - which must be empirically confirmed to be credible.
[/quote]

1) "Morality has nothing to do with language" can be true or false depending on it's interpretation, just like moral answers. Morality has everything to do with language in that it's the external expression of our internal understanding of right and wrong. Morality has nothing to do with language in that it exists whether or not we speak of it. Morality has everything to do with language in that it is a non-individual understanding of right and wrong and Must be communicated.

Ethics (understood as that external expression and/or agreement) don't exist as directly measurable, so the insistence upon producing a measurement is itself contingent. Contingency is not the same as arbitrary, it's the same as complex, so ethical answers can still be "known" sufficiently for all intents and purposes. The demonstration of moral facts must come from logical necessity to be absolute and measurement of the relation between anecdote and effect to be statistically relevant.

2) Any description of a feature of reality is automatically bound to a metaphysical understanding of what reality is in the first place.

"A system and framework of knowledge" is better understood simply as "answers". All answers are a framework of understanding. All solution s are custom plans of action.

4) All "What is the nature of...?" questions are semantic, and Only semantic, because all "things" are patterns with a purpose, and you can't have the thing without the purpose. Defined attributes and boundary conditions are what render things from the ineffable stuff of Actuality into usable form in our minds.

[Peter Holmes]

Pay careful attention.

1 The features of reality I refer to are precisely those that are or can be empirically confirmed. I don't assume they exist. I insist that they must be demonstrable. So I insist that so-called moral features of reality must be demonstrated. And that demonstration, of course, has nothing to do with language.

2 I agree that any description of a feature of reality - any factual truth-claim - exists within a descriptive context - what you grandly call a system and framework of knowledge (FSK). There's no such thing as a context-free description.

3 But a description neither creates nor changes the thing being described. What - are we ontological idealists?

4 The denial that there are things-in-themselves is really the denial that there can be a context-free, absolute or complete description - which is correct. There can't be. Anxiety about things-in-themselves is the residue of a metaphysical delusion.

5 Diversionary flak about descriptive context, the non-existence of things-in-themselves and therefore facts-in-themselves does precisely nothing to establish the existence of moral features of reality - moral facts - which must be empirically confirmed to be credible.

1) "Morality has nothing to do with language" can be true or false depending on it's interpretation, just like moral answers. Morality has everything to do with language in that it's the external expression of our internal understanding of right and wrong. Morality has nothing to do with language in that it exists whether or not we speak of it. Morality has everything to do with language in that it is a non-individual understanding of right and wrong and Must be communicated.

Ethics (understood as that external expression and/or agreement) don't exist as directly measurable, so the insistence upon producing a measurement is itself contingent. Contingency is not the same as arbitrary, it's the same as complex, so ethical answers can still be "known" sufficiently for all intents and purposes. The demonstration of moral facts must come from logical necessity to be absolute and measurement of the relation between anecdote and effect to be statistically relevant.

2) Any description of a feature of reality is automatically bound to a metaphysical understanding of what reality is in the first place.

"A system and framework of knowledge" is better understood simply as "answers". All answers are a framework of understanding. All solution s are custom plans of action.

4) All "What is the nature of...?" questions are semantic, and Only semantic, because all "things" are patterns with a purpose, and you can't have the thing without the purpose. Defined attributes and boundary conditions are what render things from the ineffable stuff of Actuality into usable form in our minds.

1 I didn't say morality has nothing to do with language. I said that, if there are moral facts - moral features of reality - their existence and its demonstration has nothing to do with language. The existence and nature of things has nothing to do with language, and therefore can't be true or false. Only factual assertions can be true or false. To show a thing exists is not to verify it. Only factual assertions can be verified - shown to be true.

2 I find the rest of what you say unfocused and largely incomprehensible. My problem, no doubt.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=491445 time=1611170561 user_id=15099]
1 I didn't say morality has nothing to do with language. I said that, if there are moral facts - moral features of reality - their existence and its demonstration has nothing to do with language. The existence and nature of things has nothing to do with language, and therefore can't be true or false. Only factual assertions can be true or false. To show a thing exists is not to verify it. Only factual assertions can be verified - shown to be true.

2 I find the rest of what you say unfocused and largely incomprehensible. My problem, no doubt.
[/quote]

1) All factual assertions require the same appeal to language as moral assertions. Internal ideas must only be internally consistent but external ones must be externally so, and that means communication, and that means language. Whether moral features can exist outside agreed communication is immaterial, they can only be externally proven through the use of words, upon which they are therefore contingent.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Look at the following words:
Now, try thinking really, really hard.

Showing a feature of reality is real - that it exists, is a fact, is a state-of-affairs - is not a linguistic operation. It has nothing to do with language.

But to 'verify' or 'falsify' something is to show that it's true or false. So the question is: what kind of thing can be shown to be true or false? Can a feature of reality be - and be shown to be - true or false? Obviously not. It can only be shown to exist or not.

So the only things that can be shown to be true or false (verified or falsified) are factual assertions - linguistic expressions.

And, seemingly unaware, you acknowledge this when you say: 'the scientific FSK can confirm whether a claim is scientifically true or false.'

The use of 'verify' to mean 'confirm' is a nice demonstration of the myth of propositions at work, as in the JTB truth-condition: S knows that p iff p is true - which gets things back to front, and is, anyway, ridiculous.

But what matters is that your supposedly crucial condition - 'facts exist only within an FSK' - is irrelevant. Because, so what if they do? Showing that they exist is what matters, and that has nothing to do with language, and so nothing to do with truth and falsehood.

You say my approach is narrowly linguistic. But I'm just insisting on the difference and separation between the way things are and what we say about them.

You are VERY ignorant of reality and is stuck with your dogmatic, bigoted and ultimately metaphysical world of illusions.

1. You are merely assuming a feature of reality exists as real, that it is a fact and is a state-of-affairs even before proving it exists.
Therefore you are begging the question.

2. This is the Philosophical Realists' stance, i.e. [mine]

• [Philosophical] Realism about a certain kind of thing, is the thesis that this kind of thing has [absolute] mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

3. The most credible method to prove what you ASSUMED exists as real is to use the scientific FSK.
But what the scientific FSK conclude as real is merely based on POLISHED CONJECTURES which can be wrong at times with regard to what is supposedly real.

4. So what you had ASSUMED as real, i.e. a feature of reality exists as real, that it is a fact and is a state-of-affairs that is independent of the human minds cannot be proven AT ALL to be really-real and existing-by-itself.

5. Thus the only means a feature of reality as real, fact and is a state-of-affairs it that it co-entangled with human conditions via various FSRs & FSKs.

6. Whether the claim of reality is true or false can only be qualified to a specific FSR/FSK which is constructed by humans.

7. Your insistence and linguistic claim that a feature of reality is real - that it exists, is a fact, is a state-of-affairs, - is a linguistic operation. It has everything to do with the language you use. You are merely thinking of reality linguistically and ASSUMING an absolutely mind independent feature of reality exists as real.

Can a feature of reality be - and be shown to be - true or false? Obviously not. It can only be shown to exist or not.

8. To show whether a your ASSUMED feature of reality exists or not and verify & justify what you assumed is real, you will have to resort to 3, i.e. relying upon the most credible FSK, i.e. the scientific FSK which is merely a conjectures polisher and concluding with 'polished conjectures' [hypotheses].

9. Therefore your insistence a feature of reality is real - that it exists, is a fact, is a state-of-affairs, - is a linguistic operation only. You are merely making noises about the metaphysical illusions you ASSUMED as really real existing independently by itself.

Pay careful attention.

1 The features of reality I refer to are precisely those that are or can be empirically confirmed. I don't assume they exist. I insist that they must be demonstrable. So I insist that so-called moral features of reality must be demonstrated. And that demonstration, of course, has nothing to do with language.

Not for me, it is you who is now paying more attention, but it is still not enough.
So pay extra careful attention to the points below;

Your Position:
You may deny, but you are by implication ASSUMING the 'features of reality' exists as a fact which is independent of the human conditions [mind etc.].
This is is the language part where you proclaims linguistically, "X exists if and only if X exists as that is the case."
This is the Philosophical Realists' and Analytic Philosophy's position.

Then you insist what is ASSUMED or claimed be empirically demonstrable which obviously must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSR and FSK.

My Position:
1. On the other hand my Philosophical Anti-Realism or Empirical Realism do not make any ASSUMPTIONs and linguistic claims at all but based directly on what is experienced or intuited.

2. In this case, what is reality is not independent of the human conditions [mind] since humans are part and parcel of reality itself, i.e. ALL-THERE-IS.
See my thread of Enactivism - Humans are co-entangled with the Reality they are part and parcel of - you must read this critical point of my argument.
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=31690

3. What is experienced and intuited is then verified and justified empirically and philosophically as FACT within a credible FSR and FSK which is constructed by humans.

4. Then that fact is put into description for communication sake.

5. Thus what I claimed as moral fact MUST be verified and justified empirically and philosophically as a moral FACT within a credible moral FSR and FSK.
I have done that in the various posts.

SO, you need to read the above more reflectively and pay more careful attention.

I note you do not counter why facts or moral fact cannot be co-entangled with the human conditions [mind, consciousness, etc.].

2 I agree that any description of a feature of reality - any factual truth-claim - exists within a descriptive context - what you grandly call a system and framework of knowledge (FSK). There's no such thing as a context-free description.

You are ignorant of the the realization of reality is separate from the description of that reality.

There is no pre-existing reality which you have assumed as real and absolutely independent, i.e. Philosophical Realism.
What is reality is a spontaneous emergence that inevitably entangles the human conditions [mind, consciousness, etc.]
This is why you are totally ignorant of.

3 But a description neither creates nor changes the thing being described. What - are we ontological idealists?

Yes describing a thing do not change the thing described which is very obvious and logical.
Note my point above,
What is reality is a spontaneous emergence that inevitably entangles the human conditions [mind, consciousness, etc.].

4 The denial that there are things-in-themselves is really the denial that there can be a context-free, absolute or complete description - which is correct. There can't be. Anxiety about things-in-themselves is the residue of a metaphysical delusion.

Nope you got it wrong.
There is nothing to describe about things-in-themselves because they are illusions.
What can be described is merely that process of illusion and not about things-in-themselves.
There is nothing real of a square-circle that can be described.

Note things-in-themselves are contrasted with things-with-ourselves.
When you insists there are features of reality, facts, state-of-affairs existing independent of the human conditions [mind, consciousness, etc.] these are the claims of things-in-themselves [independent of human minds] which are illusory.
Thus what you claimed as facts which are independent of the human mind are things-in-themselves, and you are engaging with metaphysical delusions in the ultimate sense.

5 Diversionary flak about descriptive context, the non-existence of things-in-themselves and therefore facts-in-themselves does precisely nothing to establish the existence of moral features of reality - moral facts - which must be empirically confirmed to be credible.

Your descriptive context is a straw-man.
I am not interested in the description of reality at all in this case.

What I am interested is how reality emerged to be experienced where humans play a role in that emergence of reality.

Then that emergence or given reality experienced [perceived, cognized] must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically* within a credible FSR and FSK.
* The "philosophically" requirement is critical to give the polished-conjectures from the credible FSR/FSK [e.g. science] an additional polishing of rationality.

Note your ignorance of the points I made and pay careful attention to understand [not necessary agree with] them before you counter blindly dogmatically based on your bastardized philosophy [i.e. Philosophical Realism and Analytic Philosophy].

[Veritas Aequitas]

@Peter Holmes,

I am now reading the History of Analytic Philosophy, i.e. where you have adopted some of its bastardized philosophical ideas.

Here is the problem with your linguistic, what is fact, a feature of reality, states-of-affair, that is the case,

In the Tractatus, the early Wittgenstein wrote:

• The general form of propositions is: Such-and-such is the case. (TLP 4.5, p. 103e)

And in the Philosophical Investigations, the later-Wittgenstein wrote:

(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5):
“The general form of propositions is: Such-and-such is the case.” —That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times.
One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing around the frame through which we look at it. A picture held us captive.
And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.
(PI §§114-115, p. 48e, translation slightly modified)

The above is the bastardized philosophy of the early-Wittgenstein.

However the later-Wittgenstein discovered his earlier mistakes and made improvements, while YOU are still stuck with the early-Wittgenstein bastardized philosophy shared by the logical positivists and certain analytic philosophers.

The later-Wittgenstein wisely critique his own earlier linguistically oriented philosophy [which you are still stuck with] i.e.

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (PI §109, p. 47e)

What is your aim in philosophy? —To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (PI §309, p. 103e)

The above meant to show how to get out of the bewitchment by language.

[Peter Holmes]

@Peter Holmes,

I am now reading the History of Analytic Philosophy, i.e. where you have adopted some of its bastardized philosophical ideas.

Here is the problem with your linguistic, what is fact, a feature of reality, states-of-affair, that is the case,

In the Tractatus, the early Wittgenstein wrote:

• The general form of propositions is: Such-and-such is the case. (TLP 4.5, p. 103e)

And in the Philosophical Investigations, the later-Wittgenstein wrote:

(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5):
“The general form of propositions is: Such-and-such is the case.” —That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times.
One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing around the frame through which we look at it. A picture held us captive.
And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.
(PI §§114-115, p. 48e, translation slightly modified)

The above is the bastardized philosophy of the early-Wittgenstein.

However the later-Wittgenstein discovered his earlier mistakes and made improvements, while YOU are still stuck with the early-Wittgenstein bastardized philosophy shared by the logical positivists and certain analytic philosophers.

The later-Wittgenstein wisely critique his own earlier linguistically oriented philosophy [which you are still stuck with] i.e.

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (PI §109, p. 47e)

What is your aim in philosophy? —To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (PI §309, p. 103e)

The above meant to show how to get out of the bewitchment by language.

I've been a later-Wittgensteinian since my early twenties. So I understand very well the mistake he made in the Tractatus, how he came to recognise it, and how he painstakingly set about correcting it, not least in the Investigations.

In my own work, I've been following through the implications of his hard-won and profound insight into the nature and functions of language - summed up in the doctrine that meaning is use. And his meditations on how 'a picture held us captive', how we've been bewitched by means of language, inform what I've been saying about the difference and separation between reality and what we say about it - a distinction blurred by our use of the word 'fact'.

I think you've misunderstood what the later Wittgenstein was saying. Your claim that there are moral features of reality is ontological, pure and simple. And you, along with other moral realists and objectivists, have failed so far to demonstrate their existence - which has nothing to do with language.

[Skepdick]

I think you've misunderstood what the later Wittgenstein was saying. Your claim that there are moral features of reality is ontological, pure and simple. And you, along with other moral realists and objectivists, have failed so far to demonstrate their existence - which has nothing to do with language.

What and where is "existence" without language?

Could you please point at it; show me a photo or do something in way of demonstrating it.

[Skepdick]

Despite Wittgenstein telling you about your on-going confusion on the use of language you keep tripping up over yourselves. Almost as if you didn't understand a word of what he's saying.

Social norms about what we can and cannot say about the state of affairs are called "facts".
Social norms about what we can and cannot do when interacting with the state of affairs are called "moral facts"

This stupid Philosophical game you are all playing "correcting each other's language and way of thinking"... you are enforcing moral facts.

You OUGHT NOT say this.
You OUGHT NOT think this.

[Veritas Aequitas]

@Peter Holmes,

I am now reading the History of Analytic Philosophy, i.e. where you have adopted some of its bastardized philosophical ideas.

Here is the problem with your linguistic, what is fact, a feature of reality, states-of-affair, that is the case,

In the Tractatus, the early Wittgenstein wrote:

• The general form of propositions is: Such-and-such is the case. (TLP 4.5, p. 103e)

And in the Philosophical Investigations, the later-Wittgenstein wrote:

(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5):
“The general form of propositions is: Such-and-such is the case.” —That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times.
One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing around the frame through which we look at it. A picture held us captive.
And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.
(PI §§114-115, p. 48e, translation slightly modified)

The above is the bastardized philosophy of the early-Wittgenstein.

However the later-Wittgenstein discovered his earlier mistakes and made improvements, while YOU are still stuck with the early-Wittgenstein bastardized philosophy shared by the logical positivists and certain analytic philosophers.

The later-Wittgenstein wisely critique his own earlier linguistically oriented philosophy [which you are still stuck with] i.e.

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (PI §109, p. 47e)

What is your aim in philosophy? —To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (PI §309, p. 103e)

The above meant to show how to get out of the bewitchment by language.

I've been a later-Wittgensteinian since my early twenties. So I understand very well the mistake he made in the Tractatus, how he came to recognise it, and how he painstakingly set about correcting it, not least in the Investigations.

In my own work, I've been following through the implications of his hard-won and profound insight into the nature and functions of language - summed up in the doctrine that meaning is use. And his meditations on how 'a picture held us captive', how we've been bewitched by means of language, inform what I've been saying about the difference and separation between reality and what we say about it - a distinction blurred by our use of the word 'fact'.

Despite your denial, your use of 'feature of reality', fact, proposition, states of affairs, that is the case, in all your posting so far is definitely related to the earlier-Wittgenstein.

You have not followed the later-Wittgenstein far enough.
Are you familiar with the much later-Wittgenstein's work [just before his death] "On Certainty" where he alluded reality cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e.;

• The genesis of On Certainty was Wittgenstein's "long interest" in two famous papers by G. E. Moore, his 1939 Proof of the External World and earlier Defence of Common Sense (1925).[1] Wittgenstein thought the latter was Moore's "best article", but despite that he [Wittgenstein] did not think Moore's 'proof' of external reality decisive.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Certainty

The external reality re Moore's above refer to the typical externality reality that is independent of the human conditions as spouted by Philosophical Realists and Analytic Philosophers.

I think you've misunderstood what the later Wittgenstein was saying.

Where??
The later-Wittgenstein's thought is culminated in his work "On Certainty" not the PI.

Your claim that there are moral features of reality is ontological, pure and simple. And you, along with other moral realists and objectivists, have failed so far to demonstrate their existence - which has nothing to do with language.

You are desperate, don't keep lying and resorting to straw-man.
My view of what is moral fact has nothing to do with typical 'ontology' like those of the theists and the Platonists as below;

Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies concepts such as existence, being, becoming, and reality.
It includes the questions of how entities are grouped into basic categories and which of these entities exist on the most fundamental level.
Ontology is traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology

As I had stated a "1000" times 'what is moral fact' is the following;
There are Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

which is based on what is experienced and intuited, then verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible moral FSK [similar to the scientific FSK].

It is obvious your stance in terms of fact, feature of reality, states of affairs, that is the case, is that of the Philosophical Realists and Analytic Philosophers, which claim 'what is reality' is absolutely independent of the human conditions and that it exists as things-in-themselves.
No matter how much you deny, your stance is essentially linguistic and nothing solid with reality.
As I had stated what you are grappling with your reality is ultimately metaphysical delusions.

At present I am refreshing on the History of Analytic Philosophy and therefrom it is noted you are caught and suffocating in various whirlpools of Analytic Philosophy and Philosophical Realism, which you are totally ignorant of.

[Peter Holmes]

1 I didn't say morality has nothing to do with language. I said that, if there are moral facts - moral features of reality - their existence and its demonstration has nothing to do with language. The existence and nature of things has nothing to do with language, and therefore can't be true or false. Only factual assertions can be true or false. To show a thing exists is not to verify it. Only factual assertions can be verified - shown to be true.

2 I find the rest of what you say unfocused and largely incomprehensible. My problem, no doubt.

1) All factual assertions require the same appeal to language as moral assertions. Internal ideas must only be internally consistent but external ones must be externally so, and that means communication, and that means language. Whether moral features can exist outside agreed communication is immaterial, they can only be externally proven through the use of words, upon which they are therefore contingent.

Sorry, but I think this is nonsense. What on earth is the distinction between internal and external ideas - and to what are they internal or external? Minds - which are abstract fictions? This is furkling down the rabbit hole.

Let's try to focus. A linguistic expression can be nothing other than a linguistic expression. (I assume you agree.) And outside language, features of reality are not linguistic expressions. So, if there are moral features of reality, their existence and nature have nothing to do with language and communication. Your claim that a feature of reality can only be proven to exist through the use of words is utterly ridiculous.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=491814 time=1611338140 user_id=15099]
Sorry, but I think this is nonsense. What on earth is the distinction between internal and external ideas - and to what are they internal or external? Minds - which are abstract fictions? This is furkling down the rabbit hole.

Let's try to focus. A linguistic expression can be nothing other than a linguistic expression. (I assume you agree.) And outside language, features of reality are not linguistic expressions. So, if there are moral features of reality, their existence and nature have nothing to do with language and communication. Your claim that a feature of reality can only be proven to exist through the use of words is utterly ridiculous.
[/quote]

The distinction between internal and external ideas is whether they're backed by externally sensed measurement. Mind is a metaphor for the patterns in the brain.

All patterns in the brain are a feature of reality, even if they have no external correlate. A feature of reality can only be proven by the use of words To Others - that means externally. Your own internal morality can be anything you want, whether or not it has anything to do with external circumstances.

[Peter Holmes]

Sorry, but I think this is nonsense. What on earth is the distinction between internal and external ideas - and to what are they internal or external? Minds - which are abstract fictions? This is furkling down the rabbit hole.

Let's try to focus. A linguistic expression can be nothing other than a linguistic expression. (I assume you agree.) And outside language, features of reality are not linguistic expressions. So, if there are moral features of reality, their existence and nature have nothing to do with language and communication. Your claim that a feature of reality can only be proven to exist through the use of words is utterly ridiculous.

The distinction between internal and external ideas is whether they're backed by externally sensed measurement. Mind is a metaphor for the patterns in the brain.

All patterns in the brain are a feature of reality, even if they have no external correlate. A feature of reality can only be proven by the use of words To Others - that means externally. Your own internal morality can be anything you want, whether or not it has anything to do with external circumstances.

Sorry - more nonsense. What's the difference between internally and externally sensed measurement? What's the inside, and why is it different from the outside? Are 'brain patterns' internal or external? This is conceptually incoherent.

And repeating your ridiculous claim does nothing to support it. Showing a feature of reality exists - to yourself or to someone else - has absolutely nothing to do with language. What are you talking about? The claim that there are real moral things incurs a burden of practical proof - the kind natural scientists incur, for example. Talking about it is peripheral.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=491928 time=1611402196 user_id=15099]
[quote=Advocate post_id=491840 time=1611348812 user_id=15238]
[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=491814 time=1611338140 user_id=15099]
Sorry, but I think this is nonsense. What on earth is the distinction between internal and external ideas - and to what are they internal or external? Minds - which are abstract fictions? This is furkling down the rabbit hole.

Let's try to focus. A linguistic expression can be nothing other than a linguistic expression. (I assume you agree.) And outside language, features of reality are not linguistic expressions. So, if there are moral features of reality, their existence and nature have nothing to do with language and communication. Your claim that a feature of reality can only be proven to exist through the use of words is utterly ridiculous.
[/quote]

The distinction between internal and external ideas is whether they're backed by externally sensed measurement. Mind is a metaphor for the patterns in the brain.

All patterns in the brain are a feature of reality, even if they have no external correlate. A feature of reality can only be proven by the use of words To Others - that means externally. Your own internal morality can be anything you want, whether or not it has anything to do with external circumstances.
[/quote]
Sorry - more nonsense. What's the difference between internally and externally sensed measurement? What's the inside, and why is it different from the outside? Are 'brain patterns' internal or external? This is conceptually incoherent.

And repeating your ridiculous claim does nothing to support it. Showing a feature of reality exists - to yourself or to someone else - has absolutely nothing to do with language. What are you talking about? The claim that there are real moral things incurs a burden of practical proof - the kind natural scientists incur, for example. Talking about it is peripheral.
[/quote]

I'm sorry you don't understand my words. That just proves how necessary they are to advanced thinking.


The difference is that senses are bodily sensations and there are internal and external versions of those. The external ones are what the word reality means, to the extent they're not illusions etc., which can be known by correlating them with internal senses in the case of physical space, and what others agree matches their own senses in the case of anything your own senses aren't sufficient for. Internal "measurement" is a self-ping, not a measurement. Measurement is a matter of distinguishing boundary conditions in a replicable way. Internal boundary conditions are not the same sort of thing. Only some of your internal representations share an external component that is capable of being measured directly.

Brain patterns are internal to the brain, n'est-ce pas? The brain is biological, the patterns are psychological. Could it be more simple? I don't understand what you don't understand. I'm not relying on esoteric descriptions here, the words make sense all on their own and match Everyone's experience unless they're literally insane.

Features of reality exist as undifferentiated stuff until we distinguish them according to use. They are ineffable and useless until we formalize them sufficiently to communicate, with or without words. When it comes to external communication of those ideas, whether to share as an offering or to vet for concurrence, words are usually necessary from the beginning but even ideas that can be expressed by other symbolism such as an architectural drawing, still require words to express with actionable specificity.

Real moral things are relationships between parts, just like physics. The relationships hold true, so the ideas are true. It's like logic - the soundness of the result does not depend on the accuracy of the input. IF we want a world where nobody suffers THEN morality is X. If we want a world where everyone suffers then morality is Y. There is no contradiction there. Moral facts aren't of the kind "you should do X", they are of the kind "X produces Y results, therefore if you want Y, do X".