What could make morality objective?

[Sculptor]

Wrong!!

There is an aesthetic FSK for painting [within painters, museums, art collectors, auction houses, art experts, those who appreciate arts and others] which is objectified with actual money paid for the price of each painting in correlation to the inherent standards within the FSK.

Which has been wholly ignored by the latest generation of artists, as they, in their own time ignored the last set of ideas about what constitutes "art".
FFS

Ignoramus.

Did the latest generation ignored the Mona Lisa and many other famous realism paintings from the past?

No, not ignored, they scorned it.

[Peter Holmes]

when you say ORANGE MAN is utterly morally disgusting you state it as fact

when you say ORANGE MAN, in my opinion, is utterly morally disgusting you offer opinion

the first, by your reckoning, is false

the second, by your reckoning, is all you have

quit tryin' to have it both ways

Wrong. Since there are no moral facts, any moral assertion expresses an opinion which can't be factually verified or falsified. The linking verb 'is' has a different function in factual and non-factual assertions. Merely insisting that it doesn't begs the question.

If I say 'This painting is beautiful', I'm expressing an aesthetic opinion - and I can always explain my reasons for doing so. But if someone else says 'No, this painting is ugly - for these reasons', there's no way to settle the matter. There's no aesthetic fact of the matter. To appeal to an 'aesthetic FSK', in which there are aesthetic standards, is merely to beg the question.

Now, pari passu for moral assertions.

this doesn't seem right at all

you assume wrongly any one reading ORANGE MAN is utterly morally disgusting will take it as opinion simply becuz you adhere to a moral anti-realism...you assume readers will defer to your interpretation...obviously, this is wrong-headed of you, and more than a little insultin' to those of us who reject your view

if your intent is to communicate: do it clearly & fully...avoid presenting your opinion in the guise of fact...don't presume

The function of a non-factual assertion is to express an opinion, with which anyone else can disagree. The 'in my opinion' qualification is usually understood. And not understanding it is the mistake that moral objectivists make. They think of a moral assertion as factual - one with a truth-value (true or false) which is independent from opinion.

The assertion 'abortion is morally wrong' is an example. Nothing in reality can show that assertion to be true or false, independent from opinion - because the function of that assertion is not to describe such a feature of reality. And it's the objectivist delusion to think that it does assert a feature of reality.

A factual assertion, such as 'water is H2O', has a completely different function - and 'in my opinion' isn't part of that function.

[Belinda]

Wrong. Since there are no moral facts, any moral assertion expresses an opinion which can't be factually verified or falsified. The linking verb 'is' has a different function in factual and non-factual assertions. Merely insisting that it doesn't begs the question.

If I say 'This painting is beautiful', I'm expressing an aesthetic opinion - and I can always explain my reasons for doing so. But if someone else says 'No, this painting is ugly - for these reasons', there's no way to settle the matter. There's no aesthetic fact of the matter. To appeal to an 'aesthetic FSK', in which there are aesthetic standards, is merely to beg the question.

Now, pari passu for moral assertions.

this doesn't seem right at all

you assume wrongly any one reading ORANGE MAN is utterly morally disgusting will take it as opinion simply becuz you adhere to a moral anti-realism...you assume readers will defer to your interpretation...obviously, this is wrong-headed of you, and more than a little insultin' to those of us who reject your view

if your intent is to communicate: do it clearly & fully...avoid presenting your opinion in the guise of fact...don't presume

The function of a non-factual assertion is to express an opinion, with which anyone else can disagree. The 'in my opinion' qualification is usually understood. And not understanding it is the mistake that moral objectivists make. They think of a moral assertion as factual - one with a truth-value (true or false) which is independent from opinion.

The assertion 'abortion is morally wrong' is an example. Nothing in reality can show that assertion to be true or false, independent from opinion - because the function of that assertion is not to describe such a feature of reality. And it's the objectivist delusion to think that it does assert a feature of reality.

A factual assertion, such as 'water is H2O', has a completely different function - and 'in my opinion' isn't part of that function.

People who like Donald Trump are one group of people. People with a knowledge of chemistry are another group of people. People who say surf is beautiful are another group of people. The three groups overlap like in Venn diagrams. There is another group of people who don't fit in any of the three aforesaid groups. Like a Venn diagram can explain.


There are no absolute facts that we can be aware of . Facts are what people say are facts.

[henry quirk]

Wrong. Since there are no moral facts, any moral assertion expresses an opinion which can't be factually verified or falsified. The linking verb 'is' has a different function in factual and non-factual assertions. Merely insisting that it doesn't begs the question.

If I say 'This painting is beautiful', I'm expressing an aesthetic opinion - and I can always explain my reasons for doing so. But if someone else says 'No, this painting is ugly - for these reasons', there's no way to settle the matter. There's no aesthetic fact of the matter. To appeal to an 'aesthetic FSK', in which there are aesthetic standards, is merely to beg the question.

Now, pari passu for moral assertions.

this doesn't seem right at all

you assume wrongly any one reading ORANGE MAN is utterly morally disgusting will take it as opinion simply becuz you adhere to a moral anti-realism...you assume readers will defer to your interpretation...obviously, this is wrong-headed of you, and more than a little insultin' to those of us who reject your view

if your intent is to communicate: do it clearly & fully...avoid presenting your opinion in the guise of fact...don't presume

The function of a non-factual assertion is to express an opinion, with which anyone else can disagree. The 'in my opinion' qualification is usually understood. And not understanding it is the mistake that moral objectivists make. They think of a moral assertion as factual - one with a truth-value (true or false) which is independent from opinion.

The assertion 'abortion is morally wrong' is an example. Nothing in reality can show that assertion to be true or false, independent from opinion - because the function of that assertion is not to describe such a feature of reality. And it's the objectivist delusion to think that it does assert a feature of reality.

A factual assertion, such as 'water is H2O', has a completely different function - and 'in my opinion' isn't part of that function.

as I say: you assume wrongly any one reading ORANGE MAN is utterly morally disgusting will take it as opinion simply becuz you adhere to a moral anti-realism...you assume readers will defer to your interpretation...obviously, this is wrong-headed of you, and more than a little insultin' to those of us who reject your view

here, let me show you how to do it...

in my view, ORANGE MAN has been an effective counter against the goddamn commies

see there? I've expressed, I think, a well-founded opinion...you can tell it's my opinion cuz I included in my view...and lookee there, I did it again by includin' I think

compare those to: a man belongs to himself which is a statement of verifiable, down to earth, good old-fashioned, fact

see the difference?

[Immanuel Can]

So the inconsistency is yours, not mine.

If that's true, then you do not expect even one person to think they "ought" to share your opinion.

Is that correct?

[Immanuel Can]

Not quite: if we think there is any basis upon which we can convince others that they ought to share our moral opinion, then yes, we can only be moral objectivists.

Because for some reason, you can't imagine a non-objective basis, right?

The words "non-objective basis" are like the words, "vaporous foundation." You can imagine them, but they aren't real.

A "basis" implies substance, and "non-objective" means "no substance."

Unfortunately for the subjectivist, you cannot rationally convince anybody of anything without a basis; because any subjective moral precept falls at the simple question of a child: "Why"?

[Atla]

Not quite: if we think there is any basis upon which we can convince others that they ought to share our moral opinion, then yes, we can only be moral objectivists.

Because for some reason, you can't imagine a non-objective basis, right?

The words "non-objective basis" are like the words, "vaporous foundation." You can imagine them, but they aren't real.

A "basis" implies substance, and "non-objective" means "no substance."

Unfortunately for the subjectivist, you cannot rationally convince anybody of anything without a basis; because any subjective moral precept falls at the simple question of a child: "Why"?

All known moral bases are subjective, none of them have a why, a substance like that. In case you didn't notice, that's how the world always worked.
If the made-up basis is good enough, people can totally convince many others to accept it.

[Peter Holmes]

this doesn't seem right at all

you assume wrongly any one reading ORANGE MAN is utterly morally disgusting will take it as opinion simply becuz you adhere to a moral anti-realism...you assume readers will defer to your interpretation...obviously, this is wrong-headed of you, and more than a little insultin' to those of us who reject your view

if your intent is to communicate: do it clearly & fully...avoid presenting your opinion in the guise of fact...don't presume

The function of a non-factual assertion is to express an opinion, with which anyone else can disagree. The 'in my opinion' qualification is usually understood. And not understanding it is the mistake that moral objectivists make. They think of a moral assertion as factual - one with a truth-value (true or false) which is independent from opinion.

The assertion 'abortion is morally wrong' is an example. Nothing in reality can show that assertion to be true or false, independent from opinion - because the function of that assertion is not to describe such a feature of reality. And it's the objectivist delusion to think that it does assert a feature of reality.

A factual assertion, such as 'water is H2O', has a completely different function - and 'in my opinion' isn't part of that function.

as I say: you assume wrongly any one reading ORANGE MAN is utterly morally disgusting will take it as opinion simply becuz you adhere to a moral anti-realism...you assume readers will defer to your interpretation...obviously, this is wrong-headed of you, and more than a little insultin' to those of us who reject your view

here, let me show you how to do it...

in my view, ORANGE MAN has been an effective counter against the goddamn commies

see there? I've expressed, I think, a well-founded opinion...you can tell it's my opinion cuz I included in my view...and lookee there, I did it again by includin' I think

compare those to: a man belongs to himself which is a statement of verifiable, down to earth, good old-fashioned, fact

see the difference?

Yes, but notice that 'a woman belongs to herself' - whatever that means, and even if it's true - is not a moral assertion. If it's a factual assertion, with a truth-value independent from opinion, the 'in my view' qualification has no bearing on that truth-value. My or anyone's view, opinion, belief or judgement is irrelevant, because it's either true or false. That's how factual assertions work.

We can always clarify the function of a a non-factual assertion, such as 'this painting is beautiful' or 'slavery is morally wrong' by adding 'in my view'. Are you insisting that we all do that all the time? If so, I look forward to your saying 'in my view, slavery is morally wrong' every time. Job done. End of conversation.

[Peter Holmes]

this doesn't seem right at all

you assume wrongly any one reading ORANGE MAN is utterly morally disgusting will take it as opinion simply becuz you adhere to a moral anti-realism...you assume readers will defer to your interpretation...obviously, this is wrong-headed of you, and more than a little insultin' to those of us who reject your view

if your intent is to communicate: do it clearly & fully...avoid presenting your opinion in the guise of fact...don't presume

The function of a non-factual assertion is to express an opinion, with which anyone else can disagree. The 'in my opinion' qualification is usually understood. And not understanding it is the mistake that moral objectivists make. They think of a moral assertion as factual - one with a truth-value (true or false) which is independent from opinion.

The assertion 'abortion is morally wrong' is an example. Nothing in reality can show that assertion to be true or false, independent from opinion - because the function of that assertion is not to describe such a feature of reality. And it's the objectivist delusion to think that it does assert a feature of reality.

A factual assertion, such as 'water is H2O', has a completely different function - and 'in my opinion' isn't part of that function.

People who like Donald Trump are one group of people. People with a knowledge of chemistry are another group of people. People who say surf is beautiful are another group of people. The three groups overlap like in Venn diagrams. There is another group of people who don't fit in any of the three aforesaid groups. Like a Venn diagram can explain.


There are no absolute facts that we can be aware of . Facts are what people say are facts.

1 I've never claimed there are absolute facts. I don't even know what an absolute fact could be. What is it that you're denying exists?

2 There are just what we call facts which are, as you say, what we say they are. And we say facts are either features of reality that are or were the case, or descriptions of such features of reality whose truth-values - true or false - are independent from opinion.

3 Your Venn diagram analogy doesn't work, because it elides over the crucial difference between factual and non-factual assertions. 'The surf is beautifu'l' and 'water is H2O' aren't the same kind of assertion.

4 Yes, facts are what we say they are. But not all assertions are factual. It's that simple.

[Peter Holmes]

So the inconsistency is yours, not mine.

If that's true, then you do not expect even one person to think they "ought" to share your opinion.

Is that correct?

If you agree there's no inconsistency between the claims 'there are no moral facts' and 'X is morally wrong' - then this discussion is over. Expectation as to the effect of making an assertion - for example, belief that people should agree with it - is not relevant here.

And besides, we're talking about the supposed factual nature of moral assertions - can they have truth-value independent from opinion? This line of argument is a distraction, deflecting attention from the objectivist failure to demonstrate that they can.

[Belinda]

The function of a non-factual assertion is to express an opinion, with which anyone else can disagree. The 'in my opinion' qualification is usually understood. And not understanding it is the mistake that moral objectivists make. They think of a moral assertion as factual - one with a truth-value (true or false) which is independent from opinion.

The assertion 'abortion is morally wrong' is an example. Nothing in reality can show that assertion to be true or false, independent from opinion - because the function of that assertion is not to describe such a feature of reality. And it's the objectivist delusion to think that it does assert a feature of reality.

A factual assertion, such as 'water is H2O', has a completely different function - and 'in my opinion' isn't part of that function.

People who like Donald Trump are one group of people. People with a knowledge of chemistry are another group of people. People who say surf is beautiful are another group of people. The three groups overlap like in Venn diagrams. There is another group of people who don't fit in any of the three aforesaid groups. Like a Venn diagram can explain.


There are no absolute facts that we can be aware of . Facts are what people say are facts.

1 I've never claimed there are absolute facts. I don't even know what an absolute fact could be. What is it that you're denying exists?

2 There are just what we call facts which are, as you say, what we say they are. And we say facts are either features of reality that are or were the case, or descriptions of such features of reality whose truth-values - true or false - are independent from opinion.

3 Your Venn diagram analogy doesn't work, because it elides over the crucial difference between factual and non-factual assertions. 'The surf is beautifu'l' and 'water is H2O' aren't the same kind of assertion.

4 Yes, facts are what we say they are. But not all assertions are factual. It's that simple.

Peter,

1. What I call "an absolute fact" is a synthetic proposition that is true whether or not anyone believes it, has an opinion about it.

2.As your comment.

3.What you call "non-factual assertions" are what I call lies. You say "the surf is beautiful" is non-factual. I say "the surf is beautiful" is a synthetic proposition which , same as "water is H2O", can be justified by reference to criteria of beauty or criteria of truth. All synthetic propositions are justified by reference to criteria . In that sense truth is beauty and beauty is truth because claims about beauty and truth are claims about reality.

A criterion may be publicly observable experiments and nomenclature like chemists do, or a criterion may be an individual's feeling of pleasure, or a criterion may be a sacred text.
True, I daresay most people would agree with you, Peter, that there is an ontic difference between salt and surf, or between a statement about chemistry and a statement about affect. But there exists no ontic difference between one claim and another because all synthetic claims are tentative anyway: all synthetic claims hang on other synthetic claims ad infinitum.

4. Assertions that are not factual are lies. It is that simple.I challenge you to show me an assertion which is neither a deliberate lie, nor true regardless of context.

[Peter Holmes]

People who like Donald Trump are one group of people. People with a knowledge of chemistry are another group of people. People who say surf is beautiful are another group of people. The three groups overlap like in Venn diagrams. There is another group of people who don't fit in any of the three aforesaid groups. Like a Venn diagram can explain.


There are no absolute facts that we can be aware of . Facts are what people say are facts.

1 I've never claimed there are absolute facts. I don't even know what an absolute fact could be. What is it that you're denying exists?

2 There are just what we call facts which are, as you say, what we say they are. And we say facts are either features of reality that are or were the case, or descriptions of such features of reality whose truth-values - true or false - are independent from opinion.

3 Your Venn diagram analogy doesn't work, because it elides over the crucial difference between factual and non-factual assertions. 'The surf is beautifu'l' and 'water is H2O' aren't the same kind of assertion.

4 Yes, facts are what we say they are. But not all assertions are factual. It's that simple.

Peter,

1. What I call "an absolute fact" is a synthetic proposition that is true whether or not anyone believes it, has an opinion about it.

2.As your comment.

3.What you call "non-factual assertions" are what I call lies. You say "the surf is beautiful" is non-factual. I say "the surf is beautiful" is a synthetic proposition which , same as "water is H2O", can be justified by reference to criteria of beauty or criteria of truth. All synthetic propositions are justified by reference to criteria . In that sense truth is beauty and beauty is truth because claims about beauty and truth are claims about reality.

A criterion may be publicly observable experiments and nomenclature like chemists do, or a criterion may be an individual's feeling of pleasure, or a criterion may be a sacred text.
True, I daresay most people would agree with you, Peter, that there is an ontic difference between salt and surf, or between a statement about chemistry and a statement about affect. But there exists no ontic difference between one claim and another because all synthetic claims are tentative anyway: all synthetic claims hang on other synthetic claims ad infinitum.

4. Assertions that are not factual are lies. It is that simple.I challenge you to show me an assertion which is neither a deliberate lie, nor true regardless of context.

Thanks, Belinda, but I don't think this makes sense.

1 I assume you're using the standard analytic/synthetic distinction between assertions - and that the truth-value of synthetic assertions depends on features of reality being or not being the case. And if so, that distinction assumes that it's possible to make assertions with such truth-value. That, for example, it's possible to say 'water is H2O' is true regardless of anyone's opinion. If you think that's not possible, then talk of synthetic assertions is pointless.

2 If you accept my description of what we call facts, as in my 2, what you say about the tentativeness of factual assertions is incoherent.

3 Justification by criteria is the crux of our argument. The criteria for justifying factual assertions are features of reality - things as they are. And things as they are are neither beautiful nor ugly, neither morally good nor morally bad - which is why a thing can be considered either beautiful or ugly, morally good or morally bad. To say such judgements depend on previously standardised criteria merely begs the question. Your assertion 'claims about beauty and truth are claims about reality' is incoherent - it's a category error. 'Water is H2O' isn't a claim about truth. It's a factual claim about water that assumes the possibility of synthetic truth.

4 This straw man about context is irritating. VA keeps conjuring it up as well. To repeat: yes, all descriptions - all truth-claims - are contextual and make a conventional use of signs. So the very idea of an assertion being 'true regardless of context' is dead in the water. Your challenge is incoherent.

To finish. Your parting shot about infinite regress is also a distraction. A justification is nothing more than an explanation, and explanations come to an end. That we can always say more does not mean we can never say enough. What could be the foundation for what we say that you say doesn't exist?

[Belinda]

1 I've never claimed there are absolute facts. I don't even know what an absolute fact could be. What is it that you're denying exists?

2 There are just what we call facts which are, as you say, what we say they are. And we say facts are either features of reality that are or were the case, or descriptions of such features of reality whose truth-values - true or false - are independent from opinion.

3 Your Venn diagram analogy doesn't work, because it elides over the crucial difference between factual and non-factual assertions. 'The surf is beautifu'l' and 'water is H2O' aren't the same kind of assertion.

4 Yes, facts are what we say they are. But not all assertions are factual. It's that simple.

Peter,

1. What I call "an absolute fact" is a synthetic proposition that is true whether or not anyone believes it, has an opinion about it.

2.As your comment.

3.What you call "non-factual assertions" are what I call lies. You say "the surf is beautiful" is non-factual. I say "the surf is beautiful" is a synthetic proposition which , same as "water is H2O", can be justified by reference to criteria of beauty or criteria of truth. All synthetic propositions are justified by reference to criteria . In that sense truth is beauty and beauty is truth because claims about beauty and truth are claims about reality.

A criterion may be publicly observable experiments and nomenclature like chemists do, or a criterion may be an individual's feeling of pleasure, or a criterion may be a sacred text.
True, I daresay most people would agree with you, Peter, that there is an ontic difference between salt and surf, or between a statement about chemistry and a statement about affect. But there exists no ontic difference between one claim and another because all synthetic claims are tentative anyway: all synthetic claims hang on other synthetic claims ad infinitum.

4. Assertions that are not factual are lies. It is that simple.I challenge you to show me an assertion which is neither a deliberate lie, nor true regardless of context.

Thanks, Belinda, but I don't think this makes sense.

1 I assume you're using the standard analytic/synthetic distinction between assertions - and that the truth-value of synthetic assertions depends on features of reality being or not being the case. And if so, that distinction assumes that it's possible to make assertions with such truth-value. That, for example, it's possible to say 'water is H2O' is true regardless of anyone's opinion. If you think that's not possible, then talk of synthetic assertions is pointless.

2 If you accept my description of what we call facts, as in my 2, what you say about the tentativeness of factual assertions is incoherent.

3 Justification by criteria is the crux of our argument. The criteria for justifying factual assertions are features of reality - things as they are. And things as they are are neither beautiful nor ugly, neither morally good nor morally bad - which is why a thing can be considered either beautiful or ugly, morally good or morally bad. To say such judgements depend on previously standardised criteria merely begs the question. Your assertion 'claims about beauty and truth are claims about reality' is incoherent - it's a category error. 'Water is H2O' isn't a claim about truth. It's a factual claim about water that assumes the possibility of synthetic truth.

4 This straw man about context is irritating. VA keeps conjuring it up as well. To repeat: yes, all descriptions - all truth-claims - are contextual and make a conventional use of signs. So the very idea of an assertion being 'true regardless of context' is dead in the water. Your challenge is incoherent.

To finish. Your parting shot about infinite regress is also a distraction. A justification is nothing more than an explanation, and explanations come to an end. That we can always say more does not mean we can never say enough. What could be the foundation for what we say that you say doesn't exist?

Peter, what I mean by "a synthetic proposition" is when someone proposes two or more attributes belong together. Thus, God is good
might be either synthetic or analytic , or even not a proposition at all but a devotional act.
Thus also water is H2O
proposes water is that which is composed of hydrogen and oxygen etc.
Take for instance water is H2O . It is a fact that water is indeed H2O by virtue of beliefs about chemistry. However, I think you will agree with me that chemistry is not an invention of Almighty God but is a human idea. As human idea, chemistry will not exist when men no longer think chemical thoughts.

All contexts are related to other contexts and so on ad infinitum. People who believe there exists an Ultimate Context are God-believers in the most general sense .NB I am not decrying this degree of God belief. Explanations do not come to an end except for explanations that end with Ultimate Order.

[Immanuel Can]

All known moral bases are subjective,

"All known to me," you mean. Other people claim there are other bases, of course. It seems you just happen to choose to just deny those bases are real.

But that's just a tu quoque fallacy. Even if we suppose that all other bases people propose for morality are illusions, that doesn't help the subjectivist one bit; for he is still utterly without a basis himself. So, if he's honest, he has to admit that, and say, "I have opinion X about action Y, and you have opinion Z about action Y; both are nothing more than opinions, so we are equal, and you can continue to believe Z, rather than my X.

So you can't even say, "Morally, you ought to believe in moral subjectivism." For in that case, there's nothing morally wrong with believing in moral objectivism instead.

So why are you arguing, if you're so honest a subjectivist that you would never try to compel anyone else to your view? As a subjectivist, you must know that there are no reasons or evidence you can bring to bear on the question, as that would turn you objectivist.

So what are you saying? All you CAN say is that there is no morality at all -- that, or you can turn mere propagandist, campaigning for moral precepts as if they were objective, whereas you yourself know they are all nothing more than subjective.

Are you being a propagandist? Are you pushing for moral subjectivism, all the while knowing nobody can have rational bases or grounds for choosing it? Or do you actually believe moral subjectivism is objectively morally right? But if you do, then you're not a moral subjectivist anymore.

That's a dilly of a pickle you've got there.

[Immanuel Can]

So the inconsistency is yours, not mine.

If that's true, then you do not expect even one person to think they "ought" to share your opinion.

Is that correct?

If you agree there's no inconsistency between the claims 'there are no moral facts' and 'X is morally wrong' - then this discussion is over.

I don't, of course. They're utterly inconsistent.

Expectation as to the effect of making an assertion - for example, belief that people should agree with it - is not relevant here.

I agree.

So the subjectivist has no basis for suggesting anybody else OUGHT to BE a subjectivist. So why are you still arguing, if not because you expect to get some effect from making the assertion?

You can't have any rational basis for your moral claim, for if you did, you'd be a moral objectivist. So it's not bad if we should happen to choose to disbelieve you, and happen to prefer objective morality. That's not objectively immoral, you have to believe.