The Limit of Emotions/Passions in Morality

[Veritas Aequitas]

According to Hume, reason-alone do not play a primary role in Morality in terms of right and wrong actions.
Hume insisted it is emotions and passions that are of primary significance in anything to do with morality while reasons play a very secondary role in guiding actions after emotions/passions has activated moral actions.

This is why Hume asserted "Reason Ought to be the Slave of Passions."
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30016

Whilst Hume did his best, he could only rely on whatever knowledge available in the 18th century.

Now in the 20th century with the advancement of scientific knowledge of the human brain and psychology, what Hume asserted then can only be - relatively - very archaic.
Thus it is very embarrassing of the moral-facts-deniers like Peter Holmes, et. al. to bank on Hume's conclusions to deny the existence of moral facts.

Lately there are lots of researches that indicate strongly emotions and passion play a secondary role to reason in terms of morality and moral judgement.

Here is one article to support that point;

• The Limits of Emotion in Moral judgment
  Joshua May
  
  In: The Many Moral rationalisms
  EDITED By Karen Jones and François Schroeter
  
  CONTENT of Chapterr
  1.. Introduction
  2.0 Reason vs. Emotion
  3.0 Dispassionate Moral cognition
  • 3.1 Unconscious Moral reasoning
    3.2 Moral cognition, Fast and Slow
  4.0 Moralizing with Emotions
  • 4.1 Moralizing Conventions with Disgust
    4.2 Amplifying with Incidental Emotions
  5.0 Psychopathology
  • 5.1 Psychopathy
    5.2 Lesion Studies
  6.0 Conclusion
  ## Reference

To learn more of Joshua's view read his article above.

Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is the Introduction in the above article [with a small omission and a slight rearrangement of paras - subtitles = mine];

.........................................
1.. Introduction

[Moral Sentimentalism versus Moral Rationalism]
As a psychological theory, moral sentimentalism is the view that “gives the emotions a constitutive role in evaluative judgment” (D’Arms and Jacboson 2014: 254) or at least that ultimately “moral judgment is grounded in affective response” (Nichols 2004: 83).

The contrasting tradition of moral rationalism maintains that moral judgment fundamentally “derives from our rational capacities” (Kennett 2006: 70) or is ultimately “the culmination of a process of reasoning” (Maibom 2010: 999).
According to rationalists, emotions are either merely the natural consequences of reasoning or provide just one way of instigating or facilitating reasoning.

To a great extent the debate between rationalists and sentimentalists is hostage to empirical research.


[The sentimentalist orthodoxy Views]
More recently, there has been something of an “affect revolution” in moral psychology, as Jonathan Haidt puts it (2003: 852).
There is apparently converging scientific evidence that emotions play a foundational role in moral judgment.
Jesse Prinz, for example, proclaims: “Current evidence favors the conclusion that ordinary moral judgments are emotional in nature” (2006: 30).
Similarly, following Hume’s famous derogation of reason, Haidt concludes that “the emotions are in fact in charge of the temple of morality and that moral reasoning is really just a servant masquerading as the high priest” (2003: 852).

We will then reconsider the empirical support for sentimentalism.
It will emerge that there is no compelling evidence that the affective component of emotions is causally necessary or sufficient for making a moral judgment or for treating norms as distinctively moral.

[In Favor of Moral Rationalism]
Against the sentimentalist orthodoxy[/b], we will see that rationalism is well supported by our best science of morality.
We will start by building a brief presumptive case in favor of rationalism by appealing to evidence that much of moral judgment involves reasoning that is sensitive primarily to the outcomes of an action and how involved an agent was in bringing them about.

Ultimately, while moral judgment is largely driven by automatic intuitions, these should not be mistaken for emotions, or at least not for their non-cognitive components.
...............................

Btw, Joshua May did not insist emotions and passion play no role in morality, except that they are secondary to the primary role of reasons within the moral domain.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is one reason why Hume is so obsessed to play down reason as the main role within morality.
His target was against theists and without greater knowledge of the brain, he had to sacrifice the primary role of reason within morality instead rather he clung on to passions/emotions are critical to morality.

7.1 Moral Rationalism: Critical Phase in the Treatise
Hume thinks that “systems and hypotheses” have also “perverted our natural understanding” of morality. The views of the moral rationalists—Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), Locke and William Wollaston (1660–1724)—are prominent among them. One distinctive, but unhealthy, aspect of modern moral philosophy, Hume believes, is that it allies itself with religion and thus sees itself as serving the interests of “popular superstition”. Clarke’s theory and those of the other rationalists epitomize this tendency.
....
....
The real problem, however, is that Hutcheson just claims—hypothesizes—that we possess a unique, original moral sense. If asked why we have a moral sense, his reply is that God implanted it in us. Although in his critical phase Hume freely borrows many of Hutcheson’s arguments to criticize moral rationalism, his rejection of a God-given moral sense puts him on a radically different path from Hutcheson in his constructive phase. One way of understanding Hume’s project is to see it as an attempt to naturalize Hutcheson’s moral sense theory. He aims to provide a wholly naturalistic and economical explanation of how we come to experience the moral sentiments that also explains why we approve of the different virtues. In the course of explaining the moral sentiments, Hutcheson’s idea of an original moral sense disappears from Hume’s account of morality.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume ... tCriPhaTre

[Peter Holmes]

Whether moral judgement comes from reason or emotion, or some combination of the two, has no bearing on the status and function of moral assertions.

For example, our judgement that slavery is morally wrong may derive from rational considerations, or emotional disgust and outrage, or both. But neither cause confers factual status on the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong', because that expresses a moral judgement.

All moral realist and objectivist arguments try to establish the conclusion: therefore it's a fact that X is morally right/wrong.

And that's the fundamental, category-erroneous mistake. A moral assertion doesn't make a verifiable or falsifiable factual claim - with a truth-value - about reality. So it can never be a fact that X is morally right/wrong.

[Skepdick]

Whether moral judgement comes from reason or emotion, or some combination of the two, has no bearing on the status and function of moral assertions.

Are you ever going to tell us what the function of status is, or are you going to keep us mystified ?

A moral assertion doesn't make a verifiable or falsifiable factual claim - with a truth-value - about reality. So it can never be a fact that X is morally right/wrong.

Of course "wrongness" is verifiable! The verificationism principle is explicitly about verifying meaning.

How could we verify what "wrong" means?

Here is the verification procedure I propose: Attempt to murder Peter Holmes.

If Peter Holmes resists being murdered - that verifies wrongness.
If Peter Holmes doesn't resist being murdered - that falsifies wrongness.

When are we doing the experiment?

If you refuse to propose a verification procedure, and you reject mine... I suggest you stop using the word "wrong" until you figure out how to tell us what you mean by it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Whether moral judgement comes from reason or emotion, or some combination of the two, has no bearing on the status and function of moral assertions.

Are you ever going to tell us what the function of status is, or are you going to keep us mystified ?

A moral assertion doesn't make a verifiable or falsifiable factual claim - with a truth-value - about reality. So it can never be a fact that X is morally right/wrong.

Of course "wrongness" is verifiable! The verificationism principle is explicitly about verifying meaning.

How could we verify what "wrong" means?

Here is the verification procedure I propose: Attempt to murder Peter Holmes.

If Peter Holmes resists being murdered - that verifies wrongness.
If Peter Holmes doesn't resist being murdered - that falsifies wrongness.

When are we doing the experiment?

If you refuse to propose a verification procedure, and you reject mine... I suggest you stop using the word "wrong" until you figure out how to tell us what you mean by it.

I'll buy the above.

The fact is all normal human beings will confirm your test, i.e. they will definitely resist being murdered, i.e. verify and confirm wrongness.

In another perspective I have demonstrated all humans are "programmed" with an ought-not-to-kill neural algorithm which is why all normal humans will not simply kill in their ordinary life except forced to where the inherent existing no-killing 'program' is overridden.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Whether moral judgement comes from reason or emotion, or some combination of the two, has no bearing on the status and function of moral assertions.

For example, our judgement that slavery is morally wrong may derive from rational considerations, or emotional disgust and outrage, or both. But neither cause confers factual status on the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong', because that expresses a moral judgement.

All moral realist and objectivist arguments try to establish the conclusion: therefore it's a fact that X is morally right/wrong.

And that's the fundamental, category-erroneous mistake. A moral assertion doesn't make a verifiable or falsifiable factual claim - with a truth-value - about reality. So it can never be a fact that X is morally right/wrong.

Note Skepdick's post and my additional comments above.

I have already countered that your 'what is fact' [very conditional] is not relevant for the Moral Framework and System. See my,

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Obviously if you insist on sticking to your specific and limited Linguistic Framework and System of 'what is fact', there is no way you will accept the existence of moral facts within reality, but that is only because of your bigotry, dogmatism and ignorance.

Btw, repeat,
your objections is only effective to counter Moral Objectivity claimed by theists and platonists. Your counter has no teeth nor bite on moral facts claimed by Moral Empirical Realists who justify their moral facts empirically and philosophically as justified true moral beliefs.

[Peter Holmes]

Whether moral judgement comes from reason or emotion, or some combination of the two, has no bearing on the status and function of moral assertions.

For example, our judgement that slavery is morally wrong may derive from rational considerations, or emotional disgust and outrage, or both. But neither cause confers factual status on the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong', because that expresses a moral judgement.

All moral realist and objectivist arguments try to establish the conclusion: therefore it's a fact that X is morally right/wrong.

And that's the fundamental, category-erroneous mistake. A moral assertion doesn't make a verifiable or falsifiable factual claim - with a truth-value - about reality. So it can never be a fact that X is morally right/wrong.

Note Skepdick's post and my additional comments above.

I have already countered that your 'what is fact' [very conditional] is not relevant for the Moral Framework and System. See my,

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Obviously if you insist on sticking to your specific and limited Linguistic Framework and System, there is no way you will accept the existence of moral facts within reality, but that is only because of your bigotry, dogmatism and ignorance.

Btw, repeat,
your objections is only effective to counter Moral Objectivity claimed by theists and platonists. Your counter has no teeth nor bite on moral facts claimed by Moral Empirical Realists who justify their moral facts empirically and philosophically as justified true moral beliefs.

Inference: people don't want to be enslaved; therefore slavery is morally wrong.

What's the connection between those two claims? Why does the second follow from the first? Why does the first entail the second?

If people wanted to be enslaved, would that mean slavery is not morally wrong? Is what people do and don't want the criterion for moral rightness and wrongness? If (as I assume) your answer is 'no' - go back to your claim and apply the same test.

You call yourself a moral empirical realist. Moral realism is the claim that there's a moral reality with real moral things in it. And empiricism is the claim that knowledge comes from experience - usually understood to mean something like sense data. So you claim that we can have sensory experience of a moral reality with real moral things in it. And in this experience, language and arguments are irrelevant.

Yours is the burden of proof, unmet so far, to my knowledge. Your claim is as unsupported as the theistic and platonic claims that you so deride. You're as deluded a metaphysician as any other moral realist.

[Skepdick]

Inference: people don't want to be enslaved; therefore slavery is morally wrong.

What's the connection between those two claims? Why does the second follow from the first? Why does the first entail the second?

It's difficult to answer before we understand what it is that you are asking for.

Why are you asking "why"?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have already countered that your 'what is fact' [very conditional] is not relevant for the Moral Framework and System. See my,

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Obviously if you insist on sticking to your specific and limited Linguistic Framework and System, there is no way you will accept the existence of moral facts within reality, but that is only because of your bigotry, dogmatism and ignorance.

Btw, repeat,
your objections is only effective to counter Moral Objectivity claimed by theists and platonists. Your counter has no teeth nor bite on moral facts claimed by Moral Empirical Realists who justify their moral facts empirically and philosophically as justified true moral beliefs.

Inference: people don't want to be enslaved; therefore slavery is morally wrong.

What's the connection between those two claims? Why does the second follow from the first? Why does the first entail the second?

I have already explained the above a "1000" times but because you are so dogmatic and bigoted, there is no way the message will get through.

Note the meaning of "wrong"

• Wrong:
  1. not correct or true; incorrect.; "that is the wrong answer"
  2. in an unsuitable or undesirable manner or direction.;
  3. an unjust, dishonest, or immoral act.;
  misdeed; bad deed; bad act/action; offence; injury; crime; unlawful act; illegal act; violation; infringement; infraction; transgression; peccadillo; sin; injustice; unfairness; unjust act; grievance; outrage; atrocity; malfeasance; tort; trespass; malefaction
  act unjustly or dishonestly towards.;

The more relevant meaning of 'wrong' in this case is 'undesirable' and unjust.

Thus:

• P1. people don't want to be enslaved - a moral issue;
  P2. "Don't want" = undesirable = wrong [see dictionary];
  C1. therefore slavery is morally wrong.

As I had asserted, 100% of all 'normal' human beings do not want to be enslave.
That itself is inductively true [similar to Science], therefore slavery is wrong.

The above wrongness is supported by the banning and chattel slavery is legally a crime in all sovereign nations.

Morality within its specific Moral FSK is what humans ought-to or ought-not-to do on a voluntarily basis. This as I have shown is inductively true.

Other than the above which is sufficient, I have other means to justify why slavery is morally.

If people wanted to be enslaved, would that mean slavery is not morally wrong? Is what people do and don't want the criterion for moral rightness and wrongness? If (as I assume) your answer is 'no' - go back to your claim and apply the same test.

Yes, it is a "NO" because it is not supported by evidence at all like ALL 'normal' humans want to be enslaved by another human.
Do you even have a tiny bit of evidence to support the above thesis??

"what people do and don't want" is not the sole criterion for moral rightness and wrongness.
Rather "what people do and don't want" has to be considered within a constituted Moral Framework and System with what humans ought-to or ought-not-to do on a voluntarily basis.

Whatever principles and processes within the Moral Framework must be empirically and philosophically justified.
One principle of the Moral FSK is the avoidance of terrible sufferings [physically and psychologically], terrible pains, torture, and the likes which ALL "normal" human beings would want to avoid.
There are many other principles and practices to be considered within the Moral FSK.

You call yourself a moral empirical realist. Moral realism is the claim that there's a moral reality with real moral things in it. And empiricism is the claim that knowledge comes from experience - usually understood to mean something like sense data. So you claim that we can have sensory experience of a moral reality with real moral things in it. And in this experience, language and arguments are irrelevant.

Yours is the burden of proof, unmet so far, to my knowledge. Your claim is as unsupported as the theistic and platonic claims that you so deride. You're as deluded a metaphysician as any other moral realist.

I am not here to convince you and your dogmatic and bigoted stance.
The above posts and discussion are merely opportunity to express my views for my own personal interests in reinforcing my own knowledge of Morality and Ethics.
You can stick to whatever views you are clinging onto.

My point re slavery is not arbitrary but based on observations, i.e. empirical evidences and personal experience [..I would not want to be enslaved] to an understanding of human nature.
There are loads of empirical-based research concluding on the evil_ness of chattel slavery and other forms of slavery. Suggest you research on them.

You're as deluded a metaphysician as any other moral realist.

Note this survey in the current modern time = not during the flat-earther days;

A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).
wiki-moral realism

Your stance is only represented by 28% and effectively could be much less than that.

The above is not definite but give us a clue of where your stance is [not credible] and that moral realism has greater support than your stance which is based on some sort of bastardized philosophy.

Btw, so far I have spent 14 months researching full time on Morality and Ethics so I do have some reasonable credibility in supporting my stance of moral empirical realism.

[Peter Holmes]

I have already countered that your 'what is fact' [very conditional] is not relevant for the Moral Framework and System. See my,

• There are Moral Facts
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Obviously if you insist on sticking to your specific and limited Linguistic Framework and System, there is no way you will accept the existence of moral facts within reality, but that is only because of your bigotry, dogmatism and ignorance.

Btw, repeat,
your objections is only effective to counter Moral Objectivity claimed by theists and platonists. Your counter has no teeth nor bite on moral facts claimed by Moral Empirical Realists who justify their moral facts empirically and philosophically as justified true moral beliefs.

Inference: people don't want to be enslaved; therefore slavery is morally wrong.

What's the connection between those two claims? Why does the second follow from the first? Why does the first entail the second?

I have already explained the above a "1000" times but because you are so dogmatic and bigoted, there is no way the message will get through.

Note the meaning of "wrong"

• Wrong:
  1. not correct or true; incorrect.; "that is the wrong answer"
  2. in an unsuitable or undesirable manner or direction.;
  3. an unjust, dishonest, or immoral act.;
  misdeed; bad deed; bad act/action; offence; injury; crime; unlawful act; illegal act; violation; infringement; infraction; transgression; peccadillo; sin; injustice; unfairness; unjust act; grievance; outrage; atrocity; malfeasance; tort; trespass; malefaction
  act unjustly or dishonestly towards.;

The more relevant meaning of 'wrong' in this case is 'undesirable' and unjust.

Thus:

• P1. people don't want to be enslaved - a moral issue;
  P2. "Don't want" = undesirable = wrong [see dictionary];
  C1. therefore slavery is morally wrong.

As I had asserted, 100% of all 'normal' human beings do not want to be enslave.
That itself is inductively true [similar to Science], therefore slavery is wrong.

So your argument is: what people find undesirable and unjust is morally wrong; and therefore, what people find desirable and just is morally right.

So, for example, if people think welcoming asylum seekers is undesirable and unjust, then welcoming them is morally wrong. And, for example, if people want to kill animals for sport - if they desire to do so - then doing so is morally right.

I denounce your criterion for moral rightness and wrongness as morally disgusting. And patently not at all objective.

The above wrongness is supported by the banning and chattel slavery is legally a crime in all sovereign nations.

Morality within its specific Moral FSK is what humans ought-to or ought-not-to do on a voluntarily basis. This as I have shown is inductively true.

Other than the above which is sufficient, I have other means to justify why slavery is morally.

No, the above is demonstrably insufficient - and morally degenerate.

If people wanted to be enslaved, would that mean slavery is not morally wrong? Is what people do and don't want the criterion for moral rightness and wrongness? If (as I assume) your answer is 'no' - go back to your claim and apply the same test.

Yes, it is a "NO" because it is not supported by evidence at all like ALL 'normal' humans want to be enslaved by another human.
Do you even have a tiny bit of evidence to support the above thesis??

[/quote]
Do you really not understand the point I'm making? I find that very hard to believe. But I'll spell it out again. If you agree that the criterion for moral rightness and wrongness is NOT what people want, then you are demolishing your claim that people not wanting to be enslaved means that slavery is morally wrong.{quote]

"what people do and don't want" is not the sole criterion for moral rightness and wrongness.
Rather "what people do and don't want" has to be considered within a constituted Moral Framework and System with what humans ought-to or ought-not-to do on a voluntarily basis.[/quote]
Blather. If ought-to and ought-not-to are the criteria for moral rightness and wrongness, then what people want is irrelevant. Their wanting not be enslaved is irrelevant if they ought to be enslaved. Their wanting to kill each other is irrelevant if they ought not to kill each other. You're just asserting, without evidence, that there are moral oughts and ought-nots - moral facts.

Whatever principles and processes within the Moral Framework must be empirically and philosophically justified.
One principle of the Moral FSK is the avoidance of terrible sufferings [physically and psychologically], terrible pains, torture, and the likes which ALL "normal" human beings would want to avoid.
There are many other principles and practices to be considered within the Moral FSK.

Your invention of 'the moral framework and system of knowledge' does nothing to establish moral objectivity. All you are saying is: there are moral facts that can be known, so there are moral facts that can be known. It's laughable.

You call yourself a moral empirical realist. Moral realism is the claim that there's a moral reality with real moral things in it. And empiricism is the claim that knowledge comes from experience - usually understood to mean something like sense data. So you claim that we can have sensory experience of a moral reality with real moral things in it. And in this experience, language and arguments are irrelevant.

Yours is the burden of proof, unmet so far, to my knowledge. Your claim is as unsupported as the theistic and platonic claims that you so deride. You're as deluded a metaphysician as any other moral realist.

I am not here to convince you and your dogmatic and bigoted stance.
The above posts and discussion are merely opportunity to express my views for my own personal interests in reinforcing my own knowledge of Morality and Ethics.
You can stick to whatever views you are clinging onto.

Sorry, but this is disingenuous. You've bombarded us with post after post making an argument for moral objectivity - the existence of moral facts - and I and others have refuted every attempt - from which you seem to have learned nothing.

My point re slavery is not arbitrary but based on observations, i.e. empirical evidences and personal experience [..I would not want to be enslaved] to an understanding of human nature.
There are loads of empirical-based research concluding on the evil_ness of chattel slavery and other forms of slavery. Suggest you research on them.

You're as deluded a metaphysician as any other moral realist.

Note this survey in the current modern time = not during the flat-earther days;

A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).
wiki-moral realism

Your stance is only represented by 28% and effectively could be much less than that.

The above is not definite but give us a clue of where your stance is [not credible] and that moral realism has greater support than your stance which is based on some sort of bastardized philosophy.

Btw, so far I have spent 14 months researching full time on Morality and Ethics so I do have some reasonable credibility in supporting my stance of moral empirical realism.

It's the claims and arguments that count, not how many people make or believe them. Since moral realists and objectivists have not demonstrated the truth of their claims and the soundness of their arguments, the rational position is to withhold agreement.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Inference: people don't want to be enslaved; therefore slavery is morally wrong.

What's the connection between those two claims? Why does the second follow from the first? Why does the first entail the second?

I have already explained the above a "1000" times but because you are so dogmatic and bigoted, there is no way the message will get through.

Note the meaning of "wrong"

• Wrong:
  1. not correct or true; incorrect.; "that is the wrong answer"
  2. in an unsuitable or undesirable manner or direction.;
  3. an unjust, dishonest, or immoral act.;
  misdeed; bad deed; bad act/action; offence; injury; crime; unlawful act; illegal act; violation; infringement; infraction; transgression; peccadillo; sin; injustice; unfairness; unjust act; grievance; outrage; atrocity; malfeasance; tort; trespass; malefaction
  act unjustly or dishonestly towards.;

The more relevant meaning of 'wrong' in this case is 'undesirable' and unjust.

Thus:

• P1. people don't want to be enslaved - a moral issue;
  P2. "Don't want" = undesirable = wrong [see dictionary];
  C1. therefore slavery is morally wrong.

As I had asserted, 100% of all 'normal' human beings do not want to be enslave.
That itself is inductively true [similar to Science], therefore slavery is wrong.

So your argument is: what people find undesirable and unjust is morally wrong; and therefore, what people find desirable and just is morally right.

So, for example, if people think welcoming asylum seekers is undesirable and unjust, then welcoming them is morally wrong. And, for example, if people want to kill animals for sport - if they desire to do so - then doing so is morally right.

I denounce your criterion for moral rightness and wrongness as morally disgusting. And patently not at all objective.

You as always is rhetoric and deflecting.

Did you read my point in my earlier post?

"what people do and don't want" is not the sole criterion for moral rightness and wrongness.
Rather "what people do and don't want" has to be considered within a constituted Moral Framework and System with what humans ought-to or ought-not-to do on a voluntarily basis.

So your argument is: what people find undesirable and unjust is morally wrong; and therefore, what people find desirable and just is morally right.

You are really stupid on this strawman and conclusion.

Note, I qualified specifically "moral issue"
P1. people don't want to be enslaved - a moral issue;

Elsewhere I have justified why 'chattel slavery' is morally wrong and desirable due to the terrible pains and sufferings caused to the slave.

The above wrongness is supported by the banning and chattel slavery is legally a crime in all sovereign nations.

Morality within its specific Moral FSK is what humans ought-to or ought-not-to do on a voluntarily basis. This as I have shown is inductively true.

Other than the above which is sufficient, I have other means to justify why slavery is immoral [edited].

No, the above is demonstrably insufficient - and morally degenerate.

You are too hasty.
As mentioned above and done a '1000' times I have justified why slavery is immoral.

If people wanted to be enslaved, would that mean slavery is not morally wrong? Is what people do and don't want the criterion for moral rightness and wrongness? If (as I assume) your answer is 'no' - go back to your claim and apply the same test.

Yes, it is a "NO" because it is not supported by evidence at all like ALL 'normal' humans want to be enslaved by another human.
Do you even have a tiny bit of evidence to support the above thesis??

Do you really not understand the point I'm making? I find that very hard to believe. But I'll spell it out again. If you agree that the criterion for moral rightness and wrongness is NOT what people want, then you are demolishing your claim that people not wanting to be enslaved means that slavery is morally wrong.

You are introducing your strawman.
Note my point above, the criterion for moral rightness or wrongness is NOT solely dependent on 'what people want or do not want'. There is no way and it would be stupid if I were to bank on this.
Note the specific context is you asked me to show 'why slavery is morally wrong' so you need to stick to this context and do not deflect to your strawman.

Note this context in my earlier post which you ignored.

"what people do and don't want" is not the sole criterion for moral rightness and wrongness.
Rather "what people do and don't want" has to be considered within a constituted Moral Framework and System with what humans ought-to or ought-not-to do on a voluntarily basis.

Blather. If ought-to and ought-not-to are the criteria for moral rightness and wrongness, then what people want is irrelevant. Their wanting not be enslaved is irrelevant if they ought to be enslaved. Their wanting to kill each other is irrelevant if they ought not to kill each other. You're just asserting, without evidence, that there are moral oughts and ought-nots - moral facts.

Hey, how come you are so blinded by your dogmatism.
Note the 'not' I mentioned above

Your invention of 'the moral framework and system of knowledge' does nothing to establish moral objectivity. All you are saying is: there are moral facts that can be known, so there are moral facts that can be known. It's laughable.

How come you are so ignorant of what a Framework and System of Knowledge is?
I have already explained the FSK a '1000' times;

There are Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29777

Sorry, but this is disingenuous. You've bombarded us with post after post making an argument for moral objectivity - the existence of moral facts - and I and others have refuted every attempt - from which you seem to have learned nothing.

I understand [not agree] your position very well.
There is nothing for me to agree with your bastardized philosophy.
Note my points below.

It's the claims and arguments that count, not how many people make or believe them. Since moral realists and objectivists have not demonstrated the truth of their claims and the soundness of their arguments, the rational position is to withhold agreement.

The above is not a survey of the public but known philosophers, thus it carry some weight for further considerations.

As I had sated, from your dogmatic and bigoted stance inherited from some bastardized philosophy of the LPs and Analytic, I am not expecting you to agree with me AT ALL.

It is only because that I am involved in a serious research into Morality and Ethics that I continue to post in adding relevant knowledge that I had encountered. What I had posted is only the tip of an iceberg. To prevent plagiarism I have avoided posting some of my original ideas.

[Peter Holmes]

So, VA, what people do and don't want is NOT the sole criterion for moral rightness and wrongness. But that means it is ONE criterion. And you claim the other criterion is ought-to-ness and ought-not-to-ness, which are somehow baked into our brains.

So, in what way is desire ONE criterion for moral rightness and wrongness? Why does our wanting to do something PARTLY what constitutes moral rightness? What's the PARTIAL connection?

And what's the mix? And does one criterion (say, ought-to-ness) have priority over desire when there's a conflict? And are the answers to those questions matters of fact, or matters of opinion?

Truth is, you've constructed a vast, rickety structure full of holes and easily demolished at every joint. It's a house of cards. And instead of abusing anyone who points this out, why not just produce the knock-down evidence for the existence of an empirically verifiable moral reality containing moral things?

What people want obviously isn't the evidence. And just claiming there's oughtness-to-ness and ought-not-to-ness in our nature begs the question. Why is what we're programmed to do or not do morally right or wrong?