What could make morality objective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

No. This is a category error. which you need to recognise. The fact that people make moral judgements is NOT a 'moral fact'. It isn't even a moral assertion, so it can't be a 'moral fact'.

As I had stated he above is not the main point about moral facts.
That one is making moral judgments and moral assertions, i.e. the acts is fact. It is a moral fact in a way it is related to morality specifically. Note again, that is not the main point and I am not focused on this.

Again, no. The fact (if it is a fact) that we're programmed to act in a certain way - that behavioural 'oughts' and 'ought-nots' are buit into our brains - is NOT a 'moral fact', because it isn't even a moral assertion.

Perhaps you need reminding: a moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong, or one that says we ought or ought not to do something. So, pay attention: 'we are programmed to act thus' is NOT a moral assertion. You are making a simple but fundamental mistake.

Point is you are ignorant of what is morality-proper.

As I had stated moral judgments and moral assertions by individuals and groups are not moral facts per se because they are individuals' and groups' opinions and beliefs.

That we are "programmed" with the impulse to act morally is moral fact.
The impulse to act morally is different from the impulse to think and making moral decisions.

• Note the analogy:
  All human are "programmed' with the hunger impulse [represented by a neural algorithm connected to the body] and it is activated accordingly to the appropriate circumstances. This is a fact that is inherent in ALL humans.
  This primary set-up is different from the secondary acts of assertions of being hungry, deciding what to eat or how to get the food to eat.

The above analogy is in parallel with the "programmed" of "ought-ness" and "ougth-not_ness as the potential to perform the necessary moral actions, moral thinking, moral assertions, moral decisions, etc.
The arising state of ought-not_ness to kill another human is the moral fact as represented by the neural algorithm, the potentials, the forces, etc. which is its referent and state-of-affairs.
I have been on to this paradigm of morality and I believe this is the confusion you got entangled with because your sense of morality is in another paradigm of moral assertions, etc.

Again, no. What 'has actual existence' (maybe) - and therefore is a fact - is the neural programming with oughts and ought-nots that psychopaths lack. That is the state-of-affairs that actually exists.

Please think about - and directly answer - this question:

If (like all other primates) we were programmed to kill our and our group's enemies, including other humans, would 'we ought to kill some other humans' be what you call a 'moral fact'?

Yes, human are programmed [1] to kill to facilitate survival but such a useful potential is double-edged, that is why humans are also programmed with [1] 'ought-not to kill another human' to counter the possible abuse of 1.

The categorical ought is 'no human ought to kill another'
where did you get your 'we ought to kill some other humans' from?

Where humans has to kill in self-defense, that is only a hypothetical ought, not an categorical ought.
Human are "programmed to kill" and because the 'moral impulse' is not well developed in the majority, some people will kill other people. Where people are imposed with an ought to kill another, that would be a fact of evil, not a moral fact.

But note, the overriding categorical ought 'no human ought to kill another' will strive and drive humans to eliminate all hypothetical causes that will drive humans to kill in the future as evident with the trend from 10,000 years ago.
It is evident there is a decrease rate [sign of progress] in human killing another arbitrarily, and with advancing knowledge humanity will be able to inhibit the causes that trigger humans to kill another human in the future.

So, showing why your argument is fallacious is 'spewing filth'?

You sound like someone who knows they've lost the argument.

For me it is not about winning or losing the argument as in an intellectual debate without regard for the truth.
My mission is to explore the truth, that is why I am doing SO much research which is eventually for my own knowledge database [wow!! I now have 500 files in 26 folders in relation to this topic alone] and not to win an argument specifically.

So now you claim there are overriding categorical oughts, and subordinate hypothetical oughts. Who decides which is which? And is it a fact that one overrides the other, or a matter of opinion? And this laughable evasion doesn't answer my question anyway.

If we were programmed categorically not to kill humans, but also hypothetically to kill some humans, do you think the assertion 'sometimes we ought to kill some humans' is a 'moral fact'? Cut the blather and focus just on that question.

Who decides?
Who decides you should breathe or not?
Like the program to breathe, the categorical ought is 'programmed' and emerged from the start along with evolution.
That is why it is an indisputable moral fact!

There is no program that human ought to kill some humans.
That humans are killed by other humans regardless of the hypothetical situations or premeditated murder is itself an evil act or evil fact in contravention of the moral fact, no human ought to kill another.

While in some cases, killing another human is unavoidable and acceptable, it is not morally acceptable in the categorical sense.

This is why I have always asserted the moral fact is to be used as the standard objective and GUIDE only to steer humanity towards the ideals of the inherent moral fact.

Where we do not recognize this moral fact as a GUIDE, moral progress will be slow and not expedited.

And this laughable evasion doesn't answer my question anyway.
Cut the blather and focus just on that question.

These merely reflect your ignorance, shallowness and narrowness.
It is only a tip of an iceberg we are scratching on, I still have a great depth and width awaiting you to dig and crawl to them and perhaps never due to your psychological dogmatism.
I am still at it because it is for my benefit to carry on as a leverage to expand and reinforced my morality database.

[Peter Holmes]

If we were programmed categorically not to kill humans, but also hypothetically to kill some humans, do you think the assertion 'sometimes we ought to kill some humans' is a 'moral fact'? Cut the blather and focus just on that question.

Who decides?
The categorical ought is 'programmed' and emerged from the start along with evolution.
That is why it is an indisputable moral fact!

There is no program that human ought to kill some humans.
That humans are killed by other humans regardless of the hypothetical situations or premeditated murder is itself an evil act or evil fact in contravention of the moral fact, no human ought to kill another.

While in some cases, killing another human is unavoidable and acceptable, it is not morally acceptable in the categorical sense.

This is why I have always asserted the moral fact is to be used as the standard objective and GUIDE only to steer humanity towards the ideals of the inherent moral fact.

Where we do not recognize this moral fact as a GUIDE, moral progress will be slow and not expedited.

But you just said that humans are programmed to kill our or our group's enemies - but that we're also categorically programmed not to kill humans, and that that programming overrides the other programming.

So if the categorical programming means that 'humans ought not to kill humans is a 'moral fact' - then the subordinate, hypothetical programming which means that 'humans ought to kill some humans' is also a 'moral fact'. That one so-called 'moral fact' overrides another 'moral fact' doesn't mean that the subordinate 'moral fact' isn't a fact.

This is the necessary conclusion from your argument about there being 'moral facts'. Not so? If not, why not?

[Veritas Aequitas]

If we were programmed categorically not to kill humans, but also hypothetically to kill some humans, do you think the assertion 'sometimes we ought to kill some humans' is a 'moral fact'? Cut the blather and focus just on that question.

Who decides?
The categorical ought is 'programmed' and emerged from the start along with evolution.
That is why it is an indisputable moral fact!

There is no program that human ought to kill some humans.
That humans are killed by other humans regardless of the hypothetical situations or premeditated murder is itself an evil act or evil fact in contravention of the moral fact, no human ought to kill another.

While in some cases, killing another human is unavoidable and acceptable, it is not morally acceptable in the categorical sense.

This is why I have always asserted the moral fact is to be used as the standard objective and GUIDE only to steer humanity towards the ideals of the inherent moral fact.

Where we do not recognize this moral fact as a GUIDE, moral progress will be slow and not expedited.

But you just said that humans are programmed to kill our or our group's enemies - but that we're also categorically programmed not to kill humans, and that that programming overrides the other programming.

So if the categorical programming means that 'humans ought not to kill humans is a 'moral fact' - then the subordinate, hypothetical programming which means that 'humans ought to kill some humans' is also a 'moral fact'. That one so-called 'moral fact' overrides another 'moral fact' doesn't mean that the subordinate 'moral fact' isn't a fact.

This is the necessary conclusion from your argument about there being 'moral facts'. Not so? If not, why not?

I said again, humans are programmed to kill to facilitate getting food to survive but not to kill another human.

That humans killed other humans in various circumstances is a sort of defect as such this is a fact of evil not a moral fact.
The point is this defect is possible to be resolved in time, i.e. in the future.

• Note the moral intuition from the overriding Christian's pacifist maxim, 'love your enemies' which mean one cannot kill even one's enemies.
  In this case, Christians being humans will still kill in various hypothetical circumstances but they have to confess the sin and not to repeat it again.
  I have to admit this maxim had worked to some degree till the present but not for the future.

The categorical ought. i.e. DNA/RNA wise the moral fact is deeply embedded in the brain and pysche so it will very difficult to change or be tweaked.

But the impulses of killing other humans can be managed by dealing with their root causes,
e.g. eliminating wars, enemies, violent emotions via,
-managing impulse control
-increase moral quotient,
-increase emotional intelligence
-manage empathy and compassion
-whatever it take to do the job.

In addition to finding effective treatment to deal with psychopaths and those with serious tendency to kill.
In the future, finding way to ensure psychopaths are prevented from birth via fool proofs methods.

Get it?

[Peter Holmes]

Who decides?
The categorical ought is 'programmed' and emerged from the start along with evolution.
That is why it is an indisputable moral fact!

There is no program that human ought to kill some humans.
That humans are killed by other humans regardless of the hypothetical situations or premeditated murder is itself an evil act or evil fact in contravention of the moral fact, no human ought to kill another.

While in some cases, killing another human is unavoidable and acceptable, it is not morally acceptable in the categorical sense.

This is why I have always asserted the moral fact is to be used as the standard objective and GUIDE only to steer humanity towards the ideals of the inherent moral fact.

Where we do not recognize this moral fact as a GUIDE, moral progress will be slow and not expedited.

But you just said that humans are programmed to kill our or our group's enemies - but that we're also categorically programmed not to kill humans, and that that programming overrides the other programming.

So if the categorical programming means that 'humans ought not to kill humans is a 'moral fact' - then the subordinate, hypothetical programming which means that 'humans ought to kill some humans' is also a 'moral fact'. That one so-called 'moral fact' overrides another 'moral fact' doesn't mean that the subordinate 'moral fact' isn't a fact.

This is the necessary conclusion from your argument about there being 'moral facts'. Not so? If not, why not?

I said again, humans are programmed to kill to facilitate getting food to survive but not to kill another human.

That humans killed other humans in various circumstances is a sort of defect as such this is a fact of evil not a moral fact.
The point is this defect is possible to be resolved in time, i.e. in the future.

• Note the moral intuition from the overriding Christian's pacifist maxim, 'love your enemies' which mean one cannot kill even one's enemies.
  In this case, Christians being humans will still kill in various hypothetical circumstances but they have to confess the sin and not to repeat it again.
  I have to admit this maxim had worked to some degree till the present but not for the future.

The categorical ought. i.e. DNA/RNA wise the moral fact is deeply embedded in the brain and pysche so it will very difficult to change or be tweaked.

But the impulses of killing other humans can be managed by dealing with their root causes,
e.g. eliminating wars, enemies, violent emotions via,
-managing impulse control
-increase moral quotient,
-increase emotional intelligence
-manage empathy and compassion
-whatever it take to do the job.

In addition to finding effective treatment to deal with psychopaths and those with serious tendency to kill.
In the future, finding way to ensure psychopaths are prevented from birth via fool proofs methods.

Get it?

As always, you just don't get the point.

[Peter Holmes]

By way of valediction, here’s a summary of my argument against moral objectivism, including, where relevant, explanation of the theory of truth and theory of language I use to make the argument. And I apologise for the repetition.

I’m also posting this at my other OP, Is morality objective or subjective?, for anyone following one discussion but not the other.


1 Signs such as words can mean only what we use them to mean, and there is no other court of appeal. So what we call truth, facts and objectivity are what we say they are. For example, when we talk about factual assertions being true, that is what constitutes what we call truth. And what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge.

The idea that what we call such things as truth and knowledge may not be what we say they are comes from a metaphysical delusion. Unlike nouns such as dog and tree, abstract nouns, such as truth and knowledge, are not names of things of some kind that can be described, in the way we can describe dogs and trees.

Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational. But the myth of abstract things is ancient and pervasive.


2 What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. So, in this context, that there are facts is a given. And to ask if morality is objective is really to ask if there are moral facts.


3 We use the word fact in two radically different ways, to mean either a feature of reality (a state-of-affairs) that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And only the second kind of fact - typically a linguistic expression – has a truth-value: (classically) true or false.

Most features of reality just are or were, neither true not false, because reality is not linguistic. The only features of reality that can have truth-value are factual assertions.


4 I define a factual assertion as an assertion that claims something about reality that may or may not be or have been the case. So a factual assertion has a truth-value: true or false. And we call a true factual assertion a fact.

A factual assertion is always contextual and involves a conventional use of signs. And as there are many ways to describe features of reality, there are many facts about any feature of reality, each true in its descriptive context. But though we invented different ways to talk about reality, we did not invent the reality that we talk about. A description is not the described.


5 A putative moral fact is either a moral feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And only the second kind of putative moral fact – typically a linguistic expression – has a truth-value: true or false.


6 Moral realists and objectivists claim that there are moral features of reality – moral rightness and wrongness – that are or were the case, so that there can be factual assertions about them that have truth-value.


7 To my knowledge, moral realists and objectivists have failed to prove that moral features of reality exist. And while that may not mean they do not exist, it does mean that to believe they do exist is irrational.


8 Given this, a moral assertion, such as ‘slavery is morally wrong’ is non-factual, does not claim something about reality that may or may not be or have been the case, and therefore does not have a truth-value.

Instead, the function of a moral assertion is to express a moral value-judgement about a feature of reality, such as genocide, slavery, rape, abortion, capital punishment, eating animals – and so on.


9 Our moral values and judgements matter deeply to us. And we think of them as universal – applicable everywhere and for all time. For example, if we think slavery is morally wrong, we think it always was and will be morally wrong. To think otherwise would be morally inconsistent.

For these reasons, it is easy to think there are moral facts, so that morality is objective. It is an understandable misunderstanding.

[Veritas Aequitas]

By way of valediction, here’s a summary of my argument against moral objectivism, including, where relevant, explanation of the theory of truth and theory of language I use to make the argument. And I apologise for the repetition.

I’m also posting this at my other OP, Is morality objective or subjective?, for anyone following one discussion but not the other.


1 Signs such as words can mean only what we use them to mean, and there is no other court of appeal. So what we call truth, facts and objectivity are what we say they are. For example, when we talk about factual assertions being true, that is what constitutes what we call truth. And what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge.

The idea that what we call such things as truth and knowledge may not be what we say they are comes from a metaphysical delusion. Unlike nouns such as dog and tree, abstract nouns, such as truth and knowledge, are not names of things of some kind that can be described, in the way we can describe dogs and trees.

Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational. But the myth of abstract things is ancient and pervasive.

(I agree it is effective to made repetitions)

No other courts of appeal??
Words as sign to represent truth, fact and objectivity is very crude.
This is a very serious issue and philosophically you need to approach it with more rigor and precision.

What is truth, fact and objectivity is justified empirically and philosophical reasoning within specific Framework and System of knowledge.
The resultant truths, facts and objectivity need not be presented in words but more precise in mathematical symbols and images, videos, etc.

Whatever fact you talk of must be conditioned upon a FSK, and the most credible is the Scientific FSK not on your mere talks of signs, words and what they mean.

Thus the grounding of your argument based on words is toothless and therefore to the conclusions you made depended on the above groundless premises.

2 What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. So, in this context, that there are facts is a given. And to ask if morality is objective is really to ask if there are moral facts.

Again objectivity is based on what is justified empirically and philosophical reasoning within specific Framework and System of knowledge.

What is objective in relation to Morality is grounded and structured upon 3 main and 7 sub-dimensions.

• The ontological dimensions of ethical objectivity explored in this book are
  • mind-independence,
    determinate correctness,
    uniform applicability, and
    invariance;
  the epistemic dimensions are
  • transindividual concurrence and
    impartiality; and
  the semantic dimension is
  • truth-aptitude.

I am reading the book on this at present.

3 We use the word fact in two radically different ways, to mean either a feature of reality (a state-of-affairs) that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And only the second kind of fact - typically a linguistic expression – has a truth-value: (classically) true or false.

Most features of reality just are or were, neither true not false, because reality is not linguistic. The only features of reality that can have truth-value are factual assertions.

Your grounding of what is fact of reality is toothless.
Thus your 3 is pointless.

4 I define a factual assertion as an assertion that claims something about reality that may or may not be or have been the case. So a factual assertion has a truth-value: true or false. And we call a true factual assertion a fact.

A factual assertion is always contextual and involves a conventional use of signs. And as there are many ways to describe features of reality, there are many facts about any feature of reality, each true in its descriptive context. But though we invented different ways to talk about reality, we did not invent the reality that we talk about. A description is not the described.

Your grounding of what is fact of reality is toothless.
Thus your 4 is pointless.

5 A putative moral fact is either a moral feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And only the second kind of putative moral fact – typically a linguistic expression – has a truth-value: true or false.

Your grounding of what is fact of reality is toothless.
Thus your 5 is pointless.

6 Moral realists and objectivists claim that there are moral features of reality – moral rightness and wrongness – that are or were the case, so that there can be factual assertions about them that have truth-value.

Moral realist and moral objectivists [cognitivists] made the following claims;

Moral Sentence and moral judgments;
1. Are propositions
2. Is True or False – Truth Apt
3. Is Objective – mind independent via its FSK
4. Reducible to non-moral properties

The above are justified via a Moral Framework and System and Moral Cognitivists [different groups] has given their respective supports for their claims.

7 To my knowledge, moral realists and objectivists have failed to prove that moral features of reality exist. And while that may not mean they do not exist, it does mean that to believe they do exist is irrational.

This is because you have never bothered to read widely on the various claims made by the cognitivists.
In addition I have presented my of my justifications on the existence of moral facts, but because of your dogmatism you are naturally blinded and be open to alternative views.

8 Given this, a moral assertion, such as ‘slavery is morally wrong’ is non-factual, does not claim something about reality that may or may not be or have been the case, and therefore does not have a truth-value.

Instead, the function of a moral assertion is to express a moral value-judgement about a feature of reality, such as genocide, slavery, rape, abortion, capital punishment, eating animals – and so on.

I have already provided the justifications.
In addition there are loads of books and articles by cognitivists who provided their own basis of justification for moral facts.

9 Our moral values and judgements matter deeply to us. And we think of them as universal – applicable everywhere and for all time. For example, if we think slavery is morally wrong, we think it always was and will be morally wrong. To think otherwise would be morally inconsistent.

For these reasons, it is easy to think there are moral facts, so that morality is objective. It is an understandable misunderstanding.

The misunderstanding is due to your ignorance and dogmatism in sticking to some archaic doctrines inherited from the bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists, note Ayer's Emotivism for example.

You should try to counter the Frege-Geach Problem that had sunk the non-Cognitivists ideology.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30150
I believe this is beyond your grasp?
This Frege-Geach Problem undermines all your claims above and those nonCognitivists' stances I listed below.
You must counter to keep your claims above water after being sunk.

Your above counter against Moral Objectivism is too flimsy, note the more complete stance taken by nonCognitivists like yourself are;

• Moral Sentences - moral judgments
  1. Cannot be Propositions
  2. Cannot be True nor False
  3. Not truth apt
  4. Not fact, not state-of-affairs
  4i Are opinions and 'beliefs'
  5. Not objectively true
  6. Prescriptive not descriptive
  7. Non-Declarative Speech Acts
  8. Meaningless - Boo, woo woo
  9. Moral knowledge impossible
  10. Not state of mind of Beliefs
  11. Express desires, emotions, dis/approval
  12. Do not predicate properties of subjects
  13. Are Queer - mythical
  14. Mind Dependent

But the nonCognitivists claims are full of big holes, i.e. fallacious.
Therefore you should get your own house in order before you critique others.

[Peter Holmes]

What we call objectivity is sticking to the facts.

What we call facts are states-of-affairs, or descriptions of states-of-affairs, that are or were the case.

So there can be moral objectivity only if there are moral states-of affairs - if, for example, the moral rightness of capital punishment is a state-of-affairs, or the moral wrongness of eating animals. And, of course, those aren't states-of-affairs at all - and to think they are is an obvious misunderstanding.

Because there are states-of-affairs that can be described by physics, there are 'physics facts'. But there are no such states-of-affairs that moral assertions describe. So morality can't be objective - how ever desperately moral objectivists want it to be.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What we call objectivity is sticking to the facts.

What we call facts are states-of-affairs, or descriptions of states-of-affairs, that are or were the case.

So there can be moral objectivity only if there are moral states-of affairs - if, for example, the moral rightness of capital punishment is a state-of-affairs, or the moral wrongness of eating animals. And, of course, those aren't states-of-affairs at all - and to think they are is an obvious misunderstanding.

Because there are states-of-affairs that can be described by physics, there are 'physics facts'. But there are no such states-of-affairs that moral assertions describe. So morality can't be objective - how ever desperately moral objectivists want it to be.

Shouting from being trapped within your 'silo' is not about the real world.
Your definition of 'what is fact' is too archaic and shallow which is inherited from the bastardized ideology of the logical positivists and those of analytic philosophy.

Read this;
What is fact?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact
I have quoted this a '1000' times.

What you are arguing against is the typical moral claims, from theists who made claims of moral facts from a God; platonists who claim there are moral universals; various people who make subjective moral claims and judgments, i.e. murder is wrong, abortion is wrong, capital punishment is wrong and the likes. I agree these are not moral facts per se but merely opinions and belief.

What I am claiming is there are moral facts within a Moral Framework and System which are justified as credible facts like facts from Science.
These moral facts are states-of-affairs within the brain of the moral agent as represented by the referent of various moral neural algorithms which can be verified like scientific and psychological facts.
From this perspective moral facts are objective.

In addition, I don't believe you understand what is objectivity-proper.
According to Mathew Kramers who wrote one specialized book on 'Moral Objectivity' where what is objectivity-proper must fulfill 7 dimensions below;

• Ontological (Chapters 2–5)
  1 Mind-independence
  2 Determinate correctness
  3 Uniform applicability
  4 Invariance
  
  Epistemic (Chapters 6–7)
  5 Transindividual concurrence
  6 Impartiality
  
  Semantic (Chapter -8)
  7 Truth-aptitude

I have stated the above many times, and I don't think you will every grasp them given your dogmatism and confirmation bias to your bastardized ideas on 'what is morality'.

[Peter Holmes]

What we call objectivity is sticking to the facts.

What we call facts are states-of-affairs, or descriptions of states-of-affairs, that are or were the case.

So there can be moral objectivity only if there are moral states-of affairs - if, for example, the moral rightness of capital punishment is a state-of-affairs, or the moral wrongness of eating animals. And, of course, those aren't states-of-affairs at all - and to think they are is an obvious misunderstanding.

Because there are states-of-affairs that can be described by physics, there are 'physics facts'. But there are no such states-of-affairs that moral assertions describe. So morality can't be objective - how ever desperately moral objectivists want it to be.

Shouting from being trapped within your 'silo' is not about the real world.
Your definition of 'what is fact' is too archaic and shallow which is inherited from the bastardized ideology of the logical positivists and those of analytic philosophy.

Read this;
What is fact?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact
I have quoted this a '1000' times.

What you are arguing against is the typical moral claims, from theists who made claims of moral facts from a God; platonists who claim there are moral universals; various people who make subjective moral claims and judgments, i.e. murder is wrong, abortion is wrong, capital punishment is wrong and the likes. I agree these are not moral facts per se but merely opinions and belief.

What I am claiming is there are moral facts within a Moral Framework and System which are justified as credible facts like facts from Science.
These moral facts are states-of-affairs within the brain of the moral agent as represented by the referent of various moral neural algorithms which can be verified like scientific and psychological facts.
From this perspective moral facts are objective.

In addition, I don't believe you understand what is objectivity-proper.
According to Mathew Kramers who wrote one specialized book on 'Moral Objectivity' where what is objectivity-proper must fulfill 7 dimensions below;

• Ontological (Chapters 2–5)
  1 Mind-independence
  2 Determinate correctness
  3 Uniform applicability
  4 Invariance
  
  Epistemic (Chapters 6–7)
  5 Transindividual concurrence
  6 Impartiality
  
  Semantic (Chapter -8)
  7 Truth-aptitude

I have stated the above many times, and I don't think you will every grasp them given your dogmatism and confirmation bias to your bastardized ideas on 'what is morality'.

If Kramer's list of requirements for objectivity fairly represents his grasp of the issue, there's no need to take him seriously. Laughable.

[Belinda]

What we call objectivity is sticking to the facts.

What we call facts are states-of-affairs, or descriptions of states-of-affairs, that are or were the case.

So there can be moral objectivity only if there are moral states-of affairs - if, for example, the moral rightness of capital punishment is a state-of-affairs, or the moral wrongness of eating animals. And, of course, those aren't states-of-affairs at all - and to think they are is an obvious misunderstanding.

Because there are states-of-affairs that can be described by physics, there are 'physics facts'. But there are no such states-of-affairs that moral assertions describe. So morality can't be objective - how ever desperately moral objectivists want it to be.

Despite their great probability and their mathematical verification there are no absolutely true physics facts. So if there be objective reality we can't know it.

Why are physics facts interesting? Because they can be the matter of future conditional sentences.

EG a future conditional sentence: If you murder me today I will not enjoy tomorrow and you should not so deprive me.

EG another future conditional sentence: If you murder me today I will not enjoy tomorrow, and you should so deprive me as I don't deserve to be allowed to live.

My point is every scientific opinion and every moral opinion is a concealed conditional. Note that a command is not always an opinion, although some stated opinions are commands in disguise.

The only difference between scientific opinion and moral opinion is a scientific opinion might not imply affect and seldom does so. EG if a scientist states " We can be sure this vaccine will work" he might say so with smilingly with tears in his eyes which will imply he also thinks the vaccine to be a good thing. The point I make here is the only difference between what we call a moral claim and what we call a scientific (or factual) claim is the moral claim unlike the scientific claim is usually accompanied by affect.This is why if a robot said "Murder is wrong" we would not pay a lot of attention to him.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What we call objectivity is sticking to the facts.

What we call facts are states-of-affairs, or descriptions of states-of-affairs, that are or were the case.

So there can be moral objectivity only if there are moral states-of affairs - if, for example, the moral rightness of capital punishment is a state-of-affairs, or the moral wrongness of eating animals. And, of course, those aren't states-of-affairs at all - and to think they are is an obvious misunderstanding.

Because there are states-of-affairs that can be described by physics, there are 'physics facts'. But there are no such states-of-affairs that moral assertions describe. So morality can't be objective - how ever desperately moral objectivists want it to be.

Shouting from being trapped within your 'silo' is not about the real world.
Your definition of 'what is fact' is too archaic and shallow which is inherited from the bastardized ideology of the logical positivists and those of analytic philosophy.

Read this;
What is fact?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact
I have quoted this a '1000' times.

What you are arguing against is the typical moral claims, from theists who made claims of moral facts from a God; platonists who claim there are moral universals; various people who make subjective moral claims and judgments, i.e. murder is wrong, abortion is wrong, capital punishment is wrong and the likes. I agree these are not moral facts per se but merely opinions and belief.

What I am claiming is there are moral facts within a Moral Framework and System which are justified as credible facts like facts from Science.
These moral facts are states-of-affairs within the brain of the moral agent as represented by the referent of various moral neural algorithms which can be verified like scientific and psychological facts.
From this perspective moral facts are objective.

In addition, I don't believe you understand what is objectivity-proper.
According to Mathew Kramers who wrote one specialized book on 'Moral Objectivity' where what is objectivity-proper must fulfill 7 dimensions below;

• Ontological (Chapters 2–5)
  1 Mind-independence
  2 Determinate correctness
  3 Uniform applicability
  4 Invariance
  
  Epistemic (Chapters 6–7)
  5 Transindividual concurrence
  6 Impartiality
  
  Semantic (Chapter -8)
  7 Truth-aptitude

I have stated the above many times, and I don't think you will every grasp them given your dogmatism and confirmation bias to your bastardized ideas on 'what is morality'.

If Kramer's list of requirements for objectivity fairly represents his grasp of the issue, there's no need to take him seriously. Laughable.

As usual, I don't think you know what you are talking about re objectivity.
What is wrong with the above 7 dimensions of objectivity?
You offered no justifications for your views at all - that is more laughable.

[Peter Holmes]

Shouting from being trapped within your 'silo' is not about the real world.
Your definition of 'what is fact' is too archaic and shallow which is inherited from the bastardized ideology of the logical positivists and those of analytic philosophy.

Read this;
What is fact?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact
I have quoted this a '1000' times.

What you are arguing against is the typical moral claims, from theists who made claims of moral facts from a God; platonists who claim there are moral universals; various people who make subjective moral claims and judgments, i.e. murder is wrong, abortion is wrong, capital punishment is wrong and the likes. I agree these are not moral facts per se but merely opinions and belief.

What I am claiming is there are moral facts within a Moral Framework and System which are justified as credible facts like facts from Science.
These moral facts are states-of-affairs within the brain of the moral agent as represented by the referent of various moral neural algorithms which can be verified like scientific and psychological facts.
From this perspective moral facts are objective.

In addition, I don't believe you understand what is objectivity-proper.
According to Mathew Kramers who wrote one specialized book on 'Moral Objectivity' where what is objectivity-proper must fulfill 7 dimensions below;

• Ontological (Chapters 2–5)
  1 Mind-independence
  2 Determinate correctness
  3 Uniform applicability
  4 Invariance
  
  Epistemic (Chapters 6–7)
  5 Transindividual concurrence
  6 Impartiality
  
  Semantic (Chapter -8)
  7 Truth-aptitude

I have stated the above many times, and I don't think you will every grasp them given your dogmatism and confirmation bias to your bastardized ideas on 'what is morality'.

If Kramer's list of requirements for objectivity fairly represents his grasp of the issue, there's no need to take him seriously. Laughable.

As usual, I don't think you know what you are talking about re objectivity.
What is wrong with the above 7 dimensions of objectivity?
You offered no justifications for your views at all - that is more laughable.

And you offer no justification for the metaphysical (and therefore deluded) claim that there's such a thing as 'objectivity-proper' - and merely quote someone else's list of its properties or conditions. Doubly-laughable.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If Kramer's list of requirements for objectivity fairly represents his grasp of the issue, there's no need to take him seriously. Laughable.

As usual, I don't think you know what you are talking about re objectivity.
What is wrong with the above 7 dimensions of objectivity?
You offered no justifications for your views at all - that is more laughable.

And you offer no justification for the metaphysical (and therefore deluded) claim that there's such a thing as 'objectivity-proper' - and merely quote someone else's list of its properties or conditions. Doubly-laughable.

My presentation of the 7 dimensions is not a conclusively claim but rather an indication that there are more to objectivity-proper than you envisaged and exposing your ignorance. The intention is to inhibit the arrogance of your view till you have understood what Kramer is talking about.
The points are presented in 360 pages, surely that is too much to expect me to explain the whole thing to you.
If I were you and upon being informed on my lack of such knowledge I will surely download the book to read to either refute or agree with the points highlighted.

https://www.amazon.com/Moral-Realism-Do ... 1405194022

[Peter Holmes]

As usual, I don't think you know what you are talking about re objectivity.
What is wrong with the above 7 dimensions of objectivity?
You offered no justifications for your views at all - that is more laughable.

And you offer no justification for the metaphysical (and therefore deluded) claim that there's such a thing as 'objectivity-proper' - and merely quote someone else's list of its properties or conditions. Doubly-laughable.

My presentation of the 7 dimensions is not a conclusively claim but rather an indication that there are more to objectivity-proper than you envisaged and exposing your ignorance. The intention is to inhibit the arrogance of your view till you have understood what Kramer is talking about.
The points are presented in 360 pages, surely that is too much to expect me to explain the whole thing to you.
If I were you and upon being informed on my lack of such knowledge I will surely download the book to read to either refute or agree with the points highlighted.

https://www.amazon.com/Moral-Realism-Do ... 1405194022

What we call objectivity can only be what we say it is. So the claim that there's such an abstract thing as 'objectivity-proper' is an example of metaphysical delusion as its most pretentiously ridiculous. Instead of regurgitating the latest piece of pseudo-intellectual-looking tripe that you've come across, try some genuinely critical thinking.

[Skepdick]

What we call objectivity can only be what we say it is.

Which makes "objectivity" inter-subjective.

That's exactly how objective morality works.