Is morality objective or subjective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

All humans are programmed to avoid evil to facilitate survival of the species
Rape is an evil
Therefore people are programmed not to rape

All humans are not programmed to avoid evil in order to facilitate survival of the species
Were this true then no human - including psychopaths - would be psychologically or physically capable of evil
Since this is demonstrably false then either humans are not programmed at all or not sufficiently programmed
Or only some of them are programmed to avoid evil - but definitely not all of them - as evidence demonstrates

You missed the point.

DNA/RNA wise, All humans are "programmed" to avoid evil, i.e. evil acts being done to them by others.
Surely a psychopath [other things being normal] would not want to be killed or raped by another.

Some humans are naturally evil such as psychopaths for example but not all rapists however are psychopaths
Even rapists who are non psychopathic will still commit rape even if they subsequently regret it [ as some do ]
These rapists may not be naturally evil from a psychological perspective but this does not mean that they are incapable of evil
Any one in fact is capable of it even if they do not have a natural inclination towards it and that is because they have free will

Another fact is,
DNA/RNA wise ALL humans are "programmed" with the POTENTIAL to commit good and evil.
Point is the evil tendency in the majority are somewhat inhibited to a great degree while the evil tendency in SOME [guessing 20%] are quite active, e.g. the psychopaths and the likes.

[Peter Holmes]

Here's another way to understand why morality isn't and can't be objective - why there are no moral facts. Look at this argument:

We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong.

I hope no one thinks the conclusion follows from the premise - that the premise entails the conclusion. And notice that substituting 'I', 'some of us', 'many of us' or 'all of us' for 'We' in the premise makes no difference to the lack of entailment. It could always be that X is not morally wrong.

Now insert more information into the premise, as follows:

We believe X is morally wrong, because ... ; therefore X is morally wrong.

Now, what comes after 'because' can be anything at all: life begins at fertilisation, the murder rate is falling, a person own herself, humans are programmed not to do X, a god disapproves of X - and so on.

The point is, whatever reason(s) we have for believing X is morally wrong, it still doesn't follow that X is morally wrong. It could still always be that X is not morally wrong. Nothing does or can entail the moral conclusion except the main clause in the premise: we believe X is morally wrong - which, of course, makes the argument vacuous.

And if we delete the main clause - we believe X is morally wrong - we're left with numerous possible 'reasons' - countless possible facts - in a subordinate clause, with nothing for them to be reasons for anyway.

And that's the really hard thing for moral objectivists to grasp. Whatever reason we have to believe X is morally wrong, it could always be that X is not morally wrong, for some other reason. So 'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact. So there are no moral facts, and morality isn't and can't be objective.

[Skepdick]

Here's another way to understand why morality isn't and can't be objective - why there are no moral facts. Look at this argument:

We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong.

I hope no one thinks the conclusion follows from the premise - that the premise entails the conclusion. And notice that substituting 'I', 'some of us', 'many of us' or 'all of us' for 'We' in the premise makes no difference to the lack of entailment. It could always be that X is not morally wrong.

Now insert more information into the premise, as follows:

We believe X is morally wrong, because ... ; therefore X is morally wrong.

Now, what comes after 'because' can be anything at all: life begins at fertilisation, the murder rate is falling, a person own herself, humans are programmed not to do X, a god disapproves of X - and so on.

The point is, whatever reason(s) we have for believing X is morally wrong, it still doesn't follow that X is morally wrong. It could still always be that X is not morally wrong. Nothing does or can entail the moral conclusion except the main clause in the premise: we believe X is morally wrong - which, of course, makes the argument vacuous.

And if we delete the main clause - we believe X is morally wrong - we're left with numerous possible 'reasons' - countless possible facts - in a subordinate clause, with nothing for them to be reasons for anyway.

And that's the really hard thing for moral objectivists to grasp. Whatever reason we have to believe X is morally wrong, it could always be that X is not morally wrong, for some other reason. So 'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact. So there are no moral facts, and morality isn't and can't be objective.

Idiot philosopher.

The objectivity of morality is a premise, not a conclusion.

If the premise is true then the premise is true. The conclusion is irrelevant.

The subjectivity/objectivity of a true premise is a red herring.

[surreptitious57]

There are many who believe that objective morality is an empirical fact rather than a premise
For them it is beyond all doubt that it actually exists so dont just treat it as part of a syllogism

[henry quirk]

Here's another way to understand why morality isn't and can't be objective - why there are no moral facts. Look at this argument:

We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong.

I hope no one thinks the conclusion follows from the premise - that the premise entails the conclusion. And notice that substituting 'I', 'some of us', 'many of us' or 'all of us' for 'We' in the premise makes no difference to the lack of entailment. It could always be that X is not morally wrong.

Now insert more information into the premise, as follows:

We believe X is morally wrong, because ... ; therefore X is morally wrong.

Now, what comes after 'because' can be anything at all: life begins at fertilisation, the murder rate is falling, a person own herself, humans are programmed not to do X, a god disapproves of X - and so on.

The point is, whatever reason(s) we have for believing X is morally wrong, it still doesn't follow that X is morally wrong. It could still always be that X is not morally wrong. Nothing does or can entail the moral conclusion except the main clause in the premise: we believe X is morally wrong - which, of course, makes the argument vacuous.

And if we delete the main clause - we believe X is morally wrong - we're left with numerous possible 'reasons' - countless possible facts - in a subordinate clause, with nothing for them to be reasons for anyway.

And that's the really hard thing for moral objectivists to grasp. Whatever reason we have to believe X is morally wrong, it could always be that X is not morally wrong, for some other reason. So 'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact. So there are no moral facts, and morality isn't and can't be objective.

Idiot philosopher.

The objectivity of morality is a premise, not a conclusion.

If the premise is true then the premise is true. The conclusion is irrelevant.

The subjectivity/objectivity of a true premise is a red herring.

seems to me: pete is right on the money with We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong. bein' silly.

are any of us moral realists sayin' that silly thing?

I don't think so

[Skepdick]

seems to me: pete is right on the money with We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong. bein' silly.

are any of us moral realists sayin' that silly thing?

I don't think so

It is silly. That's precisely why I am not putting a "therefore" after "Murder is morally wrong" - it's a true premise that requires no conclusions being drawn.

Pete is the insisting that it OUGHT to be a conclusion.

[henry quirk]

Pete is the insisting that it OUGHT to be a conclusion.

i think pete is just pokin' with a not-so-sharp stick

[Peter Holmes]

Pete is the insisting that it OUGHT to be a conclusion.

i think pete is just pokin' with a not-so-sharp stick

Looks like you've cracked it, Henry. Your conclusion is your premise, as it is for all moral assertions. You can't get to the conclusion any other way. So an argument trying to establish a moral conclusion is ineluctably circular. And, of course, your premise is merely a moral assertion for which there's no evidence and, obviously, no sound argument.

And that's the way it is. That's our moral predicament - as I and others have been saying all along. Job done.

[Peter Holmes]

There are many who believe that objective morality is an empirical fact rather than a premise
For them it is beyond all doubt that it actually exists so dont just treat it as part of a syllogism

Erm. All we have is arguments consisting of premises and conclusions. Those who think that such a thing as the moral wrongness of slavery is a thing of some kind that actually exists presumably have reasons for thinking it does exist. But if they don't produce the evidence - and, of course, they can't, because it's a ridiculous idea - there's no reason to accept their claim. End of story.

[Skepdick]

Looks like you've cracked it, Henry. Your conclusion is your premise, as it is for all moral assertions. You can't get to the conclusion any other way. So an argument trying to establish a moral conclusion is ineluctably circular. And, of course, your premise is merely a moral assertion for which there's no evidence and, obviously, no sound argument.

And that's the way it is. That's our moral predicament - as I and others have been saying all along. Job done.

All arguments are circular, Peter.

That is how logic works. Decidable logical expressions are closed under logical consequence. "Closed" is another name for "circular"

It's only your predicament since you are the one insisting that we OUGHT to arrive at such conclusions using logic.

[henry quirk]

Looks like you've cracked it, Henry.

nah, that was skep

he's the smart guy: I'm just a certain one


So an argument trying to establish a moral conclusion is ineluctably circular.

nah, you start with a fact (a man belongs to himself) and move to the moral fact (it's wrong to leash a man)

ain't nuthin' circular about it: it's a straight line forward

[Peter Holmes]

Looks like you've cracked it, Henry.

nah, that was skep

he's the smart guy: I'm just a certain one


So an argument trying to establish a moral conclusion is ineluctably circular.

nah, you start with a fact (a man belongs to himself) and move to the moral fact (it's wrong to leash a man)

ain't nuthin' circular about it: it's a straight line forward

Sorry, I thought you were saying your premise is 'slavery is morally wrong'.

Okay. If your premise is 'a person owns herself', why does it follow that 'slavery is morally wrong'? What's the entailment? Why is 'slavery is not morally wrong' a contradiction? Do you have any evidence, or is it just your moral opinion?

[henry quirk]

Sorry, I thought you were saying your premise is 'slavery is morally wrong'.

I'm sayin' what I've said from the start (way back early, when dinos walked the earth, and this thread was young)


Okay. If your premise is 'a person owns herself', why does it follow that 'slavery is morally wrong'?

a man belongs to himself so, another man layin'' claim to him is another man layin' claim to his property (slavery is theft of a person; the use of that person without his permission; the misuse of that person against his will)


Why is 'slavery is not morally wrong' a contradiction?

slavery as morally right or morally neutral would require a man not to belong to himself (which, of course, he does)

since each man belongs to himself: it's false, contradictory, to say slavery is not morally wrong


Do you have any evidence,

there are no willing slaves: there are resigned slaves, but no willing ones


is it just your moral opinion?

I say it's moral fact; you say it's moral opinion

same as it ever was

[Veritas Aequitas]

Sorry, I thought you were saying your premise is 'slavery is morally wrong'.

I'm sayin' what I've said from the start (way back early, when dinos walked the earth, and this thread was young)


Okay. If your premise is 'a person owns herself', why does it follow that 'slavery is morally wrong'?

a man belongs to himself so, another man layin'' claim to him is another man layin' claim to his property (slavery is theft of a person; the use of that person without his permission; the misuse of that person against his will)


Why is 'slavery is not morally wrong' a contradiction?

slavery as morally right or morally neutral would require a man not to belong to himself (which, of course, he does)

since each man belongs to himself: it's false, contradictory, to say slavery is not morally wrong


Do you have any evidence,

there are no willing slaves: there are resigned slaves, but no willing ones


is it just your moral opinion?

I say it's moral fact; you say it's moral opinion

same as it ever was

Hume will definitely agree with you as supported by his own justifications.

Hume: Morality = Moral Sense = Objective
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30013

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here's another way to understand why morality isn't and can't be objective - why there are no moral facts. Look at this argument:

We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong.

I hope no one thinks the conclusion follows from the premise - that the premise entails the conclusion. And notice that substituting 'I', 'some of us', 'many of us' or 'all of us' for 'We' in the premise makes no difference to the lack of entailment. It could always be that X is not morally wrong.

Now insert more information into the premise, as follows:

We believe X is morally wrong, because ... ; therefore X is morally wrong.

Now, what comes after 'because' can be anything at all: life begins at fertilisation, the murder rate is falling, a person own herself, humans are programmed not to do X, a god disapproves of X - and so on.

The point is, whatever reason(s) we have for believing X is morally wrong, it still doesn't follow that X is morally wrong. It could still always be that X is not morally wrong. Nothing does or can entail the moral conclusion except the main clause in the premise: we believe X is morally wrong - which, of course, makes the argument vacuous.

And if we delete the main clause - we believe X is morally wrong - we're left with numerous possible 'reasons' - countless possible facts - in a subordinate clause, with nothing for them to be reasons for anyway.

And that's the really hard thing for moral objectivists to grasp. Whatever reason we have to believe X is morally wrong, it could always be that X is not morally wrong, for some other reason. So 'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact. So there are no moral facts, and morality isn't and can't be objective.

As I had always maintained, your 'what is fact' is a traceable to the bastardized philosophy of the logical positivist.

Note again [the "thousand" times], the generally acceptable meaning of 'what is fact'.

Its ideological, you have been brainwashed to be ignorant and dogmatic, there are no moral facts from a rigid perspective.

Note the shift to this paradigm of 'what is a fact';

A fact is an occurrence in the real world.[1]
For example, "This sentence contains words." is a linguistic fact, and
"The sun is a star." is an astronomical fact.
Further, "Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States." and "Abraham Lincoln was assassinated." are also both facts, of history.
Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

In line with the above, why can't we have moral facts???

• All FSK produce their respective facts.
  Morality has its own FSK
  Therefore the Morality FSK has its respective moral facts.

• Justified Scientific facts from its FSK has the highest standard of credibility at present.
  The Morality FSK has similar features of the Scientific FSK
  Therefore the justified moral facts from its FSK are expected to have a high degree of credibility.

I had claimed justified true moral facts [JTB-m] must be justified empirically and philosophically.