Interesting to see how this forum devolved into practicing cannibalism

[Immanuel Can]

And that complete truth is the realisation there is nobody to possess truth,

That statement self-contradicts.

No it is not.

Sure it does.

If you know it to be true, then it's false...because you know it to be true, which means there's a truth. If you don't know it to be true, then it's just an intuition you happen to have, and may well be false, since you don't have reason to know it.

[Skepdick]

That statement self-contradicts.

No it is not.

Sure it does.

If you know it to be true, then it's false...because you know it to be true, which means there's a truth. If you don't know it to be true, then it's just an intuition you happen to have, and may well be false, since you don't have reason to know it.

You keep insisting that my intuitions/knowledge OUGHT to be true...

I poses intuitions and knowledge. They work. I don't care if they are true or false.

[Immanuel Can]

The No True Scotsman fallacy?

That's a fallacy about a fallacy.

The "No True Scotsman" fallacy depends on one claiming a criterion unrelated to being a Scotsman. But to argue "No true Scotsman isn't from Scotland" is not a fallacy but a definition.

In the same way, "philosopher" has a definition, one that begins with Greek etymology and proceeds through the entire tradition of philosophy. It's "lover of wisdom," and more expansively, "one who pursues knowledge through the application of rationality."

Thus, to say that nobody who does that is a real "philosopher" is merely definitional. One can only avoid it by pretending there are no criteria for being a "philosopher."

To insist that the is-ought gap applies to morality in particular is special pleading.

Not at all. It's what Hume himself, who first proposed the gap, thought was the case.

Now, unless you want to argue that "It ought to rain tomorrow" or "You ought to paint your house" are freighted with moral import, then you've got "oughts" there that are uninvolved in morality. So for me to say, "A philosopher ought to use rationality" is not a moral claim. I'm not saying that they will be morally bad people if they are not philosophers, or if they don't use rationality. I'm only pointing out that they will not fit the definition, held by everybody from Socrates to Sartre, of what a "philosopher" is.

No special pleading. No "Scotsman" fallacy.

[Immanuel Can]

You keep insisting that my intuitions/knowledge OUGHT to be true...

No, I insisted that IF you want to be a philosopher (i.e. the form is, "If you want X"), then you should use rationality (i.e. the form is, "then you must Y").

I poses intuitions and knowledge. They work.

Without rationality, you have no idea whether or not they "work." For you deny the possibility of any rational grounds to test whether or not they "work." In fact, you don't even establish what "work" entails. So there's no way for you to show, even to yourself, that they actually do "work" for anything. All you can say is "I feel like they 'work,' whatever the heck that means."

I don't care if they are true or false.

Which, as I said before, you are free to do. But what you are doing, then, is mere superstition, and by definition, not philosophy.

[Skepdick]

The No True Scotsman fallacy?

That's a fallacy about a fallacy.

The "No True Scotsman" fallacy depends on one claiming a criterion unrelated to being a Scotsman. But to argue "No true Scotsman isn't from Scotland" is not a fallacy but a definition.

In the same way, "philosopher" has a definition, one that begins with Greek etymology and proceeds through the entire tradition of philosophy. It's "lover of wisdom," and more expansively, "one who pursues knowledge through the application of rationality."

Thus, to say that nobody who does that is a real "philosopher" is merely definitional. One can only avoid it by pretending there are no criteria for being a "philosopher."

Q.E.D you are claiming a criterion for being a philosopher.

Are you sure your definition is right? What if your definition is wrong? What if a True Philosopher is somebody who pursues rationality through the application of knowledge?

Not at all. It's what Hume himself, who first proposed the gap, thought was the case.

It doesn't matter what Hume said. Since we are trying to avoid special pleadings here I am asking you to justify oughts in general.

Justify why things OUGHT to be different than the way things are?

So for me to say, "A philosopher ought to use rationality" is not a moral claim.

It doesn't matter if it's not a moral claim. It is an ought-claim.

I'm not saying that they will be morally bad people if they are not philosophers, or if they don't use rationality. I'm only pointing out that they will not fit the definition, held by everybody from Socrates to Sartre, of what a "philosopher" is.

So what? OUGHT they jump on the bandwagon and fit the definition?

No special pleading. No "Scotsman" fallacy.

Q.E.D you are prescribing what the definition of "philosopher" OUGHT to be.

[Sculptor]

That statement self-contradicts.

No it is not.

Sure it does.

If you know it to be true, then it's false...because you know it to be true, which means there's a truth. If you don't know it to be true, then it's just an intuition you happen to have, and may well be false, since you don't have reason to know it.

Your trouble is that you cannot fucking read

[Immanuel Can]

you are claiming a criterion for being a philosopher.

No. I'm claiming there IS one. Whether or not I am one is not the issue.

Are you sure your definition is right? What if your definition is wrong?

Then both the etymology and history of philosophy is also wrong. But that it implausible, since the very meaning of the word philosophy is a coinage from within that tradition.

What if a True Philosopher is somebody who pursues rationality through the application of knowledge?

You've got the means and the outcome reversed there.

Not at all. It's what Hume himself, who first proposed the gap, thought was the case.

It doesn't matter what Hume said.

Sure it does. He is the originator of it. But even if you ignore Hume, it changes nothing about the problem.

So for me to say, "A philosopher ought to use rationality" is not a moral claim.

It doesn't matter if it's not a moral claim. It is an ought-claim.

So you think there's only one meaning of the word "ought"? And it's always strictly moral?

That's manifestly wrong, but I can't stop you believing whatever you want to, so go ahead.

[Skepdick]

No. I'm claiming there IS one. Whether or not I am one is not the issue.

You are claiming much more than that. You are claiming that. Not only are you claiming that there is a criterion, you are also claiming that you know what it is. And you are claiming that it's definable/expressible in language and that people have correctly expressed it.

Then both the etymology and history of philosophy is also wrong. But that it implausible, since the very meaning of the word philosophy is a coinage from within that tradition.

No. The etymology and history of that which you call "philosophy" is precisely as it is. But you can say the same about any human tradition.

I am simply asking whether those who self-identify as "philosophers" have figured out why they pursue the things they are pursuing.

You've got the means and the outcome reversed there.

Exactly as I indented. Hence the question - maybe your way is backwards and my way is right?

Some say you OUGHT to start with premises and arrive at conclusions.
Others say you OUGHT to start with conclusions and arrive at premises.

Who's right and who's wrong?

Sure it does. He is the originator of it. But even if you ignore Hume, it changes nothing about the problem.

But I insist - It doesn't matter what Hume says. What changes about the problem is scope. Hume's scope was too narrow.

I am broadening it to ALL oughts. Such as "We OUGHT to pursue truth", or. "we OUGHT to pursue philosophy".

So you think there's only one meaning of the word "ought"? And it's always strictly moral?

No. I think that the moral meaning of "ought" is a subset of the general meaning of "ought".

That's manifestly wrong, but I can't stop you believing whatever you want to, so go ahead.

Is that the moral meaning of "wrong" or are you equivocating?

[Immanuel Can]

Not only are you claiming that there is a criterion, you are also claiming that you know what it is.

Right. I'm claiming I can read and understand a simple definition. Hardly a grand claim, but there it is...it's worse if one can't.

Then both the etymology and history of philosophy is also wrong. But that it implausible, since the very meaning of the word philosophy is a coinage from within that tradition.

No. The etymology and history of that which you call "philosophy" is precisely as it is. But you can say the same about any human tradition.

Then you've just admitted you were wrong.

I am broadening it to ALL oughts.

That's outside your power. You can pretend you can amalgamate all the "oughts," but if they aren't really the same thing, you can't.

Is that the moral meaning of "wrong" or are you equivocating?

No. You're factually wrong. Whether you're also morally wrong is not something I'm judging here.

[Skepdick]

Right. I'm claiming I can read and understand a simple definition. Hardly a grand claim, but there it is...it's worse if one can't.

I didn't ask you if you can understand the definition. I asked you if the definition is wrong. Given that you know what the word "wrong" means (apparently). Even though you keep equivocating it.

Then you've just admitted you were wrong.

I've made no moral transgression as far as I can tell. What do you mean by "wrong" ?

That's outside your power.

If it was outside of my power I couldn't have possibly done what I already did.

You can pretend you can amalgamate all the "oughts," but if they aren't really the same thing, you can't.

I can. I did! And if you take time in to account (which philosophers constantly forget to do) it should've been called the was-is-ought gap, but that's immaterial to my point.

If you insist that something needs to be different than the way it was, is or will be then that is an OUGHT.

It's downward causation.

No. You're factually wrong. Whether you're also morally wrong is not something I'm judging here.

Q.E.D you are equivocating wrongness.

And what does "factuality" have to do with anything? An OUGHT is precisely about facts needing to change.

[Immanuel Can]

I asked you if the definition is wrong.

My answer would be "No." It's the best definition we've got, and fits the tradition descriptively very well.

Then you've just admitted you were wrong.

I've made no moral transgression as far as I can tell. What do you mean by "wrong" ?

Factually wrong. Erroneous. Off track.

You can pretend you can amalgamate all the "oughts," but if they aren't really the same thing, you can't.

I can. I did!

No, you did nothing, really. All you did was to stipulate for yourself a definition of "ought" that no person actually familiar with the usages of the relevant word would accept.

No. You're factually wrong. Whether you're also morally wrong is not something I'm judging here.

Q.E.D you are equivocating wrongness.

No. "Wrong," like "ought" has more than one connotation. One can be morally "wrong" without being factually "wrong," and the reverse is true...particularly in this case.

[Skepdick]

My answer would be "No." It's the best definition we've got, and fits the tradition descriptively very well.

It does? If philosophers pursue truth/wisdom then how come most of them are so dumb in practice?

Factually wrong. Erroneous. Off track.

What is my "error" exactly? Why is it an "error"?

No, you did nothing, really. All you did was to stipulate for yourself a definition of "ought" that no person actually familiar with the usages of the relevant word would accept.

And I should care if you accept or reject my "definition" why?

In so far as I can tell it is descriptively accurate that you make choices about the future every passing moment of your life.
So it seems perfectly adequate to overlay OUGHT to the future, IS to the present and WAS to the past.

Of course, most philosophers tend to object. Something about eternal, timeless truth. Blah blah!

No. "Wrong," like "ought" has more than one connotation.

Exactly! That's called "equivocation". Good thing that my conception of "ought" erases the ambiguity then, eh?

The past was what the past was.
The present is what the present is.
The future will be what the future will be.

If you want the future go differently to the way the past went then something needs to change. That's an OUGHT.

One can be morally "wrong" without being factually "wrong," and the reverse is true...particularly in this case.

I see. So which wrongness is worse?

[Immanuel Can]

My answer would be "No." It's the best definition we've got, and fits the tradition descriptively very well.

It does? If philosophers pursue truth/wisdom then how come most of them are so dumb in practice?

Many of them also are not. But it only shows that to "pursue" is not the same thing as always to "arrive at."

Factually wrong. Erroneous. Off track.

What is my "error" exactly? Why is it an "error"?

Read back, so I don't waste time repeating myself.

No, you did nothing, really. All you did was to stipulate for yourself a definition of "ought" that no person actually familiar with the usages of the relevant word would accept.

And I should care if you accept or reject my "definition" why?

No, you can choose not to care. You can be at variance with usage and common sense if you wish to be. Nobody can stop you.

it seems perfectly adequate to overlay OUGHT to the future,

"Ought" does pertain to the future. But one usage addresses the probable, factual future, another addresses the instrumental future, and a third addresses the moral future. It's only the third of these in which the IS-OUGHT problem Hume identified appears.

One can be morally "wrong" without being factually "wrong," and the reverse is true...particularly in this case.

I see. So which wrongness is worse?

It depends on what is being addressed.

[Skepdick]

Many of them also are not. But it only shows that to "pursue" is not the same thing as always to "arrive at."

Seems unwise to practice an activity that seldom arrives at the things it pursues.

Read back, so I don't waste time repeating myself.

I am not asking for a repetition. I am asking for a clarification.

"Ought" does pertain to the future. But one usage addresses the probable, factual future, another addresses the instrumental future , and a third addresses the moral future

But ALL usages of OUGHT deal with the future!!! It seems like you are agreeing with my general non-definition.

If you want to split up the future into a billion categories, be my guest. I like simplicity.

It's only the third of these in which the IS-OUGHT problem Hume identified appears.

This is good news for you then no?

Go ahead and demonstrate how to arrive at an instrumental OUGHT from an IS.

It depends on what is being addressed.

Wrongness is being addressed. It wouldn't confuse you this much if you weren't equivocating "wrongness".

[Immanuel Can]

Many of them also are not. But it only shows that to "pursue" is not the same thing as always to "arrive at."

Seems unwise to practice an activity that seldom arrives at the things it pursues.

It depends on the value of the outcome. People who search for gold or diamonds "seldom" find them. But the surpassing value of what they seek, as they see it, makes their search worth their time.

But "seldom" was your word, not mine. And seeking is a continuum, not merely a conclusion point.

"Ought" does pertain to the future. But one usage addresses the probable, factual future, another addresses the instrumental future , and a third addresses the moral future

But ALL usages of OUGHT deal with the future!!!

Of course. But that's irrelevant to the question of which KIND of future consideration the IS-OUGHT relates to. It only relates to the moral future.

I like simplicity.

Sometimes simplicity is clarity. Sometimes it's not...sometimes, it's just simplistic or oversimplification.

Go ahead and demonstrate how to arrive at an instrumental OUGHT from an IS.

Already done. But I'll give you another.

"If it IS the case that you want to visit Madagascar, you OUGHT to take an airplane." That is, you don't have to, and you won't be immoral if you don't. It's just the most instrumental means to your goal, presuming that's your goal.

It depends on what is being addressed.

Wrongness is being addressed.

Factual wrongness, instrumental wrongness, or moral wrongness?

Here are examples of the above. Factual wrongness: "The capital city of the UK is Durham." Instrumental wrongness: "Here's a cooper's hammer; use it to repair that wristwatch." Moral wrongness: rape.