Reformulating the analytic/synthetic distinction to make it unequivocal

[PeteOlcott]

The way that I divide analytic from synthetic may be unconventional. Every aspect of knowledge that can be represented in language and encoded as strings of characters is {analytic knowledge}. Every aspect of knowledge that can only be perceived as sensations through the sense organs is {empirical knowledge}. I discard the use of the term synthetic.

The above analytic versus empirical distinction would seem to overcome any possible objection that this distinction cannot be made unequivocal.

Semantic Tautology
I am creating a brand new idea that I named {semantic tautology}. A semantic tautology occurs when a new combination of ideas is assigned to a word or phrase making a brand new term. To verify that a semantic tautology is true only requires verifying that this set of ideas has been assigned to this term. That cats are animals is an example of a semantic tautology.

Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott

The meaning of every existing word is a member of the set of {analytic knowledge}. Every new combinations of ideas creating a new meaning that is assigned to a word or phrase is also an element of the set of {analytic knowledge} as long as it does not contradict any other element.

Every element of the set of {analytic knowledge} has to be impervious to future contradiction because its entire basis is only anchored in the semantic meanings of other terms that are also impervious to future contradiction.

There will never be a time when a {cat} is a type of {dog} because the properties that have been assigned to {cat} and {dog} are mutually exclusive. If anyone genetically engineers a {cat} that barks this animal becomes a hybrid that is neither {cat} nor {dog}.

[RCSaunders]

But, 'it does not matter what character is used', just as long as the character is already understood, correct?

I'm not exactly sure what you are asking, Age, but it seems like a fair question, and I'll answer what I think you are probably asking.

A symbol, in language, can be any arbitrary mark or vocalization, even a gesture (sign language and semaphor, for example), that stands for or represents a concept. The sign or symbol, itself, has no meaning. A concept is an identification of some existent. An existent is anything that is, an entity, an event, an attribute, a relationship, whether material (rocks, houses, animals, planets) or epistemological (history, mathematics, science, fiction). What a concept identifies (the actual existents) is what the concept means.

And what the 'concept' itself means is relative to the observer. This is because absolutely EVERY thing is relative to the observer.

I have no idea what you are trying to say here. A concept means whatever it identifies, usually called its referrent. It means that no matter how one thinks or uses that concept. What it means is not, "relative," to anything, it means what it means, period.

So, when you say, "it does not matter what character is used, just as long as the character is already understood," is only true so long as by, "already understood," means "the actual concept the character represents is known."

Remember that the 'actual concept' the character represents can only be truly known with and through clarification. Obviously, for what you know is not what "another" knows.

Clarification of what? You may know something I don't know, but if I know what a radio is and you know what a radio is, be both know exactly the same thing, what a radio is.

Since, the meaning of a concept is the actual existents it identifies, no character, symbol, or sign means anything unless it represent a concept that means actual existents.

Just as long as this is what the human being, who makes things mean things, makes that the meaning of a concept.

What else would they make it, and why would they. It isn't like we are handed a basket of concepts and then have go out and find meanings for them. We first observe things that exist and then identify them by forming a concepts of them, words (symbols) plus definitions (descriptions of the existents), which we can then think, say, or write, about that existent without actually having one before us, and to able to identify other existents of the same kind. Nobody sees a horse, forms a concept for a horse, then chooses to make the meaning of the concept of horse a kumquat.

Obviously, if a human being makes the meaning of a 'concept' something other than the actual existents it identifies, then the meaning of a 'concept', to them, is different from the meaning of a 'concept', to you.

You cannot change the meaning of a concept. A concept means whatever it identifies and cannot mean anything else. The concept, "dog," for example means any animal of the Canis familiaris family. The word, "dog," is only a symbol for the concept, "dog," but a different symbol, el perro, for example, can be used for the same concept. The same symbol can also be used to identify more then one concept, for example, in addition to the concept, Canis familiaris, the word, "dog," can also be used to identify the concept for, "a u-shaped metallic device used for gripping or holding heavy objects," as well as the concept, "to track or trail persistently." These are not different meanings for the same concept, they are different concepts. The word is not the concept, the word is only the symbol for the concept. Any concept has only one meaning, the actual existents it identifies, and any supposed other, "meanings," are actually different concepts.

And, if it is impossible for a human being to make the meaning of a 'concept' other than the actual existents it identifies, then this is just an unequivocal fact, which obviously cannot be refuted.

Yes, that's right.

My question was asking for nothing more than what the question itself asks for, that is; a yes or a no answer.

Perhaps I did not understand the question, which is certainly possible. In any case, epistemological questions are always subject ambiguities, and I was only attempting to evade any possible such confusion. When asked to answer, just, "yes or no," I assume the question is on the order of, "do you still take drugs?"

[Age]

I'm not exactly sure what you are asking, Age, but it seems like a fair question, and I'll answer what I think you are probably asking.

A symbol, in language, can be any arbitrary mark or vocalization, even a gesture (sign language and semaphor, for example), that stands for or represents a concept. The sign or symbol, itself, has no meaning. A concept is an identification of some existent. An existent is anything that is, an entity, an event, an attribute, a relationship, whether material (rocks, houses, animals, planets) or epistemological (history, mathematics, science, fiction). What a concept identifies (the actual existents) is what the concept means.

And what the 'concept' itself means is relative to the observer. This is because absolutely EVERY thing is relative to the observer.

I have no idea what you are trying to say here. A concept means whatever it identifies, usually called its referrent. It means that no matter how one thinks or uses that concept. What it means is not, "relative," to anything, it means what it means, period.

A 'concept' itself is just an individual's interpretation of things. A 'concept', itself, like a sign, character, or symbol has no meaning at all, other than what an individual gives it. Different people can have different concepts of the same things. For example, a concept of what God is, is solely dependent upon an individual. The concept is within the human being. A concept does not necessarily have to be an identification of some existent because to some people God does not even exist. What a concept refers to, or identifies, is only known by the one making up and holding the concept itself. Concepts, themselves, do not necessarily mean anything, other than whatever meaning people give to them. One word can trigger completely different concepts, which can be completely different and even completely opposing concepts to different people.

Therefore, whatever meaning you give to a concept, which you individually have in regards to words, can be completely different from what meaning another gives to a concept about the exact same word.

Only through clarification with another can what a concept is identifying (the actual existents or the non-existents) become known, and also only through clarification of what a concept means to another can it then become known. Until clarification is made what a concept identifies or means to another is only assumed to be known.

Remember that the 'actual concept' the character represents can only be truly known with and through clarification. Obviously, for what you know is not what "another" knows.

Clarification of what?

Of what the concept is or means TO ANOTHER.

Obviously you can NOT know, for sure, what concept another has, without clarifying with them first.

You may know something I don't know, but if I know what a radio is and you know what a radio is, be both know exactly the same thing, what a radio is.

But OBVIOUSLY what your concept of what a radio is might be completely different than my concept of what a radio is, and without clarifying with each other first, we would only be assuming, or guessing, what the other's concept is. That is; IF we were assuming or guessing what the concept of the other is.

Honestly, I prefer to NOT make any assumption at all.

Also, 'radios' are one thing, knowing physically seen things are a LOT different than knowing what non-physically seen things.

For example; If you say you know what God is, and, I say I know what God is, then is it actually true that we both know exactly the same thing?

If no, then maybe, and hopefully, you are closer to understanding that in Truth we actually do NOT know what concept another has and/or is holding. That is; until clarification is made.

Just as long as this is what the human being, who makes things mean things, makes that the meaning of a concept.

What else would they make it, and why would they.

Because individual persons are DIFFERENT from each other.

It isn't like we are handed a basket of concepts and then have go out and find meanings for them. We first observe things that exist and then identify them by forming a concepts of them, words (symbols) plus definitions (descriptions of the existents), which we can then think, say, or write, about that existent without actually having one before us, and to able to identify other existents of the same kind. Nobody sees a horse, forms a concept for a horse, then chooses to make the meaning of the concept of horse a kumquat.

Some might. How do you KNOW 'nobody' sees and does this?

Is your concept of a horse the EXACT SAME as absolutely EVERY human being that ever lived?

If yes, then I think you will find that you are wrong.

But, if no, then that is all the evidence and proof needed that without clarifying first you do not yet KNOW what concept another has or is holding onto.

Your concept of a kumquat could be completely different than mine. So, how would you KNOW?

I do NOT know what you see, until I clarify with you. Your concept of a horse could be completely different than mine. We do NOT know until we clarify.

Also, what you see may NEVER be the EXACT SAME as what I see. For example, even with clarification we have NO way ever of KNOWING if what you see as 'red' is what I see as 'red'. For all we KNOW what you see as 'red' could be what I see as 'blue', from your perspective. The only thing we can KNOW, for sure, is what we 'agree on', and, it is this 'agreement', which is what provides the meaning given to concepts. And, as I have been saying, it is only through clarification with others these concepts and meanings can be Truly understood. Until clarification is made human beings will continue to live in their confused, misunderstood, lost, differing, separate and warring ways that they do now, in the days of when this is being written.

Obviously, if a human being makes the meaning of a 'concept' something other than the actual existents it identifies, then the meaning of a 'concept', to them, is different from the meaning of a 'concept', to you.

You cannot change the meaning of a concept.

Please refrain from telling me what I can and cannot do. But please feel free to tell us that you believe that 'you' cannot change the meaning of a concept.

See I am FREE to change the meaning of a concept at any time I want to.

A concept means whatever it identifies and cannot mean anything else.

What does the concept of 'gay' mean, and has what that concept identifies NEVER changed?

Obviously, what a concept means, AT THE TIME that it is identifying some thing, it does not change and will not change, but, words and their meanings evolve and change, over time, so to what words and concepts identify also must change as well. Therefore, it is possible for you to change the meaning of a concept. For example, Does the concept of what it means to be an 'old person' or a 'young person' change, over time with you?

The concept, "dog," for example means any animal of the Canis familiaris family. The word, "dog," is only a symbol for the concept, "dog," but a different symbol, el perro, for example, can be used for the same concept. The same symbol can also be used to identify more then one concept, for example, in addition to the concept, Canis familiaris, the word, "dog," can also be used to identify the concept for, "a u-shaped metallic device used for gripping or holding heavy objects," as well as the concept, "to track or trail persistently." These are not different meanings for the same concept, they are different concepts. The word is not the concept, the word is only the symbol for the concept. Any concept has only one meaning, the actual existents it identifies, and any supposed other, "meanings," are actually different concepts.

So, if ANY concept has only ONE meaning, then what is the meaning of the concept 'old', 'young', 'hot', and 'cold'? What is the ACTUAL existents these identify? Are they the EXACT SAME "meanings" for me, and others, as they are for you? Is it possible that there could actually be different 'meanings', for the perceived same concepts?

Is it at all possible that concepts are actually relative to the individual observer, and therefore do not actually have ONE meaning only? Or, is this not possible in the way you individually look at and see things?

It is possible that some concepts are just more easily seen, and/or understood, and thus are more accepted and agreed upon than other concepts, and their meanings, are?

And, if it is impossible for a human being to make the meaning of a 'concept' other than the actual existents it identifies, then this is just an unequivocal fact, which obviously cannot be refuted.

Yes, that's right.

Therefore, this is 'thee ACTUAL Truth', which is unambiguous and irrefutable fact that EVERY one agrees with. This finding 'thee actual Truth' like you imply we have just done here now is what some people say is what philosophy is for.

You may well believe that it is impossible for a human being to make the meaning of a 'concept' other than the actual existents it identifies, but now how do we KNOW that the concept is the EXACT SAME as the alleged 'actual existent' the concept identifies?

What is the actual existent, which the concepts 'hot weather' and 'old person' identifies?

What is the meaning of the concept 'the weather is hot' and 'that person is old', to you? And, is that going to be the EXACT SAME meaning for EVERY person as well?

Is it possible that different people have different meaning of 'concepts'?

In fact, does the concept of 'actual existents concepts identifies' mean the EXACT SAME thing to EVERY one?

How do 'you', as a person, KNOW what is an 'actual existent'? Is by the actual concept that you have and use? Is it possible that 'your' concept of some thing is different than some one else's concept?

My question was asking for nothing more than what the question itself asks for, that is; a yes or a no answer.

Perhaps I did not understand the question, which is certainly possible. In any case, epistemological questions are always subject ambiguities, and I was only attempting to evade any possible such confusion.

But it was not an epistemological question, from my perspective.

From my perspective, I was just asking you a clarifying question about what you thought.

When asked to answer, just, "yes or no," I assume the question is on the order of, "do you still take drugs?"

When I seek yes or no answers, here in this forum, I think you will find that they are nearly always in relation to what thoughts are in that head, and not necessarily at all about what that body does.

[Skepdick]

Impredicativity has the compositional meaning of not predictive which literally mean unable to predict.

Impredicativity has nothing to do with prediction.

It has to do with logical predicates.

Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) Says what it means and means what it says.

Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004)
Is the case where the self-reference of an expression prevents this expression
from being a truth-bearer.

If it's pathological, why do you keep referring to yourself as "Pete Olcott" ?

[PeteOlcott]

Impredicativity has the compositional meaning of not predictive which literally mean unable to predict.

Impredicativity has nothing to do with prediction.

It has to do with logical predicates.

Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) Says what it means and means what it says.

Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004)
Is the case where the self-reference of an expression prevents this expression
from being a truth-bearer.

If it's pathological, why do you keep referring to yourself as "Pete Olcott" ?

There is Pathological self-reference and there is self-reference that is not Pathological.
"This sentence is not true," is the former and "This sentence is comprised of words." is the latter.

[Skepdick]

"This sentence is not true," is the former and "This sentence is comprised of words." is the latter.

You can't assert that if you don't have a True() predicate.

Any more than you can assert this sentence if you don't have a Red() predicate.

This sentence is written in the color red.

[PeteOlcott]

"This sentence is not true," is the former and "This sentence is comprised of words." is the latter.

You can't assert that if you don't have a True() predicate.

Any more than you can assert this sentence if you don't have a Red() predicate.

This sentence is written in the color red.

The actual way that actual truth really works is the sound deductive inference model.

Only because mathematical logic diverges from this model is Gödel Incompleteness and Tarski Undefinability possible.

Analytical_Knowledge
The set of expressions of language verified as true entirely on the basis of their semantic meaning fully specified as stipulated relations between expressions of this same language.

AK = Analytical_Knowledge(as defined above) including all of mathematics
∀x ∈ AK (( AK ⊢ x) ↔ True(AK, x))

The body of analytic knowledge is entirely comprised of a set of stipulated relations between expressions of language such as the stipulated relation that {dog} [is a type of] {mammal} or sound deduction (a sequence of stipulated relations) on the basis of these stipulated relations:

{dog} [is a type of] {mammal}
{mammal} [is a type of] {animal}
∴ {dog} [is a type of] {animal}

A sound deductive inference chain begins with a set of stipulated relations (true premises) proceeds through a sequence of additional stipulated relations (valid deduction) and ends with a conclusion that is guaranteed to be true.

[Skepdick]

The actual way that actual truth really works is the sound deductive inference model.

Are you sure? How do you even begin deducing without true premises?

How do you determine the truthfulness of a premise without induction?

[PeteOlcott]

The actual way that actual truth really works is the sound deductive inference model.

Are you sure? How do you even begin deducing without true premises?

How do you determine the truthfulness of a premise without induction?

To avoid the problem of induction I am only examining {analytical knowledge}.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction

True premises are either stipulated relations between expression of language
such as "a dog is a mammal" or a sequence of stipulated relations beginning on
the basis of stipulated relations.

[Skepdick]

True premises are either stipulated relations between expression of language
such as "a dog is a mammal" or a sequence of stipulated relations beginning on
the basis of stipulated relations.

Whatever. How have you DETERMINED that your stipulated premises are true?

[PeteOlcott]

True premises are either stipulated relations between expression of language
such as "a dog is a mammal" or a sequence of stipulated relations beginning on
the basis of stipulated relations.

Whatever. How have you DETERMINED that your stipulated premises are true?

The fact that I can look inside my mind right now and see that the relation:
"a dog is an animal" is true proves that the relation: {dog} [is a type of] {animal}
has been stipulated. In other words: "A dog is an animal" has been assigned the
Boolean property of TRUE.

Chinese uses different finite strings to stipulate the same relation: 狗是动物

[Skepdick]

The fact that I can look inside my mind right now and see that the relation:
"a dog is an animal" is true proves that the relation: {dog} [is a type of] {animal}
has been stipulated. In other words: "A dog is an animal" has been assigned the
Boolean property of TRUE.

Pete, that's not fucking useful. In your system IsTypeOf() is a predicate.

How did the entity {dog} and the entity {animal} end up in your head (database)?
How was the relationship between them established?

How does the predicate IsTypeOf() work?

You are stuck somewhere between inheritance and relational databases.

Why is this true?

https://repl.it/repls/ChillyHonorableLogin

Code: Select all

class Animal(object): pass
class Dog(Mamal): pass

print(Dog.__base__)

Why is this not true?

{dog} [is a type of] {fish}

Code: Select all

class Fish(object): pass
class Dog(Fish): pass

print(Dog.__base__)