Is morality objective or subjective?

[Immanuel Can]

An intuition is a guess or a feeling, so it's the wrong word to use here.

I agree the word is not perfect, and is capable of being read that way. I did not intend that reading.

But it's the best I could think of to describe the phenomenon of having an experience of something, but being in a pre-articulate condition regarding it. The sensation is rather like being able to stretch out one's arm just enough to touch a thing with one's fingertips, but not quite enough to close one's hand fully on it.

If you have an alternate word to describe such an experience, I'm open to hearing it, of course.

You seem to think ontology is being and epistemology is knowledge.

Not at all. I think that ontology is the study of (or inquiry about) being, and epistemology is the study of knowledge. Those are quite different things, again.

You said this: 'The ontological is thus primary, the epistemological secondary, and the linguistic tertiary...though the tertiary level, words, can create a feedback-loop with the secondary or epistemological level, and modify our experiences. Human articulations cannot, however, have any impact at all on the primary ontological level.'

Here you are using the phrase 'the ontological' to mean 'being', and the phrase 'the epistemological' to mean 'knowledge'.

Rather, I am using them to indicate the question of what exists (ontology) and the level of knowledge we have of that (epistemology).

That you think your question is clear shows that you don't understand what truth-value refers to, which is factual assertions

No, reworded to clarify, as you can see below.

So let's rephrase: what sort of thing would you accept as a demonstration of the objectivity of right and wrong, supposing such a thing were offered you? You said the lack of such a "demonstration" to use your words, constituted a reasonable objection in believing in objective right and wrong; so what sort of "demonstration" were you referring to? You must know, if you think it has lacked being done...

That's trying to shift the burden of proof.

Not so. The original statement, the claim that a level of "demonstration" has not been met, was yours not mine. I assumed that you must have had something in mind. I merely asked you what it was.

Try not to be so prickly, Pete...I'm not coming after you personally, or trying to set you up for ridicule. I'm trying to understand your position.

In other words, let's not let our conversation become like this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1XMJTWD2mzs

[Peter Holmes]

Immanuel Can.

Let's do a deal. I'll try not to be prickly, and we'll both acknowledge any mistakes that we make.

As for the burden of proof - you said this: ''The original statement, the claim that a level of "demonstration" has not been met, was yours not mine. I assumed that you must have had something in mind. I merely asked you what it was.'

I don't know how to meet the burden of proof for the claim that moral objectivists haven't met their burden of proof. I have nothing in mind, apart from the absence of evidence for their claim.

I apologise if that's frustrating. And by all means leave me to my unjustified rejection of moral objectivism. Or, if you prefer, please meet the burden of proof for moral objectivism and realism. I'm surely not the only one who'd be interested.

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel Can.

Let's do a deal. I'll try not to be prickly, and we'll both acknowledge any mistakes that we make.

Deal. Fair enough.

As for the burden of proof - you said this: ''The original statement, the claim that a level of "demonstration" has not been met, was yours not mine. I assumed that you must have had something in mind. I merely asked you what it was.'

I don't know how to meet the burden of proof for the claim that moral objectivists haven't met their burden of proof. I have nothing in mind, apart from the absence of evidence for their claim.

Well, my question was for this reason: if a person walks into a house and says, "This place doesn't have enough furniture," then the obvious next question is, "What kind of thing does it lack?" And ordinarily, the objector says, "It needs a mirror," or "a piano," or "two more chairs under the window," or "an ornament cabinet."

It would be a little hard for the homeowner if the answer was, "I don't know: I just feel it needs more... something." He wouldn't be unreasonable to press, "Well, what would you suggest?"

I apologise if that's frustrating.

It could be, but it doesn't have to be. We can just parse that out a bit, and figure out what we'd be looking for IF some kind of "demonstration" of moral objectivity were to appear.

However, so long as we have no specific "demonstration" in mind, we can hardly be either discontent or confident that it hasn't appeared -- we don't even know what we're looking for, so we'd never recognize it if it ever came, right?

[Peter Holmes]

So your proposed analogy is between the claim that a house lacks furniture, and the claim that moral objectivism lacks supportive evidence. Have I got that right?

[Immanuel Can]

So your proposed analogy is between the claim that a house lacks furniture, and the claim that moral objectivism lacks supportive evidence. Have I got that right?

Indeed so.

I'm curious as to how we can discern that we have a "lack" of something we admit we couldn't recognize even if it appeared. After all, maybe it has appeared, but we had no idea what to look for.

But we could fix that.

[henry quirk]

"And when you demonstrate your love, is that like demonstrating the existence of a real thing like a chemical element or the Higgs boson? Does love exist in a way analogous to the way such real things exist?"

Yes, in the sense that love (loving) is action (which exists). Walking exists, yeah? Seeing exists, yeah? Loving exists, yeah?

#

"You claim that 'the moral dimension of reality' or 'the Natural Law' or 'objective morality' exists. But you obviously don't think they exist in the way a chemical element exists or a fundamental particle exists - demonstrably."

What I said is moral objectiveness/moral realism/Natural Law is a principle (more accurately, specifically with Natural Law, a description of principle). The three laws of thermodynamics describe Reality, describe principle, describe the way things are: are those three laws (more accurately, is what they describe) real?

#

"To be moral is to be free to choose."

In context: one is free to align one's self with the way things are or attempt to do othewise.

#

"Who decides what the Natural Law says?"

I say Crom does (or did...hell knows what he's up to these days).

#

"If it's just 'how things are', how can there be disagreement?"

A man can shove his naked hand into a blazin' camp fire as many times as he likes, insistin' it's his right, but he's gonna get burned each and every time.

#

"Natural Law, the 'moral dimension of reality', is merely sublimated theology."

Ain't no sublimation: flat out, I recognize the way things are through the lens of my deism.

-----

Pete, do you think murder (killing another person without just cause) is wrong?

Offing a person in defense of self or in defense of another is killing, but not murder.

A catastrophic miscalculation resulting in a person's death is killing, but not murder.

Murder is intentfully, willfully, killing a person pretty much cuz you just want 'em dead.

Is murder wrong?

If yeah: why?

If no, why not?

[henry quirk]

Natural law is the concept that incontrovertible laws of nature exist and should inform any of the laws written by governments and societies. These are thought to include not only the observable laws of physics and mathematics, but also laws that govern human flourishing. It is closely associated with the concept of objective morality: the belief that some actions will always remain moral or immoral, regardless of the attitudes of individuals, societies or governments to these actions.

The above comes from https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Natural_law and is as good a summary as any.

I only differ from the above in: I see objective morality and Natural Law as practically synonymous, or part & parcel, instead of being closely associated.

[Immanuel Can]

Natural law is the concept that incontrovertible laws of nature exist and should inform any of the laws written by governments and societies. These are thought to include not only the observable laws of physics and mathematics, but also laws that govern human flourishing. It is closely associated with the concept of objective morality: the belief that some actions will always remain moral or immoral, regardless of the attitudes of individuals, societies or governments to these actions.

Here's my question about Natural Law theories, Henry. It parallel's the very good question C.S. Lewis asked when criticizing the phenomenon of "historicism," that is, of people trying to "read" a sort of moral or message out of the facts of the past. He said, " “I do not dispute that History is a story written by the finger of God. But have we the text?"

"Have we the text?" Great question. Likewise, I have no objection to the proposition that some actions are inherently moral and some inherently immoral. The question, though, is who is qualified to "read" out of the facts the right set of moral judgments? Who "has the text"?

Natural Law arguments are made on both sides of many questions. The anti-homosexualist says such actions are "unnatural," and the homosexual advocate responds, "Well, they're natural to me. It's in my nature to be homosexual." Both are claiming to read the "text" of the natural world, and both are claiming their reading is the right one: yet they're opposite readings.

An environmentalist might argue that eating inorganic or GM food is "unnatural." But a Monsanto marketer might respond, "Is it not in our human nature to invent, engineer, manage and control our environment? How can you say it's 'unnatural' to us to do the same with our food?" One is reading as natural our organic food supply; the other is reading as natural our human inclination to manipulate food. Do not both have a point?

Some people jump to the irrational conclusion that if people disagree then there cannot be a right answer. That's silly, of course. People might disagree about the distance between us and the moon, or the sum of 2 and 5...and that won't mean that all answers are equal. And in many cases, there will still be an ultimate answer or truth about things, even if it were to be the case that no person on earth knew what it was.

But what it really argues is only this: that before we can say what the Natural Law is showing us, we need first to know whose eyes are seeing it clearly. Appealing vaguely to "nature" will not really help us, unless we know the answer to that. Because people can justify all kinds of things based on their peculiar readings of what's natural and not.

Who, then, "reads" the moral law of Nature to us? Who has that right?

Crom, perhaps?

[henry quirk]

"Have we the text?" "Crom"

The degree a man needs educating on what's in his soul (the text, the map, the blueprint) is the same degree he's been bamboozled into thinkin' someone else knows more about his soul than he does.

As for Crom: the Architect is away, but that's okay cuz the blueprints are in our hands, each and every one (the notes can be hard to decipher but not insurmountably so).

[Immanuel Can]

(the notes can be hard to decipher but not insurmountably so).

I tend to think that's true.

You might like a book titled, "What We Can't Not Know." It was done some years ago by an ethicist from Texas, named Jay Budziszewski (PhD). He's very keen on Natural Law. And the book's a good read, too.

Just saying.

[henry quirk]

(the notes can be hard to decipher but not insurmountably so).

I tend to think that's true.

You might like a book titled, "What We Can't Not Know." It was done some years ago by an ethicist from Texas, named Jay Budziszewski (PhD). He's very keen on Natural Law. And the book's a good read, too.

Just saying.

I'm familiar with him and the book. He's right (though, obviously, he and me, we disagree on a fundamental notion).

[Immanuel Can]

I'm familiar with him and the book.

No guff?

Well done.

[Peter Holmes]

So your proposed analogy is between the claim that a house lacks furniture, and the claim that moral objectivism lacks supportive evidence. Have I got that right?

Indeed so.

I'm curious as to how we can discern that we have a "lack" of something we admit we couldn't recognize even if it appeared. After all, maybe it has appeared, but we had no idea what to look for.

But we could fix that.

But here your analogy breaks down. If I say the house is empty - has no furniture - and you disagree, you can easily point out the items of furniture that I failed to notice, and show me that I'm wrong. I know what furniture is as well as you, so there could be no argument. There would be a fact of the matter either way.

The situation with evidence for moral objectivism is different. If you claim there is such evidence (such 'furniture'), but can't show me what the evidence is, why should I believe you - and why do you believe it yourself? I'm completely open-minded, because I want to know the truth - the fact of the matter. If I say there's no furniture, telling me I couldn't recognise it even if it were there would be ridiculous.

So, bin the analogy, please, and actually back up your claim that moral rightness and wrongness are real things - features of reality. I'm sorry, but until you do that, there's no reason for me to believe the claim - and you shouldn't either.

The claim that the only way we can recognise evidence for moral objectivism is to believe it exists is, obviously, intellectually bankrupt.

[Peter Holmes]

"And when you demonstrate your love, is that like demonstrating the existence of a real thing like a chemical element or the Higgs boson? Does love exist in a way analogous to the way such real things exist?"

Yes, in the sense that love (loving) is action (which exists). Walking exists, yeah? Seeing exists, yeah? Loving exists, yeah?

#

What exists is the behaviour and its motivations that we call 'loving'. But to extrapolate from that to the claim that there is a real thing - a thing as real as rocks and stones and trees - that is 'love' is a metaphysical delusion.

"You claim that 'the moral dimension of reality' or 'the Natural Law' or 'objective morality' exists. But you obviously don't think they exist in the way a chemical element exists or a fundamental particle exists - demonstrably."

What I said is moral objectiveness/moral realism/Natural Law is a principle (more accurately, specifically with Natural Law, a description of principle). The three laws of thermodynamics describe Reality, describe principle, describe the way things are: are those three laws (more accurately, is what they describe) real?

#

The difference is that thermodynamics describes the way real things in the universe actually behave or function. The science is demonstrable. And what it describes is reality, not a principle (a given rule or starting point). You seem a little confused here. What you call Natural Law, moral realism or moral objectivism doesn't describe something demonstrably in the way that thermodynamics does.

"To be moral is to be free to choose."

In context: one is free to align one's self with the way things are or attempt to do otherwise.

#

Here the failure of the analogy is evident. If thermodynamics describes reality correctly - as seems to be the case - we aren't free to choose to 'align' ourselves with reality. But we can choose to transgress any moral 'rule', whatever its real or imagined source.

"Who decides what the Natural Law says?"

I say Crom does (or did...hell knows what he's up to these days).

#

"If it's just 'how things are', how can there be disagreement?"

A man can shove his naked hand into a blazin' camp fire as many times as he likes, insistin' it's his right, but he's gonna get burned each and every time.

#

Agreed. But people can and do 'disobey' moral rules all the time, often without consequences. And that's why moral realism is nothing like thermodynamics.

"Natural Law, the 'moral dimension of reality', is merely sublimated theology."

Ain't no sublimation: flat out, I recognize the way things are through the lens of my deism.

Imo, to the extent that deism is even less intellectually defensible than classical theism, it is even more ridiculous.

-----

Pete, do you think murder (killing another person without just cause) is wrong?

Offing a person in defense of self or in defense of another is killing, but not murder.

A catastrophic miscalculation resulting in a person's death is killing, but not murder.

Murder is intentfully, willfully, killing a person pretty much cuz you just want 'em dead.

Is murder wrong?

If yeah: why?

If no, why not?

So why is killing in self-defence morally right and justifiable? Is there a fact of the matter here? Is there something we can test, in the way we can test thermodynamic theory, to demonstrate the moral rightness or wrongness of an action?

I understand the frustration of moral realists and objectivists, and why it must end up with this table-banging, lapel-grabbing rage: is murder morally wrong, or isn't it? We want certainty for our moral judgements - so we end up out-sourcing them to reality, or 'the way things are', or Natural Law, or the Noboddady god of theism, or the absent god of deism - and so on. Insert the delusion of choice.

It's much more rational to accept moral responsibility and argue individually and collectively for the moral values and judgements we want to have and make.

[Immanuel Can]

So your proposed analogy is between the claim that a house lacks furniture, and the claim that moral objectivism lacks supportive evidence. Have I got that right?

Indeed so.

I'm curious as to how we can discern that we have a "lack" of something we admit we couldn't recognize even if it appeared. After all, maybe it has appeared, but we had no idea what to look for.

But we could fix that.

But here your analogy breaks down...So bin the analogy, please.

Well, anything that's an analogy is only there to assist thought. It is not the substance of the thing itself, so we can let it go if it doesn't help you understand the question better.

The question itself is actually very easy: if you say that there's something lacking, how do you know that?