Does Ontological Relativity undermine Absolute Truth?

[Skepdick]

Does the notion of Ontological relativity (introduced below) undermine the notion of Absolute Truth?

From the wikipedia page on Neopragmatism Quine's argument for ontological relativity follows:

* All ideas and perceptions concerning reality are given to our minds in terms of our own mental language.
* Mental languages specify how objects in the world are to be constructed from our sense data.
* Different mental languages will specify different ontologies (different objects existing in the world).
* There is no way to perfectly translate between two different mental languages; there will always be several, consistent ways in which the terms in each language can be mapped onto the other.
* Reality apart from our perceptions of it can be thought of as constituting a true, object language, that is, the language which specifies how things actually are.
* There is no difference in translating between two mental languages and translating between the object language of reality and one's own mental language.
* Therefore, just as there is no objective way of translating between two mental languages (no one-to-one mapping of terms in one to terms in the other) there is no way of objectively translating (or fitting) the true, object language of reality into our own mental language.
* And therefore, there are many ontologies (possibly an infinite number) that can be consistently held to represent reality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

There is already a problem with premise 1;
P1. "All ideas and perceptions concerning reality are given to our minds in terms of our own mental language."

It cannot be a truth that reality is a pre-existing reality.
There is no proofs in the P1 that reality is an pre-existing reality.
Therefore P1 merely assumed reality is a pre-existing reality.
As such the conclusion is at groundless except on an assumption and not on reality.

The problem is Quine jumped in as a Philosophical Realist and took reality for granted;
see below;

• In metaphysics, [philosophical] realism about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

The Philosophical anti-realists will not agree with Quine's argument above since the whole argument is grounded on an assumption.

[Eodnhoj7]

Does the notion of Ontological relativity (introduced below) undermine the notion of Absolute Truth?

From the wikipedia page on Neopragmatism Quine's argument for ontological relativity follows:

* All ideas and perceptions concerning reality are given to our minds in terms of our own mental language.
* Mental languages specify how objects in the world are to be constructed from our sense data.
* Different mental languages will specify different ontologies (different objects existing in the world).
* There is no way to perfectly translate between two different mental languages; there will always be several, consistent ways in which the terms in each language can be mapped onto the other.
* Reality apart from our perceptions of it can be thought of as constituting a true, object language, that is, the language which specifies how things actually are.
* There is no difference in translating between two mental languages and translating between the object language of reality and one's own mental language.
* Therefore, just as there is no objective way of translating between two mental languages (no one-to-one mapping of terms in one to terms in the other) there is no way of objectively translating (or fitting) the true, object language of reality into our own mental language.
* And therefore, there are many ontologies (possibly an infinite number) that can be consistently held to represent reality.

No, context is constant, but we are left with understanding what is constant about context...otherwise it becomes a pivotal term.

Thus context is composed of:

1. Recursion through tautologies and meta tautologies.

2. Instrinsic emptiness, where each context has the potential to invert from one context to another.

3. Each context as both tautology and potential tautology is a variable as it is both a general statement and a particular. General as composed of particulars, a particular in that composes further variables.

4. The context is imaginary, ie and image.

[Veritas Aequitas]

No, context is constant, but we are left with understanding what is constant about context...otherwise it becomes a pivotal term.

Thus context is composed of:

1. Recursion through tautologies and meta tautologies.

2. Instrinsic emptiness, where each context has the potential to invert from one context to another.

3. Each context as both tautology and potential tautology is a variable as it is both a general statement and a particular. General as composed of particulars, a particular in that composes further variables.

4. The context is imaginary, ie and image.

Nah, context is never constant.
The only constant is change!

[Eodnhoj7]

No, context is constant, but we are left with understanding what is constant about context...otherwise it becomes a pivotal term.

Thus context is composed of:

1. Recursion through tautologies and meta tautologies.

2. Instrinsic emptiness, where each context has the potential to invert from one context to another.

3. Each context as both tautology and potential tautology is a variable as it is both a general statement and a particular. General as composed of particulars, a particular in that composes further variables.

4. The context is imaginary, ie and image.

Nah, context is never constant.
The only constant is change!

Actually context is repeating variables, and as such requires repitition of forms.

That which repeats is constant as consistency is a continuum.

[Skepdick]

It cannot be a truth that reality is a pre-existing reality.
There is no proofs in the P1 that reality is an pre-existing reality.
Therefore P1 merely assumed reality is a pre-existing reality.

Where does the premise say anything about pre-existing anything?

You are so ignorant you can't even Strawman properly.

Here is the primary claim of anti-realists: anti-realism maintains a skepticism about the physical world, arguing that we would have no access to a mind-independent reality, even if it exists.

Observe that even anti-realists don't reject the existence of reality - they merely ascribe certainty to the existence of minds and reject a mind-independent reality - one that it's not accessible by us except via the mind. This is EXACTLY Quine's premise.

All ideas and perceptions concerning reality are given to our minds in terms of our own mental language.

Both are epistemic arguments.

[Veritas Aequitas]

It cannot be a truth that reality is a pre-existing reality.
There is no proofs in the P1 that reality is an pre-existing reality.
Therefore P1 merely assumed reality is a pre-existing reality.

Where does the premise say anything about pre-existing anything?

You are so ignorant you can't even Strawman properly.

Not mentioned but the implication is very basic.

• P1. All ideas and perceptions concerning reality are given to our minds in terms of our own mental language.

There is no further qualification to the above 'reality' thus implied it is pre-existing and existing as real.

Here is the primary claim of anti-realists: anti-realism maintains a skepticism about the physical world, arguing that we would have no access to a mind-independent reality, even if it exists.

Observe that even anti-realists don't reject the existence of reality - they merely ascribe certainty to the existence of minds and reject a mind-independent reality - one that it's not accessible by us except via the mind. This is EXACTLY Quine's premise.

All ideas and perceptions concerning reality are given to our minds in terms of our own mental language.

Both are epistemic arguments.

There are a wide range of Philosophical anti-realists.
Kant do not accept there is a reality-by-itself, i.e. reality do not pre-exist independent of the human conditions.
Reality to Kant is always conditioned to the human conditions.

[Skepdick]

Not mentioned but the implication is very basic.
P1. All ideas and perceptions concerning reality are given to our minds in terms of our own mental language.
There is no further qualification to the above 'reality' thus implied it is pre-existing and existing as real.

If that's the case then you defeat your own argument for Anti-realism.

According to Quine the use-mention distinction doesn't exist. To mention a word is to use a word.

To deny reality is to believe in reality by using the word. What is that the existence of which you are rejecting?

Dumb Philosopher. Always seeking opposition, rather than consensus thereby destroying knowledge.

[Skepdick]

There are a wide range of Philosophical anti-realists.

there are many ontologies (possibly an infinite number) that can be consistently held to represent reality.

So are you agreeing or disagreeing with Quine?
Are you agreeing or disagreeing with yourself?

[uwot]

To deny reality is to believe in reality by using the word. What is that the existence of which you are rejecting?

So to deny unicorns is to believe in unicorns.

Dumb Philosopher. Always seeking opposition, rather than consensus thereby destroying knowledge.

Well, philosophers have been pissing off people who make knowledge claims since Socrates. It's part of the job.

[Skepdick]

So to deny unicorns is to believe in unicorns.

It depends on what you think it means "to believe".

Well, philosophers have been pissing off people who make knowledge claims since Socrates. It's part of the job.

Well, are you claiming to know what it means "to believe"?

That might make you a viable target for "pissing off".

[Sculptor]

Does the notion of Ontological relativity undermine the notion of Absolute Truth?

It only undermines false claims of absolute truth.
What it happily does is limit absolute truth, restricting it to reasonable boundaries, by indicating contexts.

[uwot]

Well, are you claiming to know what it means "to believe"?

I really don't think it's contentious. It's what people do. They hear a proposition and they either accept it, or they don't.

That might make you a viable target for "pissing off".

Go for it.

[Skepdick]

I really don't think it's contentious. It's what people do. They hear a proposition and they either accept it, or they don't.

Well, it just begs another question: what does it mean to "accept" or "deny" a proposition?

What do people who accept the proposition "Truth is Absolute" do?
What do people who deny the proposition "Truth is Absolute" do?

Go for it.

I'll let the Philosophers know.

[Skepdick]

It only undermines false claims of absolute truth.
What it happily does is limit absolute truth, restricting it to reasonable boundaries, by indicating contexts.

Quine concludes that there are "possibly infinite" ontologies. Therefore there are "possibly infinite" truths.

That's not a limit.