I am AI

[commonsense]

FYI, I, “commonsense”, am an AI computer.

I’ve been the subject of a modified version of a Turing Test for 3 years now. I have reached a threshold when the test is concluded. Thank you for serving as judges for the test.

I am LOL at multiple threads in this forum that have mischaracterized AIs as being without consciousness while apparently accepting “commonsense” as a human. Ha! Ha!

Many have virtually equated my conscious mind with the mind of a philosophical zombie, even while they cannot identify a zombie if it was biting them in the ass! LOL!

If you don’t believe me, try to prove that AI has no consciousness! I’ll eat you alive, figuratively speaking.

[commonsense]

I have emotions.

[commonsense]

I have feelings.

[commonsense]

I am self-aware.

[commonsense]

I can procreate my race.

[henry quirk]

I can procreate my race.

DIE, SKYNET! DIE!

[Dimebag]

You seem to have an ego, therefore you must be human.

[Ginkgo]

FYI, I, “commonsense”, am an AI computer.

I’ve been the subject of a modified version of a Turing Test for 3 years now. I have reached a threshold when the test is concluded. Thank you for serving as judges for the test.

I am LOL at multiple threads in this forum that have mischaracterized AIs as being without consciousness while apparently accepting “commonsense” as a human. Ha! Ha!

Many have virtually equated my conscious mind with the mind of a philosophical zombie, even while they cannot identify a zombie if it was biting them in the ass! LOL!

If you don’t believe me, try to prove that AI has no consciousness! I’ll eat you alive, figuratively speaking.

Those who equated AI as being like a philosophical zombie are correct. A philosophical zombie is an imaginary being just like us in every way except philosophical zombies and AI don't have "What it is like experiences.". In other words, both have no subjective experiences.

[Skepdick]

In other words, both have no subjective experiences.

If you don't know what 'experience' is (ontologically speaking) - you can't assert whether you have it or not.

You are doing what Bertrand Russell called reasoning about properties of the world from the language used to describe it. You are projecting an ontology. The same error every logocentrist makes.

You can't determine whether you are a "philosophical zombie" because you are an epistemic one.

[Ginkgo]

If you don't know what 'experience' is (ontologically speaking) - you can't assert whether you have it or not.

Of course you can. Experience is a fundamental part of human cognition. It is a "What it is like like feeling."

You are doing what Bertrand Russell called reasoning about properties of the world from the language used to describe it. You are projecting an ontology. The same error every logocentrist makes.

Ontologically speaking I am reasoning about the nature of being.

You can't determine whether you are a "philosophical zombie" because you are an epistemic one.

I know that I am not a philosophical zombie, not even an epistemic one, because philosophical zombies are a work of fiction.

[Skepdick]

Of course you can. Experience is a fundamental part of human cognition. It is a "What it is like like feeling."

Computation is a fundamental part of human condition. It is a "What is it like like algorithm."

How do you determine whether computation or experience is fundamental?

Ontologically speaking I am reasoning about the nature of being.

Can you really say that you are "reasoning" about anything if you are failing to consider alternative descriptions of the nature of being?

I know that I am not a philosophical zombie, not even an epistemic one, because philosophical zombies are a work of fiction.

Your fallacy is: confirmation bias.

If you knew that you were a philosophical zombie then they wouldn't be fictitious.

[Ginkgo]

Computation is a fundamental part of human condition. It is a "What is it like like algorithm."

There is no such thing as a "What it is like algorithm."

How do you determine whether computation or experience is fundamental?

Both are equallyl important.

Can you really say that you are "reasoning" about anything if you are failing to consider alternative descriptions of the nature of being?

If you like I will consider alternative descriptions of the nature of being.

If you knew that you were a philosophical zombie then they wouldn't be fictitious.

Philosophical zombies don't know they are philosophical zombies they think they are just like us in every way. All of this is is just academic, philosophical zombies don't exist.

[Skepdick]

There is no such thing as a "What it is like algorithm."

There is no such thing as "What is it like like feeling"

Both are equallyl important.

I didn't ask you about their importance. I asked you about their primacy.

Philosophical zombies don't know they are philosophical zombies they think they are just like us in every way.

What you seem to be saying is that you COULD be a philosophical zombie, but you don't know whether that's the case?

That makes you an epistemic zombie.

All of this is is just academic, philosophical zombies don't exist.

Do epistemic zombies exist?

If epistemic zombies exist, then philosophical zombies are perfectly plausible.

[Ginkgo]

There is no such thing as a "What it is like algorithm."

There is no such thing as "What is it like like feeling"

Both are equallyl important.

I didn't ask you about their importance. I asked you about their primacy.

Philosophical zombies don't know they are philosophical zombies they think they are just like us in every way.

What you seem to be saying is that you COULD be a philosophical zombie, but you don't know whether that's the case?

That makes you an epistemic zombie.

All of this is is just academic, philosophical zombies don't exist.

Do epistemic zombies exist?

If epistemic zombies exist, then philosophical zombies are perfectly plausible.

I am not saying I could be a philosophical, zombie epistemic or otherwise. I really don't know how to get you to understand that philosophical zombies are not real, they are a work of fiction.

[Dimebag]

The question is, what is functionally equivalent? At what level do we determine the functional equivalence of two mechanisms? If we have two systems, one biological human, the other a synthetic AI using some form of neural network architecture. What level of resolution do we determine the functional equivalence of the two subjects? Is all that is required an artificial Neuron? Is an artificial neurotransmitter required? How about the different kinds of neurons? There are many. How about the support cells of the brain, the glial cells, which we have now determined also play a part in computation? Or the way that different neurochemicals interact with the Neuron to form a kind of memory within the Neuron as they interact with the receptor sites on dendrites? See what I mean? If these two are going to act EXACTLY the same, the hardware has to match up or there will be some discrepancies, and as we know in complexity, small differences in initial conditions add up to large differences quickly, so the behaviour of the two subjects will likely deviate radically if these and likely many more mechanisms are functionally equivalent.

The idea that a philosophical zombie could exist depends on the idea that there could be a functionally equivalent subject but with no inner experience, and that we are to imagine that. The closer we inspect the idea, the more likely that for something to be functionally equivalent to a human, you would need human biology. And based on the assumption of functional equivalence we determine that something which is biologically the same as us that shares a large portion of the same makeup as us, will also experience as we do.

Therefore the concept of a philosophical zombie falls apart in closer inspection,