Only if 'thing-in-itself' doesn't refer to the 'real world'.
For all things philosophical.
My point is, the "thing-in-itself" is a transcendental illusion generated in the real minds of the majority [theists and others] living in a real world.
Empirical illusions are not real and we can know them when they are explained to us, e.g. bent-stick in water, curved parallel lines, snake-rope in the shade, etc.
Transcendental illusions [thing-in-itself] are mental-logical-illusions that are triggered subliminally deep in the mind.
After a very long winded argument, Kant reduced the thing-in-itself into only 3 main ones, i.e.
- 1. God -Absolute
2. a soul that survives physical death
3. The WHOLE Universe.
It's really not difficult. If you believe that there is only some thinky thing, or even just thoughts, that's your ontology. The epistemological issue is 'How do you know?' It's only difficult to split up if your answer is 'Because my belief that it is so exists'.
Really? Which of these is wrong?
We know that thought exists.
Only things we know to be true are real.
Therefore only thought is real.
We know that thought exists.
Thoughts require thinkers.
Therefore thinkers exist.
We know that thought exists.
Everything that exists has some physical presence.
Therefore thoughts are physical.
The first premise is the same in each case. It is sound, because if it can be stated, it is necessarily true. The three second premises, in some version held by idealists, dualists and materialists respectively, are theory laden. You can make a coherent story out of any of those conclusions. What people do, is fall into the trap of believing that a coherent story is a true story. In other words they believe they have found some sound second premise, because the story based on it makes sense. It's a circular argument. Some such people, you for example, then make claims that anything not consistent with their coherent story, is therefore wrong. It should be obvious that doesn't follow.
I rest my case.
I disagree. It is entirely possible that a models edge and corners are precise analogs with the universe's.
'Can't be falsified' and 'unfalsifiable' are two separate things. 'Can't be falsified' may simply be a lack of the necessary technology, but it could also be because the hypothesis is correct and will always produce correspondence with experiment. 'Unfalsifiable' means there is no conceivable experiment that could test an hypothesis.
That's not a fact.
Why's that then?
It is a fact. A fact of human epistemology.
To claim otherwise is to argue that "God did it" is NOT an explanation for the universe. It is a perfectly valid explanation, but it doesn't satisfy your need. The God hypothesis explains everything. That's why it sucks.
If you accept the Modus Tollens then all of these arguments can be made:
iff God ⇒ Universe, Universe ⊢ God
iff TOE ⇒ Universe, Universe ⊢ TOE
In general: iff X ⇒ Universe, Universe ⊢ X
It is tautological, true and therefore factual.
That's why you need constructive logic. And it starts with recognizing that proving ¬[¬X] is not the same thing as proving X.
The elimination of double negation is the explanatory gap of "meaning" e.g interpretation: https://rufflewind.com/2016-12-11/doubl ... limination
Last edited by Skepdick on Thu Sep 19, 2019 10:11 am, edited 4 times in total.
Can you rest your case? If the model "You are a dualist" can be determined (and you claim to have determined it), then you contradict yourself.
I am a noumenon to you. Your claim of my dualism is an ontological knowledge claim about a noumenon.
Well, I haven't made any such claim, so your conditional clause doesn't apply.
You are words on a screen to me. I think it entirely plausible that the source of those words is something that corresponds to whatever you take yourself to be, but I could be wrong.
In this statement you have assumed words have an exact meaning, and that this meaning is available to you merely from the syntax on your screen, and therefore your interpretation of my words corresponds with my ontological nature.
Congratulations. You are a monist.
Last edited by Skepdick on Thu Sep 19, 2019 10:25 am, edited 1 time in total.
Precisely! From an epistemic view-point wrong means useful. Not wrong means unfalsifiable, and unfalsifiable is useless.
That is why "not even wrong" is an insult. Not-wrong sucks!
A "Theory of Everything" would HAVE to explain EVERYTHING. It will have to explain why future attempts to falsify it would be wrong.
For if it were to be falsified (in future) then it was never the "Theory of Everything" to begin with.
A TOE would (quite literally) re-define "science" by explaining why we no longer need the epistemic criterion of falsification.
Clearly you have missed me arguing that words do not have any precise meaning.Skepdick wrote: ↑Thu Sep 19, 2019 10:13 amIn this statement you have assumed words have an exact meaning...
That simply doesn't follow. There is nothing I can deduce with certainty about your ontological nature from words on a screen.
As it happens, I am, but not for the reasons you state, nor am I committed to monism. I just don't know.
Haven't missed that. What I have missed is how you disambiguate imprecise meanings. You claimed that claim X is made by dualists.
I pointed out that claim X is also made by monists.
It then follows that claim X is made by both monists AND dualists, and so I am simply asking "In the event that somebody makes claim X, how do you disambiguate whether they are a monist or a dualist?"
I don't know whether you are or aren't a monist either, but you are making the exact same claims a monist would. How would I know that you aren't a monist?
No it doesn't. It means there is no conceivable way of being proven wrong.
Doesn't follow. Einstein's concept of 'spacetime' is unfalsifiable; probably wrong, but nonetheless useful.
Not wrong could be right.
The fact that we cannot know whether a particular theory will be falsified is precisely why they are all underdetermined.
The epistemic criterion of falsification will remain useful for reasons you so far haven't grasped. Falsification is not the demand that a theory be wrong, it is simply the insistence that at least one experiment can be devised, if only in theory, that could prove it wrong.
If there is a conceivable way to falsify the Theory of Everything, then it's not the Theory of Everything. Is it?
It's a "Theory of Everything (that doesn't falsify the Theory of Everything)".
Contradiction. If it's unfalsifiable then General Relativity is unscientific.
To a scientific epistemology not wrong is useless. Therefore you are claiming that useless could be right.
Which is precisely my argument. Between truth and utility - which do you prefer?
Then how would we determine that it's a theory of EVERYTHING?
I grasp those reasons very well. What you don't grasp is that Truth and Utility are opposing goals.uwot wrote: ↑Thu Sep 19, 2019 11:25 am The epistemic criterion of falsification will remain useful for reasons you so far haven't grasped. Falsification is not the demand that a theory be wrong, it is simply the insistence that at least one experiment can be devised, if only in theory, that could prove it wrong.
A True Right and Correct theory that explains everything has zero utility.