Atla wrote: ↑Sat Feb 02, 2019 4:06 pm
Why did you choose such a confusing/misleading wording for your arguments by the way? Does it serve some purpose, or do you not see any problem with it?
I don't see what would be confusing but it is up to you if you want to elaborate on that. I don't think there's any clearer wording or phasing. Maybe you could give a few examples of modal arguments that would be less confusing.
Here is an example. It's a modal argument in favour of Dualism:
1. It is imaginable that one's mind might exist without one's body.
2. Therefore, it is conceivable that one's mind might exist without one's body.
3. Therefore, it is possible one's mind might exist without one's body.
4. Therefore, one's mind is a different entity from one's body.
Is that clearer?
Or, Plantinga's logical argument for mind-body dualism:
1. If A and B are identical then any statement of A is true of B and vice versa.
2. I can imagine existing without my body, for example in the body of a bird. I cannot imagine my body existing without my body.
3. By (2) we showed the existence of a statement that is true of (me) but not true of my (body).
4. By (1) my body and me are not identical.
Is that clearer?
Or this one from Penrose:
We try to suppose that the totality of methods of (unassailable) mathematical reasoning that are in principle humanly accessible can be encapsulated in some (not necessarily computational) sound formal system F. A human mathematician, if presented with F, could argue as follows (bearing in mind that the phrase “I am F” is merely a shorthand for “F encapsulates all the humanly accessible methods of mathematical proof”):
“Though I don’t know that I necessarily am F, I conclude that if I were, then the system F would have to be sound and, more to the point, F2 would have to be sound, where F2 is F supplemented by the further assertion “I am F.” I perceive that it follows from the assumption that I am F that the Gödel statement G(F2) would have to be true and, furthermore, that it would not be a consequence of F2. But I have just perceived that “If I happened to be F, then G(F2) would have to be true,” and perceptions of this nature would be precisely what F2 is supposed to achieve. Since I am therefore capable of perceiving something beyond the powers of F2, I deduce that I cannot be F after all. Moreover, this applies to any other (Gödelizable) system, in place of F.” (Penrose)
Apparently not a sound argument, but surely valid.
EB