What could make morality objective?

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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Belinda
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Belinda »

Logik wrote:
The only consciousness that can make decisions is us.
The only entity that can classify things into categories be it "subjective"/"objective", .
Plato was one of us too. Ideas survive in our cultures.
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I'd not like to bet £100 on any bell curve unless I had evidence. I'm not all that keen on risks.

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I seem to remember some religious cult that chose death. It's not unheard of.
So we take the (assumed) standard distribution and say "suppose that 50% of people want to live and 50% of people want to die". What would you expect to see if that was true? High suicide rates?

The highest rate anywhere in the world is 30 people per 100000. 0,03%
I can imagine scenarios where the whole population of them would choose to die.
Plato's dead and God is silent. The ball is in our court.
God has not revealed truth but we do have the advantage of Plato's wisdom /
rhetoric during our more responsible deliberations.
Belinda
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Belinda »

Logik I 'll agree that it's human nature that most people want to live and not die. I agree less because of your statistics based argument which I barely understand but because of the little I know about human psychology and its function within natural selection. Despite that some cultures produced sacrificial kings and some cults persuaded all their devotees to want to die I believe these individuals were in the minorities and show, if anything, that human nature is part artifice component with a larger component of genetic nature.

So I add to the bare anatomical characteristics of human nature the characteristic that humans strive to live. In this they aren't different from other living things which as Dawkins pointed out want to live until they have reproduced themselves.

Sapiens do have the extra characteristic which other living things don't have and that extra is language which enables us to discuss abstract ideas such as Plato's Form of the Good. Probably there are neural correlates of abstract ideas which other animals lack. That people talk is action too. That people learn ideas is also action.

The special character of clinical depression is apathy, a sort of boredom . This apathy can lead to the death of the subject. The fact that we are having this conversation connotes action and love of action and so to love of life. Plato's Form of the Good is the most excellent statement of objective morality known to man.The very thought of Plato's Form of the Good is therefore good and it follows that it's objective morality.
Logik
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Logik »

Belinda wrote: Tue Jan 15, 2019 5:11 pm Logik I 'll agree that it's human nature that most people want to live and not die. I agree less because of your statistics based argument which I barely understand but because of the little I know about human psychology and its function within natural selection. Despite that some cultures produced sacrificial kings and some cults persuaded all their devotees to want to die I believe these individuals were in the minorities and show, if anything, that human nature is part artifice component with a larger component of genetic nature.

So I add to the bare anatomical characteristics of human nature the characteristic that humans strive to live. In this they aren't different from other living things which as Dawkins pointed out want to live until they have reproduced themselves.
I don't think there's need to focus on the details. There are may edge cases where right and wrong are not so clear-cut and if absolutism is what we are after, I think one can get disheartened rather quickly.

At the macro scale there's no denying that global warming is an existential threat to the species.

Making any meaningful dent in green house gas emissions is a moral thing to do. Right and wrong is clear cut.
Peter Holmes
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Logik wrote: Mon Jan 14, 2019 11:15 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Mon Jan 14, 2019 10:46 am A rule has no truth-value, so it's neither true nor false.
The rule has no truth-value. The rule is what establishes the criteria and mechanisms by which we determine truth-value.
Without axiomatic rules you cannot assert anything!
Correct. Hang on to that. And notice that we need to follow rules in order to assert that without rules you cannot assert anything. Notice the absence of a foundation for what we say beneath our linguistic practices.

If we take "=" to mean "compare two things to one another" then the proposition "A=A" can be interpreted as "Is A the same as A"?
No - a rule can't be interpreted as a question - that's the point of a rule - there is no yes/no answer, so there's no true or false. You've forgotten what you wrote a minute ago: 'The rule has no truth-value'. This is perhaps the incoherence at the heart of your misunderstanding.

Then we can have two different rules/axioms.
* A=A ⇒ ⊤ (two things can be the same)
* A=A ⇒ ⊥ (two things can never be the same)

Which one is "correct"? It's a matter of choice!
Why you reach this mistaken conclusion is obvious. An assertion that's true by one set of rules can be false by another set of rules. That's fatuously obvious. But remember your opening: 'The rule is what establishes the criteria and mechanisms by which we determine truth-value'. There's no contradiction between different sets of rules, because rules aren't truth-claims.

The same goes with things you classify as 'errors'.
In order to assert error-value - you necessarily have a set of rules.
Agreed.

The consequence of the above is that both truth-value; error-value or any assertion for that matter is a function of choice. The choice of rules you adhere to.
Agreed - but there's no rule-free perspective from which to judge between truth-claims within different rule-frameworks. Every assertion of truth-value uses linguistic rules.

Since rules are prescriptive by definition it leaves us in a very precarious paradox: How do we decide which prescriptions to adhere to? What if we choose different rules?
I find it interesting that you think our predicament is precariously paradoxical. Why so? How could it be any different? To repeat the question I've often asked, and you've never addressed: what kind of foundation is it that you think doesn't exist?
Peter Holmes wrote: Mon Jan 14, 2019 10:46 am As I've explained above, a rule has no truth-value, so it can't be an error. Your mistake is to treat it as a factual assertion instead of a rule, and then conclude that the rule leads to contradiction.
The rule has no truth-value. Choosing to adhere or ignore any particular rule produces different truth-value for the same grammatical proposition.
This is an elementary mistake. Of course it's possible to produce identical linguistic expressions using different rules - and confusion will result. We use language in countless different contexts, for countless different purposes, and meaning is usually clear, though of course it can go wrong. I really don't believe you're a follower of Wittgenstein, because this was the whole point of his later philosophy.
Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Jan 13, 2019 8:48 pm Here's the conflation and confusion at work. You're mistaking the application of rules (we call this a rock and this a pebble) for the things and properties we talk about, using the rules. Things and properties don't name, categorise and describe themselves. That thing, with those properties, is not in itself a rock or a pebble - so, of course, we can call it either or both.
You are failing to recognise that when you have overlapping definitions you are already guilty of a contradiction.
This is simply and completely false. Definitions / descriptions 'overlap' all the time, because we can describe things in countless different ways - as you've agreed. Contradiction only occurs when, within one descriptive context, using one set of constitutive rules, we assert both a claim and its negation.

A thing can not be two different things at the same time and in the same sense.
Look at your words: 'and in the same sense'. What does it mean to say a thing is what it is 'in a sense'? Follow your insight: a thing can not be two different things at the same time. Agreed - and that shows that seeming contradictions in description are linguistic, and therefore nothing to do with the reality being described. You're mistaking the map for the terrain, as you have been doing all along.

If some rocks are pebbles then necessarily some things are "rocks" and "pebbles" at the same time and in the same sense.
This violates the law of non-contradiction. And you are yet to answer whether you have chosen to adhere to it or not...
Sigh. Some rocks ARE pebbles. Some hills ARE mountains. Some colour patches ARE both green and blue. Mummy, why are things so strangely confusing and pawadoxical? It looks like all facts are choices! (FFS.)
Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Jan 13, 2019 8:48 pm If you mean that the social behaviour we describe as morally good and bad is not a linguistic matter - that's trivially true, and also not the moot point. The issue is whether a moral assertion is factual, so that morality is objective (a factual matter). No demonstration so far.
Sorry. Your premise is entirely artificial.

Animals do not have spoken or written language yet they exhibit morality.
I know you're finding this all terribly challenging, but just look at these two assertions:

1 Mine: '...the social behaviour we describe as morally good and bad is not a linguistic matter...'
2 Yours: 'Animals do not have spoken or written language yet they exhibit morality.'

As you see, I agree that morality is not a linguistic matter, and I've never once argued that it is. But 'objective' means 'factual', and facts are nothing more than linguistic assertions. So my claim that the issue is 'whether a moral assertion is factual, so that morality is objective (a factual matter)' is correct.

To insist that morality is all about the truth-value of the linguistic assertion "murder is wrong" is a fundamental misconceptualisation of morality and objectivity.
See above. The misunderstanding - of both the issue and my argument - is yours, as it has always been. And an example is your repetition of the claim that I think a moral assertion has a truth-value of any kind - which is unbelievably thick.
Nobody can meet the subjective criteria which you have chosen as the mark of "objective morality".

It is a confirmation bias. A self-fulfilling prophecy that “morality is linguistic”.
Ridiculous and dishonest. How about apologising for this lie? Or just acknowledging your mistake?

Logic/language is constructive and constructed.
Objectivity is constructive and constructed.
Morality is constructive and constructed.
Society is constructive and constructed.

Objective morality is constructed and goes hand-in-hand with social contract theory.
I'm tired of having to explain your mistakes - and your failure to acknowledge them as you plough on making more and different ones.
Logik
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Logik »

Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:04 am Correct. Hang on to that. And notice that we need to follow rules in order to assert that without rules you cannot assert anything. Notice the absence of a foundation for what we say beneath our linguistic practices.
There is a foundation. Human cognition.The ability of the human mind to tell the difference and similarity between things. This is why and how science works. Empiricism.

Language is not a description of reality. Language is a description of our experiences of reality.

To say "this is a cat" or "this is not a cat" first you must be able to recognise that which you have experienced/observe as being a cat.

Given the concept of a cat (C) in your mind and any particular object you experience through observation of reality (O) you cannot claim that "this is a cat" before you have established the truth-value of O=C!

First you must recognise the thing before you can narrate it/label it.

I cannot believe that you take (re)cognition for granted!
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:04 am No - a rule can't be interpreted as a question - that's the point of a rule - there is no yes/no answer, so there's no true or false.
I am not interpreting the rule as a question. I am interpreting your ability to make positive claims about reality as evidence for (re)cognition and conception. As evidence that you can assert O = C is true and therefore "This (O) is a cat" is true.

Because you can say "this is a cat" it is evidence that you have a conception of a "cat" and you have the ability to recognise cats.

Because you do not have a concept of a gureblotch is why you cannot tell me if this is a gureblotch:

https://previews.123rf.com/images/sylve ... etric-.jpg

Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:04 am I'm tired of having to explain your mistakes - and your failure to acknowledge them as you plough on making more and different ones.
Because you keep telling me that I keep making "mistakes" I am inferring that you have a CONCEPT of a "mistake".
You are claiming that you can recognise mistakes (M)!

You are claiming that you can assert the truth-value of O=M!

You can no more provide an ostensive definition for a "mistake" than I can provide you with an ostensive definition for "wrong".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ostensive_definition

If you point at something and call it a "mistake" (in the non-moral sense) I will point at something and call it "wrong" (in the moral sense).

So, please (for the 7th time). State the normative rules you have CHOSEN by which you assert/recognise "mistakes".
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:04 am And an example is your repetition of the claim that I think a moral assertion has a truth-value of any kind - which is unbelievably thick
Strawman.

I RECOGNISE that you do not RECOGNISE truth-value in moral claims. But I am perplexed that you recognise truth-value in claiming that others are "mistaken".

All claims about reality fall into two exhaustive categories: descriptive and prescriptive (normative).

By process of elimination a claim of 'mistake' is not factual e.g it's not descriptive of reality, so it must be a normative/prescriptive claim, but you claim that you are not a prescriptivist.

I don't know what to make of this? Should I be paying attention to what you say or what you do?
Last edited by Logik on Wed Jan 16, 2019 12:09 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Peter Holmes
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Logik wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:48 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:04 am Correct. Hang on to that. And notice that we need to follow rules in order to assert that without rules you cannot assert anything. Notice the absence of a foundation for what we say beneath our linguistic practices.
There is a foundation. Human cognition.The ability of the human mind to tell the difference and similarity between things. This is why and how science works. Empiricism.
I wrote: Notice the absence of a foundation for what we say beneath our linguistic practices. [Emphasis added.] And that includes what we say about what we experience and know. So far you have rejected all forms of foundationalism. Why are you now asserting empiricism, which is a classical foundational epistemology? More incoherence.

Language is not a description of reality. Language is a description of our experiences of reality.

To say "this is a cat" or "this is not a cat" first you must be able to recognise that which you have experienced/observe as being a cat.

Given the concept of a cat (C) in your mind and any particular object you experience through observation of reality (O) you cannot claim that "this is a cat" before you have established the truth-value of O=C!

First you must recognise the thing before you can narrate it/label it.

I cannot believe that you take (re)cognition for granted!
So now you're appealing to 'concepts' 'in the mind'. How much spurious foundationalism are you prepared to countenance, in the effort to reconcile contradictory beliefs?
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:04 am No - a rule can't be interpreted as a question - that's the point of a rule - there is no yes/no answer, so there's no true or false.
I am not interpreting the rule as a question. I am interpreting your ability to make positive claims about reality as evidence for cognition and conception. As evidence that you have asserted that O = C is true.
That's a lie. You explicitly said a rule can be interpreted as a question. My comment was a direct reaction - and you've dishonestly redacted your claim, in order to disguise the truth. Shame on you.

Because you can say "this is a cat" it is evidence that you have a conception of a "cat" and you have the ability to recognise cats.

Because you do not have a concept of a gureblotch is why you cannot tell me if this is a gureblotch:

https://previews.123rf.com/images/sylve ... etric-.jpg

Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:04 am I'm tired of having to explain your mistakes - and your failure to acknowledge them as you plough on making more and different ones.
Because you keep telling me that I keep making "mistakes" I am inferring that you have a CONCEPT of a "mistake".
You are claiming that you can recognise mistakes (M)!
This is puerile. You claim to have been pointing out my mistakes in reasoning, so you know damn well what we mean by the word 'mistake' in this context.

You are claiming that you can assert the truth-value of O=M!

You can no more provide an ostensive definition for a "mistake" than I can provide you with an ostensive definition for "wrong".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ostensive_definition.
I haven't once mentioned ostensive definition / description. Oh, I know. I don't know how to refute this argument, so I'll invent a straw man to deflect attention. Have some self-respect, please.

If you point at something and call it a "mistake" (in the non-moral sense) I will point at something and call it "wrong" (in the moral sense).

So, please (for the 7th time). Define the rules you have CHOSEN by which you assert/recognise "mistakes".
A mistake occurs when a move is made that doesn't follow the rules. When you move the rook diagonally. Of course, you can do what you like. But if you move the rook diagonally, you're not playing chess. If you say 'all foundationalisms are false' and 'human cognition is our foundation', you're breaking a rule. And your confusion and desperation are patently obvious.
Logik
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Logik »

Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:04 am A mistake occurs when a move is made that doesn't follow the rules.
Peter, I am courteously ignoring all your slander and getting straight to the point. For the 8th time now.

Which rules have you CHOSEN to FOLLOW?
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 10:04 am This is puerile. You claim to have been pointing out my mistakes in reasoning, so you know damn well what we mean by the word 'mistake' in this context.
Bullshit! I know what I mean by a 'mistake' because I know which rules I have CHOSEN to follow.

I have no fucking clue what rules you or anybody else have CHOSEN to follow and if you have not CHOSEN the same set of rules as me, then it's very unlikely that we use the word "mistake" in the same manner!

To claim that I am breaking a rule to which I have not CHOSEN to adhere to is prescriptivism. By definition!

I have openly stated that I am holding you accountable to the law of non-contradiction. I took your silence as tacit agreement.
I have openly stated that I have CHOSEN to follow the law of non-contradiction so when I say "you are making a mistake" it is the same as saying "You are breaking the rule I have CHOSEN to follow!"

I further deem performative contradictions to be much more serious mistakes than logical contradictions.

So, no - I don't know what you mean by "mistake" until you tell me which rules you have CHOSEN to follow.
Logik
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Logik »

Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 12:07 pm A mistake occurs when a move is made that doesn't follow the rules.
Great! I agree with this conception of a 'mistake', but there is still a problem: What are the rules?
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 12:07 pm When you move the rook diagonally. Of course, you can do what you like.
So moving rooks diagonally is discretionary?
Like murdering people is discretionary?
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 12:07 pm But if you move the rook diagonally, you're not playing chess.
I never said I was playing chess? Perhaps you have assumed that I am playing chess, or that I should be playing chess?
But that is your assumption - it has nothing to do with me.

Your objection seems to boil down to "You aren't playing the same game as me".
What makes my CHOICE of rules/game a "mistake"?

Would you say that we are all playing The Game of Life?
What are the objective rules of this game?
If there are no objective rules does it also mean there are no mistakes?
Belinda
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Belinda »

Logik wrote:
Your objection seems to boil down to "You aren't playing the same game as me".
What makes my CHOICE of rules/game a "mistake"?

Would you say that we are all playing The Game of Life?
What are the objective rules of this game?
If there are no objective rules does it also mean there are no mistakes?


You are right to insist on moral criteria. Could we perhaps make a list of all the moral criteria that have so far been mooted?

I suggested that natural human nature is a sufficient moral criterion (i.e. objective criterion)but I demolished it except on a pragmatic level, while I understand that you support it on statistical Utilitarian grounds. I cannot think of any other candidates for a list of moral criteria but maybe others can.
Logik
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Logik »

Belinda wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 4:21 pm You are right to insist on moral criteria.
Peter doesn't see the above as a problem...

He draws a distinction between saying "murder is wrong" and saying "you are making a mistake".

First he needs to admit/see that they are exactly the same thing. Value judgments.

Every time he says "mistake" all I hear is "You are not adhering to the arbitrary rules that I like".
Belinda wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 4:21 pm I suggested that natural human nature is a sufficient moral criterion (i.e. objective criterion)but I demolished it except on a pragmatic level, while I understand that you support it on statistical Utilitarian grounds. I cannot think of any other candidates for a list of moral criteria but maybe others can.
By Peter's conception of 'objectivity' there aren't any objective criteria. And not just moral, but epistemic criteria too!
Hence the problem. Which system (of language, of thought, of morality) should one choose for oneself?

Moral and intellectual anarchy or attempt to negotiate some normative (but entirely subjective) ground rules.

Enter Discourse ethics ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discourse_ethics )
Belinda
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Belinda »

Logik, Ilooked up the useful link that you provided. Very soon I found a puzzlement with the following from a further link to 'deontological' and wonder if you could help .
In moral philosophy, deontological ethics or deontology (from Greek δέον, deon, "obligation, duty"[1]) is the normative ethical theory that the morality of an action should be based on whether that action itself is right or wrong under a series of rules, rather than based on the consequences of the action.[2]

It is sometimes described as "duty-" or "obligation-" or "rule-" based ethics, because rules "bind one to one's duty".[3] Deontological ethics is commonly contrasted to consequentialism,[4] virtue ethics, and pragmatic ethics. In this terminology, action is more important than the consequences.
(Wiki) My problem is that consequences are open to questions of bad and good and so consequentialism too is subject to rules.
Logik
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Logik »

Belinda wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 5:42 pm (Wiki) My problem is that consequences are open to questions of bad and good and so consequentialism too is subject to rules.
All human affairs are in dire need of rules. It is the very rules that we need to negotiate.

For example appealing against global warming is a purely consequentialist argument.
The warning is against the consequence of potential extinction.

If I don't care about human extinction then there is no reason to care about global warming.

Which is why the question "do you believe in global warming?" is moot.
Believing in global warming and wanting to prevent it. There is a disconnect.
Belinda
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Belinda »

Logik wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 5:47 pm
Belinda wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 5:42 pm (Wiki) My problem is that consequences are open to questions of bad and good and so consequentialism too is subject to rules.
All human affairs are in dire need of rules. It is the very rules that we need to negotiate.

For example appealing against global warming is a purely consequentialist argument.
The warning is against the consequence of potential extinction.
I think you are a fan of utilitarianism. While I cannot think of a better moral rule for the foundation of legislation , and for the use of statistics in moral philosophy, when we consider what the lone individual ought to do the greatest happiness of the greatest number does not directly apply .

I think that universalism (Ethical universalism is a concept in which the ethical implications of an action applies universally to anyone, regardless of circumstance. To summarize, the end justifies the means. Examples of pseudo-universally wrong actions: murder, rape, torture.) leads to right action. However subjectivity is inevitable when universalism is applied, because as for consequentialism, the lone ethicist needs his own rules.

Universalism is usefully applicable to global warming becasue global warming or climate change has universal application. Nuclear weapons use is possibly another action where universalism can rule. It goes against my feelings to say so but murder, rape,and torture need to be deemed evils by a criterion besides that of universalism.

Murder has been so often legitimate, as in time of war, that it becomes not a definite category. Rape likewise with the addditon that marital rape has been countenanced until recently. Torture is denounced on pragmatic grounds so is not a matter of ethics.
Charm
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Charm »

Belinda wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 5:59 pm
Logik wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 5:47 pm
Belinda wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 5:42 pm (Wiki) My problem is that consequences are open to questions of bad and good and so consequentialism too is subject to rules.
All human affairs are in dire need of rules. It is the very rules that we need to negotiate.

For example appealing against global warming is a purely consequentialist argument.
The warning is against the consequence of potential extinction.
I think you are a fan of utilitarianism. While I cannot think of a better moral rule for the foundation of legislation , and for the use of statistics in moral philosophy, when we consider what the lone individual ought to do the greatest happiness of the greatest number does not directly apply .

I think that universalism (Ethical universalism is a concept in which the ethical implications of an action applies universally to anyone, regardless of circumstance. To summarize, the end justifies the means. Examples of pseudo-universally wrong actions: murder, rape, torture.) leads to right action. However subjectivity is inevitable when universalism is applied, because as for consequentialism, the lone ethicist needs his own rules.
There is a certain understanding in morality, and it defies reason.. Laws are attempts to make morals objective, but since the Decalogue we have had a loop hole for every law.. No number of laws could control humanity were it not for the fact of general human morality... Nietzsche held it in contempt because it kept people in a condition of servitude in the face of injustice.. Nietzsche hated democracy because it gave people the power to make the moral argument without the benefit of drama, or mortal combat heroic and sublime.. Morality should win.. The moral were moral because they were connected, with love, and family.. The over man was a stick figure, distant, and sterile.. Overmen don't have to breed.. They are replaced by the strong who have no need of morality.. Morality is a form without substance.. Where physical forms have meaning and being, moral forms like Love, God, Justice, Truth, Nation, Good- exist only as meanings, as understanding often unconscious of the unity and family of humanity..
Logik
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Re: What could make morality objective?

Post by Logik »

Charm wrote: Wed Jan 16, 2019 6:22 pm There is a certain understanding in morality, and it defies reason.. Laws are attempts to make morals objective, but since the Decalogue we have had a loop hole for every law...
The loop hole is as a direct result of the symbol-grounding problem. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_grounding_problem

Meaning is an ellusive thing. Difficult to capture in words. Even harder to prevent it from escaping.
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