Logik wrote: ↑Wed Dec 19, 2018 2:01 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Dec 19, 2018 1:06 pm
And if you reject the fact-value distinction, you can't then talk about the objectivity (factual nature) of any assertion, let alone moral ones - unless you clarify the non-standard way you're using the words 'truth', 'fact' and 'objectivity'. I assume you agree.
I can't talk about your conception of objectivity (grounded in facts) because we cannot agree on a reference frame in which we ought to make factual assertions about reality. This is the criterion problem in epistemology. Is the Baryocentric or Heliocentric conception of the Solar system "correct"? By what criterion for 'correctness'?
The criterion for correctness - and therefore what constitutes the factual - is always within a frame of reference, so there's no correct frame of reference. I thought we'd agreed on that. But notice that what we say about frames of reference is factual - true or false - so this is the nature of our dilemma - again, as I think you agree. There's no way off this hamster-wheel.
I can talk about objective morality because I think we can agree on a framework in which we can make moral assertions about human existence in reality.
There's the rub. If we've agreed on a framework in which 'objective' means 'factual', and if we've agreed that 'factual' means 'making a claim about a feature of reality that's independent of opinion'', then the question is: can you provide an example of what you call a moral fact - a true factual assertion about a moral feature of reality, independent of opinion - without begging the question? If you can't - and I'm confident you can't - then, within this frame of reference, I'd like to know why you claim morality is objective.
The conception of objectivity grounded in "facts" is an error because there are far too many perspectives from which one can 'view' reality.
Objectivity grounded in human experience is far more stable grounding - because that is the one thing we all share.
1 So you propose a phenomenological foundation, having dismissed all foundationalisms as flawed.
2 What will 'ground' the truth-value of phenomenological assertions about experience? Could it by chance be exactly what grounds the truth-value of ordinary assertions in natural language: our linguistic practices?
Most everybody would agree that getting kicked in the shins hurts. And we could agree that (if given a choice) getting kicked in the shins is not something we want to experience.
Of course - you have already rejected phenomenology once, so I am not sure if you are keen to be convinced.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Dec 18, 2018 3:56 pm
Language isn't a 'notion' - it's a concrete tool we use to, among other things, talk about features of reality by means of factual assertions, which are concrete, real things - also not notions. I don't in any way conflate or confuse language with objectivity.
I agree. It is just a tool. As are the notions of 'facts' and 'objectivity'. We get to decide how to use our tools.
And having decided how to use them, we can then distinguish between factual assertions, which are objective, and moral assertions, which are subjective.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Dec 18, 2018 3:56 pm
Your mistake is this: we find it useful to use language - with conventional rules - to make true factual assertions about features of reality - true given the entirely arbitrary way we use the words or other signs involved; and because the use of signs is merely conventional, what we call factual truth and objectivity are subjective - matters of opinion. Non sequitur.
OK, so if the rules are arbitrary then why have you chosen that particular conception of objectivity to derive morality from?
There's the mistake. My argument all along has been that we don't and can't 'derive' morality from factual assertions; that we use the words 'objective' and 'subjective' to distinguish sharply between matters of fact and matters of judgement or opinion.
If you want to explain objectivity and subjectivity in a different, non-standard way, using a different frame of reference, then by all means do so. But you can't deny the distinction and its basis within this frame of reference. No frame of reference is superior to any other - none can say: 'You're not using the words 'true', 'false', 'fact', 'objective' and 'subjective' correctly.' But that's what you've been doing all this time.