Authentic vs. Vicarious?

[SpheresOfBalance]

For myself, as example: can't bear to watch baseball, but love to play (poorly).

Fair enough. Is there anything to choose between someone telling you about a game they have seen and their description of your performance? If you are on the stage, or in the audience, you are part of the experience, it seems to me. The people living vicariously are the ones who read the reviews.

It is possible that there are several degrees of living vicariously, from witnessing an event, to hearing or reading someone else's description of that event. Then one must be clear which degree of living vicariously one is referring to, I have been describing someone who is witnessing the event, not hearing a description of that event.

Of course there is a difference between a first and third person point of view. Usually one of the first person, is emotionally wrapped up in the event, due to a certain amount of stress that may be present, while the third person is usually comfortably carefree, so as to evaluate the event from all sides, if they are so inclined. So afterwards the recounting shall almost always be different, between the first and third person perspective. The truth of it, being the most clear with the summation of all perspectives.

[Ginkgo]

Qualia is not actually objective and it isn't the physicilists explanation for experience. Qualia is the subjective quality of our experiences. It is the "What it is like for me or you to experience red." Qualia is possibly intersubjective but never objective. I can never be sure your experience of red is the same as my experience of red. In other words, what it is like to experience red is unique to me.

Physicalists on the other hand say that qualia is an adjunct added to experience by people who think there is something 'extra real' about experience. Physicalists go on to say the physical facts about redness is adequate and complete. No need to bring qualia into it.

[Wyman]

Makes you wonder?!!

Well, yes. Chalk it down to English understatement, and contrast it with this:

That is the whole problem of modern philosophy.

Easy, Tiger!

I could give you a hundred more examples of how the brain interprets the world/creates qualia/influences perception. The model that does not take the brain's causal influence in perception into account is flawed from the start.

As I keep saying, philosophy of mind isn't my field, but isn't part of the challenge of science is to discover exactly what objective actually means?

Yes, I was about to write 'Bit of an understatement, isn't it?' but opted for the more provocative wtf! post. But the brain/sense stimuli distinction is, or as problematic as, the mind/body distinction. I don't think science is challenged to discover what objective means. How so?

[Wyman]

Qualia is not actually objective and it isn't the physicilists explanation for experience. Qualia is the subjective quality of our experiences. It is the "What it is like for me or you to experience red." Qualia is possibly intersubjective but never objective. I can never be sure your experience of red is the same as my experience of red. In other words, what it is like to experience red is unique to me.

Physicalists on the other hand say that qualia is an adjunct added to experience by people who think there is something 'extra real' about experience. Physicalists go on to say the physical facts about redness is adequate and complete. No need to bring qualia into it.

I think that qualia are the experience and that something extra - a feel - is bunk. What does that make me?

[uwot]

I don't think science is challenged to discover what objective means. How so?

Yeah, that was clumsily put. All I really meant was that science attempts to discover and study objective facts about the world.

Physicalists go on to say the physical facts about redness is adequate and complete. No need to bring qualia into it.

It is so well drummed into me not to multiply entities beyond necessity that my immediate reaction is to agree with the physicalists, unless someone can persuade me that qualia are necessary. What exactly do they explain that can't be done with the physical facts?

[Ginkgo]

Qualia is not actually objective and it isn't the physicilists explanation for experience. Qualia is the subjective quality of our experiences. It is the "What it is like for me or you to experience red." Qualia is possibly intersubjective but never objective. I can never be sure your experience of red is the same as my experience of red. In other words, what it is like to experience red is unique to me.

Physicalists on the other hand say that qualia is an adjunct added to experience by people who think there is something 'extra real' about experience. Physicalists go on to say the physical facts about redness is adequate and complete. No need to bring qualia into it.

I think that qualia are the experience and that something extra - a feel - is bunk. What does that make me?

That would make Dennett, Lewis, uwot and yourself physicalists. You would be in pretty good company there.

[Ginkgo]

[
It is so well drummed into me not to multiply entities beyond necessity that my immediate reaction is to agree with the physicalists, unless someone can persuade me that qualia are necessary. What exactly do they explain that can't be done with the physical facts?

I'll give it a go. The physicalists objection to qualia is centred on the ability hypothesis. Basically they are saying Mary actually learns nothing new when she sees red for the first time. In fact they say she actually learns something else. This something else being an ability. This ability is A KNOWING HOW ability , not A KNOWING THAT ability as the qualia exponents claim. I think I can mount an argument against physicaism.

Consider something I have just attempted recently and have regretted it ever since. Yes, you guessed it, a handyman job. Patterns have always interested me so I thought I would tile the bathroom floor. Tiling a bathroom floor is a real experience because we can use some interesting shapes, but the bottom line is that the shapes must always tessellate. A regular hexagon will tessellate, but a regular pentagon will not.

If we want to use a pentagon then we can overcome the problem of tessellation by adding an additional shape to be used in conjunction with the pentagon. The types of shapes and number of sided figures we can use is quite complex, so we might employ a computer programme to help us out. After all, shapes that can tessellate can be both regular and irregular. It is possible that a computer programme can tell us if any particular combinations of tile shapes will, or will not tessellate.

The important point of this bad handyman job is that this trying out different shapes is exactly the same argument as the ability hypothesis. In other words, it is A KNOWING HOW procedure that can be conducted by humans or computers in an algorithmic fashion. Obviously computers do it better than ourselves but this is beside the point because it is the same 'trying out' type of procedure that the physicalists expect us to believe is Mary's insight.

As Penrose tells us, it is possible for a non-repeating pattern to tessellate if we work in three dimensions rather than two dimensions. As an aside, it is not a good idea to work in three dimensions if you are tiling a floor because you create raised surfaces in the process. A computer doing algorithmic calculations can crunch all the information it likes to the cows come home, but it will never 'think' to work in three dimensions to solve the problem. The ability to solve this problem is unique to humans. This is what I would call KNOWING THAT. Something the physicalists would deny actually exists.

From the point of view of qualia I would say. NOW THAT IS HOW you tile the Euclidean plane.

P.S. Sorry about the bold type, but I thought it would be useful for following the argument.

[Wyman]

[
It is so well drummed into me not to multiply entities beyond necessity that my immediate reaction is to agree with the physicalists, unless someone can persuade me that qualia are necessary. What exactly do they explain that can't be done with the physical facts?

I'll give it a go. The physicalists objection to qualia is centred on the ability hypothesis. Basically they are saying Mary actually learns nothing new when she sees red for the first time. In fact they say she actually learns something else. This something else being an ability. This ability is A KNOWING HOW ability , not A KNOWING THAT ability as the qualia exponents claim. I think I can mount an argument against physicaism.

Consider something I have just attempted recently and have regretted it ever since. Yes, you guessed it, a handyman job. Patterns have always interested me so I thought I would tile the bathroom floor. Tiling a bathroom floor is a real experience because we can use some interesting shapes, but the bottom line is that the shapes must always tessellate. A regular hexagon will tessellate, but a regular pentagon will not.

If we want to use a pentagon then we can overcome the problem of tessellation by adding an additional shape to be used in conjunction with the pentagon. The types of shapes and number of sided figures we can use is quite complex, so we might employ a computer programme to help us out. After all, shapes that can tessellate can be both regular and irregular. It is possible that a computer programme can tell us if any particular combinations of tile shapes will, or will not tessellate.

The important point of this bad handyman job is that this trying out different shapes is exactly the same argument as the ability hypothesis. In other words, it is A KNOWING HOW procedure that can be conducted by humans or computers in an algorithmic fashion. Obviously computers do it better than ourselves but this is beside the point because it is the same 'trying out' type of procedure that the physicalists expect us to believe is Mary's insight.

As Penrose tells us, it is possible for a non-repeating pattern to tessellate if we work in three dimensions rather than two dimensions. As an aside, it is not a good idea to work in three dimensions if you are tiling a floor because you create raised surfaces in the process. A computer doing algorithmic calculations can crunch all the information it likes to the cows come home, but it will never 'think' to work in three dimensions to solve the problem. The ability to solve this problem is unique to humans. This is what I would call KNOWING THAT. Something the physicalists would deny actually exists.

From the point of view of qualia I would say. NOW THAT IS HOW you tile the Euclidean plane.

P.S. Sorry about the bold type, but I thought it would be useful for following the argument.

I can't say I understand this post, I'll have to think about it. But isn't the problem with Mary's room the same problem we have with, say, subatomic particles? We can never see them, but we can know a lot about them - same with black holes. But we don't go on about whether some day our knowledge of these unperceived objects will be so great that we will actually 'experience' them. Knowing about something can never be the same as experiencing it. We accept this proposition easily in regards to black holes and I would accept it just as well regarding Mary and her lack of experiencing 'red.' The distinction I draw is between experience and knowledge. If Searle claims that qualia is the same as experience, so be it. I always thought 'qualia' was a superfluous, made up word. But experience is not 'experience' plus 'qualia.'

I know I'm missing something - what is it?

I know Searle says - 'but we stipulated that Mary knows 'everything' about red.' Since experiencing red is a kind of 'knowing,' it is thus possessed by her in her room, by stipulation. And yet, it is also stipulated that she has never experienced red - it seems like a shell game to me.

[thedoc]

Those who dismiss the visceral as unimportant, are missing half the fun.

[Ginkgo]

I can't say I understand this post, I'll have to think about it. But isn't the problem with Mary's room the same problem we have with, say, subatomic particles? We can never see them, but we can know a lot about them - same with black holes. But we don't go on about whether some day our knowledge of these unperceived objects will be so great that we will actually 'experience' them.

Sorry about my other post. Hex should have stepped in and told me I was babbling on with nonsense. I hope this is a bit better.

The physialist would probably "go on about it." The only reason we cannot imagine what it is like to be in a black hole is because we lack all the information. Once we accumulate enough factual knowledge of black holes then we will be ale to imagine the experience. Mary the expert on blackholes with all the factual knowledge at her disposal would say as she is dragged into the event horizon, "I knew what this was going to be like all along."

Knowing about something can never be the same as experiencing it.

A physicalist would disagree with this, but a supporter of qualia would agree.

We accept this proposition easily in regards to black holes and I would accept it just as well regarding Mary and her lack of experiencing 'red.' The distinction I draw is between experience and knowledge. If Searle claims that qualia is the same as experience, so be it. I always thought 'qualia' was a superfluous, made up word. But experience is not 'experience' plus 'qualia.'

I know I'm missing something - what is it?

If you want to make a distinction between "knowledge" and "experience" then you are no longer a physicalist, but a qualia-ite. If on the other hand, you don't make this distinction then you are one again a physicalist.

Qualia-ites would say that we have no choice in the matter. Qualia always comes attached to the facts. Physicalists would counter by saying there are only the physical facts, nothing else attached.

[Wyman]

I can't say I understand this post, I'll have to think about it. But isn't the problem with Mary's room the same problem we have with, say, subatomic particles? We can never see them, but we can know a lot about them - same with black holes. But we don't go on about whether some day our knowledge of these unperceived objects will be so great that we will actually 'experience' them.

Sorry about my other post. Hex should have stepped in and told me I was babbling on with nonsense. I hope this is a bit better.

The physialist would probably "go on about it." The only reason we cannot imagine what it is like to be in a black hole is because we lack all the information. Once we accumulate enough factual knowledge of black holes then we will be ale to imagine the experience. Mary the expert on blackholes with all the factual knowledge at her disposal would say as she is dragged into the event horizon, "I knew what this was going to be like all along."

Knowing about something can never be the same as experiencing it.

A physicalist would disagree with this, but a supporter of qualia would agree.

We accept this proposition easily in regards to black holes and I would accept it just as well regarding Mary and her lack of experiencing 'red.' The distinction I draw is between experience and knowledge. If Searle claims that qualia is the same as experience, so be it. I always thought 'qualia' was a superfluous, made up word. But experience is not 'experience' plus 'qualia.'

I know I'm missing something - what is it?

If you want to make a distinction between "knowledge" and "experience" then you are no longer a physicalist, but a qualia-ite. If on the other hand, you don't make this distinction then you are one again a physicalist.

Qualia-ites would say that we have no choice in the matter. Qualia always comes attached to the facts. Physicalists would counter by saying there are only the physical facts, nothing else attached.

I wouldn't say you were babbling of course, but the idea expressed is probably too complex to write a short couple paragraphs about. Or I am dense. I said Searle made up Mary's, room, but he actually created the Chinese room, I think.

I think I am missing something, because I think that the use of the words 'facts,' 'knowledge,' and 'qualia' are so loaded and convoluted that I cant make sense of either position. Take the proposition 'I see a red apple.' One has knowledge of this fact, not upon seeing a red apple, but upon understanding 'red,' 'apple,' etc. in context - mastering the conceptual scheme of objects, colors, seeing. This is knowledge as propositional knowledge.

When I see a red apple I am experiencing (perceiving) something. Perceiving is not propositional knowledge. It is a relation between a subject and an object - an activity. It is not true or false any more than running or walking or singing is true or false.

[Ginkgo]

I can't say I understand this post, I'll have to think about it. But isn't the problem with Mary's room the same problem we have with, say, subatomic particles? We can never see them, but we can know a lot about them - same with black holes. But we don't go on about whether some day our knowledge of these unperceived objects will be so great that we will actually 'experience' them.

Sorry about my other post. Hex should have stepped in and told me I was babbling on with nonsense. I hope this is a bit better.

The physialist would probably "go on about it." The only reason we cannot imagine what it is like to be in a black hole is because we lack all the information. Once we accumulate enough factual knowledge of black holes then we will be ale to imagine the experience. Mary the expert on blackholes with all the factual knowledge at her disposal would say as she is dragged into the event horizon, "I knew what this was going to be like all along."

Knowing about something can never be the same as experiencing it.

A physicalist would disagree with this, but a supporter of qualia would agree.

We accept this proposition easily in regards to black holes and I would accept it just as well regarding Mary and her lack of experiencing 'red.' The distinction I draw is between experience and knowledge. If Searle claims that qualia is the same as experience, so be it. I always thought 'qualia' was a superfluous, made up word. But experience is not 'experience' plus 'qualia.'

I know I'm missing something - what is it?

If you want to make a distinction between "knowledge" and "experience" then you are no longer a physicalist, but a qualia-ite. If on the other hand, you don't make this distinction then you are one again a physicalist.

Qualia-ites would say that we have no choice in the matter. Qualia always comes attached to the facts. Physicalists would counter by saying there are only the physical facts, nothing else attached.

I wouldn't say you were babbling of course, but the idea expressed is probably too complex to write a short couple paragraphs about. Or I am dense. I said Searle made up Mary's, room, but he actually created the Chinese room, I think.

I think I am missing something, because I think that the use of the words 'facts,' 'knowledge,' and 'qualia' are so loaded and convoluted that I cant make sense of either position. Take the proposition 'I see a red apple.' One has knowledge of this fact, not upon seeing a red apple, but upon understanding 'red,' 'apple,' etc. in context - mastering the conceptual scheme of objects, colors, seeing. This is knowledge as propositional knowledge.

Yes, you are right Searle is the Chinese room argument. However, it doesn't make much difference from my point of view. In fact trying to tile the Euclidean plane is my version of The Chinese Room. Nonetheless, the mistake of the physicilists is always the same. That is, to assume experience is exactly the same as arithmetic calculations, or as in the case of computers- rule based programming is the experience.

I think we can argue that these types of calculations are a basic type of experience used by humans and computers, but it isn't the only type of experience. Certainly, physicilists are not arguing that computer experience makes a computer conscious. A computer can shuffle the known data around in a meaningful and logical fashion that appears to be a type of empirical approach. But in the end a computer does not know, "what it is like" to tile the Euclidean plane, any more than the man in the Chinese rooms knows, "what it is like" to speak Chinese, any more than Mary locked away in a black and white room "knows what it is like" to see red.

That's my argument and I am sticking to it, unless someone can convince me otherwise.



P.S.

I also think you are correct in terms definitions of words. Physicists prefer a limited definition of the word "experience" because it gives force to their argument.

[Wyman]

Your tile example makes more sense in light of the analogy to the Chinese room. I just have never tiled a room, so the metaphor is hazy to me. Perhaps I just don't know 'what it is like to be a floor tiler.'

I was thinking of this 'what it is like to be' concept.

In Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he goes through an historical survey of modern philosophy - Descartes to Locke to Berkely to Hume to Kant, etc.. He points out some glaring contradictions in Locke's theory of knowledge and explains it by claiming that Locke (and most of those preceding him) thought of knowledge as a relation between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge - knowledge as analogous to perception.

Thus, like Plato, Locke had problems with knowledge of physical objects and the sensory world. There are mistakes, illusions, ephemeral appearances. So they searched for 'objects of knowledge' that were immutable (among other attributes), such as universals or primary qualities. There are many problems with this conception of knowledge - knowledge as a relation.

Rorty credits Kant with moving modern philosophy towards knowledge as 'knowing that' - propositional knowledge. But he thinks Kant stopped short, for reasons that I won't go into. Modern pragmatism (which Rorty advocates for), he claims, properly treats of knowledge as 'knowing that.'

I would add 'knowing how' as a kind of red haired stepchild that gets overlooked in philosophy.

But basically, we have 1) knowledge as a relation; 2)knowledge of facts or propositions (knowing that); and knowing how.

Mathematics and physics deal in knowing that and knowing how. They don't give a rat's ass about 'coming into contact with' universals or primary qualities because this type of concept is utterly useless to them.

Now, this idea of 'knowing what it is like to be' something is proposed by philosophers as a different type of knowledge than the other three. Right off the bat, we can be pretty sure it fails on pragmatic grounds - physicists and mathematicians will not use it and Hexhammer will deride it as cozy chatter. But among philosophers, dismissing concepts on solely pragmatic grounds is at best bad form.

So, my question is, what is this 'what it is like to be' knowledge?

So I thought of the example of what it is like to be a marathon runner. I have never run one. I have run shorter distances, I have watched marathons. I f I wanted to, I could interview marathon runners, study the subject (much like Mary) and even run 25 miles, which would no doubt be very much like being a marathon runner, but not quite.

The closer and closer I got (in my imagination) to being a marathon runner, the more and more I thought that the concept of 'knowing what it is like to be' something, reduces finally to the concept of 'actually doing or being' that something.

But I think this is the same as the problem of subjective knowledge - i.e. I can never see exactly what you see - I can't see the objects in front of you exactly from your perspective (since you are standing on the other side of the room, for instance). I can go over to where you were standing, but since I am half an inch taller than you, have different life experiences than you, etc., I will never experience exactly what you experience.

This problem of subjective experience is the problem of 'the existence of other minds' or solipsism, or Cartesian skepticism. So, in my view, all this talk of 'knowing what it is like to be something' is the same old problem dressed in new terminology.

This is in keeping with my overall suspicion that philosophy never progresses past the point of what the 19 year old undergraduate philosophy major knows by the end of his or her first semester. And this comes from someone who thoroughly enjoys the subject.

[Ginkgo]

Your tile example makes more sense in light of the analogy to the Chinese room. I just have never tiled a room, so the metaphor is hazy to me. Perhaps I just don't know 'what it is like to be a floor tiler.'

I was thinking of this 'what it is like to be' concept.

In Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he goes through an historical survey of modern philosophy - Descartes to Locke to Berkely to Hume to Kant, etc.. He points out some glaring contradictions in Locke's theory of knowledge and explains it by claiming that Locke (and most of those preceding him) thought of knowledge as a relation between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge - knowledge as analogous to perception.

Thus, like Plato, Locke had problems with knowledge of physical objects and the sensory world. There are mistakes, illusions, ephemeral appearances. So they searched for 'objects of knowledge' that were immutable (among other attributes), such as universals or primary qualities. There are many problems with this conception of knowledge - knowledge as a relation.

Rorty credits Kant with moving modern philosophy towards knowledge as 'knowing that' - propositional knowledge. But he thinks Kant stopped short, for reasons that I won't go into. Modern pragmatism (which Rorty advocates for), he claims, properly treats of knowledge as 'knowing that.'

I would add 'knowing how' as a kind of red haired stepchild that gets overlooked in philosophy.

But basically, we have 1) knowledge as a relation; 2)knowledge of facts or propositions (knowing that); and knowing how.

Mathematics and physics deal in knowing that and knowing how. They don't give a rat's ass about 'coming into contact with' universals or primary qualities because this type of concept is utterly useless to them.

Now, this idea of 'knowing what it is like to be' something is proposed by philosophers as a different type of knowledge than the other three. Right off the bat, we can be pretty sure it fails on pragmatic grounds - physicists and mathematicians will not use it and Hexhammer will deride it as cozy chatter. But among philosophers, dismissing concepts on solely pragmatic grounds is at best bad form.

So, my question is, what is this 'what it is like to be' knowledge?

So I thought of the example of what it is like to be a marathon runner. I have never run one. I have run shorter distances, I have watched marathons. I f I wanted to, I could interview marathon runners, study the subject (much like Mary) and even run 25 miles, which would no doubt be very much like being a marathon runner, but not quite.

The closer and closer I got (in my imagination) to being a marathon runner, the more and more I thought that the concept of 'knowing what it is like to be' something, reduces finally to the concept of 'actually doing or being' that something.

But I think this is the same as the problem of subjective knowledge - i.e. I can never see exactly what you see - I can't see the objects in front of you exactly from your perspective (since you are standing on the other side of the room, for instance). I can go over to where you were standing, but since I am half an inch taller than you, have different life experiences than you, etc., I will never experience exactly what you experience.

This problem of subjective experience is the problem of 'the existence of other minds' or solipsism, or Cartesian skepticism. So, in my view, all this talk of 'knowing what it is like to be something' is the same old problem dressed in new terminology.

This is in keeping with my overall suspicion that philosophy never progresses past the point of what the 19 year old undergraduate philosophy major knows by the end of his or her first semester. And this comes from someone who thoroughly enjoys the subject.

To be honest I don't know what it would be like to be a marathon runner. I could imagine to a limited extent, but that's about all. Having said that, I certainly don't know what it is like to be a bat, horse,cat or dog. As Nagel points out, there must be something it is like to be one of these animals. If a creature is complex enough then there is every chance it has subjective experience. I am sure there is something it is like to be my cat.

But here is the strange thing. Apparently when sport is played at the elite level there is nothing it is like to be playing that sport. The athlete can lose the subjective component of their experience. In other words, they can start to have a zone or flow experience. The term "experience" in this particular state of mind is questionable because athlete's report a distinct lack of experience while playing.

Without the subjective component in a high level sporting performance, these gifted individuals seem to be able to train their mind into a "knowing how" rather than a "knowing that" state.

[Lev Muishkin]

Are vicarious experiences as valid as authentic ones that you have experienced yourself. Everyone has stories that relate to their lives, some have been lived directly, some are experiences of others and those stories are part of ones life.

Vicarious experiences are equally authentic as non-vicarious ones. The two words do not form a natural dichotomy and are not mutually exclusive.

The reason for this, is that there is no such thing as literally vicarious in the sense that you can live the experiences of another. All personal experience, vicarious or otherwise is done through the direct sensory data of the self. And in attempting a vicarious experience it is acknowledged that you are only imagining the experience of another and so are really confronting yourself - another aspect of your self.
In doing this you are authoring an alternative view, not the view of another.

So in the two senses of the word, perhaps you could give an example of why you think this might challenge the idea of authenticity?