John K wrote:Compatibilism (W.T. Stace) offers a possible way out of this age old dilemma. If the cause of said event is internal, resulting actions are determined by ourselves. Just a thought.
So we choose to determine what those actions will be?
John K wrote:Compatibilism (W.T. Stace) offers a possible way out of this age old dilemma. If the cause of said event is internal, resulting actions are determined by ourselves. Just a thought.
It appears you are lumping the ability to choose somehow with theistic belief? ...I think you are making two separate arguments here. 1) That we have free will 2) Determinism precludes God. Which one would you like to discuss?
This is why I like you, IC. An informed opinion, cutting though the thicket of obscurity and presenting arguments clearly and intelligently. Philosophical writing sorely lacks this nowadays.Immanuel Can wrote:It appears you are lumping the ability to choose somehow with theistic belief? ...I think you are making two separate arguments here. 1) That we have free will 2) Determinism precludes God. Which one would you like to discuss?
In support of aiddon's claim, consider the following:
Determinism...two types.
1) UltraCalvinism -- the belief that God predetermines everything, then micromanages the universe so as to make only one course of action ever happen. Requires Theism.
2) Materialism -- the belief that there is absolutely nothing but materials and scientific laws operating in the universe -- nothing but material cause plus natural effect -- so that from the initial singularity of origin every event in the history of the universe was already guaranteed to happen. Does not require Theism.
Thus Determinism can be explicated in terms of either metaphysic. The real question, though, is not about whether Theism or Atheism is true, but whether there's any way out of Determinism in either case.
Not always. I can decide to leave the room for lunch (internal cause). I can be dragged out of the room by the police (external cause). Both scenarios have causes, but are different kinds of causes.thedoc wrote:So we choose to determine what those actions will be?John K wrote:Compatibilism (W.T. Stace) offers a possible way out of this age old dilemma. If the cause of said event is internal, resulting actions are determined by ourselves. Just a thought.
Yet if Determinism is true, then even what you call an "internal cause" is actually, secretly, the long-term product of an "external cause". In that case, the distinction disappears again.Not always. I can decide to leave the room for lunch (internal cause). I can be dragged out of the room by the police (external cause). Both scenarios have causes, but are different kinds of causes.
You saw that too. This is the argument hard determinists use to counter compatibilism. Stace places emphasis on the psychological state of the individual in question. People have died from hunger strikes, so it would seem they bucked the system and proved free will exists. It's a metaphysical game of rock-paper-scissors.Immanuel Can wrote: Yet if Determinism is true, then even what you call an "internal cause" is actually, secretly, the long-term product of an "external cause". In that case, the distinction disappears again.
In other words, I might *think* I chose to go to lunch, but it was actually a product of my stomach pains, which were a product of my having eaten too early, which were a product of my having gotten up to early, which was a product of my having slept badly, which was a product of my having watched a disturbing film on the previous night, which was a product of my wife choosing the wrong channel on the TV, which was a product of her annoyance with me, which was a product of my having come home late from the pub... and so on, back to the Big Bang.
I really didn't *choose* to go to lunch: rather, I was *caused* to feel the sensation of making a choice by a specific chain previous events. My "internal" cause was an "external" one, ultimately.
Going on hunger strike - or any feat of human "will" does not assume free will. In fact you can equally argue that again it is deterministic. Someone who "chooses" to go on hunger strike is obviously someone who is ideologically driven, courageous, principled...all of those things - these can be viewed as products of that person's genetics and environment for example. Not being afraid of dying is not a choice you make. Some people are naturally more afraid than others - this is hardwired into their neurology. Yes, one can change how they behave, prejudices, outlooks, etc. but this can just as easily be explain in terms of how someone is predisposed to the notion of change in the first place.You saw that too. This is the argument hard determinists use to counter compatibilism. Stace places emphasis on the psychological state of the individual in question. People have died from hunger strikes, so it would seem they bucked the system and proved free will exists. It's a metaphysical game of rock-paper-scissors.
I am by no means an expert in this area, as I think very few people can claim to be anyway - and I have changed positions on this many times in the past. I am beginning to find equilibrium, however, in the idea that free will is simply an illusion - albeit a very powerful illusion. Free will must be distinguished from the ability to make good choices and bad choices - themselves products of determinism. Some folk are genetically and neurologically programmed to make bad choices, due to genetic coding and environmental factors. Other folk make good choices. How often have we seen those from stable, nurturing or more well-off backgrounds making good choices? The number is very high. They may be under some illusion that they were exercising their free will - which happens to be somehow more finely-tuned than the beggar on the street. It appears to me more and more that we are simply a consequence of our actions, and our actions are a consequence of our biology. Again, I do not have a hardened line on this, but I do consider myself a materialist (though a very awestruck one, it must be said) and I suppose determinism sits very well with me in that sense.Immanuel Can wrote: Yes, I think it is possible to discover a place for the concept "free will" in a Theist universe. This is because foreknowledge and predestination are distinct concepts. There's no necessity that if God "knows" a thing, He is therefore the effective *cause* of that thing.
But Materialism? No, I can't save it from Determinism. If it's suppositions are true, then Determinism seems inevitably to follow.
Some people vainly look to "quantum physics" to get us out of the causality chain; but I think this is a vain hope because it only changes the mechanism by which the Determinism takes place -- moving it from blind causality to total randomness -- but either way we are the helpless pawns of forces that determine what will happen to us, without any volition on our part. The thing we need to save is the idea that our decisions, not impersonal forces of any kind, actually matter in the causal chain.
This raises a new question. If I am hungry, the argument could still be made that it's me causing my leaving the room to have lunch. The free will philosopher might claim that after all, the source of his hunger is his own stomach, and is therefore (quite literally) an internal cause. It's begs the question as to when exactly (if ever) do we cross the line from determined to free action, since I can't control my hunger if I don't eat. Compatibilism acknowledges determined action in it's definition, and at some point it suggests we may break away from it's grasp. Hard determinists would claim than once we've crossed into its influence, all bets are off. In other words, if we go far enough back...gotcha! Can we use the BB as the source of determinism? It's an interesting question, since cause and effect is a time dependent phenomenon, and time didn't exist before it. I'm sure you see question this raises.Immanuel Can wrote: In other words, I might *think* I chose to go to lunch, but it was actually a product of my stomach pains, which were a product of my having eaten too early, which were a product of my having gotten up to early, which was a product of my having slept badly, which was a product of my having watched a disturbing film on the previous night, which was a product of my wife choosing the wrong channel on the TV, which was a product of her annoyance with me, which was a product of my having come home late from the pub... and so on, back to the Big Bang.
Well, not "Hell," I hope. I would wish better for you.Hell if I know exactly what I am (not exactly 'free', not exactly 'determined, not exactly the initiator of causal chains, not entirely mired in causal chains).
What I do know: it's not as simple (black and white) as "choice or determinism".