The Two Faces of Objectivity

[Veritas Aequitas]

I had demonstrated
There are Two Senses of 'Objectivity'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39326

R. W. Newell in OBJECTIVITY, EMPIRICISM AND TRUTH
argued there are "Two Faces of Objectivity"
in [] = mine

The idea of objectivity is handed down to us bearing two generically different faces.

• 1. One of them [faces] is a source of self-imposed puzzlement and guides directly to foundationalism.
  
  2. Objectivity's other face is altogether different; it is central to our concerns and indispensable to our actions as rational beings.
  Objectivity's second face is a largely untechnical conception, on the whole thought to be of less philosophical interest than the first one. [see below]

The first face of objectivity
The first face of objectivity is an essentially technical conception...
It gives objectivity two roles.

• First, an ontological role ascribing objectivity to ‘objects’, or particular bodies, entities, complexes or states of affairs existing apart from perceptions more or less continuously in space and time, falling under the heading of ‘objective particulars’.
  
  And second, an epistemological role in which objectivity is ascribed to items of a different sort, beliefs, judgments, propositions or products of thought about what is really the case, forming a general class of ‘objective judgments’.

The two roles become linked when objective particulars are seen as the topics of objective judgments and, thus linked, ‘objectivity’ becomes an explanatory notion.

The positing of an objective world of particulars independent of experience is intended to account for experience as we have it.
Objective particulars seem required if there is to be any explanation of how different impressions taken to be representations of the world are to have a unity ensuring identity through change, or any explanation of beliefs about the continuous and independent existence of real objects.

And they [Objective particulars] seem needed if cogency is to be given to the idea that judgments about the real world can be independent of judgments about particular states of awareness or experience.
For this could not occur, it seems, unless an aggregative structure of outer things and their properties provide a stable referential framework for the ascription of predicates, as well as the means by which assertions of fact can have truth-values irrespective of the beliefs of individuals.
Objective particulars are needed as the correlates of objective judgments to explain how experiences can succeed or fail to represent the world.

Central to this picture of objectivity is the requirement that beliefs about an objective world must hold good independently of the experiences, or particular states of mind, on which people may rely for their assertion.
This fastening of objectivity to impersonality is a common premise of different epistemologies.

Although Locke took personal experiences to differ in the extent to which they are trustworthy indicators of an impersonal external world, he nevertheless honoured the premise in his account of representation.
And Kant held that even if experience has to possess the connectedness of a unified world, judgments about objects, if they are objective, hold independently of the occurrence of any experiences of them.
The intention [of the 1st face] is to dissociate objective judgments from any essential connection with the opinions and experiences of persons, or from anything that can be called ‘oneself’.

The Second Face of Objectivity
Objectivity's second face is a largely untechnical conception, on the whole thought to be of less philosophical interest than the first one.
Objective judgments are contrasted with prejudiced, biased or dogmatic judgments and objectivity is associated with impartiality, detachment, disinterestedness and a willingness to submit to standards of evidence.
It is distinctive of this [2nd face] view that objectivity attaches to persons through their actions.
What makes a judgment objective is not something special about outer objects, but something special about people's practices.
Seen in this way objectivity is an inter-personal notion, giving sense to the idea that a person may be, or may become objective by the exercise of a disposition to act within the constraints of a wider social practice, just as, for example, honesty is associated with identifiable patterns of behaviour within a network of practice so, in this view, objectiveness is identified by a respect for certain norms, and among them are standards of evidence and argument regulating ways of resolving disputes, settling issues and deciding beliefs. [FSKs?]

A person may be encouraged or taught to be objective; he may learn to be, for example, by trying to free himself from the bias of his beliefs; he may choose to be objective, much as he may choose to be honest; and he can be commended for his objectivity, for we see objectivity as being a desirable quality in a person.
In these cases the earlier ontological role is displaced by a normative one attaching objectivity to people and their actions.
‘Objectivity’ becomes a quality of character applied or withheld on the evidence of what one does.

Thus the two ‘faces’ face the world differently.

On the first view, objectivity will depend upon the existence of impersonal entities and is independent of subject-related properties;
on the second view it is dependent upon the performance of human actions and bound up with choices and decisions.

The above is related to this thread;
Practical Knowledge Conflated with Speculative Knowledge
viewforum.php?f=8
PH and others who deny there are no objective moral facts because they have conflated practical knowledge with Speculative Knowledge. i.e. the Two Faces of Objectivity.

Discuss?? Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Iwannaplato]

Discuss?? Views??

1) he may well be defining objectivity in ways that might be different from Atla and PH, but
he is not weighing on whether there is a mind independent reality or not. It's not an antirealism (at least not in that quote), it's a pragmatism not weighing in on that issue. IOW it is not making an ontological claim.
2) he seems to disagree with your interpretation of Kant.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Discuss?? Views??

1) he may well be defining objectivity in ways that might be different from Atla and PH, but
he is not weighing on whether there is a mind independent reality or not. It's not an antirealism (at least not in that quote), it's a pragmatism not weighing in on that issue. IOW it is not making an ontological claim.
2) he seems to disagree with your interpretation of Kant.

1. Newell opposed the 1st face of Objectivity which is ontological [typical] and is all about a mind-independent reality. Note the bolded and highlighted points above as edited. Read the 1st face again and this is expressed in his book.
The 2nd face of Objectivity is anti-realism. Newell's leaning is pragmatism which is, in his case, is one type of anti-realism.

2. He mentioned Kant but misrepresented Kant who obviously opposed the idea of an absolute mind-independent reality. This misrepresentation is not significant to the issue on hand.

[Iwannaplato]

1. Newell opposed the 1st face of Objectivity which is ontological [typical] and is all about a mind-independent reality. Note the bolded and highlighted points above as edited. Read the 1st face again and this is expressed in his book.
The 2nd face of Objectivity is anti-realism. Newell's leaning is pragmatism which is, in his case, is one type of anti-realism.

Again, he is not saying there are not mind independent objects out there. He is saying that we shift the criterion determining objectivity from whether the conclusions match external realist, to the criterion being that processes we call objective meet standards of rigor.

Instead of saying methodology A is objective because it creates models that match external reality, we call methodology a objective because it is organized in ways X, Y, and Z.

That is not a claim about external reality, mind independent, existing or not.

You're making a category error. He's also pragmatic here, not antirealist and pragmatist here. He's essentially black boxing the issue.

2. He mentioned Kant but misrepresented Kant who obviously opposed the idea of an absolute mind-independent reality. This misrepresentation is not significant to the issue on hand.

But as always you present writers in an appeal to authority tone. You start with 'I had demonstrated...'
So, once someone is put forward as justification, then if they have opinions that go against yours, it makes sense to point this out.

Newell, in the quotes, is primarily asserting stuff. You are presenting his position, not really his arguments. So, it comes off as 'see I am right'.

In that context pointing out that the same expert disagrees with you highlights the problem of doing that.

On the first view, objectivity will depend upon the existence of impersonal entities and is independent of subject-related properties;
on the second view it is dependent upon the performance of human actions and bound up with choices and decisions.

How do we determine the objectivity of a person? on the accuracy of their models of external reality or on their performances of......' We determine THEIR objectivity.

That is not a stand on whether those objects exist or not. It is talking about how we decide a person is objective or a field of knowledge. It's not an ontological stand about the world.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I believe you are strawmaning the issue.

In the first place the OP and the book is about "The Two Faces of Objectivity" and the author's preference for his 2nd Face of Objectivity [detailed above].

It was you who brought up the issue of realism vs antirealism.
Since you brought it up, I believe we can infer the author's stance is that of antirealism because he severely critique the "1st face of objectivity" which is obviously realism [as implied by his description of it, even though the author did not specifically mention it is realism].

Despite the author's criticism of the 1st face of objectivity [see details above], you think he could be a realist?

I did not focus on whether the author is a realist or anti-realist but merely inferred he is antirealism with pragmatism leanings from what he wrote.
I will go through the book again to find points that could reinforce my belief that the author is definitely anti-realist by inference.

[Iwannaplato]

I believe you are strawmaning the issue.

In the first place the OP and the book is about "The Two Faces of Objectivity" and the author's preference for his 2nd Face of Objectivity [detailed above].

Sure. I understood that and in fact repeated that in my posts.

It was you who brought up the issue of realism vs antirealism.

Sure. Almost all your posts have to do with moral realism and metaphysical antirealism. It obviously ties in to issues of antirealism. PH is a moral antirealist. You are a moral realist. You are a metaphysical antrealist. He he a metaphysical realist. Nearly everything you write here, except regarding Islam and occasional other posts has to do with these two tightly related issues. Of course, I saw it as relate to those issues. Of course it is in that context. It may not be the only thing going on in that OP for you but it is part of that wider context. You want to undermine realism's sense of objectivity, which includes a mind independent reality, so that moral facts can be objective. Which is a fine line of argument, but let's not pretend it isn't happening here and elsewhere.

Since you brought it up, I believe we can infer the author's stance is that of antirealism because he severely critique the "1st face of objectivity" which is obviously realism [as implied by his description of it, even though the author did not specifically mention it is realism].

I gave my reasons why that is not what the author is talking about. He is talking about what is getting rated as objective and it is the knowledge/conclusions/methodology. He is not weighing in on the nature of reality, but rather what the label objectivity should be focused on when evaluating science.

He may severely critique realism, but in what you quoted he actually just lays out, and very respectfully, the two types of objectivity. He certainly is not saying anything anywhere near: people who believe in philosophical realism of philosophical gnats being controlled by an evolutionary default. But further it doesn't make any claim about the external world either way.

And let us know if he is a moral realist.

You haven't rebutted that position, simply restated your position.

Despite the author's criticism of the 1st face of objectivity [see details above], you think he could be a realist?

Actually what I said is
here
viewtopic.php?p=679836#p679836

I did not focus on whether the author is a realist or anti-realist but merely inferred he is antirealism with pragmatism leanings from what he wrote.
I will go through the book again to find points that could reinforce my belief that the author is definitely anti-realist by inference.

Yes, you inferred it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I believe you are strawmaning the issue.

In the first place the OP and the book is about "The Two Faces of Objectivity" and the author's preference for his 2nd Face of Objectivity [detailed above].

Sure. I understood that and in fact repeated that in my posts.

It was you who brought up the issue of realism vs antirealism.

Sure. Almost all your posts have to do with moral realism and metaphysical antirealism. It obviously ties in to issues of antirealism. PH is a moral antirealist. You are a moral realist. You are a metaphysical antrealist. He he a metaphysical realist. Nearly everything you write here, except regarding Islam and occasional other posts has to do with these two tightly related issues. Of course, I saw it as relate to those issues. Of course it is in that context. It may not be the only thing going on in that OP for you but it is part of that wider context. You want to undermine realism's sense of objectivity, which includes a mind independent reality, so that moral facts can be objective. Which is a fine line of argument, but let's not pretend it isn't happening here and elsewhere.

Since you brought it up, I believe we can infer the author's stance is that of antirealism because he severely critique the "1st face of objectivity" which is obviously realism [as implied by his description of it, even though the author did not specifically mention it is realism].

I gave my reasons why that is not what the author is talking about. He is talking about what is getting rated as objective and it is the knowledge/conclusions/methodology. He is not weighing in on the nature of reality, but rather what the label objectivity should be focused on when evaluating science.

He may severely critique realism, but in what you quoted he actually just lays out, and very respectfully, the two types of objectivity. He certainly is not saying anything anywhere near: people who believe in philosophical realism of philosophical gnats being controlled by an evolutionary default. But further it doesn't make any claim about the external world either way.

And let us know if he is a moral realist.

You haven't rebutted that position, simply restated your position.

Despite the author's criticism of the 1st face of objectivity [see details above], you think he could be a realist?

Actually what I said is
here
viewtopic.php?p=679836#p679836

I did not focus on whether the author is a realist or anti-realist but merely inferred he is antirealism with pragmatism leanings from what he wrote.
I will go through the book again to find points that could reinforce my belief that the author is definitely anti-realist by inference.

Yes, you inferred it.

Note my fundamental;

All [if not almost all] philosophical issues are Reducible to ‘Realism’ vs ‘ANTI-p_Realism’
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=28643

It is because the majority are dogmatically trapped within the evolutionary default of philosophical realism and do not have the awareness of a higher perspective of reality to realize philosophical realism is limited and should not be clung on as an ideology.

You are not wrong to infer, that eventually this OP will lead to antirealism, but that is not my intention at present.

However, this OP is limited to the 'Two Faces of Objectivity' so as to highlight to Philosophical Realists there are two faces of objectivity rather than their ONLY ideological view of objectivity which is illusory.

Thus whenever PH and his like insist 'Morality is not Objective' because there are no objective moral facts, then I will throw this OP at him plus the following;

What is Philosophical Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31416

There are Two Senses of 'Objectivity'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39326

Scientific Objectivity
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39286 Jan 13, 2023

What is Moral Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30707

Evolution of Objectivity
viewtopic.php?t=41212

[Iwannaplato]

However, this OP is limited to the 'Two Faces of Objectivity' so as to highlight to Philosophical Realists there are two faces of objectivity rather than their ONLY ideological view of objectivity which is illusory.

The author is certainly arguing that there are two ways to look at objectivity: do the ideas represent reality, and is that how we evaluate their objectivity, by results and comparisons with reality. Or do we evaluate them via the rigor of the process used to reach the conclusions.

Interestingly you could be a realist and follow either one.
And you could be an anti-realist and follow either one.

As long as the realist, in the first face checks the idea/model against observations - which is what they tend to do. If they claim they checked with a mind-independent reality, there's an issue, but they can certainly believe in one and yet check the objectivity of their conclusions by comparing them to empirical stuff (observations). And then realist scientists certainly check the rigor of their own and other scientists protocols, face 2.

One need not be committed to antirealism to do that.

In fact a humble realist scientist could of course say that the advantage of science over revealed religion, for example, is that it is open to revision. Which is a way of saying that we are dealing with observations and how well our conclusions predict future ones, for example performed by other groups. "while i do think there is a mind independent reality, I am aware that interactions are mediated by perception and all the biases present in that. The posited qualities of what is out there, may change over time.'

Science as it stands now uses both faces. Realists and antirealists alike. They analyze their own protocols for rigor and they check to see if models and conclusions fit more empirical research. Some would call the latter comparing the models and ideas with external reality in the realist camp. Well, most of them. But what they actually do is check against experience, with further experimentation, result as gatherings of observations. And of course looking at their own methodologies.

[Veritas Aequitas]

However, this OP is limited to the 'Two Faces of Objectivity' so as to highlight to Philosophical Realists there are two faces of objectivity rather than their ONLY ideological view of objectivity which is illusory.

The author is certainly arguing that there are two ways to look at objectivity: do the ideas represent reality, and is that how we evaluate their objectivity, by results and comparisons with reality. Or do we evaluate them via the rigor of the process used to reach the conclusions.

Interestingly you could be a reality and follow either one.
And you could be an anti-realist and follow either one.

As long as the realist, in the first face checks the idea/model against observations - which is what they tend to do. If they claim they checked with a mind-independent reality, there's an issue, but they can certainly believe in one and yet check the objectivity of their conclusions by comparing them to empirical stuff (observations). And then realist scientists certainly check the rigor of their own and other scientists protocols, face 2.

One need not be committed to antirealism to do that.

In fact a humble realist scientist could of course say that the advantage of science over revealed religion, for example, is that it is open to revision. Which is a way of saying that we are dealing with observations and how well our conclusions predict future ones, for example performed by other groups. "while i do think there is a mind independent reality, I am aware that interactions are mediated by perception and all the biases present in that. The posited qualities of what is out there, may change over time.'

Science as it stands now uses both faces. Realists and antirealists alike. They analyze their own protocols for rigor and they check to see if models and conclusions fit more empirical research. Some would call the latter comparing the models and ideas with external reality in the realist camp. Well, most of them. But what they actually do is check against experience, with further experimentation, result gathers of observations. And of course looking at their own methodologies.

IWP: "Interestingly you could be a realist and follow either one.
And you could be an anti-realist and follow either one."
You got is wrong.

The first face of objectivity re OP is this;

• First, an ontological role ascribing objectivity to ‘objects’, or particular bodies, entities, complexes or states of affairs existing apart from perceptions more or less continuously in space and time, falling under the heading of ‘objective particulars’.
  see OP

The above, i.e. is ontological with objective particulars that are mind-independent which satisfy the definition of philosophical realism.
How can an anti-realist which oppose the above view, accept it?

As for the 2nd face,

• "In these cases the earlier ontological role is displaced by a normative one attaching objectivity to people and their actions.
  ‘Objectivity’ becomes a quality of character applied or withheld on the evidence of what one does."

Within the 2nd face, the 1st ontological-based-objectivity is DISPLACED with an objectivity that is related to the human-conditions.
This is the antirealist version.
How can a realist accept this sort of objectivity?

[Iwannaplato]

IWP: "Interestingly you could be a realist and follow either one.
And you could be an anti-realist and follow either one."
You got is wrong.

If you do not integrate my justification for a point I make, then it is unclear if you understood my justification. It's most likely you will simply repeat your position, perhaps in a new version. A better response is to rebut my justification. Then I don't have to repeat it.

The first face of objectivity re OP is this;

• First, an ontological role ascribing objectivity to ‘objects’, or particular bodies, entities, complexes or states of affairs existing apart from perceptions more or less continuously in space and time, falling under the heading of ‘objective particulars’.
  see OP

The above, i.e. is ontological with objective particulars that are mind-independent which satisfy the definition of philosophical realism.
How can an anti-realist which oppose the above view, accept it?

By focusing on observations. Antirealists have models and will even call them models and they will check with reality. At root they don't think there is an independent reality, however the process is exactly the same and within their FSKs, as you would say, they do refer to objects and they will check their models against them. They, as you would say, do not consider them absolutely mind independent, but the process is EXACTLY THE SAME as the realists first face objectivity verification.

As for the 2nd face,

• "In these cases the earlier ontological role is displaced by a normative one attaching objectivity to people and their actions.
  ‘Objectivity’ becomes a quality of character applied or withheld on the evidence of what one does."

Within the 2nd face, the 1st ontological-based-objectivity is DISPLACED with an objectivity that is related to the human-conditions.
This is the antirealist version.
How can a realist accept this sort of objectivity?

Realist scientist do this all the time. The evaluate the rigor and objectivty of protocols and methodology. There is no questions the evaluate the objectivity of their own research and the research of other scientists, precisely as in that quote:

• "In these cases the earlier ontological role is displaced by a normative one attaching objectivity to people and their actions.
  ‘Objectivity’ becomes a quality of character applied or withheld on the evidence of what one does."

And if you read reviews by scientists of other scientists' research realists will do this and, in fact, this is generally the focus of their critiques (and support). Any peer review process by a respected journal will do precisely this, regardless of the ontological position of the reviewers, with every single article submitted.

As I said, realists have always done both processes. And anti-realists use both processes, however, yes, when they do the first one, there is the proviso that it is about repeated empirical events, and not some final claim about what it out their beyond minds. But they use both processes and think about both kinds of objectivity.

Though I use that term only because they would. I think interempiricism and other inter- words with that base are better for antirealists. It leaves out all the realist baggage in objectivity, subjectivity and the related words.

[Veritas Aequitas]

IWP: "Interestingly you could be a realist and follow either one.
And you could be an anti-realist and follow either one."
You got is wrong.

If you do not integrate my justification for a point I make, then it is unclear if you understood my justification. It's most likely you will simply repeat your position, perhaps in a new version. A better response is to rebut my justification. Then I don't have to repeat it.

The first face of objectivity re OP is this;

• First, an ontological role ascribing objectivity to ‘objects’, or particular bodies, entities, complexes or states of affairs existing apart from perceptions more or less continuously in space and time, falling under the heading of ‘objective particulars’.
  see OP

The above, i.e. is ontological with objective particulars that are mind-independent which satisfy the definition of philosophical realism.
How can an anti-realist which oppose the above view, accept it?

By focusing on observations. Antirealists have models and will even call them models and they will check with reality.
At root they don't think there is an independent reality, however the process is exactly the same and within their FSKs, as you would say, they do refer to objects and they will check their models against them. They, as you would say, do not consider them absolutely mind independent, but the process is EXACTLY THE SAME as the realists first face objectivity verification.

I still think you got it wrong, i.e. not as the author of the book intended.

All scientists whether they are
1. philosophical realists - non-theistic
2. philosophical realists - theistic or
3. anti-p-realists [Kantian]
4. anti-p-realists -others

must follow and comply with all the relevant conditions of the scientific method or scientific FSK without exceptions.
So, they all adopt the SAME basic scientific processes of the scientific method.
Up the point of establishing the scientific conclusion they are all scientists without any consideration whether they are p-realists, theistic-realists not anti-realists.
Thus, when they process, verify and justify empirical observations, they are doing strictly on a purely scientific basis without considering in their philosophical beliefs.
Scientists per se do not even claim their scientific conclusions are "objective" but merely claim their conclusions comply with the requirements of the scientific methods [scientific FSK].

It is only when they [scientists if they are philosophical] shift from the scientific perspective to wear the philosophical hat, that they assert their philosophical beliefs and deliberate on the question of philosophical objectivity.
Einstein a philosophical realist would not incorporate his philosophical view 'God do not play dice' into his scientific papers as a scientist-proper.
Non-scientists philosophers will discuss philosophical objectivity which may not involve the philosophy of science, but other philosophical topic e.g. morality, etc.

In the case of the OP, the "two faces of objectivity" is related to philosophical objectivity and not on science. It is about the ultimate philosophical groundings related to morality, science, etc. held each individual.
Thus your bringing of Scientific processes and scientists are not relevant to the topic.

The "two faces of objectivity" per the Book, is reducible to;
1. 1st face of mind-independent is related those of the realists [philosophical].
2. 2nd face re human interactions is related to antirealist [Kantian], pragmatists and the like.

Thus you cannot claim any individual can adopt both at the same time.

Here's the author intend;
(in [] = mine)

The temptation to think of these two faces [of objectivity] in terms of alternative senses of the word ‘objective’ should be resisted.
Much more is at stake.
We are presented with rival conceptions of objectivity [philosophical]
organizing and shaping a central range of epistemological issues,
compelling ‘pictures’, in Wittgenstein's phrase, carrying different philosophical commitments.
page 18

Here is the authors critique of the 1st face of objectivity;

The poverty of objectivity [1st face] as a product of self-transcendence is clear in its by-passing of objectivity's ethical dimension;
objectiveness cannot be seen as a virtuous or desirable characteristic of people's actions if it has nothing to do with their actions at all.
And a person can hardly be responsible for being or failing to be objective, or be praised or blamed for it, if objectivity is an external property ascribed independently of the desires, motivations and beliefs of any individual self.
Understood in this [1st face] way objectivity is an artificial concept having no application to the real world, and it is not surprising that it should prove to be so elusive.

Taking a larger view of the matter,
the objectivist tradition [1st face] has been betrayed by an infatuation with the externalist tradition [mind-independent];
and the exchange of its [objectivity’s] normative role for a picture of objectivity ‘out there’ beyond the scope of actual agents
has deprived objectivism of its most cogent [clear, logical, and convincing] defences.
pg 38

As for the 2nd face,

• "In these cases the earlier ontological role is displaced by a normative one attaching objectivity to people and their actions.
  ‘Objectivity’ becomes a quality of character applied or withheld on the evidence of what one does."

Within the 2nd face, the 1st ontological-based-objectivity is DISPLACED with an objectivity that is related to the human-conditions.
This is the antirealist version.
How can a realist accept this sort of objectivity?

Realist scientist do this all the time. The evaluate the rigor and objectivty of protocols and methodology. There is no questions the evaluate the objectivity of their own research and the research of other scientists, precisely as in that quote:

As stated above, you cannot conflate realist with scientist at the same time in the same sense.
The 'objectivity' [impartiality] of practices of scientists are conditioned upon the requirements of the scientific method regardless of whether they are realists, antirealists, pragmatists, theists or skeptics.
What the OP is dealing with is not this sense of objectivity but rather a typical philosophical objectivity.

• "In these cases the earlier ontological role is displaced by a normative one attaching objectivity to people and their actions.
  ‘Objectivity’ becomes a quality of character applied or withheld on the evidence of what one does."

And if you read reviews by scientists of other scientists' research realists will do this and, in fact, this is generally the focus of their critiques (and support). Any peer review process by a respected journal will do precisely this, regardless of the ontological position of the reviewers, with every single article submitted.

As I said, realists have always done both processes. And anti-realists use both processes, however, yes, when they do the first one, there is the proviso that it is about repeated empirical events, and not some final claim about what it out their beyond minds. But they use both processes and think about both kinds of objectivity.

Though I use that term only because they would. I think interempiricism and other inter- words with that base are better for antirealists. It leaves out all the realist baggage in objectivity, subjectivity and the related words.

As above, you cannot conflate 'realists' [philosophy] with scientists [science] at the same time in the same sense.

Who is a realist is very definitive.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
who will claim reality is objective [objective reality] as existing independent of the human conditions, regardless whether there are humans or not. [1st face]

A p-realist will never agree to the 2nd-face-objectivity incorporating human factors as objective. A p-realist will claim the antirealist's sense of objectivity is tainted and corrupted with subjectivity.

An antirealist [Kantian] will brush off the realist's sense of subjectivity as crude misinterpretation and explain that the antirealist's sense of subjectivity emerges from a collective-of-subjects thus intersubjectivity based upon a specific FSR-FSK with varying degrees of objectivity.