[Which is why this golden rule fails as the bankers do exactly that, act as they think others will do unto them and this is how they to wish to be treated too.
/quote]
wow i agree with arisingI`m not here to make a name for myself..i am to listen and hear aswell as ask those questions near to my heart.
Tiebertr saidum my point was and is not all do, sadists don`t practice it like you do neither do masochists..are you now denying they exist? are you suggesting only NORMAL people do this? pray tell me what is normal in this world? I see many starving that are "normal" i see many in power that would let you die..the GR is a red herring used to oppress
Golden Rule universal wisdom or universal follery
Re: Golden Rule universal wisdom or universal follery
The "Inverted Golden Rule"
As stated by others above, it is almost a truism that every culture, every religion has some version of the ‘Golden Rule’. In its most common formulation the Golden Rule states: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” Marcus Singer (as cited in Gewirth, 2007) suggests an alternative formulation which he calls the ‘Inversion’ of the Golden Rule, namely: “Do unto others as they would have you do unto them.”
Gewirth concurs with Singer’s view of the Inverted Golden Rule (IGR) stating: “As Singer correctly notes, this conception is quite unacceptable” (p.570). However, Singer misstates the situation, claiming that the Inversion is “tantamount to: ‘Always do what anyone else wants you to do,’ which in turn is equivalent to a universal requirement of perfect or absolute altruism, the absurdity of which is so manifest as not to require detailing” (Singer as cited in Gewirth, 2007, p.570). However, Singer appears to have slipped the word ‘always’ into his ‘translation’ radically changing the requirements of the IGR. He seems to have converted ‘when you are dealing with someone, you must consider such and such’ into ‘you must always do such and such’.
I believe that the IGR, that is, ‘do unto others as they would have you do unto them’, is well worth considering as an overriding ethical principle and is not excessively burdensome.
To take a simple example, suppose that I have recently moved house and one of my new neighbours has been particularly helpful. I decide to ‘return the favour’ by having them over for dinner. Do I serve them my favourite meal of sautéed tripe with lambs’ brain puree or do I ask them in advance whether there is anything they particularly like or dislike? Surely it is not only correct, but common, to do the latter.
Singer and Gewirth seem to think that ‘inverting’ the Golden Rule suddenly makes it too burdensome for the moral agent; that is, it requires them to do too much for the recipient. However, there is no requirement in the IGR for the agent to act at all – it specifies how we should act, not when or why. That is, all the IGR states is that in transactions with the recipient, the agent should favour the recipient’s needs, wants and desires over and above the agent’s own. This means that if one wants to act altruistically towards someone else then they should ‘treat them as they want to be treated’ (Gewirth, 2007, p571). Leaving aside situations where the recipient is irrational or unable to formulate their needs, wants and desires, this would seem to be morally correct. Let’s take another example.
Suppose one day you are walking in the city when you stumble and fall. Perhaps you would want everyone around you to rush to your aid – checking that you are okay, helping you up, dusting you off and then seeing you on your way. What, however, if you found the situation highly embarrassing and people making a fuss over you humiliating? Perhaps you would actually prefer everyone to ignore you so that you could simply pretend it never happened. It seems reasonable to suggest that the ‘correct’ course of action would be to discretely ask you if you wanted a hand and do ‘as you wished were done to you’ (the IGR).
The concept of altruism, almost by definition, describes the moral requirement to put another’s needs, wants and desires before our own. But to do this in any meaningful way surely requires that we can only act for someone’s benefit if we consider their values, principles and preferences. Neither the Golden Rule nor the IGR speak to the degree of altruism. Despite Singer’s (2007) claim otherwise, there is no ‘always’ nor would it seem that there is an implicit ‘despite the cost to yourself’. This leads us to our final example.
Imagine that your best friend of many years has a terminal illness which by all accounts is going to kill them slowly and horribly, but also surely. There is no hope of cure, few ways to reduce their suffering even minimally, and they are in all respects rational. They ask, nay beg, you to assist them in suicide. What do you do?
Do we, based on the IGR, have an obligation to assist? Even if to do so would go against our own values? It would seem not – for although something may be ‘morally forbidden’, I do not believe that something could ever be ‘morally compulsory’. Perhaps this scenario simply highlights the fact that our greatest sacrifice may not be giving up our life for a friend but giving up our values.
Reference.
Gewirth, A. (2007). The Golden Rule rationalized. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Ethical Theory: An anthology (pp.569-581). Carlton, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.
Gewirth concurs with Singer’s view of the Inverted Golden Rule (IGR) stating: “As Singer correctly notes, this conception is quite unacceptable” (p.570). However, Singer misstates the situation, claiming that the Inversion is “tantamount to: ‘Always do what anyone else wants you to do,’ which in turn is equivalent to a universal requirement of perfect or absolute altruism, the absurdity of which is so manifest as not to require detailing” (Singer as cited in Gewirth, 2007, p.570). However, Singer appears to have slipped the word ‘always’ into his ‘translation’ radically changing the requirements of the IGR. He seems to have converted ‘when you are dealing with someone, you must consider such and such’ into ‘you must always do such and such’.
I believe that the IGR, that is, ‘do unto others as they would have you do unto them’, is well worth considering as an overriding ethical principle and is not excessively burdensome.
To take a simple example, suppose that I have recently moved house and one of my new neighbours has been particularly helpful. I decide to ‘return the favour’ by having them over for dinner. Do I serve them my favourite meal of sautéed tripe with lambs’ brain puree or do I ask them in advance whether there is anything they particularly like or dislike? Surely it is not only correct, but common, to do the latter.
Singer and Gewirth seem to think that ‘inverting’ the Golden Rule suddenly makes it too burdensome for the moral agent; that is, it requires them to do too much for the recipient. However, there is no requirement in the IGR for the agent to act at all – it specifies how we should act, not when or why. That is, all the IGR states is that in transactions with the recipient, the agent should favour the recipient’s needs, wants and desires over and above the agent’s own. This means that if one wants to act altruistically towards someone else then they should ‘treat them as they want to be treated’ (Gewirth, 2007, p571). Leaving aside situations where the recipient is irrational or unable to formulate their needs, wants and desires, this would seem to be morally correct. Let’s take another example.
Suppose one day you are walking in the city when you stumble and fall. Perhaps you would want everyone around you to rush to your aid – checking that you are okay, helping you up, dusting you off and then seeing you on your way. What, however, if you found the situation highly embarrassing and people making a fuss over you humiliating? Perhaps you would actually prefer everyone to ignore you so that you could simply pretend it never happened. It seems reasonable to suggest that the ‘correct’ course of action would be to discretely ask you if you wanted a hand and do ‘as you wished were done to you’ (the IGR).
The concept of altruism, almost by definition, describes the moral requirement to put another’s needs, wants and desires before our own. But to do this in any meaningful way surely requires that we can only act for someone’s benefit if we consider their values, principles and preferences. Neither the Golden Rule nor the IGR speak to the degree of altruism. Despite Singer’s (2007) claim otherwise, there is no ‘always’ nor would it seem that there is an implicit ‘despite the cost to yourself’. This leads us to our final example.
Imagine that your best friend of many years has a terminal illness which by all accounts is going to kill them slowly and horribly, but also surely. There is no hope of cure, few ways to reduce their suffering even minimally, and they are in all respects rational. They ask, nay beg, you to assist them in suicide. What do you do?
Do we, based on the IGR, have an obligation to assist? Even if to do so would go against our own values? It would seem not – for although something may be ‘morally forbidden’, I do not believe that something could ever be ‘morally compulsory’. Perhaps this scenario simply highlights the fact that our greatest sacrifice may not be giving up our life for a friend but giving up our values.
Reference.
Gewirth, A. (2007). The Golden Rule rationalized. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Ethical Theory: An anthology (pp.569-581). Carlton, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.