Here is the typical realist shoot-from-the hip approach:Those who advance antirealist conclusions often rely on considerations to do with disagreement to support their views.
The basic idea, developed in the two-part argument offered below, is that the many moral disagreements we actually encounter, as well as the hypothesized Moral disagreements we can anticipate among more ideal judges, are best explained by central antirealist assumptions.
I think that this line of argument is mistaken at a number of points, and will try to reveal its weaknesses in what follows.
Chapter 9 in Moral realism: A Defence; Russ Shafer-Landau
Your knowledge re Morality and Ethics is too narrow and shallow.Sculptor wrote: ↑Wed Mar 29, 2023 6:00 pm This question comes up ad nauseam
I am continually puzzled by the moral objectivists.
What are they scared of.
You've only to take a moment to examine the history of morality to know with utter certainty that there are no certainties or objective facts that stand the test of time.
Justice is always handed out unevenly; either in mitigation of class, status or circumstance; or restricted due to age, race, and low status or social standing.
That it the world we live in.
Yeah, it is common sense moral disagreement denote moral relativism, i.e. not objective, but on more serious consideration, moral disagreements actually support moral realism, i.e. moral Objectivity.
Analogy, different people may disagree on how to avoid diabetes, on what food to avoid and to eat, but the underlying fact that intake of excessive glucose through various sources is a metabolic problem to health is inherent to all humans, i.e. objective.
Recently there had been a lot of arguments that Moral Disagreements do support moral realism. Example,
There are also arguments that Moral Disagreements has no weight against Moral Realism - thus Moral Objectivity.Since intractable disagreement among wise, informed and rational people about philosophical matters does not license a verdict of philosophical antirealism, it should not do so when the subject is ethics proper.
https://academic.oup.com/book/32534/cha ... m=fulltext
Note this thread;Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with a challenge to realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully. Others beg the question against the moral realist, and yet others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that — when carefully stated — can be seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement.
Arguments based on moral disagreement itself have almost no weight, I conclude, against moral realism.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ... id=2607198
Moral Relativism is SELF-REFUTING
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