A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

[Alexander_Reiswich]

You are very generous in marking your own homework, but this is plain foolishness. You don't have a system that aligns with *OUR* best-effort moral deliberations, you have an engine for agreeing with your own predispositions and and an insane bullshit sales patter about it being purely descriptive and non-normative while doing that.

Your deliberations about abortion aren't worth shit, and your mechanised means for formalising your own opinion into moral fact (which is all that these things are ever for) won't impress anyone who isn't you. Just as nobody actually agrees with any of the insane "moral facts" that VA spits out.

The point of moral, normative, evaluative facts out there to be discovered not created is that they offer the possibility of resolving ambiguity by reference to features of the world that are not subjective. You and VA are trying to make your things equivalent to maths or science by downgrading those methods to matters of shared opinion because neither of you can make that reference back to the world work.

You can't live up to your lofty claims of equivalence so you have to make the other thing a wretched, meaner, littler thing than it is out of jealousy.

Wouldn't it be exceedingly boring if no one ever attempted to push boundaries and propose unconventional approaches, even if they ended up being completely stupid in the end? Would you really prefer it if everyone agreed with the currently accepted standards and never proposed anything crazy that "triggers" us to engage with them and thus hone our own arguments? Wouldn't Batman be nothing without the Joker?

We're all biased towards our own inventions, and it's always easier to find flaws in them from an external, detached point of view. But external points of view can also be biased, so the only way to distill some clarity is by muddling-through until the flaws become apparent enough to surpass the biases.

For example, I believe you have summarized one of your main critiques quite clearly in this statement:

You and VA are trying to make your things equivalent to maths or science by downgrading those methods to matters of shared opinion because neither of you can make that reference back to the world work.

However, I'm quite familiar with this problem and as such I've considered it from the very beginning. The entire reason why my proposed approach makes sense to me is precisely because it requires no opinions and values for it to work. It's of course possible that I'm blind to it, but then it should be trivial to point out exactly where the error occurs, no?

So let me summarize the logic one more time, and maybe you can pinpoint where exactly the violation(s) occurs:

- "claiming a right" is a social signal: it communicates to others that you have an expectation of other people that they either do or refrain from doing something. The process of claiming a right is entirely subjective (and inter-subjective)

- "respecting a right" is a behavior which meets the stated requirements of a claimed right. If the claimed right is communicated clearly enough, it's possible to determine empirically whether a particular behavior respects it, because an action or a behavior is an actual, real-world occurrence, which can be compared against the prescription of the claimed right

- the response to a claimed right is determined subjectively: for example, if my neighbor asks me not to watch TV loudly in the evening, it's up to my discretion whether I respect their claimed right or not. However, I can determine objectively whether the right was legitimately earned or not. If my neighbor consistently honored my requests, then it's legitimate for him to expect that I honor his requests in return. But once again: whether I choose to respect his "legitimate" request is completely subjective and up to me

What my framework reveals is that we can objectively determine when a claim to a right is valid and when a behavior satisfies a claimed right, even though the claim and the response to it are subjective in themselves.

Whether we -- individually and collectively -- respect "legitimate" rights as described is, of course, subjective. But my argument is that the respect of legitimately claimed rights is the entire point of Morality, and therefore it's perfectly appropriate to apply moral terminology to it (but to be clear, that's literally just my opinion).

So... can you spot where the mistake happens, exactly?

[Alexander_Reiswich]

Okay, start with the Big One:

"In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court decided that the right to privacy implied in the 14th Amendment protected abortion as a fundamental right. However, the government retained the power to regulate or restrict abortion access depending on the stage of pregnancy."

No need to be "hypothetical" at all in regard to abortion.

Sure thing. First, let's talk about the US constitution. We have to admit that there is a dilemma between constitutional originalism vs revisionism. The idea that the founding documents are "perfect as intended" and therefore can provide us with the correct answers if only we properly understand the original reasoning behind it is really quite silly. The authors of the founding documents -- even though many of them were quite adept in philosophy -- were primarily politicians. For this reason, the founding documents do not provide us with a philosophical framework based on which rights can be derived. Rather, they have collected sets of various best practices that were attractive to fans of the enlightenment.

Although most of these ideas were and still are quite reasonable, the world keeps changing and progressing. It is therefore not reasonable to believe that we'll always be able to find an answer for everything somewhere in the constitution or the bill of rights, if only we look hard enough. Many things that we have to deal with today didn't even exist back then. Plus, it was just people who wrote those documents, not omniscient gods.

But here's the problem: if we want to update and revise these documents, how can we do this "correctly"? There are various interest groups and all would like to change the constitution to align with their own interests. But most of these interests are mutually exclusive, so it's not possible to make everyone happy at the same time. That's the problem of constitutional revisionism.

Both positions are untenable, which is why this is a serious conundrum.

To resolve it, we need to devise a method which allows us to derive rights on the basis of an indisputable principle. I believe that there is only one such possible candidate:

"As individuals, as a society and as civilized human beings, we must respect the legitimate rights of all people."

I would argue that this principle is incontestable. But it does have one big problem: who's to judge which right is legitimate and which isn't? That's the question.

Can it be God? Sure -- if he or she came down here and actually talked to us. But since that's not particularly likely, the best we can do in that regard is rely on some holy text. But which one? Even if we agree on a single book, here's the next problem: none of them say anything about rights. Not even Jesus Christ noticed anything fundamentally wrong with slavery. So the idea that there are god-given rights can't possibly be derived on the basis of scripture without some heavy interpretation.

If holy books can't help us, what else can? Should we vote on it? Well, why should something be "right" just because a majority agrees on it? Isn't that just tyranny of the majority?

No matter how you think about it, there is nothing "out there" which can be used as a basis to determine the legitimacy of a right, and there is a very good reason for this: it's because a claim to a right is subjective, meaning it exists only relative to the person making the claim.

This understanding provides us with the solution: the only possible standard by which the legitimacy of a right can be determined is by reference to the subject making the claim.

Therefore, the only possible way in which one can make a legitimate claim to a right is by actually respecting said right.

This insight provides us with an objective and incontestable standard by which to judge whether a right is valid or not. And on this basis, it's now possible to re-evaluate the founding documents and clarify them, without needing to know the intentions of their authors, at all.

So with that in mind, how can we apply this to the question of abortion?

Well, the first thing to understand is that rights are inextricably connected to duties. If you want to legitimately claim to have a particular right, you have a duty to respect that right, as otherwise the legitimacy of your claim will be put into question.

Another important thing to realize regarding the question of abortion is that a fetus can't claim a right, so others must make the claim on its behalf. But those who do must also earn this right in order to make a legitimate claim.

This should make it apparent that it's not possible to just outright ban or legalize abortion -- ergo, the correct answer is not binary. Rather, it depends on various relevant factors.

First, it's important to understand the nature of what we're dealing with; an abortion is a medical procedure. Medical procedures are essentially tools which can be used for various purposes, but they're never "good" or "bad" in themselves. A chemo therapy is harmful to a healthy person, but to the right patient at the right time it can be life-saving. The question is therefore what conditions must be met for an abortion to be considered permissible.

As I have explained before, a right to an abortion can be legitimized by medical concerns.

If medical considerations don't come into play but a pregnancy is unwanted for some reason, the question becomes who makes a claim on behalf of the not-yet-born baby and how they legitimize it. For example, if an abortion is considered due to financial problems, the pro-lifers have a duty to provide the mother with the necessary finances, such that an abortion becomes no longer necessary, in order for the claim to become legitimate. If an abortion is considered due to a birth defect, there must be someone willing to adopt the child, in order for the claim to become legitimate. And so on and so forth. The point is that a right can only ever be legitimately claimed if it's earned appropriately.

Therefore, a sensible abortion law might be formulated as follows:

The necessity for an abortion is primarily a medical question, and as such must be answered by the assigned doctor. If an abortion is not medically necessary, but desired for other reasons, an assessment must be done to determine if a resolution to eliminate the desire for the abortion is possible. If it is, then an opportunity must be given to those who have an interest in the pregnancy being carried to term to provide the necessary resolution. If the resolution is not provided, the right to the abortion can't be contested. If the resolution is fully provided, the pregnancy must be carried to term. This is realized on the basis of a contract between both parties, wherein the penalties for not honoring the corresponding obligations are detailed.

But eventually I will ask you to bring the applications of objective Morality around to those actual flesh and blood women confronting the existential reality of an unwanted pregnancy.

The part that revolves around this:

Again and again: the pro-life folks insist that the problem "down here" is that the pro-choice folks have no intention of being honest because in being honest about abortion they would embrace the "natural right" of the unborn to exist beyond the womb. And then the "pro-choice" folks insist that, on the contrary, the pro-life folks have no intention of being honest because in being honest about abortion they would embrace a woman's "political right" to choose abortion in order to secure equality with men in a world where biologically only women can become pregnant.

In other words, those who tell us...

"Objective Morality? That's easy. It revolves around the 'natural right' of the unborn to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'".

And those who tell us:

"Objective Morality? That's easy. It revolves around the 'political right' of women to pursue equality with men in a world where biologically only women can get pregnant".

Unfortunately I don't know what else I could add pertaining to this that I haven't already explained previously. As I said, it's not possible to derive rights from some external source. Objective natural rights are not a valid concept, neither are objective political rights. They're only valid to the degree that the people involved agree to them. If there is no agreement, they are invalid (which means they're subjective). The only way to solve this (afaik) is via the method I described above, i.e. by reference to the subjective claim to a right, whose validity can objectively be ascertained on the basis of the demonstrated respect of the claimant relative to that right.

[FlashDangerpants]

So... can you spot where the mistake happens, exactly?

• You keep using the word "rights" but all you actually are referring to is explicitly stated contracts. So what you are wildly overestimating is just a social contract theory that requires reciprocal fair value.

• You can't even allow for implicit anything because to include such would make it clear that the evaluations involved in simple observation are value laden, but that leaves your theory to say almost nothing at all.

• You are hoping not to have to deal with how you determine in a non evaluative manner what makes these contract negotiations fair and equal. But in your example, if the neighbour asks permission to murder your cat with a bucket of acid and he has honoured more than one of your previous requests to stop throwing bricks at your children then his cat killing request represents a fair and equal contract. Or a "claimed right" in your mystifying jargon.

[Peter Holmes]

So... can you spot where the mistake happens, exactly?

• You keep using the word "rights" but all you actually are referring to is explicitly stated contracts. So what you are wildly overestimating is just a social contract theory that requires reciprocal fair value.

• You can't even allow for implicit anything because to include such would make it clear that the evaluations involved in simple observation are value laden, but that leaves your theory to say almost nothing at all.

• You are hoping not to have to deal with how you determine in a non evaluative manner what makes these contract negotiations fair and equal. But in your example, if the neighbour asks permission to murder your cat with a bucket of acid and he has honoured more than one of your previous requests to stop throwing bricks at your children then his cat killing request represents a fair and equal contract. Or a "claimed right" in your mystifying jargon.

Nailed it nicely. Thanks. And I think an earlier line gives it away:

'...the respect of legitimately claimed rights is the entire point of Morality.'

[Age]

Hello! I have come across a rather simple approach to objective Morality, but it seems surprisingly coherent -- not sure if I'm missing something, so feedback would be much appreciated.

Where did you come across a rather simple approach to objective Morality?

And, why do you write 'morality' here with a capital 'M'? If it is because you have arrived at 'objective morality', itself, then just the 'Morality' word with the capital 'M' would suffice, correct?

But I will await your answer as your response might show another reason why you use a capital 'M'

Before I get into it, I would like to define subjectivity and objectivity. I think these terms are frequently misunderstood, which leads to many strange notions of what should constitute objective Morality. First, it's helpful to keep in mind that these terms refer to concepts. For example, the concept of a chair may be objective, but an actual chair is not -- it merely is (an object). Objective concepts are mental constructs and as such do not exist physically in exactly the same way as subjective concepts.

Both subjective and objective concepts can reference physical objects (or physical subjects). The difference is that subjective concepts include or rely on the viewpoint of a subject (=an observer that experiences external objects through their senses), whereas an objective concept references the external object itself (and/or its properties and relationships to other objects, etc.).

But HOW could a so-called 'objective concept' NOT include NOR rely on the 'viewpoint' of a 'subject', that is; of a human being?

For example we ALL could be referencing 'morality', itself, but is 'morality' EVER a so-called 'external object'?

If no, then there could NEVER exist an 'objective concept', which in turn would also mean there is NO 'objective morality', NOR 'Morality' here, correct?

If no, then WHY NOT?

Now, an objective concept is not required to be accurate. If I say that a basket contains 12 apples, but in actuality it contains only 11, then the concept of a basket with 12 apples still remains objective -- it's just not very accurate.

So, what is this 'concept' 'objective' in relation TO, EXACTLY?

I could even say that the basket contains a toaster rather than 11 apples -- this concept would be inaccurate to such an extent that it can be considered false, but it's still objective ("objectively false"), because it does not include a subjective point of view.

If, in 'your' viewpoint and concept, some basket contains a toaster, but in ACTUALITY that basket contains eleven apples, then HOW, EXACTLY, is that 'concept' and 'viewpoint of 'yours' NOT a 'subjective point of view'?

An objective concept can also be invalid. For example, if I were to say that a basket fully covers an object larger than its storage capacity, we would know that this contradicts the concept of containment. As such, this concept would be invalid, but still objective ("objectively invalid").

So in order to be accurate, a concept must map well to an external object.

What do you mean by 'well' here?

The word 'well' does NOT necessarily mean being with 100% accuracy, or even close to 100% accuracy if the truth be known.

If it maps well to the concept of an object, we can consider it true (i.e. "it's true that a basket can contain apples"). If it maps well to a particular instance of an object, we can consider it factual (i.e. "it's factually correct that this particular basket contains 11 apples").

BUT from WHO'S 'point of view'?

By the way, this leads on to DISCOVERING and FINDING OUT HOW 'objectivity' is ACTUALLY OBTAINED. But anyway, we await your answers here.

Importantly, the same terminology can be applied to subjective concepts: a subjective concept can be accurate or inaccurate, valid or invalid, factually correct or incorrect, and true or false. Subjective facts make perfect sense. For example, "this particular apple is sweet" can be a factually correct and accurate subjective statement.

AGAIN, it will ALWAYS come back to, From WHO'S 'point of view'?

But I am liking WHERE this is heading, so far.

If there was actually a very sweet apple in front of you, you might be even tempted to say that this apple is objectively sweet

Well, to me anyway, this would be a VERY STUPID and ABSURD 'thing' to SAY, CLAIM, or STATE.

-- this, however, would be incorrect, as sweetness is not a property of the apple itself, but a sensation which a subject tasting the apple can experience.

Based on this misunderstanding, there is a lot of unnecessary debate about whether something like beauty can be objective; the answer is of course no, as beauty is an interpretation or evaluation of things that simply "are".

And, the 'volume of a container' is ALSO just an interpretation or evaluation of things that simply 'are'.

Also, to me, 'beauty' can be 'objective' as well. But 'you' and 'I' have DIFFERENT VERSIONS of what 'objectivity' or 'objectiveness' actually entails and are ARRIVED AT and/or KNOWN.

As such, there can be subjective truths about aesthetics, but never objective ones.

Is this an 'objective truth' or 'objective fact', or does this ALSO come from 'your' 'point of view' here?

If it is the former, then WHERE, EXACTLY, is the 'external object itself' here, (and/or its properties and relationships to other objects), which is what you SAY and CLAIM makes up 'objective truth' or 'objective facts'?

And this in turn leads many to conclude that Ethics must also be subjective.

But why should we be concerned whether Morality is objective or subjective in the first place? Well, due to its nature, a subjective concept is always dependent upon the viewpoint of one particular subject.

And, what you call 'an objective concept' was DEPENDENT UPON your OWN viewpoint of that particular subject.

you think that terms objectivity and subjectivity are frequently misunderstood, which leads to many strange notions of what should constitute objective Morality. This would obviously be your OWN personal point of viewpoint or subjective concept, right?

Inter-subjectivity is a useful concept, but it's merely an aggregate or averaging of multiple individual subjective viewpoints. So for example, a statement such as "I like eating apples" can be subjectively true, and a statement like "humans like eating apples" can be argued to be inter-subjectively at least somewhat accurate. But a statement such as "eating apples is liked" is nonsensical, because a subjective concept without reference to a subject is unintelligible.

In the context of aesthetics, this works just fine: we can think in terms of personal taste and similarities in personal tastes.

But when it comes to Morality, this no longer seems sufficient; after all, the entire point of Morality is to determine what's morally true or false independently from our own subjective opinions.

Since WHEN has the ' ENTIRE POINT OF 'Morality' ' been to determine what is morally true or false INDEPENDENT from human beings' opinions?

From my perspective;

1. There is NO 'thing' that is morally true NOR false. There are, however, behaviors that ARE morally Right or Wrong.

2. HOW, EXACTLY, can ANY of these sort of subjects be DISCUSSED and LOOKED AT IF people's opinions are EXCLUDED?

This means that the subjective viewpoint has to be removed.

Does your 'subjective viewpoint', 'the terms objectivity and subjectivity are frequently misunderstood' HAVE TO BE removed also. Or, can we remove this 'subjective viewpoint' of yours?

Or, is 'it' in fact a True 'objective concept', which you are actually proving True here.

Could your OWN personal views of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' also being misunderstood? Or, is this an IMPOSSIBILITY from your OWN personal perspective or point of view?

For example, if we take a prescriptive statement such as "you should eat apples" and remove the subjective perspective, you're left with "apples should be eaten". Well, by whom?

So, HOW, EXACTLY, was the 'subjective perspective' removed there?

I can NOT see ANY 'subjective perspective' removed from that second quote. What I observe is just a DIFFERENT 'subjective perspective'.

I'm sure plenty of animals can't eat apples. So what we actually mean is "humans should eat apples". But this is now simply a generalized subjective statement and not objective, at all. Hume's dichotomy prevails, we can't get an ought from an is.

But the 'subjective perspective' was NEVER 'removed' AT ALL, from the outset when you said and wrote, 'and remove the subjective perspective'.

Just maybe your OWN person subjective perspective and viewpoint of 'subjective perspective' is being MISUNDERSTOOD here, AS WELL. After all 'those terms' are 'frequently being misunderstood', right?

So with that out of the way, let me now present an approach that seemingly solves this issue.

Are you SURE you have got 'that' 'out of the way', YET?

And, by the way, what is 'that', EXACTLY, which you think or BELIEVE is 'out of the way' now?

The way it works is through a particular method of deriving "rights" and "duties".

Was does the 'it' word here refer to, EXACTLY?

Now, the classic approach to rights and duties is fairly straightforward: for example, an employer and an employee can sign a work contract. On the basis of this agreement, the employer has a duty to pay the employee and the employee has a duty to perform a certain work. Conversely, the employee has a right to be paid for performing the required work and the employer has a right to the employees time, effort and expertise as per the agreement. We can furthermore conclude that the employer has no right to the employees time, effort and expertise if they do not pay them and the employee has no right to get paid if they don't do their job. Or: if the employer does not pay the employee, the latter has no longer a duty to do the work, and if the employee fails to do the work the employer has no longer a duty to pay them.

The logic of rights and duties is sound and objective

But VERY, VERY subjective.

-- we don't need to view it from the viewpoint of a subject to make sense of it. It checks out.

However, it only works based on agreement. So I can only be expected to have a duty to do X if I have agreed to do X, and due to me doing X I can then claim a right to Y.

This is not sufficient for objective Morality, because if it was possible for all of us to agree on everything, we would have no need for Morality in the first place.

your so-called 'logic' here seems VERY CONFUSED.

WHO, in the beginning, thinks or expects ALL of us to agree on EVERY thing?

If you have NOT ALREADY explained what 'objective Morality' even means or refers to, to you, EXACTLY, then will you explain 'it' now?

And, HOW, EXACTLY, does 'that' definition of 'objective Morality' fit in with your CLAIM that if ALL of us AGREED on EVERY 'thing', then we would have NO need AT ALL for 'Morality' in the first place?

Also, if you did NOT explain the difference, if any, between 'Morality' and 'objective Morality' above, then will you now?

However, it seems to me that it is legitimately possible to derive rights without any agreement or subjective concerns. First, let's remember that rights are claims to what others can, should or must do (or can't, shouldn't or mustn't do).

How does this relate to say, the 'right to life', for example?

What can, should, or must 'one' and "others" do, and, what can, should, or must 'one' or "others" NOT do, to you, in relation to 'the right to life'?

This is necessarily true because agreements can only be made between subjects. As such, I can't claim to have a valid right to not get sick, as this claim can't be made against another subject.

But what has 'getting sick' got to do with 'Morality', 'objective morality' and/or 'subjective morality' to begin with?

I can however validly claim to have a right that others have to distance themselves from me such that they can't infect me.

AGAIN, WHO is this a 'valid claim' to, EXACTLY?

you MAY NEED to 'get sick', in the beginning, in order to NOT 'get MORE sick' later on. So, getting 'infected', in the beginning, might make you stronger and also 'save your life', later on. And, this is NOT taking into ALL of the other variables and scenarios here.

If you were to distance yourself from me, we would be able to objectively ascertain that you are therefore respecting my claimed right. By doing so, you would in turn receive the right for me to stay distanced from you -- this is necessarily (implicitly) true, even if you don't claim to have that right. In fact, neither of us has to claim to have any particular rights -- simply the act of us keeping distance from one another implies that we respect each others (implied) rights to social distancing.

Now, a right of course doesn't necessarily have to be respected. But if you don't respect my right, I therefore don't have a duty to respect yours.

Is this your 'subjective perspective and viewpoint'?

And, where, EXACTLY, is the 'external object itself' here?

This means that even though the choice of whether to respect someone else's right is subjective, the logic of rights and duties itself remains true.

According to WHO, EXACTLY?

The 'logic' of 'rights' and 'what is right', to some, is if someone does NOT respect one's, so-called, 'rights', then then that 'one' still does have to respect the 'rights' of "others".

This, it seems to me, is sufficient for objective Morality, because the logic works even if we remove the subjective viewpoints.

To me, it seems like you will say just about absolutely ANY thing when 'trying to' back up and support your ALREADY held onto BELIEFS here.

So the way a moral right can be derived in subject A is by (objectively) determining whether a claimed right has been respected by subject A in regards to other subjects.

For example, if I respect other people's property, I can make a valid claim to have my property respected.

So, 'this' is ALL based on your OWN subjective views here. That is; if your OWN personal subjective perspective is of respecting other people's property, then you have some 'internal logic', which tells you that EVERY one else MUST respect your property ALSO.

Consequently, if someone were to not respect my property, I would no longer have a duty to respect theirs.

Talk about 'subjectivity' in its highest form.

In moral terms we can therefore say that it's immoral to steal from those who themselves do not steal.

Well considering EVERY adult 'steals', then, according to your "logic" here, it is 'moral' to steal from adults.

But I TOTALLY AGREE that it is VERY, VERY Wrong, BAD, and IMMORAL to steal from children.

But it's not immoral to steal from those who do. But not only that -- we can also determine exactly what it means for theft to be immoral: it means that by stealing, you make it permissible for others to steal from you. Furthermore, this also tells us what the appropriate punishment for theft is: to deny respect of the culprits property rights. Even more than that; we can also conclude what the proper road to retribution is: for the offender to convincingly demonstrate that they will respect the property rights of others going forward, i.e. by giving back what they have stolen, paying a fee, doing community service... whatever it takes to reclaim their lost right to property.

This also allows us to deduce that i.e. cutting the hand off from a thief is not an appropriate punishment, as this punishment can't be logically derived from the offense. Such a punishment would imply that you have a right to arbitrarily decide punishments. Therefore, others can legitimately claim to have a right to punish you for any arbitrary reason -- this is what it means for inappropriate punishment to be immoral.

This is ALL VERY arbitrary and VERY subjective.

As you can see, this approach is surprisingly powerful,

I do NOT see this AT ALL here.

because unlike other approaches, it doesn't simply say X is immoral and that's it -- well, what exactly is immoral?

Considering that you started this thread we are WAITING for 'you' to TELL and INFORM 'us'.

Also, is stealing from those who do NOT steal 'immoral', to you?

The categorical imperative for example claims that propositions which aren't universalizable or don't view others as an end-in-themselves are essentially immoral. But this is merely an appeal to values, i.e. you should value actions that are universalizable and those that treat others as an end-in-themselves. As such, it's just a subjective evaluation, not an objective methodology. Utilitarianism also has no say on what it means for something to be immoral. What if a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian disagree on a moral problem? What if two utilitarians disagree? What is the appropriate response? These questions can't be answered in the context of utilitarianism because it only works if you subscribe to a particular version of it. In other words, it can only be applied subjectively (or inter-subjectively).

The approach I described above on the other hand works in spite of disagreement. It's applicable no matter what you personally think of it; hence, it's objective.

you are joking here, right?

I could go on and demonstrate how it can be applied to moral dilemmas, etc. but I feel this introduction is already long enough as it is. Hopefully I was able to get the main idea across.

[bahman]

Now, my proposed approach to objective Morality is based on the idea that moral rights can be objectively derived by the extent to which they are respected. So if I respect other people's property rights, I can legitimately claim to have my property rights respected, as well. I realize that this sounds a bit simplistic and possibly even naive, that's why I myself was surprised to find that it actually seems to work out when put to the test.

It works mainly due to the logic of rights & duties at its core, which states that if you deny someone's legitimate right to X, you therefore lose that same right to X, as a right is earned by respecting it and lost by not respecting it.

Thus, we now *know* what exactly it means for something to be immoral. This is significant, because traditional moral systems equate immorality with a prescriptive commandment: "you ought not to do X" -- this simply tells us that you should not do X, but not the reason why or in what sense it's "wrong" exactly. In my proposed approach, we are informed precisely of why something is immoral and what it entails.

Why should I respect people's right on their properties when I have no property?

[iambiguous]

Okay, start with the Big One:

"In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court decided that the right to privacy implied in the 14th Amendment protected abortion as a fundamental right. However, the government retained the power to regulate or restrict abortion access depending on the stage of pregnancy."

No need to be "hypothetical" at all in regard to abortion.

Sure thing. First, let's talk about the US constitution. We have to admit that there is a dilemma between constitutional originalism vs revisionism. The idea that the founding documents are "perfect as intended" and therefore can provide us with the correct answers if only we properly understand the original reasoning behind it is really quite silly. The authors of the founding documents -- even though many of them were quite adept in philosophy -- were primarily politicians. For this reason, the founding documents do not provide us with a philosophical framework based on which rights can be derived. Rather, they have collected sets of various best practices that were attractive to fans of the enlightenment.

Fine, either interpretation. What doesn't change however is that women agonized over unwanted pregnancies back then just as they still do today. What doesn't change is that the legislatures and the courts pass and rule on laws that either focus in on the rights of the unborn or the rights of the pregnant women.

As you note...

Although most of these ideas were and still are quite reasonable, the world keeps changing and progressing. It is therefore not reasonable to believe that we'll always be able to find an answer for everything somewhere in the constitution or the bill of rights, if only we look hard enough. Many things that we have to deal with today didn't even exist back then. Plus, it was just people who wrote those documents, not omniscient gods.

Here, I basically agree. Thus...

But here's the problem: if we want to update and revise these documents, how can we do this "correctly"? There are various interest groups and all would like to change the constitution to align with their own interests. But most of these interests are mutually exclusive, so it's not possible to make everyone happy at the same time. That's the problem of constitutional revisionism.

Both positions are untenable, which is why this is a serious conundrum.

In regard to making abortion entirely legal or entirely illegal, I agree. That's precisely why Roe v. Wade encompassed the "moderation, negotiation and compromise" approach to government. Each side gets something but neither side gets everything. That's the whole point of "democracy and the rule of law" rather than "might makes right" or "right makes might".

In fact, "moderation, negotiation and compromise" presumes that there is no objective Morality. After all, if there was, why wouldn't that be the standard by which legislatures passed laws on abortion and courts rules on them?

To resolve it, we need to devise a method which allows us to derive rights on the basis of an indisputable principle. I believe that there is only one such possible candidate:

"As individuals, as a society and as civilized human beings, we must respect the legitimate rights of all people."

But then back to those who insist the unborn are human beings just like all the rest of. Respect their "legitimate rights" and not the "illegitimate rights" of the pregnant women. And then the other way around.

Thus...

I would argue that this principle is incontestable. But it does have one big problem: who's to judge which right is legitimate and which isn't? That's the question.

That's certainly my question. Only I'm "fractured and fragmented" here and the objectivists clobber me because, well, what if I convince them that in a No God world, it's reasonable that they should be as well?

Can it be God? Sure -- if he or she came down here and actually talked to us. But since that's not particularly likely, the best we can do in that regard is rely on some holy text. But which one? Even if we agree on a single book, here's the next problem: none of them say anything about rights. Not even Jesus Christ noticed anything fundamentally wrong with slavery. So the idea that there are god-given rights can't possibly be derived on the basis of scripture without some heavy interpretation.

Note to Immanuel Can:

Pay attention!

If holy books can't help us, what else can? Should we vote on it? Well, why should something be "right" just because a majority agrees on it? Isn't that just tyranny of the majority?

I certainly think so. Here and now. But I am no less "fractured and fragmented" in regard to this as well.

No matter how you think about it, there is nothing "out there" which can be used as a basis to determine the legitimacy of a right, and there is a very good reason for this: it's because a claim to a right is subjective, meaning it exists only relative to the person making the claim.

I agree. So, how then, in regard to abortion, do we connect the dots here to objective Morality?

This understanding provides us with the solution: the only possible standard by which the legitimacy of a right can be determined is by reference to the subject making the claim.

Therefore, the only possible way in which one can make a legitimate claim to a right is by actually respecting said right.

Okay, but, in my view, subjective claims are rooted existentially in dasein: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And, in regard to abortion, I note my own existential trajectory in the OP here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=194382

And I suggest further that in regard to the moral objectivists among us the "psychology of objectivism" often prevails. As explored in the OP here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 5&t=185296

This insight provides us with an objective and incontestable standard by which to judge whether a right is valid or not. And on this basis, it's now possible to re-evaluate the founding documents and clarify them, without needing to know the intentions of their authors, at all.

For you, obviously. But certainly not for me and for others. Except given the manner in which you encompass this "objective and incontestable standard" up in the clouds "theoretically".

So with that in mind, how can we apply this to the question of abortion?

Well, the first thing to understand is that rights are inextricably connected to duties. If you want to legitimately claim to have a particular right, you have a duty to respect that right, as otherwise the legitimacy of your claim will be put into question.

Another important thing to realize regarding the question of abortion is that a fetus can't claim a right, so others must make the claim on its behalf. But those who do must also earn this right in order to make a legitimate claim.

This should make it apparent that it's not possible to just outright ban or legalize abortion -- ergo, the correct answer is not binary. Rather, it depends on various relevant factors.

First, it's important to understand the nature of what we're dealing with; an abortion is a medical procedure. Medical procedures are essentially tools which can be used for various purposes, but they're never "good" or "bad" in themselves. A chemo therapy is harmful to a healthy person, but to the right patient at the right time it can be life-saving. The question is therefore what conditions must be met for an abortion to be considered permissible.

As I have explained before, a right to an abortion can be legitimized by medical concerns.

If medical considerations don't come into play but a pregnancy is unwanted for some reason, the question becomes who makes a claim on behalf of the not-yet-born baby and how they legitimize it. For example, if an abortion is considered due to financial problems, the pro-lifers have a duty to provide the mother with the necessary finances, such that an abortion becomes no longer necessary, in order for the claim to become legitimate. If an abortion is considered due to a birth defect, there must be someone willing to adopt the child, in order for the claim to become legitimate. And so on and so forth. The point is that a right can only ever be legitimately claimed if it's earned appropriately.

Again, you have these claims and rights and duties all worked out in your head. Only it has almost nothing at all to do with the real world. For the pro-life folks every woman has the duty not to get pregnant in the first place unless she wants to be a mother. For the pro-choice folks every man has the duty to sustain a world where true equality exists between men and women. The actual contexts in which unwanted pregnancies occur can be bursting at the seams with all manner of ambiguities and uncertainties. Only "up in the clouds" theoretically can claims and rights and duties be all fitted together seamlessly in the ideal world.

Whose "relevant factors" here? Yours? Mine? the pregnant woman's" the unborn baby's? This legislature? that court?

So, just how far up into the theoretical clouds can you go:

Therefore, a sensible abortion law might be formulated as follows:

The necessity for an abortion is primarily a medical question, and as such must be answered by the assigned doctor. If an abortion is not medically necessary, but desired for other reasons, an assessment must be done to determine if a resolution to eliminate the desire for the abortion is possible. If it is, then an opportunity must be given to those who have an interest in the pregnancy being carried to term to provide the necessary resolution. If the resolution is not provided, the right to the abortion can't be contested. If the resolution is fully provided, the pregnancy must be carried to term. This is realized on the basis of a contract between both parties, wherein the penalties for not honoring the corresponding obligations are detailed.

The next time that a woman you know and love becomes pregnant and doesn't want to be [for any one of dozens of personal reasons] run that by her.

This part:

But eventually I will ask you to bring the applications of objective Morality around to those actual flesh and blood women confronting the existential reality of an unwanted pregnancy.

The part that revolves around this:

Again and again: the pro-life folks insist that the problem "down here" is that the pro-choice folks have no intention of being honest because in being honest about abortion they would embrace the "natural right" of the unborn to exist beyond the womb. And then the "pro-choice" folks insist that, on the contrary, the pro-life folks have no intention of being honest because in being honest about abortion they would embrace a woman's "political right" to choose abortion in order to secure equality with men in a world where biologically only women can become pregnant.

In other words, those who tell us...

"Objective Morality? That's easy. It revolves around the 'natural right' of the unborn to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'".

And those who tell us:

"Objective Morality? That's easy. It revolves around the 'political right' of women to pursue equality with men in a world where biologically only women can get pregnant".

Unfortunately I don't know what else I could add pertaining to this that I haven't already explained previously. As I said, it's not possible to derive rights from some external source. Objective natural rights are not a valid concept, neither are objective political rights. They're only valid to the degree that the people involved agree to them.

If there is no agreement, they are invalid (which means they're subjective). The only way to solve this (afaik) is via the method I described above, i.e. by reference to the subjective claim to a right, whose validity can objectively be ascertained on the basis of the demonstrated respect of the claimant relative to that right.

Exactly. The part I root existentially in dasein, the part you root in your "argument" above. Only there you are outside the abortion clinic, in the Congress or before the Supreme Court attempting to convince the fiercely conflicted parties that if they truly do grasp your theoretical assumptions about claims and rights and duties, it really is posible to come up with the optimal [if not the only] rational laws.

[Alexander_Reiswich]

You keep using the word "rights" but all you actually are referring to is explicitly stated contracts. So what you are wildly overestimating is just a social contract theory that requires reciprocal fair value.

Sure, I think that's a fair description. I don't usually use the term "contract" because I find it more difficult to reason about (in this context), but I'm not stuck on one particular terminology.

Another way to formulate it is with "standards". A standard is subjective, so it's always true relative to the particular subject that holds it. My argument is that by knowing which "standard" another person has, we can know which standard we should use to conform to theirs (or not -- this choice is entirely subjective).

I don't believe this observation is particularly controversial, but my point is that it naturally leads to certain conclusions, which form a logical framework. For example:

- if I respect someone else's standard by holding myself to the same standard, then that standard is being respected within our relationship

- if I don't respect someone else's standard by not holding myself to the same standard, then my counterpart has no longer a reason to respect their standard relative to me. Rather, they only have to respect my standard relative to me

- if I don't respect someone else's standard but wish that they respect their standard relative to me, then I have an incentive to prove that I respect their standard

- etc.

This logic helps us to understand how an environment in which everyone's standards are being respected can be realized. Of course, this particular ideal is purely subjective. But I don't think there is any reason not to respect other people's rights or standards, unless we literally have bad intentions...

You can't even allow for implicit anything because to include such would make it clear that the evaluations involved in simple observation are value laden, but that leaves your theory to say almost nothing at all.

Are you saying that the process of determining other people's values is too "subjective"? As I explained before, this is only a problem in application, not in theory. When considering it hypothetically, we can "know" other people's values / standards. In practice it's certainly much more difficult, but I don't think it's impossible or hopeless. After all, that's how the court system currently works.

But maybe I misunderstand your point?

You are hoping not to have to deal with how you determine in a non evaluative manner what makes these contract negotiations fair and equal.

Well, whenever you think there's something I'm hoping not to deal with please don't hesitate to bring it up

Regarding this particular problem, please understand I'm not claiming that evaluation isn't involved; I'm saying that values are variables, but the "function" through which they're processed is constant (objective). For example, let's say Bob and Doug ordered a pizza. Bob slices it into 4 parts and gives one slice to Doug, and takes the rest. Doug is offended: "Why aren't you sharing the slices equally among the two of us?" -- Bob: "Because I weigh 150kg and you weigh only 50kg. So mathematically it's only fair that I take three parts, and you take one."

At this point, Doug might say: "Yeah, but I'm skinny, so I should eat more, while you're fat, so you should eat less."

So who's right? When it comes to the framework I'm proposing, it doesn't matter at all. Like I said, these values are just variables, so their content is irrelevant. What matters is whether the subjects involved accept that their right / standard / end of the contract is being respected or not.

So for example, if Doug says: "You're right, I don't want to end up a fatso like you, bro!! Thanks for looking out for me!", then Doug's right was respected.

If Doug says: "No way, I'm hungry, you have to give me at least two slices!" -- then Bob will only be able to respect Doug's "right" by giving him two slices. If he doesn't then Doug will not be "obligated" to respect Bob's claim to some other "right" next time.

In other words, each subject must interpret whether someone else is honoring their claim to a right or not. This is simply a matter of intersubjective communication.

But in your example, if the neighbour asks permission to murder your cat with a bucket of acid and he has honoured more than one of your previous requests to stop throwing bricks at your children then his cat killing request represents a fair and equal contract. Or a "claimed right" in your mystifying jargon.

It's perfectly possible that my neighbor is crazy and in their mind, it constitutes a great favor to stop throwing bricks at my children, which would justify their claim (in their mind) to the right to kill my cat with a bucket of acid.

None of this has any bearing on the logic of the framework I'm proposing, which still works perfectly fine:

If my neighbor acts in ways that endanger the well-being of me and my family, and I believe that me and my family have a right to not have our well-being endangered, then I have a duty to stop my neighbor from acting in those ways. Furthermore, anyone who agrees that people who don't endanger the well-being of others have a legitimate claim to have this right respected, have a duty to contain those who do cause danger to other peoples health. Based on this logic I would therefore be justified in asking the police to detain my neighbor, and the police would have a duty to comply with my request, so long as there is sufficient evidence for my claim.

So yes, it doesn't matter what values (input) you provide, the logic always works.

But I do get the sense that you might be thinking I'm claiming more than I actually do...

[Alexander_Reiswich]

Nailed it nicely. Thanks. And I think an earlier line gives it away:

'...the respect of legitimately claimed rights is the entire point of Morality.'

I already said multiple times that it's a subjective choice whether we want to respect other people's rights or not... so not sure what exactly this should "give away"

So, simple question: What do you think -- should we respect other people's legitimate rights? Or not?

The only contentious part about this question, it seems to me, is what a "legitimate" right is (which is the purpose of my proposed framework), but I would be quite surprised if you or any sane, decent human being disagreed with this proposition in general. And I would argue that we don't really have to respect the opinions of insane and indecent people.

[Impenitent]

Nailed it nicely. Thanks. And I think an earlier line gives it away:

'...the respect of legitimately claimed rights is the entire point of Morality.'

I already said multiple times that it's a subjective choice whether we want to respect other people's rights or not... so not sure what exactly this should "give away"

So, simple question: What do you think -- should we respect other people's legitimate rights? Or not?

The only contentious part about this question, it seems to me, is what a "legitimate" right is (which is the purpose of my proposed framework), but I would be quite surprised if you or any sane, decent human being disagreed with this proposition in general. And I would argue that we don't really have to respect the opinions of insane and indecent people.

discard the "insane and indecent"?

-Imp

[FlashDangerpants]

I get it, kind of. You seem to think you have decanted out the bathtub of moarilty to get a teaspoon of pure reason on the one side and a bathtub (minus one teaspoon) of preference for the rest.

There certainly seems to be a Kripkenstein problem... The rule for interpreting the rule is absent, as can be observed by comparing the solutions you offer for the cat drowning nutter against the pizza stealing fatty. The disparity is clearly th result of special pleading. There's no real need to get into the weeds with those, the point really is that you create the problem here:

You can't even allow for implicit anything because to include such would make it clear that the evaluations involved in simple observation are value laden, but that leaves your theory to say almost nothing at all.

Are you saying that the process of determining other people's values is too "subjective"? As I explained before, this is only a problem in application, not in theory. When considering it hypothetically, we can "know" other people's values / standards. In practice it's certainly much more difficult, but I don't think it's impossible or hopeless. After all, that's how the court system currently works.

You have no wriggle room. The best way out for you is to just admit that your theory does actually say almost nothing at all, after which I might not bother trying to take the 'almost' away from you.

Even in theory, you were not able to address the crazy neighbour situation without changing the rules for a special event, this was because the example didn't give you a rational agent whose motives you could rationally interpret into one of your little contracts so instead you imagined millions of other people and initiated the contract with them instead. The pizza thing gave an example of using any old rationale to no particular purpose and to do nothing. And this is all using the colloquial edition of "rational", we're not even looking at the outocme of strictly reasoned arguments here.

And that's the fundamental issue your theory could never even in theory escape. There is no wrong way to interpret the rules, there is no right way to interpret the rules, so the whole thing is just a fancy framework of unsupported terminology that you can point to at random while saying things that feel like common sense to you.

But I do get the sense that you might be thinking I'm claiming more than I actually do...

When I look at the title of this discussion, unless we remove the words Coherent, Objective, and Morality, I think you must have thought you would be claiming more than you actually do.

[Alexander_Reiswich]

@Age -- thank you for the very detailed response! It would get very messy if I were to try and respond to every single point you raised, so I will try to focus on the "re-occurring themes". I think a lot of problems can be resolved by clarifying certain definitions. But first things first:

But I will await your answer as your response might show another reason why you use a capital 'M'

As I have answered elsewhere before, this is just a personal habit, so please feel free to ignore it

---

I would like to begin with the terms "objective" and "subjective". I realized in the meantime from other discussions that these terms may be hopelessly preloaded with cognitive ballast, such that it might be better to use alternative, more specific terms. The distinction which I would like to draw is between concepts which reference our perception / awareness of things, and those that reference just the *things*.

As I explained in the OP, the concept of "sweetness" references a particular type of taste sensation within our consciousness. "Sweetness" therefore doesn't exist within food, but rather within the cognition of the living being consuming the food. The concept of "sugar" on the other hand refers to a particular chemical compound within food, which triggers the sensation of "sweetness" within living beings upon consumption.

The concept of "sugar" can therefore be said to reference a "thing" that we can experience through our perception, but not the perception / experience itself.

The concept of "sweetness" on the other hand can be said to reference the perception / experience of sweetness, not some actual, physical "thing" outside of it.

Does this distinction make any sense to you? If not -- can you think of a way such that it can be "corrected" to make sense? If yes -- what adjectives would best describe these two concepts? "objective" and "subjective" are fitting terms, imho, but contain so many connotations that they become practically useless. Maybe "cognitive" vs. "phenomenological"?

It would be great if we could clarify this point before we proceed. But I would like to briefly cover your question regarding "how objective concepts can not include subjective viewpoints".

Again, I think the terms "objective" and "subjective" are probably more confusing rather than helpful here. What I differentiate between are propositions which are evaluative and those that are descriptive.

Here are some examples of evaluative statements:

- dogs are the best pets
- the sound of rain is soothing
- boxing is a violent combat sport

All of these statements include some kind of personal evaluation. They don't merely describe properties of things, but rather their value relative to the person making the statement. As such, if we change the viewpoint, we can arrive at the opposite statements, even though we're referring to the same things:

- dogs are the worst pets
- the sound of rain is anxiety-inducing
- boxing is a civilized combat sport

And here are some examples of descriptive statements:

- dogs are quadrupedal
- rain is emitted from clouds
- modern boxers utilize boxing gloves and mouth guards

But -- descriptiveness does not automatically equal accuracy. For example, the statement "dogs are bipedal" is still a descriptive statement, but it describes something that can't be generally observed in the natural world.

I would argue therefore, that accuracy and descriptiveness are two separate properties. Just because something is not accurate does not make it evaluative. In other words, there is no spectrum between descriptiveness and evaluative-ness; they're entirely different categories.

With this in mind, it should not be too hard to see how a concept or proposition can be purely descriptive, without evaluative properties.

Do you think that's a fair assessment?

[Age]

@Age -- thank you for the very detailed response! It would get very messy if I were to try and respond to every single point you raised, so I will try to focus on the "re-occurring themes". I think a lot of problems can be resolved by clarifying certain definitions. But first things first:

But I will await your answer as your response might show another reason why you use a capital 'M'

As I have answered elsewhere before, this is just a personal habit, so please feel free to ignore it

---

I would like to begin with the terms "objective" and "subjective". I realized in the meantime from other discussions that these terms may be hopelessly preloaded with cognitive ballast, such that it might be better to use alternative, more specific terms. The distinction which I would like to draw is between concepts which reference our perception / awareness of things, and those that reference just the *things*.

As I explained in the OP, the concept of "sweetness" references a particular type of taste sensation within our consciousness. "Sweetness" therefore doesn't exist within food, but rather within the cognition of the living being consuming the food. The concept of "sugar" on the other hand refers to a particular chemical compound within food, which triggers the sensation of "sweetness" within living beings upon consumption.

The concept of "sugar" can therefore be said to reference a "thing" that we can experience through our perception, but not the perception / experience itself.

The concept of "sweetness" on the other hand can be said to reference the perception / experience of sweetness, not some actual, physical "thing" outside of it.

Does this distinction make any sense to you? If not -- can you think of a way such that it can be "corrected" to make sense? If yes -- what adjectives would best describe these two concepts? "objective" and "subjective" are fitting terms, imho, but contain so many connotations that they become practically useless. Maybe "cognitive" vs. "phenomenological"?

It would be great if we could clarify this point before we proceed. But I would like to briefly cover your question regarding "how objective concepts can not include subjective viewpoints".

Again, I think the terms "objective" and "subjective" are probably more confusing rather than helpful here. What I differentiate between are propositions which are evaluative and those that are descriptive.

Here are some examples of evaluative statements:

- dogs are the best pets
- the sound of rain is soothing
- boxing is a violent combat sport

All of these statements include some kind of personal evaluation. They don't merely describe properties of things, but rather their value relative to the person making the statement. As such, if we change the viewpoint, we can arrive at the opposite statements, even though we're referring to the same things:

- dogs are the worst pets
- the sound of rain is anxiety-inducing
- boxing is a civilized combat sport

And here are some examples of descriptive statements:

- dogs are quadrupedal
- rain is emitted from clouds
- modern boxers utilize boxing gloves and mouth guards

But -- descriptiveness does not automatically equal accuracy. For example, the statement "dogs are bipedal" is still a descriptive statement, but it describes something that can't be generally observed in the natural world.

I would argue therefore, that accuracy and descriptiveness are two separate properties. Just because something is not accurate does not make it evaluative. In other words, there is no spectrum between descriptiveness and evaluative-ness; they're entirely different categories.

With this in mind, it should not be too hard to see how a concept or proposition can be purely descriptive, without evaluative properties.

Do you think that's a fair assessment?

you obviously have NOT understood or NOT wanted to take on what I have SAID and POINTED OUT and just want to re-repeat what you have previously SAID and STATED, which was ALREADY UNDERSTOOD.

I have asked you some questions, to CLARIFY, which, If you had answered properly, would lead to better descriptions of the different concepts that you are addressing here.

[Alexander_Reiswich]

Why should I respect people's right on their properties when I have no property?

Whether you should respect other people's (legitimate) rights is a subjective choice. But if you don't respect the rights of others, then others are not under the obligation to respect your rights.

In fact, people who respect the right to property for others have a duty to prevent those who do not from infringing upon other people's property rights, because if they don't, then they can't convincingly claim that they respect other people's property rights.

This is essentially a tautological observation, it's just a specific way of framing and reasoning about it.

[Alexander_Reiswich]

You have no wriggle room. The best way out for you is to just admit that your theory does actually say almost nothing at all, after which I might not bother trying to take the 'almost' away from you.

Even in theory, you were not able to address the crazy neighbour situation without changing the rules for a special event, this was because the example didn't give you a rational agent whose motives you could rationally interpret into one of your little contracts so instead you imagined millions of other people and initiated the contract with them instead. The pizza thing gave an example of using any old rationale to no particular purpose and to do nothing. And this is all using the colloquial edition of "rational", we're not even looking at the outocme of strictly reasoned arguments here.

And that's the fundamental issue your theory could never even in theory escape. There is no wrong way to interpret the rules, there is no right way to interpret the rules, so the whole thing is just a fancy framework of unsupported terminology that you can point to at random while saying things that feel like common sense to you.

"Almost nothing" is more than nothing, which is actually pretty damn good

The status quo is that we can literally say nothing about objective about morality, other than observations regarding people's opinions on it. So any improvement upon this, no matter how slight, is quite significant.

But I do understand where you're coming from, because what I'm proposing is really just a more explicit formulation of what we already know intuitively, which is this:

- there is no external standard by which the moral value of an action or behavior can be judged, only the internal standard of the person committing the action

- the (subjective) internal standards of individuals can be externally (objectively) ascertained to an imperfect, but workable degree

- treating people according to their own standards is by definition respectful, because it's their own standard

- the perception in other people's minds that one has a particular standard regarding some particular thing is developed on the basis of empirical evidence (objectively). Therefore, in order to credibly retain a certain "reputation" regarding one's standards, certain actions must be performed or avoided

- to be treated by one's own standards is a legitimate (subjective) expectation

- if anything, a society striving for justice and fairness (subjectively) ought to ensure that legitimately earned standards (or rights) are honored, and attempts to violate them are prevented, subdued and redressed

After considering it more, I think it might be unfair to minimize the subjective aspects, as they are as important as the objective ones, in their own ways.