A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm 1 I think your theory is incorrect, because you want to ground moral objectivity on the claiming and acknowledgement of rights, both of which are subjective - matters of choice. (And if we mean anything by the objective/subjective distinction, then this is a contradiction in your theory.)
This isn't quite correct -- I don't ground moral objectivity on rights per sé, but utilize the logic and the mechanics of the concept of rights and duties. The logic in itself is not subjective, as it's not a matter of choice. Rather, it simply describes causal relationships. In other words, it's like saying that three apples in a basket can be represented by the concept "number three". Is this concept subjective? I don't think so -- because it describes the relationships of real world entities in a specific way. You could call it something other than "three", but the concept would remain the same.

So if I say that "Bob has a legitimate moral right to his property", I'm simply describing reality, namely that Bob has respected the property rights of others and came about his property in a way that did not involve him violating the property rights of others. Which is to say, it has nothing to do with Bob's or anyone else's opinions on the matter. It's merely a statement of fact; a fact we can derive by normal means of investigation and observation. As such, if we were to discover that Bob did in fact steal his property from someone else, we would have to correct our description, in the same way we would have to apply the "number four" if we noticed upon closer inspection that there are four apples in the basket.

This aspect is distinct from the fact that people have the ability to make subjective choices. Within an objective moral analysis, choices are simply variables which can be replaced with whatever you like. This means that it doesn't rely on people making the "right" choice. They can choose whatever they want, from an objective point of view. There is no innate moral value to a choice, because in an objective context values don't exist. As such within the objective moral analysis, there is no good or bad. There are only (descriptions of) rights and duties and such.

Now, I get the sense there still might be some confusion regarding the term "moral". This is because this term has multiple meanings, and looking back, I can see how confusing this can be. Therefore, I would like to propose the following clarifications to distinguish them:

- in-context-of-morality: any term which has a particular definition outside of the context of Morality can be considered "moral" when we use it within the context of Morality. An example of this would be rights and duties. When I say "moral right" what I actually mean is "the concept of a right in-context-of-morality". So I don't mean "morally correct" right or something like that. In other words, it's a value-free description

- subjectively-prescriptive: any proposition which implies that it's generally preferable to do something can be considered "moral" in the sense of "subjectively-prescriptive". Again, this particular usage does not imply that it's morally right to do something in some kind of "cosmic" sense. Rather, it takes the personal circumstances of the subject into consideration. So for example, the proposition "you should exercise regularly" is subjectively-prescriptive. If your doctor tells you this, what they mean is that exercising is healthy for you, and since they assume you value being healthy, you should exercise regularly. Also known as a hypothetical imperative

- absolutely-prescriptive: if a proposition implies that a particular action or behavior is inherently preferable, regardless of any other factors, we can consider it absolutely-prescriptive. I myself do not think that this is a valid concept, as it implies that an action can have value independently from subjective considerations, which would violate the is-ought-barrier

- validly-descriptive: if a consideration in-context-of-morality is sound (free of contradictions), it can be considered "moral" in the sense that it's logically valid (while in the context of Morality). Importantly, these concepts are never prescriptive. So they only inform us whether a concept related to Morality makes internal sense. This is also what I mean by "objectively" moral

These are the four different ways in which I use the term "moral". I will try to distinguish them more clearly going forward.

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm I claim the right to coerce people, and acknowledge their right to coerce me; [...]
This is close, but the formulation is not optimal (fyi, I will tackle the conclusion separately).

First, the term "acknowledge" implies a value judgement, as acknowledgement is generally a conscious, deliberate choice. Maybe I was not completely clear, but subjective considerations are irrelevant to this process. The acceptance of other people's rights is not a personal choice to consciously accept other people's rights. Rather, it's simply an observation based on behavior. So if you don't steal from others, we can say that you accept other people's right to their property. It doesn't matter what you think subjectively.

Next, this formulation implies that there's an "AND" condition here: you must claim right X AND you must respect other peoples right to X.

This is not so: Respecting other peoples rights is what legitimizes your claim to that right. As such it is redundant to say "I claim the right to X, and I respect the right of others to X" -- it's the same thing. However, reversing it would make sense: "I respect the right of others to X, so on that basis I claim the right to X".

So the following formulation would be valid:

"I claim the right to coerce people, therefore others have the right to coerce me, even if I don't accept their right to coerce me"

As you can hopefully see, this is not equivalent to the golden rule. It could be considered an inversion of the golden rule: it's not about you treating others in the way you would like to be treated. Rather, it's about others being able to treat you on the basis of how you treat them (so it's also distinct from the silver rule).

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm [...] therefore, (it's a fact that) the coercion of people is morally right.
This conclusion is correct, but only on the basis of the subjectively-prescriptive definition for "morally right". It should become clearer if I rephrase it as such:

I claim the right to coerce people, therefore, (it's a fact that) coercing people is what I ought to do.

In other words, the conclusion is limited to you, as you are the one claiming to have a right to coerce people. Therefore, it's invariably true that for you, subjectively, this is what you ought to do.

Furthermore, it follows that it's right for others to coerce you. However, it does not follow that it's right for everyone to coerce everyone else. That would be silly.

In general, there are no absolutely-prescriptive propositions within my proposed approach, as that would constitute an is-ought-violation.

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm Now, since that argument is invalid, then so is the following.

I claim the right not to be coerced, and I acknowledge that others have the same right; therefore, (it's a fact that) the coercion of people is morally wrong.

The non-moral premises simply don't entail the moral conclusions. And substituting 'We' or 'All of us' for 'I' in the premise makes no difference. The argument remains invalid, because of the lack of entailment.
As explained before, this conclusion is a non sequitur.

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm 2 Your explanation begins in a state before morality, with the claiming of a right. So the right claimed has no moral significance - it isn't morally right (good) or wrong (bad). And yet you've stated that you use the word 'right' to mean 'moral right' - which is an equivocation. If the claiming of rights precedes and informs moral rights, those must be different things. Otherwise, your argument begs the question.
Hopefully I was able to clarify this above. When I refer to "moral rights", I mean "rights in-context-of-morality". So yes, within the objective analysis, rights are value-less and amoral. What's moral in the sense of "validly-descriptive" (or "objectively moral") is the analysis itself. For example, if you claim the right to coerce others, then it's "objectively moral" for me to conclude that I have a duty to prevent you from exercising your right since I respect the right to not be coerced, and also that I have a right to use coercion against you at my own discretion since you have forfeited your right to not be coerced by claiming your right to coerce.

In this analysis, we reached the correct conclusions on the basis of the rights & duties logic, we didn't mix-up objective and subjective contexts, and we avoided contradictions. As such, this analysis can be considered "objectively moral", in the sense of validly-descriptive.

It's also important to note that we can't extract any absolutely-prescriptive propositions from this, such as "you ought not coerce". This informs us that absolutely-prescriptive propositions are essentially nonsense, as they require an "ought" in the absence of a subject. Only objectively-descriptive propositions are coherent, i.e. "you have a right to not be coerced by following your duty to not coerce"
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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

iambiguous wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 8:16 pm You agreed to explore this distinction with me in regard to abortion.
From my point of view, this is exactly what I did. I provided you with examples for various circumstances and explained how they can be approached on the basis of a morally objective model. Not in perfect detail, not nearly comprehensive, and not even very accurate -- but it was a start.

Now, "objective" doesn't mean "personally satisfactory". It means "true and applicable whether you like it or not".

Therefore, if you want the ability to derive objective moral answers, you "ought" to understand the approach I'm proposing (assuming it is, in fact, coherent).

But you don't have to. If you don't, all that means is that you won't know of a method to derive objective moral answers. That is all.

But in that case, nothing of what I or anyone else can tell you about moral questions will matter, because you will always be thinking in terms of subjective values, which by definition are restricted to the person holding them. And how could one person possibly be more "right" about the values of another person? And how can one person possibly be wrong about their own values? None of this makes any sense.

"You ought to do X because I value X, even though you value Y!"

"No! You ought to do Y because I value Y, even though you value X!"

This isn't even moral subjectivism -- this is immoral subjectivism. As a moral nihilist, you are completely correct to conclude that both are wrong. And in this way, you have arrived at a conclusion derived by objective Morality: "a right which is not legitimately earned, by virtue of not being respected, can not be legitimately claimed, by virtue of not being respected"

To claim that another person has a duty to do what you want, even though you haven't followed your duty to do what they want, is therefore the essence of immorality.

Therefore, if you feel like arguing with some pro-life folks, ask them what exactly they did to earn having their "rights" respected? Do they promote access to birth control and sexual education? Do they provide financial and other kinds of support for mothers and families during pregnancy (and after birth)? Do they work hard towards making adoption a more viable option? Do they support social safety net programs or charities that work towards any of the aforementioned endeavors?

Because this is what you have a duty to do if you want to claim a right from others not to abort.

Objective Morality won't tell you whether abortion is right or wrong, or whether pro-life or pro-choice is correct. It informs you what needs to be done to reach a higher moral state. Or a lower one if you opt to be immoral -- the choice is entirely up to you.

iambiguous wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 8:16 pm Okay, the pro-life folks inform the pro-choice folks about their own "objective moral system" and then the pro-choice folks turn around and inform the pro-life folks about their own "objective moral system". Then what, they can both at least agree that there is an objective moral system? And that, for all practical purposes, "we're right from our side and you're right from yours"?
I'm not sure if anything of what I wrote above made sense to you, but if it did, hopefully you can see why a paragraph such as this would lead me to believe that you don't understand my position.

There is no such thing as "my objective moral system" -- if it refers to a subject, then it's subjective, by definition. An objective moral system, by definition, does not care about anyone's personal interests, because it's not subjective. What you're describing here is precisely how subjective moral systems are used -- or rather, abused.

Consistent subjective morality is peaceful, because it acknowledges that no one has the right to dictate what another person should value. Values are derived from each subject individually and only apply relative to that subject. It's only when you start to require of others to value what you value, that you leave subjective morality and enter subjective immorality.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 12:22 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm 1 I think your theory is incorrect, because you want to ground moral objectivity on the claiming and acknowledgement of rights, both of which are subjective - matters of choice. (And if we mean anything by the objective/subjective distinction, then this is a contradiction in your theory.)
This isn't quite correct -- I don't ground moral objectivity on rights per sé, but utilize the logic and the mechanics of the concept of rights and duties. The logic in itself is not subjective, as it's not a matter of choice. Rather, it simply describes causal relationships. In other words, it's like saying that three apples in a basket can be represented by the concept "number three". Is this concept subjective? I don't think so -- because it describes the relationships of real world entities in a specific way. You could call it something other than "three", but the concept would remain the same.
I feel the need to deal with your last post in stages.

So here are problems I see in the above quoted paragraph.

1 Logic deals with language, not the reality outside language. It deals with relationships between declaratives - what can be said consistently, without contradiction - 'speaking against'. So the expression 'the logic...of the concepts of rights and duties' is incoherent.

2 Concepts are misleading fictions with no explanatory value whatsoever. So talk of the 'logic and the mechanics' of concepts' is incoherent, as is a distinction between objective and subjective concepts. A description of the so-called concepts of rights and duties is nothing more than a description of the ways we do or could use the words 'right' and 'duty', their cognates, and related words, in context.

3 To use the word three to describe a number of things is not to describe a relationship, let alone a causal one. And that the word three or the figure 3 is, as it were, arbitrary - because any other word or figure could do the same job - is irrelevant. Some of us just use that word and figure to do that job. The belief that there is an abstract thing - a number or a concept - that the words and figures 'name' is an ancient dualist delusion.

4 Words and other signs can mean only what we use them to mean. And this applies to the words right, duty, moral rightness, moral wrongness, truth and fact. These words are not names of abstract things, such as so-called concepts - and explaining how we use them is not 'conceptual analysis'.

If you disagree with any of this, it'd be helpful to know, before we go further.
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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 3:03 pm 1 Logic deals with language, not the reality outside language. It deals with relationships between declaratives - what can be said consistently, without contradiction - 'speaking against'. So the expression 'the logic...of the concepts of rights and duties' is incoherent.
I think you're overthinking what I wrote here. The concept of rights and duties is just an idea, one that has existed for quite a long time and which is common to virtually all cultures. Although there are many variations and more complex forms, the basic idea is fairly clear, i.e. "if I have right X in relation to subject Y, then subject Y has a duty to satisfy my claim to right X". That's what I mean by the logic of the "concept of rights and duties". Does this clarify it? If you meant something else, please let me know.

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 3:03 pm 2 Concepts are misleading fictions with no explanatory value whatsoever. So talk of the 'logic and the mechanics' of concepts' is incoherent, as is a distinction between objective and subjective concepts. A description of the so-called concepts of rights and duties is nothing more than a description of the ways we do or could use the words 'right' and 'duty', their cognates, and related words, in context.
I use the word "concept" in a very generic way, i.e. an "idea" or "mental model". As far as I'm concerned, our entire thinking is based on concepts. We can't think of an "apple" -- we can only think of the concept of an apple, because that's how our brains work. If you're not an artist and you attempt to draw, say, an apple (because I'm feeling creative today) from memory, you'll quickly find that what you're drawing is quite different from an actually observed apple. That's because your mental models of things are only as sophisticated as necessary -- usually, not very much. In other words, our concepts of things are abstract. It takes a lot of observation and practice to notice the finer details, such as the subtle characteristics of the shape, structure and colors, how it reflects light, and how its shape changes completely depending on which viewpoint you're observing it from. To be able to freely draw a realistic apple from any perspective therefore requires a very complex "concept" of the appearance of an apple.

But regardless of whether it's simplistic or sophisticated, everything that we can conceive of is a concept. So every single word is a concept. Math is also a concept. Would you say the statement "the logic of mathematics" or "the logic of English grammar" is incoherent? If so, I don't understand your definition for the term "concept"...

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 3:03 pm 3 To use the word three to describe a number of things is not to describe a relationship, let alone a causal one. And that the word three or the figure 3 is, as it were, arbitrary - because any other word or figure could do the same job - is irrelevant. Some of us just use that word and figure to do that job. The belief that there is an abstract thing - a number or a concept - that the words and figures 'name' is an ancient dualist delusion.
There are many kinds of relationships. For example, a "group" of five stones on the beach describes a particular type of relationship based on proximity. I simply used a simpler kind of relationship to demonstrate a point.

Now, it seems to me that you're again overthinking what I'm saying. I'm not claiming that concepts are like platonic forms that exist somewhere in the universe... A concept is simply a mental model constructed by our brain. In programming terms, a concept is like a "class" which contains certain methods and properties that belong together.

Also, "abstract" essentially means "simplified". So for example, a circle is an abstract shape that can be mapped to observed objects, but nothing in reality is actually truly circular. It's merely an approximation. But it's useful because an abstract form is much easier to reason about and utilize than a "realistic", imperfect shape.

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 3:03 pm 4 Words and other signs can mean only what we use them to mean. And this applies to the words right, duty, moral rightness, moral wrongness, truth and fact. These words are not names of abstract things, such as so-called concepts - and explaining how we use them is not 'conceptual analysis'.
Not sure I follow you here. You do say that words mean what we use them to mean. Yes. But that means that words, therefore, mean *something*. So when we use a word such as "right" or "duty", we do assign them with a specific meaning, and we can identify them on that basis when we observe them, yes?

So if we can observe behavior, can we map concepts to them? If yes, can't we evaluate how well a particular concept fits to a particular observation? And if so, doesn't that constitute "conceptual analysis"?
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Sun Jan 22, 2023 2:13 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 3:03 pm 1 Logic deals with language, not the reality outside language. It deals with relationships between declaratives - what can be said consistently, without contradiction - 'speaking against'. So the expression 'the logic...of the concepts of rights and duties' is incoherent.
I think you're overthinking what I wrote here. The concept of rights and duties is just an idea, one that has existed for quite a long time and which is common to virtually all cultures. Although there are many variations and more complex forms, the basic idea is fairly clear, i.e. "if I have right X in relation to subject Y, then subject Y has a duty to satisfy my claim to right X". That's what I mean by the logic of the "concept of rights and duties". Does this clarify it? If you meant something else, please let me know.
Unless you are a natural rights sort of guy - which I doubt - then the framework of rights and duties is something that we choose to construct in a certain manner and then afterwards, according to that manner of construction, an internal rationale applies.

In modern Europe we like to have lots of personal rights, minimal public duties, we place a lot of emphasis on liberties and little on the importance of fitting in and being normal. In modern European terms the logic is to personalise the rights, not to assign them to families or villages. Other societies located elsewhere in time and space may, some indeed do, choose to see obedience to the family as the duty of every individual and make that the central point of the internal logics.

My point is that this is all constructivist stuff. We build the container and then let a logic live inside it according to rules that we chose. Those choices are values that preceed the logic of assigning future value. There's no moral fact of the matter regarding which choices to make in this regard.

If you want, you can choose to make aversion to hypocrisy and double dealing the central point of your moral schema, and after that you can logically infer that the most important thing for me to claim some right is for me to extend that same right to others. But that evaluative choice does preceed the logic that it spawns so it cannot come as a result of the same.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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iambiguous wrote: Wed Jan 18, 2023 8:29 pm Again, though, my own point here focuses less on what one believes about abortion and more on how, existentially, what one believes is the embodiment of dasein rather than any "objective moral system" that can be derived using the tools of philosophy. Claiming rights here is one thing, establishing that the rights you claim are logically and epistemologically sound -- the soundest -- another thing altogether.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am I really don't get the sense you're arguing against my position, since I actually agree with many of the points you make -- but in a general sense, not so much in relation to my proposed approach to objective Morality.
In a "general sense"? But my point here revolves precisely around the distinction I make between discussing the morality of abortion theoretically in an "ethical theory" forum, and taking whatever conclusions you come to here to a Planned Parenthood clinic where there is a confrontation between those who support a woman's right to choose and those who do not. Given all of the vast and varied sets of existential circumstances that can unfold pertaining to any one particular unwanted pregnancy.

That's why, above, I noted this:
This being posted in the "ethical theory" sub-forum, what is discussed and debated will probably not revolve around my own main interest here...connecting the dots between conclusions reached theoretically and the applicability of these "definitions and deductions" pertaining to actual moral conflicts out in the world of human interactions.
iambiguous wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 8:16 pm You agreed to explore this distinction with me in regard to abortion.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 2:30 am From my point of view, this is exactly what I did. I provided you with examples for various circumstances and explained how they can be approached on the basis of a morally objective model. Not in perfect detail, not nearly comprehensive, and not even very accurate -- but it was a start.
In my view, you explained it as one might expect it to be explained in an "ethical theory" philosophy forum. The explanation that I am interested in however is one that would be noted to a woman confronting "the agony of choice in the face of uncertainty" that revolves around an unwanted pregnancy. Your "morally objective model" explained to those outside the abortion clinic where those on both sides of the issue are going at each other.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am Now, "objective" doesn't mean "personally satisfactory". It means "true and applicable whether you like it or not".
Again: true and applicable whether you like it or not that the unborn have a "natural right" to a life outside the womb? Or true and applicable whether you like it or not that women have the "political right" to choose an abortion?
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am Therefore, if you want the ability to derive objective moral answers, you "ought" to understand the approach I'm proposing (assuming it is, in fact, coherent).
I "ought" to? Is that basically the same as suggesting that, in regard to abortion, all rational and virtuous men and women must eventually come around to accepting your own philosophical conclusions?
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am But you don't have to. If you don't, all that means is that you won't know of a method to derive objective moral answers. That is all.
You mean here, right? Whereas my interest revolves more around you introducing your method to actual flesh and blood women faced with an unwanted pregnancy. Or in imagining yourself addressing a legislature about to vote on whether to either prescribe or proscribe all abortions. Or in addressing a court about to rule on abortion.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am But in that case, nothing of what I or anyone else can tell you about moral questions will matter, because you will always be thinking in terms of subjective values, which by definition are restricted to the person holding them. And how could one person possibly be more "right" about the values of another person? And how can one person possibly be wrong about their own values? None of this makes any sense.
No, my main focus still revolves around how we acquire subjective values existentially...values that then become moral and political prejudices rooted out in particular worlds historically, culturally and interpersonally. Uniquely individual experiences that unfold in turn in a world awash in contingency, chance and change.

Your method for acquiring objective Morality while taking all of that into consideration when confronting an actual context in which those on both sides of the political spectrum are discussing and debating the morality of abortion.

Instead, from my own frame of mind, you go elsewhere:
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am "You ought to do X because I value X, even though you value Y!"

"No! You ought to do Y because I value Y, even though you value X!"

This isn't even moral subjectivism -- this is immoral subjectivism. As a moral nihilist, you are completely correct to conclude that both are wrong. And in this way, you have arrived at a conclusion derived by objective Morality: "a right which is not legitimately earned, by virtue of not being respected, can not be legitimately claimed, by virtue of not being respected"
And this pertains to the "abortion wars"...how?
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am To claim that another person has a duty to do what you want, even though you haven't followed your duty to do what they want, is therefore the essence of immorality.
Huh?

In the abortion conflagration that rends America "here and now", how on earth can someone claim it is the duty of a woman to give birth when the woman herself insist that, on the contrary, it is the duty of others to allow her to choose an abortion?

I must be misunderstanding you here.

Note to others:

A little help please.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am Therefore, if you feel like arguing with some pro-life folks, ask them what exactly they did to earn having their "rights" respected? Do they promote access to birth control and sexual education? Do they provide financial and other kinds of support for mothers and families during pregnancy (and after birth)? Do they work hard towards making adoption a more viable option? Do they support social safety net programs or charities that work towards any of the aforementioned endeavors?

Because this is what you have a duty to do if you want to claim a right from others not to abort.
The pro-life folks start with the God or the No God assumption that the unborn have earned the right to life merely by having been conceived. Period. The pro-choice folks start with the God or the No God assumption that women have earned the right to control their own body because in a world where biologically only women can become pregnant, forcing women to give birth denies them political equality with men. Period.

Then we can start noting as you do all of the vast and varied sets of circumstances that each individual might confront. Making it all that much more complex and convoluted.

Duty here is not a philosophical construct -- a la Kant and others -- but an existential concoction construed very, very differently by very, very different people having lived very, very different lives.

Then, in my view, straight back up into the theoretical clouds you go...
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am Morality won't tell you whether abortion is right or wrong, or whether pro-life or pro-choice is correct. It informs you what needs to be done to reach a higher moral state. Or a lower one if you opt to be immoral -- the choice is entirely up to you.
A higher moral state. Again, take that to the abortion clinic. Take that to a woman drawn and quartered in confronting the existential reality of a pregnancy that could upend her life.

Or just imagine this...

You live in a community where abortion is illegal. It is deemed to be premeditated murder. An inherently immoral behavior. A woman you know and love has an abortion. She is a criminal. Is it your objective Moral duty to turn her over to the authorities?
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 2:30 am Now, regardless of whether my approach is actually coherent or not, it's necessary to properly understand it before anything further can be said about it. I would therefore welcome it if you could try to explain it in your own words, maybe with the help of a simpler moral question, such as theft or deception. Although my proposed approach appears quite simple to me, it's probably far from intuitive to anyone else and most likely can be misunderstood in ways that I can't even conceive of.
Well, in my view, discussions that interest you here seem to revolve entirely around dueling definitions and deductions. Words put in a particular order defending yet more words put in a particular order. The "agony of choice in the face of uncertainty" endured by any number of women confronting an unwanted pregnancy, well, that's for another forum altogether.

I'm more interested in exploring human morality as it was broached by William Barrett in Irrational Man:

"For the choice in...human [ethical] situations is almost never between a good and an evil, where both are plainly marked as such and the choice therefore made in all the certitude of reason; rather it is between rival goods, where one is bound to do some evil either way, and where the ultimate outcome and even---or most of all---our own motives are unclear to us. The terror of confronting oneself in such a situation is so great that most people panic and try to take cover under any universal rules that will apply, if only to save them from the task of choosing themselves."
Thus...
iambiguous wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 8:16 pm Okay, the pro-life folks inform the pro-choice folks about their own "objective moral system" and then the pro-choice folks turn around and inform the pro-life folks about their own "objective moral system". Then what, they can both at least agree that there is an objective moral system? And that, for all practical purposes, "we're right from our side and you're right from yours"?

What on earth does that have to do with the real world where in any particular community laws will be enacted either prescribing or proscribing particular behaviors in regard to abortion? Either rewarding or punishing the behaviors that flesh and blood men and women actually choose.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 2:30 am I'm not sure if anything of what I wrote above made sense to you, but if it did, hopefully you can see why a paragraph such as this would lead me to believe that you don't understand my position.
Again and again and again...

My point focuses not on whether I or others here understand and agree or disagree with you, but on whether women confronting an unwanted pregnancy, or a Congress considering abortion legislation or a Supreme Court about to rule on abortion again understand and agree or disagree with you. Though, sure, not many will come to embrace moral nihilism instead, will they? Not many would welcome being "fractured and fragmented" as "I" am here.

But at least given my own frame of mind, the best of all possible worlds here would seem to be "moderation, negotiation and compromise". As with Roe v. Wade here in America. Each side got something but no one side got everything.

Then "for all practical purposes" whatever this...
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 2:30 am There is no such thing as "my objective moral system" -- if it refers to a subject, then it's subjective, by definition. An objective moral system, by definition, does not care about anyone's personal interests, because it's not subjective. What you're describing here is precisely how subjective moral systems are used -- or rather, abused.

Consistent subjective morality is peaceful, because it acknowledges that no one has the right to dictate what another person should value. Values are derived from each subject individually and only apply relative to that subject. It's only when you start to require of others to value what you value, that you leave subjective morality and enter subjective immorality.
....means.

Take it to the Planned Parenthood clinic, a legislature or a court and run it by them.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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FlashDangerpants wrote: Mon Jan 23, 2023 2:46 pm Unless you are a natural rights sort of guy - which I doubt - then the framework of rights and duties is something that we choose to construct in a certain manner and then afterwards, according to that manner of construction, an internal rationale applies.
That's correct, the logic is internal to the framework. But the real question is, of course, how to derive/justify rights externally. Natural rights for example are mostly derived from moral intuitions and a sense of empathy, as well as the belief that all humans are essentially worth the same and therefore deserve the same rights. This justification is subjective, through and through. Hence, we can -- in principle -- deny human rights on the same, subjective basis. Or pick anything we like as a "human right". That's why some people consider housing, food, electricity etc. to be human rights, while others would flat-out deny the validity of positive rights. For this reason, it's not possible to objectively determine what should constitute a human right.

However, in my approach this is not so, as it imparts us with a method for deriving rights which is non-arbitrary, non-subjective and non-optional. It's not possible to disagree with it (in a fundamental sense) or to ignore it and there are no "equally viable" alternatives. That's because it's derived from external sources, rather than on the basis of subjective ones, such as preferences and opinions.

These sources are the actions and behaviors of people, which can be objectively reviewed and inductively mapped to duties. For example, if I always return the shopping cart after a shopping trip, we can conclude that I act as if I have a duty to return shopping carts. We can abstract this to a more generic duty such as a "duty to behave socially conscious" (as long as we can observe that I also behave socially conscious in other situations). In this way, we can conclude that I have both a right and a duty to correct people who display socially irresponsible behavior. I also have a right to benefit from socially conscious behavior from others.

But don't get me wrong: I'm not implying that returning shopping carts is "moral". For example, maybe you're a believer in shopping cart anarchy; the idea that leaving carts at many different places makes it more efficient and convenient to use shopping carts. However, if your behavior does indeed not lead to a decrease in shopping experience happiness, we can still conclude that you are "behaving socially conscious"; it's just that your approach is different.

But maybe your theory of shopping cart anarchy is just an excuse for laziness and it actually decreases efficiency and satisfaction during shopping trips. In this case, we can conclude that you are, in fact, not acting as if you have a duty to behave socially conscious. But again, this in itself isn't "immoral". If you don't care about a great shopping experience, you have a right to not return your shopping cart. But you don't have a right to expect from others to behave socially conscious relative to you.

However, if you do get frustrated by shopping cart anarchy and demand from people that they return their shopping carts, yet don't return them yourself -- then you are behaving immorally.

As can hopefully be seen by this simple example, the approach I propose can be applied to any circumstance and inform us about its moral state in great detail, without relying on personal preferences or cultural norms or anything like that.

Importantly, it doesn't lead to any contradictions or inconsistencies -- as far as I can tell.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 12:35 am We can abstract this to a more generic duty such as a "duty to behave socially conscious"
Rubbish
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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iambiguous wrote: Mon Jan 23, 2023 9:11 pm In my view, you explained it as one might expect it to be explained in an "ethical theory" philosophy forum. The explanation that I am interested in however is one that would be noted to a woman confronting "the agony of choice in the face of uncertainty" that revolves around an unwanted pregnancy. Your "morally objective model" explained to those outside the abortion clinic where those on both sides of the issue are going at each other.
I truly understand your argument; I understand that you're concerned with real-life circumstances, tragedies and states of affairs.

But the reason why any of these questions are "difficult" is because we're talking about people who have their own subjective interests and usually are only open to hearing whatever supports those interests.

There is nothing that you can say or do to convince a person who has no intention of honestly considering your point of view. All you can do in such a case is to make yourself aware of this fact and dispel the illusion that you're obligated to respect their point of view.

For example, if a serial killer intends to murder you, the morally correct conclusion is to understand that they do not have your interests in mind and as such you are under no obligation to respect their interests. It's not about whether killing is moral or immoral -- that's just noise. It's all about what right can legitimately be claimed. In this particular case, you can claim a right to self-defense.

So it's not meaningful to ask: "is abortion moral or immoral"?

This question can't be answered, because this would violate the is-ought-dichotomy. Rather, the question is under which circumstances a right to abortion can legitimately be claimed. This question can be answered by reference to the concrete circumstances (but without relying on subjective preferences). On this basis it's possible to create laws which are, in theory, sophisticated enough to respond to any circumstance in the morally precisely correct manner. I would be happy to explain this in more detail, but I gather this isn't what you're interested in.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 1:41 am
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 12:35 am We can abstract this to a more generic duty such as a "duty to behave socially conscious"
Rubbish
Ah, yes, the pinnacle of philosophical argumentation 😂
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 1:46 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 1:41 am
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 12:35 am We can abstract this to a more generic duty such as a "duty to behave socially conscious"
Rubbish
Ah, yes, the pinnacle of philosophical argumentation 😂
You were talking about 'objectively' and 'inductively' extrapolating from a behaviour to an implied duty. How could you need my help to notice the immense burden of evaluative prejudice you smothered that with?

"Rubbish" was a good enough comment.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 2:40 am You were talking about 'objectively' and 'inductively' extrapolating from a behaviour to an implied duty. How could you need my help to notice the immense burden of evaluative prejudice you smothered that with?

"Rubbish" was a good enough comment.
I genuinely don't think I was claiming anything particularly controversial (regarding this specific point). I'm sure I haven't communicated it perfectly, but it doesn't seem very contentious to me... So if it is, I would really appreciate your help in understanding it -- it's perfectly possible that I just can't see it because I'm biased towards it. There's a nice German word for it called "Betriebsblindheit" :D

So let me provide you with my definitions for each term just to make sure there's no misunderstanding:

- "objectively" refers to an approach to obtain knowledge about the world via empiricism, while specifically identifying and excluding subjective biases and personal values

- "inductively" describes a specific method for interpreting data by identifying patterns and similarities between a set of individual observations / occurrences

- "abstraction" is the final concept you end up with when you apply an inductive process to a set of observations

- an "implied duty" is simply an abstraction based on the observations of a particular individuals behavior

An implied duty should not be interpreted to mean that the duty "actually" exists (other than purely conceptually & descriptively). Rather, it's just a way for us to reason about behavior within the context of the "rights and duties" framework.

So for example, if subject X appears to consistently follow duty Y based on the available evidence, it's reasonable to conclude that they would expect the same from others relative to them -- but not necessarily. It's not a "problem" if they don't. But what this would tell us is that subject X believes that duty Y is not a duty which everyone should follow, i.e. it's a voluntary duty. However, if subject X were to expect from others that they follow duty Y, this would tell us that they consider it to be generally applicable, i.e. a "citizens duty" or some such.

You see, in this way we can objectively identify the exact position that a particular subject has in regards to a particular right or duty, and thus conclude what rights they have earned and can legitimately claim to have (again, this doesn't mean the rights "actually" exist or anything like that).

Then, the only decision left is for us to choose whether we want to respect the rights that they legitimately claimed on the basis of respecting them relative to other people. Both options are possible of course -- but not respecting another person's legitimate rights is, I would argue, the essence of what it means for something to be immoral. And it's not possible to disagree with this, since that would imply that you don't respect the rights of others and hence don't have a legitimate claim to have your rights respected. And this is how a moral conclusion can be derived, even though every prior step has been purely objective and descriptive.

All of the concepts I've referred to here are commonly utilized in the sciences. So if I use them improperly or make an invalid connection somewhere, please let me know. That would save me a lot of time : P
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 6:44 pm
FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 2:40 am You were talking about 'objectively' and 'inductively' extrapolating from a behaviour to an implied duty. How could you need my help to notice the immense burden of evaluative prejudice you smothered that with?

"Rubbish" was a good enough comment.
I genuinely don't think I was claiming anything particularly controversial (regarding this specific point). I'm sure I haven't communicated it perfectly, but it doesn't seem very contentious to me... So if it is, I would really appreciate your help in understanding it -- it's perfectly possible that I just can't see it because I'm biased towards it. There's a nice German word for it called "Betriebsblindheit" :D

So let me provide you with my definitions for each term just to make sure there's no misunderstanding:
Yeah, so we don't really need the rest there. My point is very much that you are subjecting the theory you like to little scrutiny if any at all. And in your analysis of your own arg have somehow not noticed an enormous amount of smuggling.

First and foremost there was a specific context that you were replying to, where I mentioned that the rationale of the moral framework lives inside the construct that spawns it and thus is not objective in any meaningful sense. As far as I can see, your entire response was an example of just inserting what you want to find into the space where you are supposed to be discovering something that was already present.

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 6:44 pm An implied duty should not be interpreted to mean that the duty "actually" exists (other than purely conceptually & descriptively). Rather, it's just a way for us to reason about behavior within the context of the "rights and duties" framework.

So for example, if subject X appears to consistently follow duty Y based on the available evidence, it's reasonable to conclude that they would expect the same from others relative to them -- but not necessarily. It's not a "problem" if they don't. But what this would tell us is that subject X believes that duty Y is not a duty which everyone should follow, i.e. it's a voluntary duty. However, if subject X were to expect from others that they follow duty Y, this would tell us that they consider it to be generally applicable, i.e. a "citizens duty" or some such.
That's value laden before you start so it cannot work as a search for the values. If subject X always does Y, what you can infer via induction is that subject X will continue to Y. You are asserting that X does Y out of duty without any sort of inductive justification at all, if anything you are rationalising that concoction. There's certainly nothing indictive about assuming that the guy is following the maxim that ... blah blah blah <insert Kant here>.

If you want to find out what the subject in your hypothetical believes, I'm afraid you must grant him some proper way to tell you, you can't get the contents of his beliefs by just watching his behaviour unless you are a behaviorist and identify inward psychological content with outward behaviour.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 6:44 pm You see, in this way we can objectively identify the exact position that a particular subject has in regards to a particular right or duty, and thus conclude what rights they have earned and can legitimately claim to have (again, this doesn't mean the rights "actually" exist or anything like that).
We can ony do that after we have decided to make this fear of hypocrisy our central motivating moral force. We already must have made that choice before we can usen value laden terms such as 'earned'.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 6:44 pm Then, the only decision left is for us to choose whether we want to respect the rights that they legitimately claimed on the basis of respecting them relative to other people. Both options are possible of course -- but not respecting another person's legitimate rights is, I would argue, the essence of what it means for something to be immoral. And it's not possible to disagree with this, since that would imply that you don't respect the rights of others and hence don't have a legitimate claim to have your rights respected. And this is how a moral conclusion can be derived, even though every prior step has been purely objective and descriptive.

All of the concepts I've referred to here are commonly utilized in the sciences. So if I use them improperly or make an invalid connection somewhere, please let me know. That would save me a lot of time : P
Peer review would appear to be your friend, or at least it might save your ass. The boast that "this is how a moral conclusion can be derived, even though every prior step has been purely objective and descriptive" is a failure and thus we learn the importance of getting the peer review at the experiment design phase.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Thank you for the elaboration 😊

There are a couple of points that I can kind of see, but find difficult to grasp. And a couple other points seem like good old-fashioned misunderstandings:
FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 7:12 pm First and foremost there was a specific context that you were replying to, where I mentioned that the rationale of the moral framework lives inside the construct that spawns it and thus is not objective in any meaningful sense. As far as I can see, your entire response was an example of just inserting what you want to find into the space where you are supposed to be discovering something that was already present.
This is one of the points I'm having a hard time with... In my mind, my approach is essentially equivalent to arithmetic. You identify self-contained entities (ideally of the same or a similar type) and then apply arithmetic operations to them. The logic of arithmetic is contained within the framework, but this doesn't mean that we can't do very useful things with it.

What exactly is the difference to the framework of rights and duties as I have described it and to arithmetic? When I say that subject X acts as if they have a duty to Y, this seems to me like a valid description of a property that can be assigned to the subject based on an observation, in a similar sense as describing "one apple" or "half of an apple".

In fact, from an objective point of view, I don't think there is a difference between "acting as if one has a duty to X" and "having a duty to X", because "acting" is a description of intent or state of mind, which is subjective. So it's like differentiating between someone who "acts as if they are angry" and someone who "is angry". We can determine that a person is angry by observing their facial expression, their voice, their posture and movement, etc. -- but we can't know (nor do we need to) whether they are angry or just pretending to be (assuming their act is indistinguishable from the real deal). Would you say this is a fair assessment?

FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 7:12 pm That's value laden before you start so it cannot work as a search for the values. If subject X always does Y, what you can infer via induction is that subject X will continue to Y. You are asserting that X does Y out of duty without any sort of inductive justification at all, if anything you are rationalising that concoction. There's certainly nothing indictive about assuming that the guy is following the maxim that ... blah blah blah <insert Kant here>.

If you want to find out what the subject in your hypothetical believes, I'm afraid you must grant him some proper way to tell you, you can't get the contents of his beliefs by just watching his behaviour unless you are a behaviorist and identify inward psychological content with outward behaviour.
This, I think, is a case of a misunderstanding, because there is an objective and a subjective aspect to this consideration. Unfortunately I haven't properly clarified it here, but choices are of course always subjective. There are no hard "oughts" within my approach -- so whenever there is an opportunity to make a choice, the choice itself is a variable. In other words, it "doesn't matter". The variable (regardless of its content) is simply passed to the function, which then produces a result.

That's why I said that both options are possible -- you can either conclude that subject X has a duty to Y on the basis of your observation of them consistently following proposition Y, or not. It's a boolean choice.

But you are correct in that determining whether subject X has a duty to Y is a subjective choice, so ideally you would just ask them about it. But objectively, it doesn't matter either way. Objectively, it makes no difference whether a duty even "exists" (only the observable behavior "exists") -- until a right is claimed.

The act of claiming a right by subject X is a signal to other subjects that a duty towards Y is expected from subject X relative to them. Then, the previously explained method is used to determine whether the claim to right Y is valid or not. This method in itself is objective, as it is based on the observable past behavior of subject X. But once again, our choice to accept or reject subject X's claim to right Y is subjective. It's just that in this case, our choice is no longer dependent upon subjective considerations, which is why I would argue that it's appropriate to assign a moral value to it.

FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 7:12 pm We can ony do that after we have decided to make this fear of hypocrisy our central motivating moral force. We already must have made that choice before we can usen value laden terms such as 'earned'.
I agree -- this is a subjective choice. But my observation suggests that it's not actually a viable option to deny it. There is no "reasonable" argument that can be made against it. I would argue that this choice is fundamentally between morality and immorality; either you agree that people, including yourself, can have rights which they earn by demonstrating (in an objectively verifiable manner) that they accept this proposition relative to other people, or they don't -- in which case you also can't claim to have any legitimate rights. You can of course choose to not respect other peoples rights and not claim any rights for yourself. But that, it seems to me, is the definition of amorality (i.e. anything goes), which is deemed socially unacceptable.

So even though this choice must be made subjectively, it's really not like the options are equivalent. Denying the proposition is akin to an admission of guilt.

FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 7:12 pm Peer review would appear to be your friend, or at least it might save your ass. The boast that "this is how a moral conclusion can be derived, even though every prior step has been purely objective and descriptive" is a failure and thus we learn the importance of getting the peer review at the experiment design phase.
And that's exactly why I'm here 😂

So once again, thank you for your input -- really. I am of course perfectly aware that some of my claims are a bit out there (wouldn't be much fun otherwise, now would it?), but I simply fail to see a serious problem with my proposed approach, and normally I'm rather good at being self-critical...
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Wed Jan 25, 2023 2:31 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 7:12 pm We can ony do that after we have decided to make this fear of hypocrisy our central motivating moral force. We already must have made that choice before we can usen value laden terms such as 'earned'.
I agree -- this is a subjective choice. But my observation suggests that it's not actually a viable option to deny it. There is no "reasonable" argument that can be made against it.
I'm afraid that ends your argument. You are applying the reasonable man test because there is no stricter application of reason which could possibly support that leap you need to make.

The problem with the man on the Clapham Omnibus (sorry, no idea what the German equivalent is) is that he is considered reasonable because he shares our usual set of normative values and all of those prejudices of which we are not ashamed.
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