A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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Alexander_Reiswich
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A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

Hello! I have come across a rather simple approach to objective Morality, but it seems surprisingly coherent -- not sure if I'm missing something, so feedback would be much appreciated.

Before I get into it, I would like to define subjectivity and objectivity. I think these terms are frequently misunderstood, which leads to many strange notions of what should constitute objective Morality. First, it's helpful to keep in mind that these terms refer to concepts. For example, the concept of a chair may be objective, but an actual chair is not -- it merely is (an object). Objective concepts are mental constructs and as such do not exist physically in exactly the same way as subjective concepts.

Both subjective and objective concepts can reference physical objects (or physical subjects). The difference is that subjective concepts include or rely on the viewpoint of a subject (=an observer that experiences external objects through their senses), whereas an objective concept references the external object itself (and/or its properties and relationships to other objects, etc.).

Now, an objective concept is not required to be accurate. If I say that a basket contains 12 apples, but in actuality it contains only 11, then the concept of a basket with 12 apples still remains objective -- it's just not very accurate. I could even say that the basket contains a toaster rather than 11 apples -- this concept would be inaccurate to such an extent that it can be considered false, but it's still objective ("objectively false"), because it does not include a subjective point of view. An objective concept can also be invalid. For example, if I were to say that a basket fully covers an object larger than its storage capacity, we would know that this contradicts the concept of containment. As such, this concept would be invalid, but still objective ("objectively invalid").

So in order to be accurate, a concept must map well to an external object. If it maps well to the concept of an object, we can consider it true (i.e. "it's true that a basket can contain apples"). If it maps well to a particular instance of an object, we can consider it factual (i.e. "it's factually correct that this particular basket contains 11 apples").

Importantly, the same terminology can be applied to subjective concepts: a subjective concept can be accurate or inaccurate, valid or invalid, factually correct or incorrect, and true or false. Subjective facts make perfect sense. For example, "this particular apple is sweet" can be a factually correct and accurate subjective statement. If there was actually a very sweet apple in front of you, you might be even tempted to say that this apple is objectively sweet -- this, however, would be incorrect, as sweetness is not a property of the apple itself, but a sensation which a subject tasting the apple can experience.

Based on this misunderstanding, there is a lot of unnecessary debate about whether something like beauty can be objective; the answer is of course no, as beauty is an interpretation or evaluation of things that simply "are". As such, there can be subjective truths about aesthetics, but never objective ones. And this in turn leads many to conclude that Ethics must also be subjective.

But why should we be concerned whether Morality is objective or subjective in the first place? Well, due to its nature, a subjective concept is always dependent upon the viewpoint of one particular subject. Inter-subjectivity is a useful concept, but it's merely an aggregate or averaging of multiple individual subjective viewpoints. So for example, a statement such as "I like eating apples" can be subjectively true, and a statement like "humans like eating apples" can be argued to be inter-subjectively at least somewhat accurate. But a statement such as "eating apples is liked" is nonsensical, because a subjective concept without reference to a subject is unintelligible.

In the context of aesthetics, this works just fine: we can think in terms of personal taste and similarities in personal tastes.

But when it comes to Morality, this no longer seems sufficient; after all, the entire point of Morality is to determine what's morally true or false independently from our own subjective opinions. This means that the subjective viewpoint has to be removed. For example, if we take a prescriptive statement such as "you should eat apples" and remove the subjective perspective, you're left with "apples should be eaten". Well, by whom? I'm sure plenty of animals can't eat apples. So what we actually mean is "humans should eat apples". But this is now simply a generalized subjective statement and not objective, at all. Hume's dichotomy prevails, we can't get an ought from an is.

So with that out of the way, let me now present an approach that seemingly solves this issue. The way it works is through a particular method of deriving "rights" and "duties". Now, the classic approach to rights and duties is fairly straightforward: for example, an employer and an employee can sign a work contract. On the basis of this agreement, the employer has a duty to pay the employee and the employee has a duty to perform a certain work. Conversely, the employee has a right to be paid for performing the required work and the employer has a right to the employees time, effort and expertise as per the agreement. We can furthermore conclude that the employer has no right to the employees time, effort and expertise if they do not pay them and the employee has no right to get paid if they don't do their job. Or: if the employer does not pay the employee, the latter has no longer a duty to do the work, and if the employee fails to do the work the employer has no longer a duty to pay them.

The logic of rights and duties is sound and objective -- we don't need to view it from the viewpoint of a subject to make sense of it. It checks out.

However, it only works based on agreement. So I can only be expected to have a duty to do X if I have agreed to do X, and due to me doing X I can then claim a right to Y.

This is not sufficient for objective Morality, because if it was possible for all of us to agree on everything, we would have no need for Morality in the first place.

However, it seems to me that it is legitimately possible to derive rights without any agreement or subjective concerns. First, let's remember that rights are claims to what others can, should or must do (or can't, shouldn't or mustn't do). This is necessarily true because agreements can only be made between subjects. As such, I can't claim to have a valid right to not get sick, as this claim can't be made against another subject. I can however validly claim to have a right that others have to distance themselves from me such that they can't infect me. If you were to distance yourself from me, we would be able to objectively ascertain that you are therefore respecting my claimed right. By doing so, you would in turn receive the right for me to stay distanced from you -- this is necessarily (implicitly) true, even if you don't claim to have that right. In fact, neither of us has to claim to have any particular rights -- simply the act of us keeping distance from one another implies that we respect each others (implied) rights to social distancing.

Now, a right of course doesn't necessarily have to be respected. But if you don't respect my right, I therefore don't have a duty to respect yours. This means that even though the choice of whether to respect someone else's right is subjective, the logic of rights and duties itself remains true.

This, it seems to me, is sufficient for objective Morality, because the logic works even if we remove the subjective viewpoints.

So the way a moral right can be derived in subject A is by (objectively) determining whether a claimed right has been respected by subject A in regards to other subjects.

For example, if I respect other people's property, I can make a valid claim to have my property respected. Consequently, if someone were to not respect my property, I would no longer have a duty to respect theirs.

In moral terms we can therefore say that it's immoral to steal from those who themselves do not steal. But it's not immoral to steal from those who do. But not only that -- we can also determine exactly what it means for theft to be immoral: it means that by stealing, you make it permissible for others to steal from you. Furthermore, this also tells us what the appropriate punishment for theft is: to deny respect of the culprits property rights. Even more than that; we can also conclude what the proper road to retribution is: for the offender to convincingly demonstrate that they will respect the property rights of others going forward, i.e. by giving back what they have stolen, paying a fee, doing community service... whatever it takes to reclaim their lost right to property.

This also allows us to deduce that i.e. cutting the hand off from a thief is not an appropriate punishment, as this punishment can't be logically derived from the offense. Such a punishment would imply that you have a right to arbitrarily decide punishments. Therefore, others can legitimately claim to have a right to punish you for any arbitrary reason -- this is what it means for inappropriate punishment to be immoral.

As you can see, this approach is surprisingly powerful, because unlike other approaches, it doesn't simply say X is immoral and that's it -- well, what exactly is immoral? The categorical imperative for example claims that propositions which aren't universalizable or don't view others as an end-in-themselves are essentially immoral. But this is merely an appeal to values, i.e. you should value actions that are universalizable and those that treat others as an end-in-themselves. As such, it's just a subjective evaluation, not an objective methodology. Utilitarianism also has no say on what it means for something to be immoral. What if a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian disagree on a moral problem? What if two utilitarians disagree? What is the appropriate response? These questions can't be answered in the context of utilitarianism because it only works if you subscribe to a particular version of it. In other words, it can only be applied subjectively (or inter-subjectively).

The approach I described above on the other hand works in spite of disagreement. It's applicable no matter what you personally think of it; hence, it's objective.

I could go on and demonstrate how it can be applied to moral dilemmas, etc. but I feel this introduction is already long enough as it is. Hopefully I was able to get the main idea across.
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FlashDangerpants
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Sorry, but I think that falls apart by the point at which you say "The logic of rights and duties is sound and objective". Contingent agreements cannot cross that objectivity boundary.

There's nothing objective about resrticting punishments to match the crime at all, let alone the insitence that it must actually mirror the crime by taking similar form. If the purpose of the punishment is to prevent misbehaviour then death for shoplifting is just as objectively reasonable as having the store manager come round your house and steal your shampoo to see how you like it when it happens to you.

I think the root of the issue lies in the earlier section where you seem to be making an assumption that if we are able to have rational discourses about a matter then that somehow converts it into an objective matter. There's the reasonable man test - the man on the Clapham omnibus would surely agree that the punishment should fit the crime, and there's the objective reason test - the universe agrees that punishments and crimes should resemble each other. The essence of the is/ought issue lies in supposing that passing either test is good enough to pass both.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Sat Jan 07, 2023 1:55 am Hello! I have come across a rather simple approach to objective Morality, but it seems surprisingly coherent -- not sure if I'm missing something, so feedback would be much appreciated.

...
To proceed effectively you need the following;

1. Define what is morality - which must be accord with human nature; how can it anything else?

2. Define what is objectivity, e.g.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivity_(philosophy)

3. Define what is subjectivity?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivity

4. Define what is fact?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact
In philosophy, objectivity is the concept of truth independent from individual subjectivity (bias caused by one's perception, emotions, or imagination).
A proposition is considered to have objective truth when its truth conditions are met without bias caused by the mind of a sentient being.
Scientific objectivity refers to the ability to judge [in the scientific Framework] without partiality or external influence.
Objectivity in the moral framework calls for moral codes to be assessed based on the well-being of the people in the society that follow it.[1]
Moral objectivity also calls for moral codes to be compared to one another through a set of universal facts and not through subjectivity.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivity_(philosophy)
In terms of "independence" you need to decide between Philosophical Realism vs Anti-Philosophical Realism.
Philosophical Realism view is, objectivity is of external reality is absolutely independent of the subject.
Anti-philosophical-realism [Kantian] view that objectivity is independent of the individual's opinion and belief but not independent of the collective-of-subjects via intersubjective consensus, e.g. scientific objectivity is independent of any individual layman and the individual scientist's beliefs but not independent from the collective scientific community of subjects.

Until you consider the above, you will not arrive at Objective Morality as you had presented in the OP.
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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 6:28 am Sorry, but I think that falls apart by the point at which you say "The logic of rights and duties is sound and objective". Contingent agreements cannot cross that objectivity boundary.
But that's not what I'm claiming -- or rather, I specifically said that the logic of rights and duties by itself is not sufficient for objective Morality (since it's based on agreements). What I was pointing out here was the fact that the logic of rights and duties is objectively valid (as it can be contemplated in the absence of any subjective considerations, just like for instance math), but that does not automatically make particular rights and duties objective. How we apply logic (and whether we *should* apply it) is entirely subjective. Hope that makes sense.
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 6:28 am There's nothing objective about resrticting punishments to match the crime at all, let alone the insitence that it must actually mirror the crime by taking similar form. If the purpose of the punishment is to prevent misbehaviour then death for shoplifting is just as objectively reasonable as having the store manager come round your house and steal your shampoo to see how you like it when it happens to you.
You've jumped into a subjective context here. The entire point of my proposition is that subjective contexts "suck" because you have to decide what's personally important to you. But values are subjective, so there is often no "truly" right and wrong answer. Therefore, I'm proposing an approach where subjective considerations are completely irrelevant. So there is no such thing as "a goal to reduce misbehavior", because that's a subjective interest.

I'm not arguing that punishments should match the crime -- I'm pointing out that this is the natural and unavoidable conclusion of the approach I presented. You can either like it or not, it's simply logically (descriptively) the case. And the logic I present is unavoidable, because it's merely descriptive. In other words, it simply describes your "moral state" after any given moral choice, but it's still up to you to (subjectively) decide what you want to do.
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 6:28 am I think the root of the issue lies in the earlier section where you seem to be making an assumption that if we are able to have rational discourses about a matter then that somehow converts it into an objective matter. There's the reasonable man test - the man on the Clapham omnibus would surely agree that the punishment should fit the crime, and there's the objective reason test - the universe agrees that punishments and crimes should resemble each other. The essence of the is/ought issue lies in supposing that passing either test is good enough to pass both.
I certainly haven't claimed any of this 😅

First of all, no, having rational discourses about matters does not convert into objective "matter"... That's just gibberish... Please read my post again...

Next, the is-ought problem can't be "passed" -- it's not a problem per sè, it's just how reality works. However, you don't need an ought in a purely descriptive system. My point is that the only sense in which objective Morality can meaningfully exist is a descriptive one.

I'm happy to clarify any questions about my proposed approach, but please try to properly understand it first, afterwards you can criticize it as much as you like =)
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by iambiguous »

This being posted in the "ethical theory" sub-forum, what is discussed and debated will probably not revolve around my own main interest here...connecting the dots between conclusions reached theoretically and the applicability of these "definitions and deductions" pertaining to actual moral conflicts out in the world of human interactions.

To steal or not to steal...how is that any less a frame of mind rooted existentially in dasein? How can the context not be everything here? How can our own subjective convictions here not be derived from moral and political prejudices rooted in the life that we lived? that we live now?

You know, just in case anyone might be interested in coming down out of the definitional logic clouds and argue for an objective morality in regard to abortion or gun control or just war or homosexuality or animal rights or capital punishment.

In either a God or a No God world.
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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

@Veritas Aequitas I'm sorry, but the view of objective Morality you present here has nothing to do with objective Morality. It's a dead-end, which is why no real progress has been made in moral philosophy for a very long time.

In philosophy, you can't just claim that X is Y and expect it to magically become Y. You argue that inter-subjectivity should be equal to objectivity -- but you can only argue this based on subjective values and preferences, which only serves to prove its subjective nature.

I have already defined objectivity and subjectivity (as well as facts) quite extensively in the OP and am always happy to go into more detail if there are any questions. But why do you ask me to define them even though I already did in great detail?

Regarding Morality itself, it's debatable whether it should be in agreement with human nature subjectively, but it most definitely can't be dependent upon human nature objectively. It's perfectly possible for it to be coincidentally in accordance with human nature at times, and I would certainly expect that to be the case. But only (inter-) subjective Morality can be fully dependent upon human nature.

Now, an objective system of Morality is descriptive -- it informs us what is and isn't moral, independent of any subjective concerns. However, it does not tell us what we should do, because that would contradict the is-ought-problem.

The flaw with traditional (deontological) approaches to Morality is that they assume certain things to be either moral or immoral; the idea is that there's a binary choice -- either theft is moral or not. Either murder is moral or not. Everywhere, in every case, always. The conclusion is therefore that certain acts should never be committed. Cleverly, this "works" because according to deontological Morality, this is just how things are. If you steal food in order to survive, you're committing an immoral act. As such, it's morally better for you to starve to death rather than to steal.

Intuitively, we understand that this is ridiculous, that's why no one in the real world takes deontological ethics seriously (I mean outside of academia).

In the approach I propose, there are no contradictions or strange conclusions (that I could find so far). This is because it clearly informs us about what it means for something to be moral or immoral in any given circumstance, rather than simply attaching vacuous labels.

Feel free to test it -- you can come up with any kind of philosophical problem or dilemma and I'd be happy to demonstrate how it works.
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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

@iambiguous I would be happy to explain how my proposed approach can be applied to any moral issue you can think of. I would only ask to limit it to one to start with.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by iambiguous »

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 8:30 pm @iambiguous I would be happy to explain how my proposed approach can be applied to any moral issue you can think of. I would only ask to limit it to one to start with.
Thanks.

The issue I prefer is abortion. Why? Because...

1] it literally revolves around life and death
2] it is a "conflicting good" that almost everyone is familiar with
3] it often comes up "in the news"
4] it is the issue that resulted in my abandoning objective morality in a No God world and embracing moral nihilism instead

But if you prefer another, that's fine too.
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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

iambiguous wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 8:43 pm
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 8:30 pm @iambiguous I would be happy to explain how my proposed approach can be applied to any moral issue you can think of. I would only ask to limit it to one to start with.
Thanks.

The issue I prefer is abortion. Why? Because...

1] it literally revolves around life and death
2] it is a "conflicting good" that almost everyone is familiar with
3] it often comes up "in the news"
4] it is the issue that resulted in my abandoning objective morality in a No God world and embracing moral nihilism instead

But if you prefer another, that's fine too.
No, that's perfectly fair, let's do it =)

First of all, I would like to emphasize that subjective values are completely excluded within my proposed approach to objective Morality. This is crucial, because any kind of subjective influence is a distortion of objective reality. This means that when it comes to the question of abortion, it does not matter whether the mother loves or hates the child (or the father), for example. Subjectively, things like these can matter deeply, but objectively they must be ignored. Furthermore, the subjective concerns of *us*, who are here to "judge" the moral value of a particular act of abortion, do not matter in an objective moral calculation, either.

However, objective factors do matter. In fact, every single objective factor is potentially relevant. To clarify: an objective factor is anything that can be observed outside of the perception (or evaluation) of a particular subject.

Now, my proposed approach to objective Morality is based on the idea that moral rights can be objectively derived by the extent to which they are respected. So if I respect other people's property rights, I can legitimately claim to have my property rights respected, as well. I realize that this sounds a bit simplistic and possibly even naive, that's why I myself was surprised to find that it actually seems to work out when put to the test.

It works mainly due to the logic of rights & duties at its core, which states that if you deny someone's legitimate right to X, you therefore lose that same right to X, as a right is earned by respecting it and lost by not respecting it.

Thus, we now *know* what exactly it means for something to be immoral. This is significant, because traditional moral systems equate immorality with a prescriptive commandment: "you ought not to do X" -- this simply tells us that you should not do X, but not the reason why or in what sense it's "wrong" exactly. In my proposed approach, we are informed precisely of why something is immoral and what it entails.

So let's consider an "easy" variation of the question of abortion: there are severe complications during pregnancy which lead the doctor to conclude that an abortion is medically necessary in order to save the mothers life. In this context, if the mother chooses to terminate, she (implicitly) claims to have the right to abort in order to save her own life. If we were to simplify and abstract it, we could consider it "a right to murder in order to preserve one's own life". This means that others can now legitimately claim the same right in regards to her, assuming such a situation were to occur. Now, I'm sure plenty of people would claim to have such a right in any case -- as such, only the most altruistic people would have a legitimate right to blame her for her choice (but they're altruists, so they probably wouldn't). We can therefore conclude that this particular case is fairly clear from the viewpoint of objective Morality, as it pertains to a right that most people would claim to have anyway.

It gets trickier when we consider the case wherein the baby was conceived by rape. Here, an abortion is not medically necessary. There is no danger to the mothers life. In this case, choosing to terminate can be abstracted as a right to murder a person that you have been forced to care for against your will. By making this choice, the mother therefore loses her right to not be murdered if she was forced into someone else's care, unable to care for herself. This is not an imminently essential right. However, she can still retain it by delivering the baby and giving it away for adoption. In this way, we can identify the morally "better" option with no reference to subjective concerns.

A considerably more difficult case arises when the mother chooses to have an abortion "out of convenience", for example if she finds that she won't be able to retain her previous life style. In this case, the implicitly invoked right can be encapsulated as the right to murder for personal convenience. As such, the mother loses the right to not be murdered for another persons convenience. This might seem cruel, but please keep in mind that not having a right to not be murdered does not equal "should be murdered". This actually brings us to the best part of objective Morality, because it informs us about how such a scenario can best be handled.

First of all, it's important for everyone involved to realize that an abortion "out of convenience" (or for any subjective concern) is a very serious choice, as it undermines the mothers right to not be murdered. Now, maybe everyone involved is perfectly fine with her choice -- all that this means is that everyone involved therefore also doesn't have much of a claim to the right to not be murdered out of convenience. I want to stress again that objective Morality only informs us about the Morality of any given situation, the actual decisions we make are entirely up to us. So if the people involved care about their rights to not be murdered, they should therefore be very concerned with the mothers choice and question it. If the mother cares about her own right not to be murdered, she must make an effort to reclaim her right to not be murdered.

I'll leave it at that for now -- this examination is of course not exhaustive, at all, but trying to explain everything at once would be overwhelming... As such, I probably did not explain many of the conclusions presented here sufficiently, so I'm sure it's not always obvious how I get from point A to B. I'm happy to go into more detail wherever necessary.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 8:27 pm @Veritas Aequitas I'm sorry, but the view of objective Morality you present here has nothing to do with objective Morality. It's a dead-end, which is why no real progress has been made in moral philosophy for a very long time.

In philosophy, you can't just claim that X is Y and expect it to magically become Y. You argue that inter-subjectivity should be equal to objectivity -- but you can only argue this based on subjective values and preferences, which only serves to prove its subjective nature.
Btw, are you aware that 'intersubjectivity is the basis for objectivity' is a serious philosophical topic which you cannot simply brush off; it is not a matter of personal subjective values and preferences but on the consensus of the collective.
Note;
Philosophy
Contemporarily, intersubjectivity is the major topic in both the analytic and the continental traditions of philosophy. Intersubjectivity is considered crucial not only at the relational level but also at the epistemological and even metaphysical levels. For example, intersubjectivity is postulated as playing a role in establishing the truth of propositions, and constituting the so-called objectivity of objects.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubj ... Philosophy
I have already defined objectivity and subjectivity (as well as facts) quite extensively in the OP and am always happy to go into more detail if there are any questions. But why do you ask me to define them even though I already did in great detail?
But I noted your definition of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' is sort of the old fashion kind.
Your definition would be more credible if you were to provide links [philosophy] to indicate there are people who share the same views like your.
Regarding Morality itself, it's debatable whether it should be in agreement with human nature subjectively, but it most definitely can't be dependent upon human nature objectively. It's perfectly possible for it to be coincidentally in accordance with human nature at times, and I would certainly expect that to be the case. But only (inter-) subjective Morality can be fully dependent upon human nature.

Now, an objective system of Morality is descriptive -- it informs us what is and isn't moral, independent of any subjective concerns. However, it does not tell us what we should do, because that would contradict the is-ought-problem.

The flaw with traditional (deontological) approaches to Morality is that they assume certain things to be either moral or immoral; the idea is that there's a binary choice -- either theft is moral or not. Either murder is moral or not. Everywhere, in every case, always. The conclusion is therefore that certain acts should never be committed. Cleverly, this "works" because according to deontological Morality, this is just how things are. If you steal food in order to survive, you're committing an immoral act. As such, it's morally better for you to starve to death rather than to steal.

Intuitively, we understand that this is ridiculous, that's why no one in the real world takes deontological ethics seriously (I mean outside of academia).

In the approach I propose, there are no contradictions or strange conclusions (that I could find so far). This is because it clearly informs us about what it means for something to be moral or immoral in any given circumstance, rather than simply attaching vacuous labels.

Feel free to test it -- you can come up with any kind of philosophical problem or dilemma and I'd be happy to demonstrate how it works.
I don't agree with deontological approaches to morality, i.e. by the dictates of rules or God commands that all must comply or else there is the corresponding punishments by penalties or eternal hellfire.

I believe there are objective moral facts that are inherent within human nature.
Objective in this sense is facts within a FSK that is independent of personal subjective opinions nor beliefs.
That all human has the "oughtness to breathe" is human nature and objective, i.e. independent of any individual or groups subjective opinions or beliefs.
The physical referent to such "oughtness to breathe" [noun] is represented physical neurons, neural algorithms, genes, DNA, atoms, quarks and the likes.
This is empirically verifiable within the scientific-biological FSK.
This is not a coincident but can be tested to be true repeatedly, thus objective as defined.

Similarly there are moral oughtness that is a part of human nature which are independent of individuals' opinion and belief, as such are objective not subjective.

Just like the 'oughtness to breathe' is inherent and instinctive within the Agent, there is no question of forcing one to breathe, there are moral oughtness that the Agent need to develop his moral competence to enable this oughtness to unfold and be activated spontaneously without any forcing by external authorities nor rules.

It is only by such an approach that we can expedite moral progress within humanity.

Note the case of incest and consanguineous [between cousins and close relatives] marriages which is an objective moral ought-not-ness within human nature. Where there are the immoral practice against human nature in this case, we get sort of medical and/or fatal consequences.
It is only when people recognized this objective moral fact of ought-not-ness that there is now a reduction of genetics, medical and fatalities from incest and marriages between close relatives.
There are groups who are ignorant or resist such immoral practices because they are prone to subjectivity, but it is the push that there are objective moral facts to this that we can convince more and more people not to adopt such immoral practice.

Thus as demonstrated, it is objective [verified with evidence within a FSK] mora facts that will be effective for moral progress and not subjective opinions on moral matters.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Peter Holmes »

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 1:44 am Now, my proposed approach to objective Morality is based on the idea that moral rights can be objectively derived by the extent to which they are respected. So if I respect other people's property rights, I can legitimately claim to have my property rights respected, as well. I realize that this sounds a bit simplistic and possibly even naive, that's why I myself was surprised to find that it actually seems to work out when put to the test.

It works mainly due to the logic of rights & duties at its core, which states that if you deny someone's legitimate right to X, you therefore lose that same right to X, as a right is earned by respecting it and lost by not respecting it.

Thus, we now *know* what exactly it means for something to be immoral. This is significant, because traditional moral systems equate immorality with a prescriptive commandment: "you ought not to do X" -- this simply tells us that you should not do X, but not the reason why or in what sense it's "wrong" exactly. In my proposed approach, we are informed precisely of why something is immoral and what it entails.
Hi, Alexander. I've been trying to follow your argument for moral objectivity, and I'm not sure I've got it yet, for which I apologise. The above passage stands out to me, and I have some thoughts about it.

Here's your claim: 'if you deny someone's legitimate right to X, you therefore lose that same right to X, as a right is earned by respecting it and lost by not respecting it.' The condition 'legitimate' is the defeater here, because you're trying to establish legitimacy on the foundation of earning rights by respecting them.

In your model, that person's supposedly legitimate right to X can only come from their respecting someone else's (legitimate?) right, and so on. Put it this way: if I respect someone's right to kill, does that mean I have the right to kill? And then, whither moral objectivity?

So it seems to me your criterion - your test - for moral objectivity doesn't work. It merely legitimises circulated opinion. An opinion held by everyone is still an opinion, whereas a fact acknowledged by nobody is still a fact. If respecting others' right to do X is all that moral objectivity comprises, then it isn't objective.

I suggest you're trying to explain why we do or should think X is morally right or wrong - but not showing why it's a fact that X is morally right or wrong. Which you can't, because there's no such fact.

But sorry again, if I've misconstrued your argument.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 10:34 am In your model, that person's supposedly legitimate right to X can only come from their respecting someone else's (legitimate?) right, and so on. Put it this way: if I respect someone's right to kill, does that mean I have the right to kill? And then, whither moral objectivity?
Of course you do! Everybody has the legitimate right to kill in self-defence.

It sure seems to me you are unaware of the semantic distinction.

Killing is amoral language.
Murder and self-defence are moral language.

So in the way we use language to talk about the world we absolutely make the objective distinction between murder and self-defence.

How could you posibly distinguish any two things if they didn't have different semantic properties?!?
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Peter Holmes »

Der. Semantics is the branch of linguistics that deals with meaning. And outside language, reality is not linguistic. So the expression 'semantic properties' can only refer to language, or linguistic expressions. Nothing outside language has semantic properties.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 8:30 pm
@iambiguous I would be happy to explain how my proposed approach can be applied to any moral issue you can think of. I would only ask to limit it to one to start with.
iambiguous wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 8:43 pm Thanks.

The issue I prefer is abortion. Why? Because...

1] it literally revolves around life and death
2] it is a "conflicting good" that almost everyone is familiar with
3] it often comes up "in the news"
4] it is the issue that resulted in my abandoning objective morality in a No God world and embracing moral nihilism instead

But if you prefer another, that's fine too.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 12, 2023 8:30 pm No, that's perfectly fair, let's do it =)

First of all, I would like to emphasize that subjective values are completely excluded within my proposed approach to objective Morality. This is crucial, because any kind of subjective influence is a distortion of objective reality. This means that when it comes to the question of abortion, it does not matter whether the mother loves or hates the child (or the father), for example. Subjectively, things like these can matter deeply, but objectively they must be ignored. Furthermore, the subjective concerns of *us*, who are here to "judge" the moral value of a particular act of abortion, do not matter in an objective moral calculation, either.

However, objective factors do matter. In fact, every single objective factor is potentially relevant. To clarify: an objective factor is anything that can be observed outside of the perception (or evaluation) of a particular subject.
Okay, before you note your own approach to objective Morality, here is how I would encompass my own subjective, "rooted existentially in dasein" assessment of the morality of abortion:
I believe what many would construe to be two seemingly conflicting [even contradictory] things:

1] that aborting a human fetus is the killing of an innocent human being
2] that women should be afforded full legal rights to choose abortion

As a result, the first thing many point out is that, regarding this issue, I am insisting women should be permitted legally to kill innocent human beings. And that doing so is in this particular context not immoral.

To which I respond:

"Yes, but..."

But:

Just because I construe the fetus to be an innocent human being does not necessarily [objectively] make it so. On the contrary, there are reasonable arguments proffered by those who see the fetus as truly human only at birth or at the point of "viability".

And even if everyone agreed the fetus was an innocent human being from the point of conception, I would still not construe the killing of it as necessarily immoral. Why? Because out in the world we live in there can be no such thing as true "gender equality" if we forced women to give birth against their wishes.

Abortion then is a human tragedy in my view precisely because, like so many other moral conflagrations, it necessarily involves a conflict of legitimate rights.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 1:44 amNow, my proposed approach to objective Morality is based on the idea that moral rights can be objectively derived by the extent to which they are respected. So if I respect other people's property rights, I can legitimately claim to have my property rights respected, as well. I realize that this sounds a bit simplistic and possibly even naive, that's why I myself was surprised to find that it actually seems to work out when put to the test.
Yes, there are those who respect the "natural right" of the unborn to life, while others respect the "political right" of the pregnant woman to choose an abortion. Why? Because, it is argued, in a world where only women can become pregnant, to force women to give birth is to "for all practical purposes" deny them equality with men. Whether in regard to opportunities revolving around education or employment or to any other hopes and dreams that have be put on the shelf. Or abandoned altogether.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 1:44 am It works mainly due to the logic of rights & duties at its core, which states that if you deny someone's legitimate right to X, you therefore lose that same right to X, as a right is earned by respecting it and lost by not respecting it.
Yes, but then we are back to men never becoming pregnant and women always at the risk of becoming pregnant. And, in any number of instances, it being an unwanted pregnancy. Thus the birth of Gloria Steinem's suggestion that 'If men could get pregnant, abortion would be a sacrament'. The "logic" of whose rights? The unborn babies or the women forced to give birth to them?
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 1:44 am Thus, we now *know* what exactly it means for something to be immoral. This is significant, because traditional moral systems equate immorality with a prescriptive commandment: "you ought not to do X" -- this simply tells us that you should not do X, but not the reason why or in what sense it's "wrong" exactly. In my proposed approach, we are informed precisely of why something is immoral and what it entails.
Okay, go to a Planned Parenthood clinic and gather all those around for and against abortion and note this to them. Some insisting that they know precisely that abortion is moral and others insisting that they know precisely that abortion is immoral.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 1:44 am So let's consider an "easy" variation of the question of abortion: there are severe complications during pregnancy which lead the doctor to conclude that an abortion is medically necessary in order to save the mothers life. In this context, if the mother chooses to terminate, she (implicitly) claims to have the right to abort in order to save her own life. If we were to simplify and abstract it, we could consider it "a right to murder in order to preserve one's own life". This means that others can now legitimately claim the same right in regards to her, assuming such a situation were to occur. Now, I'm sure plenty of people would claim to have such a right in any case -- as such, only the most altruistic people would have a legitimate right to blame her for her choice (but they're altruists, so they probably wouldn't). We can therefore conclude that this particular case is fairly clear from the viewpoint of objective Morality, as it pertains to a right that most people would claim to have anyway.
Same thing. Some would note your point and roundly applaud, while others would scoff disdainfully. And, after all, what do you know about their own set of circumstances?

Also, for deontologists like Immanuel Kant, all of this eventually comes back to a transcending font -- God. The omniscient/omnipotent Judgement. Sans God who is to say which "logic" must necessarily prevail among mere mortals?

In other words, to the extent to which we "abstract" something like this is the extent to which it is "simplified" only in that everything then comes around to words defining and defending other words. Tell that to the woman whose life would be completely upended because, due to a defective contraceptive, she became pregnant and the law forces her to give birth.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 1:44 am It gets trickier when we consider the case wherein the baby was conceived by rape. Here, an abortion is not medically necessary. There is no danger to the mothers life. In this case, choosing to terminate can be abstracted as a right to murder a person that you have been forced to care for against your will.
Here of course you are merely assuming that a zygote and an embryo and an early stage fetus is a person. From the point of conception. While others draw the line in different places. For them it's not really a human being at all...just a "clump of cells". Now, as noted above, I believe it is human life from the point of conception. But I also recognize that forcing women to give birth makes them second class citizens politically in any number of ways. Thus being "fractured and fragmented" as "I" myself am out in the is/ought world.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 1:44 am By making this choice, the mother therefore loses her right to not be murdered if she was forced into someone else's care, unable to care for herself. This is not an imminently essential right. However, she can still retain it by delivering the baby and giving it away for adoption. In this way, we can identify the morally "better" option with no reference to subjective concerns.
Over and again, you simply assert things of this sort as though in asserting them that in and of itself makes them true. Like those on the other end of the moral and political spectrum can't assert completely opposite conclusions.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 1:44 am A considerably more difficult case arises when the mother chooses to have an abortion "out of convenience", for example if she finds that she won't be able to retain her previous life style. In this case, the implicitly invoked right can be encapsulated as the right to murder for personal convenience. As such, the mother loses the right to not be murdered for another persons convenience. This might seem cruel, but please keep in mind that not having a right to not be murdered does not equal "should be murdered". This actually brings us to the best part of objective Morality, because it informs us about how such a scenario can best be handled.
Indeed. And in a No God world, any number of narcissists and sociopaths will note exactly that. No God, no Judgment Day. No Judgment Day and for them right and wrong revolves entirely around what they perceive to be in their own selfish interest. Try using the logic of objective Morality on them.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 13, 2023 1:44 am First of all, it's important for everyone involved to realize that an abortion "out of convenience" (or for any subjective concern) is a very serious choice, as it undermines the mothers right to not be murdered. Now, maybe everyone involved is perfectly fine with her choice -- all that this means is that everyone involved therefore also doesn't have much of a claim to the right to not be murdered out of convenience. I want to stress again that objective Morality only informs us about the Morality of any given situation, the actual decisions we make are entirely up to us. So if the people involved care about their rights to not be murdered, they should therefore be very concerned with the mothers choice and question it. If the mother cares about her own right not to be murdered, she must make an effort to reclaim her right to not be murdered.
Back again to explaining this to those who are passionately for or against abortion outside an abortion clinic. Do you really imagine that it will change many minds? Does any of this make the "conflicting goods" themselves go away?

Because, beyond discussing and debating it in a "ethical theory" forum in places like this, it will have almost no impact whatsoever in regard to the actual abortion wars that are raging all around us. in fact, how often does philosophy -- ethical theory -- come up at all here?
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

@Peter Holmes -- thank you for your questions; I completely understand where you're coming from, as I had precisely the same concerns at first. I agree that the term "legitimate" sounds confusing in this context, maybe something clearer will emerge (suggestions are welcome :D ). There are also a couple of other terms that are perhaps not optimal. I think the best way to clarify the details is by walking through the entire logical process with a simple, basic example:

Let's say I consistently demonstrate respect towards the property rights of the people around me. On this basis, I claim to have the right to receive the same level of respect from others towards my property. From a duty point of view, we can say that I have followed my duty to respect the property rights of others.

Now, I'll be honest here, I'm not entirely satisfied with my terminology here, so let me define it in a more extensive and more technical manner: when I say that subject X "respects" right Y, what I mean is that we can observe (objectively) that this subject acts as if they have a duty to follow Y. This means that we don't care whether subject X subjectively values Y or what their intentions and goals are. We only care about their measurable, observable actions. In other words, we implicitly infer that X accepts the validity of right Y (even if they don't have conscious awareness of this), and on this basis, we can tell when other subjects respect right Y in relation to subject X.

This is where it's easy to misunderstand my proposition, because I'm not claiming that subject X actually has a right to Y. I'm claiming that subject X can be objectively identified as "respecting" right Y, and based on this objective fact they can "legitimately" (but subjectively) invoke a right to Y.

Right Y does not exist in any kind of physical sense -- it's an abstract description of a subjects state on the basis of past actions, similar to "subject X is a good painter" or "subject X is a veteran". A right is therefore a subjectively defined concept which can be mapped to observable reality and hence utilized objectively.

To "legitimately" claim a right therefore means that your past actions have been consistent with the concept of a particular right. Inversely, one can not claim to have a legitimate claim to a particular right if it can be demonstrated that one's actions were in defiance of that right.

But none of this is to say that there's an objective prescription for us to respect rights or anything like that. Everything I just explained is to be understood in a descriptive sense. I've merely construed abstract concepts that we can apply and compare to observed reality.

Here's where it gets really interesting, though: what happens if there's subject Z who does not recognize subject X's right to their property? (Again, I'm not talking about subject Z's subjective "opinion" regarding subject X's property right, but rather concrete actions which demonstrate their lack of "respect" for right Y) -- What this tells us is that subject Z does not respect right Y. Hence, they can't "legitimately" claim to have a right to Y. Thus, subject X has no longer a duty to respect property rights relative to subject Z. So if subject X or any other subject were to demonstrate a lack of respect towards the property rights of subject Z, they would not disrespect right X, because they didn't have a duty to respect it relative to subject Z in the first place (in the same sense that a subject doesn't have a duty to respect the "right" of an object).

Now, does this mean we have to respect subject X's right to steal or damage subject Z's property? No -- but we can infer that subject X no longer has a duty to respect our judgement. In this way, we can use this approach recursively, ad infinitum, in order to understand the moral status in any given situation and at any point in time.

I hope this clarified a few things, but I would also like to briefly examine the specific counterpoint regarding accepting someone's right to kill.

As I explained before, since we're aiming for objective Morality, we're only allowed to refer to objective observations in order to determine if a subject respects a particular right or not. So if you personally "respect" (in a subjective sense) other people's right to kill, your particular preference can't be used in a moral calculation. However, if you murder another person (or make a serious threat or attempt at it), we can conclude that you do not respect the right to not be murdered. As such, you yourself lose your "legitimate" claim to the right not to be murdered.

Does this make sense?
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