A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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iambiguous
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by iambiguous »

iambiguous wrote: Wed Jan 18, 2023 8:29 pm Again, though, my own point here focuses less on what one believes about abortion and more on how, existentially, what one believes is the embodiment of dasein rather than any "objective moral system" that can be derived using the tools of philosophy. Claiming rights here is one thing, establishing that the rights you claim are logically and epistemologically sound -- the soundest -- another thing altogether.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am I really don't get the sense you're arguing against my position, since I actually agree with many of the points you make -- but in a general sense, not so much in relation to my proposed approach to objective Morality.
In a "general sense"? But my point here revolves precisely around the distinction I make between discussing the morality of abortion theoretically in an "ethical theory" forum, and taking whatever conclusions you come to here to a Planned Parenthood clinic where there is a confrontation between those who support a woman's right to choose and those who do not. Given all of the vast and varied sets of existential circumstances that can unfold pertaining to any one particular unwanted pregnancy.

That's why, above, I noted this:
This being posted in the "ethical theory" sub-forum, what is discussed and debated will probably not revolve around my own main interest here...connecting the dots between conclusions reached theoretically and the applicability of these "definitions and deductions" pertaining to actual moral conflicts out in the world of human interactions.
iambiguous wrote: Fri Jan 20, 2023 8:16 pm
You agreed to explore this distinction with me in regard to abortion.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Sat Jan 21, 2023 2:30 am From my point of view, this is exactly what I did. I provided you with examples for various circumstances and explained how they can be approached on the basis of a morally objective model. Not in perfect detail, not nearly comprehensive, and not even very accurate -- but it was a start.
iambiguous wrote: Mon Jan 23, 2023 9:11 pm In my view, you explained it as one might expect it to be explained in an "ethical theory" philosophy forum. The explanation that I am interested in however is one that would be noted to a woman confronting "the agony of choice in the face of uncertainty" that revolves around an unwanted pregnancy. Your "morally objective model" explained to those outside the abortion clinic where those on both sides of the issue are going at each other.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 1:44 amI truly understand your argument; I understand that you're concerned with real-life circumstances, tragedies and states of affairs.

But the reason why any of these questions are "difficult" is because we're talking about people who have their own subjective interests and usually are only open to hearing whatever supports those interests.
Exactly. That why I am curious as to what you would say to those for and against abortion at the Planned Parenthood clinc, or in a legislature considering laws pertaining to abortion or in a court about to rule on abortion legislation, such that you would enable them to grasp more clearly objective Morality as you encompass it theoretically here.

That's what philosophers who pursue objective Morality in an "ethical theory" forum are eventually/ultimately faced with, right? Taking their definitions and deductions down out of the academic/scholastic clouds and introducing them to the actual existential realities embedded in the abortion conflagrations themselves.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am There is nothing that you can say or do to convince a person who has no intention of honestly considering your point of view. All you can do in such a case is to make yourself aware of this fact and dispel the illusion that you're obligated to respect their point of view.
Again and again: the pro-life folks insist that the problem "down here" is that the pro-choice folks have no intention of being honest because in being honest about abortion they would embrace the "natural right" of the unborn to exist beyond the womb. And then the "pro-choice" folks insist that, on the contrary, the pro-life folks have no intention of being honest because in being honest about abortion they would embrace a woman's "political right" to choose abortion in order to secure equality with men in a world where biologically only women can become pregnant.

The part where in regard to morality those on both sides are honestly able to make reasonable arguments given different sets of assumptions about the human condition pertaining to unwanted pregnancies.

Then the part where you do bring your own subjective assumptions about objective Morality down out of the theoretical clouds. But not here. There. Given the contexts I noted above.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am For example, if a serial killer intends to murder you, the morally correct conclusion is to understand that they do not have your interests in mind and as such you are under no obligation to respect their interests. It's not about whether killing is moral or immoral -- that's just noise. It's all about what right can legitimately be claimed. In this particular case, you can claim a right to self-defense.
Come on, in an actual human community it will rarely come down to the two individuals alone. Instead, others in the community will react to the conflict. To the murder if there is one. And out in the real world that will often revolve around how individual community members construe the morality of killing another. Why did John feel justified in killing Jim? Why did Jim believe it was unjustified?

Then the nature of the community itself. In a might makes right world if John can kill Jim [for whatever reason] that justifies it. In a right makes might world the community attempts to determine which side was morally justified in behaving as they did...John killing Jim, Jim killing John in self-defense.

And in a community that revolves around "democracy and the rule of law" courts of law are established to hear both sides and attempt to determine which man acted the most reasonably. And then for many, rationality and morality -- think Ayn Rand and Immanuel Kant -- are interchangeable.

Only Rand was an atheist and Kant embraced a "transcending font".
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am So it's not meaningful to ask: "is abortion moral or immoral"?
Right. Stop a thousand men and women at random in communities from coast to coast and ask them if "is abortion moral or immoral"? is meaningful to them.

Then, from my own frame of mind, straight back up into the theoretical clouds you go:
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 19, 2023 1:57 am This question can't be answered, because this would violate the is-ought-dichotomy. Rather, the question is under which circumstances a right to abortion can legitimately be claimed. This question can be answered by reference to the concrete circumstances (but without relying on subjective preferences). On this basis it's possible to create laws which are, in theory, sophisticated enough to respond to any circumstance in the morally precisely correct manner. I would be happy to explain this in more detail, but I gather this isn't what you're interested in.
Again, what I am interested in is you explaining it "to those for and against abortion at the Planned Parenthood clinc, or in a legislature considering laws pertaining to abortion or in a court about to rule on abortion legislation, such that you would enable them to grasp more clearly objective Morality as you encompass it theoretically here."
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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Wed Jan 25, 2023 1:05 pm I'm afraid that ends your argument. You are applying the reasonable man test because there is no stricter application of reason which could possibly support that leap you need to make.

The problem with the man on the Clapham Omnibus (sorry, no idea what the German equivalent is) is that he is considered reasonable because he shares our usual set of normative values and all of those prejudices of which we are not ashamed.
I'm afraid ze German term is as dry as our humor; we just call it "der Durchschnittsbürger" -- literally "the average citizen".

I follow your reasoning, but it seems to me that if this argument was sufficient to refute a logical framework, then we would not have any logical frameworks, at all. For example, would you say that math is invalid because it requires a "reasonable" person to use it? After all, an "unreasonable" person could completely reject math without an issue. And in fact, many do. Does this simple fact end math?

It seems to me that the choice to accept any kind of logical framework is always a subjective one, even for something as foundational as valuing facts over whims. But as long as the framework can be utilized to derive consistent conclusions and predictions that can be compared against observable reality, it should be considered viable. Not because we're somehow compelled to use it by an external force, but rather because it provides those who desire a systematic approach to derive useful information from raw data with exactly that.

Is this a fair assessment or am I missing something? What do you think?
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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

iambiguous wrote: Wed Jan 25, 2023 9:15 pm Again, what I am interested in is you explaining it "to those for and against abortion at the Planned Parenthood clinc, or in a legislature considering laws pertaining to abortion or in a court about to rule on abortion legislation, such that you would enable them to grasp more clearly objective Morality as you encompass it theoretically here."
Can you provide me with concrete details of a (hypothetical) case? Objective moral judgments naturally rely on detailed, accurate information. I need to know the specifics, such as who is involved, what their interests are, and anything else that would appear relevant (i.e. the information that would normally be presented to the judge). Then I can demonstrate how we can derive objective conclusions about it.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by FlashDangerpants »

At least one of these two claims must be untrue
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Tue Jan 24, 2023 6:44 pm And this is how a moral conclusion can be derived, even though every prior step has been purely objective and descriptive.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 1:06 am It seems to me that the choice to accept any kind of logical framework is always a subjective one
You just let us know when you've made your mind up.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 1:18 am At least one of these two claims must be untrue
That's fair, and I already clarified before that I considered subjective choices to be variables which can contain any value, which is why I didn't consider them relevant.

As I mentioned before, my claim is that there is no fundamental difference between what I'm proposing and, say, arithmetic. For example, let's take the following problem:

"Nina has a hand of 4 bananas (that's what a banana bunch is called), weighing a total of 500g. Nina intends to bake a banana cake, which requires 800g worth of bananas. How many more banana fingers should Nina add to get the desired amount? Careful: The banana shell weighs 25g per banana."

Correct me if I'm wrong, but this kind of problem is usually considered to have one perfectly objective solution -- even though it contains quite a number of subjective variables:

- Nina wants to bake a banana cake
- Nina wants to bake the cake with the correct amount of bananas as per her recipe
- Nina wants to use math to determine how many bananas she needs to buy

But beyond these hypothetical preferences, we as readers of this problem must choose to use arithmetic operations in order to solve it, if we want to solve it.

How would you interpret this? Is the problem partially subjective and partially objective? Is math in itself partly subjective?

Or is it just that these choices are merely variables and don't really affect the nature of mathematics, at all?
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 1:50 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 1:18 am At least one of these two claims must be untrue
That's fair, and I already clarified before that I considered subjective choices to be variables which can contain any value, which is why I didn't consider them relevant.
Is that a definition or what? It doesn't really mean anything to me I'm afraid.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 1:50 am As I mentioned before, my claim is that there is no fundamental difference between what I'm proposing and, say, arithmetic.
Not a strong claim. Arithmetic uses properties that are arguably fictional, but which clearly supervene to natural properties. Morality uses properties that I argue are fictional and that don't have any obvious supervenience relationship.

If you have one apple in your inventory and you add an apple to your inventory, you have two apples in your inventory. Two instances of the type "apple" are more than one, which is why we got to two by adding another. The number is a name we apply to a natural observable fact. If somebody is ever of the subjective belief that two is not less than one, you may use two of any discrete object to take them through a demonstration that they are objectively mistaken.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 9:27 am Not a strong claim. Arithmetic uses properties that are arguably fictional, but which clearly supervene to natural properties. Morality uses properties that I argue are fictional and that don't have any obvious supervenience relationship.
"Natural properties" is an oxymoron. Properties are qualia. Subjective characteristics.

Take the intuitive concept of "smoothness" which has a precise mathematical definition.
At the very minimum, a function could be considered smooth if it is differentiable everywhere (hence continuous)
Reality is smooth because you can "differentiate" it anywhere. Difference here - difference there. Difference wherever you like.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 9:27 am Not a strong claim. Arithmetic uses properties that are arguably fictional, but which clearly supervene to natural properties. Morality uses properties that I argue are fictional and that don't have any obvious supervenience relationship.
I agree that concepts are only useful to the degree they can be aligned with real-world observations. But this depends on how we define a particular concept, no? So if we define "moral" as "that which is good", then I would agree with you. This definition is circular, and there's no obvious way how it could be compared against a real-world observation.

But that's why in my approach, the term "moral" is applied to a concept which has emerged as a result of the application of the rights and duties logic, so it's already applicable to actual, observable real-world behavior. I simply argue that it is appropriate to call the act of respecting the right of another person, which has been "earned" on the basis of consistently respecting the same right relative to other people, moral, and not doing so immoral.

Now, I realize that I'm using some "questionable" terms such as "earned", but they are precisely defined within the framework and as such can be applied to real-world observations. "Earning" a right is accomplished by consistently acting as if one has a duty to respect that right relative to other people, which is something that can, in principle, be observed objectively, and thus validated or invalidated.
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 9:27 am If you have one apple in your inventory and you add an apple to your inventory, you have two apples in your inventory. Two instances of the type "apple" are more than one, which is why we got to two by adding another. The number is a name we apply to a natural observable fact. If somebody is ever of the subjective belief that two is not less than one, you may use two of any discrete object to take them through a demonstration that they are objectively mistaken.
Yes -- would you agree that we can also differentiate between "types" of actions or behaviors? Is it possible, for example, to identify an act of stealing or an act of killing? It seems to me that it is possible to objectively identify such acts in pretty much the same way as we can identify the number of instances of a particular type of object.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 6:10 pm
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 9:27 am Not a strong claim. Arithmetic uses properties that are arguably fictional, but which clearly supervene to natural properties. Morality uses properties that I argue are fictional and that don't have any obvious supervenience relationship.
I agree that concepts are only useful to the degree they can be aligned with real-world observations. But this depends on how we define a particular concept, no? So if we define "moral" as "that which is good", then I would agree with you. This definition is circular, and there's no obvious way how it could be compared against a real-world observation.

But that's why in my approach, the term "moral" is applied to a concept which has emerged as a result of the application of the rights and duties logic, so it's already applicable to actual, observable real-world behavior. I simply argue that it is appropriate to call the act of respecting the right of another person, which has been "earned" on the basis of consistently respecting the same right relative to other people, moral, and not doing so immoral.

Now, I realize that I'm using some "questionable" terms such as "earned", but they are precisely defined within the framework and as such can be applied to real-world observations. "Earning" a right is accomplished by consistently acting as if one has a duty to respect that right relative to other people, which is something that can, in principle, be observed objectively, and thus validated or invalidated.
That's a highly confused situation. The decision to initiate the parameters of the construct within which you operate your moral situation is purely subjective with no hope of rescue. But you want to use a bunch of stuff inside it to generate the objectivity to rescue the host. I would counter that the fruit of the subjective tree is subjective and the tree remains subjective too.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 6:10 pm
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 9:27 am If you have one apple in your inventory and you add an apple to your inventory, you have two apples in your inventory. Two instances of the type "apple" are more than one, which is why we got to two by adding another. The number is a name we apply to a natural observable fact. If somebody is ever of the subjective belief that two is not less than one, you may use two of any discrete object to take them through a demonstration that they are objectively mistaken.
Yes -- would you agree that we can also differentiate between "types" of actions or behaviors? Is it possible, for example, to identify an act of stealing or an act of killing? It seems to me that it is possible to objectively identify such acts in pretty much the same way as we can identify the number of instances of a particular type of object.
No. I think that a lot of people are trying to get cute with objectivity and figure little workarounds that have a nice feel. Objectivity does something though, it has a role to play, if you make a new thing that doesn't fillfulfil that role, your new thing is not objectivity. So take the maths thing. Imagine some guy says that it is perfectly possible to divide three apples equally between four people. You can objectively demonstrate his factual error.

Anything objective that you can say about an act of taking something without permission or killing somebody without a piece of paper from God saying you are allowed to kill that person is that person X was at location Y where an act that contravenes some specific convention/law/custom occurs. Should the person have done that thing? That's still subjective.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by Alexander_Reiswich »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 6:57 pm Imagine some guy says that it is perfectly possible to divide three apples equally between four people. You can objectively demonstrate his factual error.
Not sure if this is a great example 😅
You can just cut each apple into four equal slices and give every person 3 slices.

I suppose you meant to say "divide three whole apples" -- then yes. But it's an arbitrary restriction. If the goal is to equally split three apples between four people, then there is nothing wrong with cutting each apple into four parts.

Similarly, I don't think it makes sense to set arbitrary restrictions for a logical framework such as the one I propose. I understand where you're coming from because morality is generally understood in a prescriptive sense, but I specifically said that my approach is descriptive -- and this isn't just trick or workaround; it's a solution.

FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 6:57 pm Anything objective that you can say about an act of taking something without permission or killing somebody without a piece of paper from God saying you are allowed to kill that person is that person X was at location Y where an act that contravenes some specific convention/law/custom occurs. Should the person have done that thing? That's still subjective.
Well, that's not what I'm claiming. My entire point is that the adjectives "moral" and "immoral", within my approach, can be used descriptively, not prescriptively. In other words, they have a specific meaning which can be applied to observable reality.

The statements that can be made within my approach are analogous to the proposition "if you build this bridge in this particular manner, it will collapse if more than one car at a time crosses it". Nothing in this sentence implies that you, objectively, should not build a bridge in this particular manner. Maybe it's only intended to be used by one person at a time, in which case it would be entirely stable enough. However, we can objectively conclude that the bridge is not fit for frequent automobile traffic. So if your goal is to use it for cars, your bridge design would be objectively wrong.

Similarly, if your interest is to respect the legitimate rights of others, then acting in ways that violate other people's rights is wrong.

Now, as I have already pointed out a few times: you can be perfectly happy with violating other people's rights, as this is a subjective choice. But this doesn't matter, because this framework -- just as any other logical framework -- is a tool for those who wish to use it in order to reach a (subjective) goal, in this case to respect other people's rights. So if you don't respect other people's rights, then I can objectively identify you via the logic of the proposed framework.

And here's something to think about: I would argue that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with saying "if you want to be moral, you must choose to act morally", as long as the term "moral" is defined in a descriptive sense (well, other than it being a bit of a tautological "duh" type of statement). This is true for any descriptive concept (that describes a behavior):

- if you want to be honest, you must choose to act honestly
- if you want to be patient, you must choose to act patiently
- if you want to be optimistic, you must choose to act optimistically
- etc.

The terms "honesty", "patience", "optimism", etc. have clear definitions which can be assigned to concrete behaviors. As such it's trivial to formulate them in terms of hypothetical imperatives. The reason why this can't be done for the traditional term "moral" is because it's not descriptive. So what's actually being said is this:

- if you want to act as you ought to act, you must act as you ought to act

I think it goes without saying that this is circular and makes zero sense 😂

Now, this observation is nothing new -- that's why various descriptive definitions have been proposed, such as perhaps most famously the utilitarian one. The problem with it is that it's nowhere near as definitive as it proclaims to be. First of all, it includes two values -- a positive and a negative one. So right off the bat the question becomes: should we prefer maximizing the positive one in favor of minimizing the negative one? Or the other way around? There is no obvious answer here.

But that's not all: it's not even clear what exactly the positive and negative values should be. Originally we thought in terms of pleasure vs pain, then happiness vs. unhappiness, then benefit vs harm, etc. There are literally dozens of proposed variations, and many additional factors that have to be considered.

As a result, no two utilitarians will be able to reach the same conclusions (given reasonably complex circumstances), as they have to make countless subjective choices that inform their decision making process.

The approach I propose has none of these problems, because it avoids relying on values. The reason why utilitarianism fails is because it's defined in terms of values, but values are inherently subjective, and as such the idea that there are "ultimate" values is complete nonsense. So the only way to solve this problem is to not utilize any values, at all. Rather, we simply use rights and duties. This approach may be less intuitive, but it's completely unambiguous, as it's literally only possible to either respect rights (by acting as if one has a duty to respect them) or not. Because of this, any moral problem can be resolved in a definitive and predictable manner which leaves no room for "opinions" (given all relevant facts are known).

This also tells us in which way exactly it can be falsified: If you want to refute it, all you have to do is demonstrate how, by applying it properly, it's possible to arrive at completely different conclusions to the same problem.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 1:16 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 6:57 pm Imagine some guy says that it is perfectly possible to divide three apples equally between four people. You can objectively demonstrate his factual error.
Not sure if this is a great example 😅
You can just cut each apple into four equal slices and give every person 3 slices.

I suppose you meant to say "divide three whole apples" -- then yes. But it's an arbitrary restriction. If the goal is to equally split three apples between four people, then there is nothing wrong with cutting each apple into four parts.

Similarly, I don't think it makes sense to set arbitrary restrictions for a logical framework such as the one I propose. I understand where you're coming from because morality is generally understood in a prescriptive sense, but I specifically said that my approach is descriptive -- and this isn't just trick or workaround; it's a solution.
The giveaway there is that you had to use pedantry ('fly fucking' in some of Europe's cooler languages) rather than an actual counter there. You could have blended the apples and then shared out the resultant soup equally, or you could have thrown one apple away and then chop two in half. But what you couldn't offer was a subjective solution where somebody just follows different mathematical rules to everyone else and does hand out an apple to each recipient.

You went the way you did because you agree that the truth conditions of an arithmetical assertion can be demonstrated objectively using the naturally countable properties of real world objects. And that external means of confirmation that resolves contraditions and (in ideal circumstances) ambiguities too, that's what objectivity really is.

To put it into terms that seem to fit your current design, the relationship between the abstract nouns with which we think about mathematics and the real world which contains the natural properties is descriptive in nature. But you seem to be hoping to have a similarly descriptive account of morality. And it looks like we both have noticed the absence of a moral equivalent of those countable properties, but at this point my inclination is to say that this descriptive account of morality can't happen, whereas you are bout to go on a wild ride....
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 1:16 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 6:57 pm Anything objective that you can say about an act of taking something without permission or killing somebody without a piece of paper from God saying you are allowed to kill that person is that person X was at location Y where an act that contravenes some specific convention/law/custom occurs. Should the person have done that thing? That's still subjective.
Well, that's not what I'm claiming. My entire point is that the adjectives "moral" and "immoral", within my approach, can be used descriptively, not prescriptively. In other words, they have a specific meaning which can be applied to observable reality.

The statements that can be made within my approach are analogous to the proposition "if you build this bridge in this particular manner, it will collapse if more than one car at a time crosses it". Nothing in this sentence implies that you, objectively, should not build a bridge in this particular manner. Maybe it's only intended to be used by one person at a time, in which case it would be entirely stable enough. However, we can objectively conclude that the bridge is not fit for frequent automobile traffic. So if your goal is to use it for cars, your bridge design would be objectively wrong.

Similarly, if your interest is to respect the legitimate rights of others, then acting in ways that violate other people's rights is wrong.

Now, as I have already pointed out a few times: you can be perfectly happy with violating other people's rights, as this is a subjective choice. But this doesn't matter, because this framework -- just as any other logical framework -- is a tool for those who wish to use it in order to reach a (subjective) goal, in this case to respect other people's rights. So if you don't respect other people's rights, then I can objectively identify you via the logic of the proposed framework.

And here's something to think about: I would argue that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with saying "if you want to be moral, you must choose to act morally", as long as the term "moral" is defined in a descriptive sense (well, other than it being a bit of a tautological "duh" type of statement). This is true for any descriptive concept (that describes a behavior):

- if you want to be honest, you must choose to act honestly
- if you want to be patient, you must choose to act patiently
- if you want to be optimistic, you must choose to act optimistically
- etc.
Are you aiming for a Disquotational truth theory or did you end up there by accident?

Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 1:16 am The terms "honesty", "patience", "optimism", etc. have clear definitions which can be assigned to concrete behaviors. As such it's trivial to formulate them in terms of hypothetical imperatives. The reason why this can't be done for the traditional term "moral" is because it's not descriptive. So what's actually being said is this:

- if you want to act as you ought to act, you must act as you ought to act

I think it goes without saying that this is circular and makes zero sense 😂

Now, this observation is nothing new -- that's why various descriptive definitions have been proposed, such as perhaps most famously the utilitarian one. The problem with it is that it's nowhere near as definitive as it proclaims to be. First of all, it includes two values -- a positive and a negative one. So right off the bat the question becomes: should we prefer maximizing the positive one in favor of minimizing the negative one? Or the other way around? There is no obvious answer here.
Here I am getting confused again about what it is that you mean by "descriptive". Utilitarianism is assertoric, it asserts that certain types of valuing are logically prior to others, there is no descriptive way to assert such things, it is prescriptive. The theory that is most commonly referred to as descriptive in my experience is the one that was cooked specifically to be descriptive, which is non-congitivism, in which moral assertions don't actually have assertoric content with truth conditions and stuff, but instead are describing states of mind such as emotions or similar for which there can be no truth condition.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 1:16 am But that's not all: it's not even clear what exactly the positive and negative values should be. Originally we thought in terms of pleasure vs pain, then happiness vs. unhappiness, then benefit vs harm, etc. There are literally dozens of proposed variations, and many additional factors that have to be considered.

As a result, no two utilitarians will be able to reach the same conclusions (given reasonably complex circumstances), as they have to make countless subjective choices that inform their decision making process.
I think you have placed far too much confidence in this behaviour thing of yours. There is no real scope for you to unambiguously supervene a behaviour to a moral quality and there is no way to confirm that all instances apply the same mapping. Your interpretation of a behaviour contains suppositions on your part and other obeservers will suppose on thier own part.
Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 1:16 am The approach I propose has none of these problems, because it avoids relying on values. The reason why utilitarianism fails is because it's defined in terms of values, but values are inherently subjective, and as such the idea that there are "ultimate" values is complete nonsense. So the only way to solve this problem is to not utilize any values, at all. Rather, we simply use rights and duties. This approach may be less intuitive, but it's completely unambiguous, as it's literally only possible to either respect rights (by acting as if one has a duty to respect them) or not. Because of this, any moral problem can be resolved in a definitive and predictable manner which leaves no room for "opinions" (given all relevant facts are known).

This also tells us in which way exactly it can be falsified: If you want to refute it, all you have to do is demonstrate how, by applying it properly, it's possible to arrive at completely different conclusions to the same problem.
So that other stuff is how we got to here. The unbridgeable gap between facts and values that makes moral objectivity impossible by normal methods could be fixed either by finding values which beome objective by way of fact, or by just sacrificing values and making an objective morality out of nothing but observable facts. You're almost being fairly clear about which option you are taking, but I don't think you are willing to accept the compromises it requires of you.

I still don't understand right now is how you think you can make that work with something so heavily infested with values as a "right"?

And I can't tell if you are planning to take the final plunge and say that moral language already actually means what you are describing, or if you think we should amend our moral language to conform with your proposal, or if you are just creating this seperate thing that isn't morality, let's call it morality-proper - that has no real bearing on anything and no outcomes?
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Alexander_Reiswich
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Thx again for the interesting and stimulating observations and arguments 😄
...although I'll skip a few to retain some semblance of focus, but I will try to cover as much as possible.
FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 12:33 pm Here I am getting confused again about what it is that you mean by "descriptive". Utilitarianism is assertoric, it asserts that certain types of valuing are logically prior to others, there is no descriptive way to assert such things, it is prescriptive. The theory that is most commonly referred to as descriptive in my experience is the one that was cooked specifically to be descriptive, which is non-congitivism, in which moral assertions don't actually have assertoric content with truth conditions and stuff, but instead are describing states of mind such as emotions or similar for which there can be no truth condition.
I wasn't quite aware of this, good to know! -- What I mean by "descriptive" is nothing crazy; I consider a concept to be descriptive when it describes something that we can observe in the world around us. For example, I would argue that the terms "pain" and "pleasure" are descriptive, because -- even though they refer to subjective experiences -- it's possible to perceive and discern them through various means.

Yes, utilitarianism asserts i.e. that pleasure ought to be maximized and that pain ought to be minimized. In this sense utilitarianism provides a concrete definition for what it means for something to be moral or immoral: it's "moral" to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, and "immoral" to minimize pleasure and maximize pain.

This stands in contrast to deontological ethics, where "immoral" is generally just defined as that which shouldn't be done. So these terms don't describe anything in particular, not even a subjective emotion. Rather, they're purely prescriptive: you shouldn't do X because it's wrong and ought not to be done.

I would argue that a descriptive approach such as utilitarianism can be used meaningfully without assertions -- its proponents just happen to assign a positive value to pleasure and a negative one to pain. However, we could just as well say that they're equal, or that it's not possible to say which is truly positive and negative. In this case, utilitarianism would simply inform us how to maximize or minimize either pain or pleasure, without a value judgement. This would be a more "honest" version of utilitarianism, since assigning objective value to subjective values is fallacious. It's not even that difficult to imagine circumstances where minimizing pleasure or maximizing pain would be entirely appropriate (although I realize utilitarians would argue that in the long run, everything is done to maximize pleasure in some sense -- which is probably an unfalsifiable claim).

Moral relativism can also be understood in a purely descriptive sense: it informs us of what some cultures deem to be moral or immoral, but it doesn't tell us what ought to be moral or immoral.

This descriptive approach is what I'm focusing on in my proposition: it's all about discerning which rights are being respected (by acting as if one has a duty to respect them) and identifying when they're not being respected. But it's not like respecting rights is inherently "good" -- I don't claim that we "ought" to value "respect for rights" in some general sense or assert this to be "moral". Rather, I'm saying that claiming a right without having earned it -- this precise act -- is what is deserving of being called immoral. Not because it's some sort of (negative) value like "pain" or "harm" (it's not), but because it's a logical contradiction, meaning it's literally "wrong", in the same sense as a mathematical error.

FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 12:33 pm I think you have placed far too much confidence in this behaviour thing of yours. There is no real scope for you to unambiguously supervene a behaviour to a moral quality and there is no way to confirm that all instances apply the same mapping. Your interpretation of a behaviour contains suppositions on your part and other obeservers will suppose on thier own part.
I understand your argument, but there is a distinction between hypothetical and real-world scenarios. In hypothetical scenarios, we can know the state of mind of every subject involved in a particular scenario. In the real world, it's not as easy of course. We have to investigate and research and scrutinize, and it's never possible to reach 100% certainty about any conclusion. But I don't find this to be an insurmountable hurdle -- as explained before, the nature of objective Morality should be comparable to math, rather than empirical sciences. Applied objective Morality will have to deal with the uncertainties inherent to an environment of imperfect information, but in the theoretical context, we can be as omniscient as we like.

Now, if your claim is that ambiguity is unavoidable despite perfect information, then this would indeed be a problem. But I don't really see that. Maybe you can come up with a concrete example?

FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 12:33 pm You're almost being fairly clear about which option you are taking, but I don't think you are willing to accept the compromises it requires of you.
What do you mean?

FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 12:33 pm I still don't understand right now is how you think you can make that work with something so heavily infested with values as a "right"?
Yes, I rely on very bare-bones, primitive definitions of rights and duties which are free from values. Utilizing any other definitions that include values of some kind would be problematic.

FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Jan 27, 2023 12:33 pm And I can't tell if you are planning to take the final plunge and say that moral language already actually means what you are describing, or if you think we should amend our moral language to conform with your proposal, or if you are just creating this seperate thing that isn't morality, let's call it morality-proper - that has no real bearing on anything and no outcomes?
The reason I'm cautiously optimistic about this approach -- even though I don't fully get it myself :P -- is because it aligns really well with thoroughly reasoned moral analyses such as for instance regarding the trolley problem, which was initially explored by Phillipa Foot and then analyzed further by J.J.Thomson to reach the following conclusions (regarding the initial formulation):
  • It's permissible to flip the switch to save 5 people instead of one
  • It's not required to flip the switch, since you are in no way responsible for the whole situation
To reach these conclusions, Foot and Thomson attempted to formulate principles that would allow them to reach conclusions which align with our intuitive sensibilities, utilitarian ideals, notions of human rights, common sense and countless other considerations. The result is a very thorough, exhaustive line of reasoning -- but also a very verbose and complex one, relying on many assumptions to essentially reach a tailored justification for a very specific problem (which reveals certain limitations once you start changing the parameters of the thought experiment).

The rights and duties approach I present explains it in an arguably considerably simpler way, and it remains consistent no matter how you tweak the parameters:

The idea is that if you (act as if you) respect the right to not be murdered, you have a duty to prevent people from being murdered if it's within your capabilities. But if you must violate this duty while following it, it can't be a legitimate duty. Therefore you don't have a legitimate duty to flip the switch.

However, this doesn't mean that you mustn't flip the switch -- because you neither have a duty to flip nor not to flip the switch, you can flip it for subjective reasons (or consciously choose not to, for subjective reasons). This is important, because a principle that leads you to conclude that saving the maximum number of lives is always preferable is problematic. For example, what if the five people are dangerous criminals and the one person is completely innocent?

So what happens if you choose to flip the switch? Well, all that happens (from the viewpoint of objective Morality) is that you -- implicitly, through your choice -- claim the right to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of many. As such, technically, you lose your legitimate claim to not be sacrificed by someone else in a similar situation (which would make a difference if this were to happen and the person in front of the switch was aware of it). Naturally, this is a bit of a "theoretical" right, and it's somewhat offset by the gratitude you (hopefully) gained from those you saved, so it's not surprising that most people would (in theory) choose to intuitively flip the switch in this situation.

However, your intentions do matter, even though you're not responsible for the situation. For example, if there was a video camera that caught you on tape as you flipped the switch while mumbling to yourself how fun it would be to see that one guy in particular getting squashed by a train, then your right to not be murdered would be severely called into question, as this would constitute objective evidence against your respect for the right to not be murdered.

I could go on, but there's really no end to it once you start experimenting with alternative parameters and such.

So yeah, I'm not sure how this approach should be interpreted, but it does explain what's happening in any given scenario in a straightforward manner, without any need for exceptions and such. So it would seem to me that this approach is a reasonably accurate abstraction of whatever our general understanding of morality constitutes.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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Alexander_Reiswich wrote: Thu Jan 26, 2023 1:17 am
iambiguous wrote: Wed Jan 25, 2023 9:15 pm Again, what I am interested in is you explaining it "to those for and against abortion at the Planned Parenthood clinc, or in a legislature considering laws pertaining to abortion or in a court about to rule on abortion legislation, such that you would enable them to grasp more clearly objective Morality as you encompass it theoretically here."
Can you provide me with concrete details of a (hypothetical) case? Objective moral judgments naturally rely on detailed, accurate information. I need to know the specifics, such as who is involved, what their interests are, and anything else that would appear relevant (i.e. the information that would normally be presented to the judge). Then I can demonstrate how we can derive objective conclusions about it.
Start here:

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization

https://www.npr.org/2022/06/24/11023058 ... n-overturn

Imagine yourself addressing the court. You're explaining to the Justices how you yourself have "derived objective conclusions" regarding the morality of abortion.

And then, given those conclusions, critique the ruling that was handed down.

Though, again, not to us here in a philosophy forum discussion revolving around ethical theory, but to those women who are actually confronted with "the agony of choice in the face of uncertainty" that can revolve around an unwanted pregnancy.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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A claim such as 'according to this factual description of rights claimed and acknowledged, the following conclusion about abortion is valid' has nothing to do with morality at all.
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Re: A coherent approach to objective Morality -- allegedly...

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iambiguous wrote: Sun Jan 29, 2023 6:51 am Start here:

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization

https://www.npr.org/2022/06/24/11023058 ... n-overturn

Imagine yourself addressing the court. You're explaining to the Justices how you yourself have "derived objective conclusions" regarding the morality of abortion.

And then, given those conclusions, critique the ruling that was handed down.

Though, again, not to us here in a philosophy forum discussion revolving around ethical theory, but to those women who are actually confronted with "the agony of choice in the face of uncertainty" that can revolve around an unwanted pregnancy.
Well, to clarify, this is a bit different from what I requested, as this is a case questioning the constitutionality of abortions per sé, rather than a case questioning the morality of a particular (or hypothetical) instance of abortion. Therefore I'll have to analyze the constitution itself. But that's OK.

However, I have to stress that an objective moral analysis is -- by definition -- not partial, and as such it's not an appeal to convince anyone. Rather, it offers a basis to derive rational moral conclusions from first principles. This means that it doesn't really matter whether I explain it to people in a philosophy forum or to actual women confronted with these decisions.

Based on your qualifier in the last paragraph, I'm not sure if this is what you're looking for. If not, maybe you can clarify what your expectation is, because as far as I'm concerned, an objective description simply informs us of the way things are. As such, all that can be changed about it is the tone and presentation, not the actual substance.
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