This isn't quite correct -- I don't ground moral objectivity on rights per sé, but utilize the logic and the mechanics of the concept of rights and duties. The logic in itself is not subjective, as it's not a matter of choice. Rather, it simply describes causal relationships. In other words, it's like saying that three apples in a basket can be represented by the concept "number three". Is this concept subjective? I don't think so -- because it describes the relationships of real world entities in a specific way. You could call it something other than "three", but the concept would remain the same.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm 1 I think your theory is incorrect, because you want to ground moral objectivity on the claiming and acknowledgement of rights, both of which are subjective - matters of choice. (And if we mean anything by the objective/subjective distinction, then this is a contradiction in your theory.)
So if I say that "Bob has a legitimate moral right to his property", I'm simply describing reality, namely that Bob has respected the property rights of others and came about his property in a way that did not involve him violating the property rights of others. Which is to say, it has nothing to do with Bob's or anyone else's opinions on the matter. It's merely a statement of fact; a fact we can derive by normal means of investigation and observation. As such, if we were to discover that Bob did in fact steal his property from someone else, we would have to correct our description, in the same way we would have to apply the "number four" if we noticed upon closer inspection that there are four apples in the basket.
This aspect is distinct from the fact that people have the ability to make subjective choices. Within an objective moral analysis, choices are simply variables which can be replaced with whatever you like. This means that it doesn't rely on people making the "right" choice. They can choose whatever they want, from an objective point of view. There is no innate moral value to a choice, because in an objective context values don't exist. As such within the objective moral analysis, there is no good or bad. There are only (descriptions of) rights and duties and such.
Now, I get the sense there still might be some confusion regarding the term "moral". This is because this term has multiple meanings, and looking back, I can see how confusing this can be. Therefore, I would like to propose the following clarifications to distinguish them:
- in-context-of-morality: any term which has a particular definition outside of the context of Morality can be considered "moral" when we use it within the context of Morality. An example of this would be rights and duties. When I say "moral right" what I actually mean is "the concept of a right in-context-of-morality". So I don't mean "morally correct" right or something like that. In other words, it's a value-free description
- subjectively-prescriptive: any proposition which implies that it's generally preferable to do something can be considered "moral" in the sense of "subjectively-prescriptive". Again, this particular usage does not imply that it's morally right to do something in some kind of "cosmic" sense. Rather, it takes the personal circumstances of the subject into consideration. So for example, the proposition "you should exercise regularly" is subjectively-prescriptive. If your doctor tells you this, what they mean is that exercising is healthy for you, and since they assume you value being healthy, you should exercise regularly. Also known as a hypothetical imperative
- absolutely-prescriptive: if a proposition implies that a particular action or behavior is inherently preferable, regardless of any other factors, we can consider it absolutely-prescriptive. I myself do not think that this is a valid concept, as it implies that an action can have value independently from subjective considerations, which would violate the is-ought-barrier
- validly-descriptive: if a consideration in-context-of-morality is sound (free of contradictions), it can be considered "moral" in the sense that it's logically valid (while in the context of Morality). Importantly, these concepts are never prescriptive. So they only inform us whether a concept related to Morality makes internal sense. This is also what I mean by "objectively" moral
These are the four different ways in which I use the term "moral". I will try to distinguish them more clearly going forward.
This is close, but the formulation is not optimal (fyi, I will tackle the conclusion separately).Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm I claim the right to coerce people, and acknowledge their right to coerce me; [...]
First, the term "acknowledge" implies a value judgement, as acknowledgement is generally a conscious, deliberate choice. Maybe I was not completely clear, but subjective considerations are irrelevant to this process. The acceptance of other people's rights is not a personal choice to consciously accept other people's rights. Rather, it's simply an observation based on behavior. So if you don't steal from others, we can say that you accept other people's right to their property. It doesn't matter what you think subjectively.
Next, this formulation implies that there's an "AND" condition here: you must claim right X AND you must respect other peoples right to X.
This is not so: Respecting other peoples rights is what legitimizes your claim to that right. As such it is redundant to say "I claim the right to X, and I respect the right of others to X" -- it's the same thing. However, reversing it would make sense: "I respect the right of others to X, so on that basis I claim the right to X".
So the following formulation would be valid:
"I claim the right to coerce people, therefore others have the right to coerce me, even if I don't accept their right to coerce me"
As you can hopefully see, this is not equivalent to the golden rule. It could be considered an inversion of the golden rule: it's not about you treating others in the way you would like to be treated. Rather, it's about others being able to treat you on the basis of how you treat them (so it's also distinct from the silver rule).
This conclusion is correct, but only on the basis of the subjectively-prescriptive definition for "morally right". It should become clearer if I rephrase it as such:Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm [...] therefore, (it's a fact that) the coercion of people is morally right.
I claim the right to coerce people, therefore, (it's a fact that) coercing people is what I ought to do.
In other words, the conclusion is limited to you, as you are the one claiming to have a right to coerce people. Therefore, it's invariably true that for you, subjectively, this is what you ought to do.
Furthermore, it follows that it's right for others to coerce you. However, it does not follow that it's right for everyone to coerce everyone else. That would be silly.
In general, there are no absolutely-prescriptive propositions within my proposed approach, as that would constitute an is-ought-violation.
As explained before, this conclusion is a non sequitur.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm Now, since that argument is invalid, then so is the following.
I claim the right not to be coerced, and I acknowledge that others have the same right; therefore, (it's a fact that) the coercion of people is morally wrong.
The non-moral premises simply don't entail the moral conclusions. And substituting 'We' or 'All of us' for 'I' in the premise makes no difference. The argument remains invalid, because of the lack of entailment.
Hopefully I was able to clarify this above. When I refer to "moral rights", I mean "rights in-context-of-morality". So yes, within the objective analysis, rights are value-less and amoral. What's moral in the sense of "validly-descriptive" (or "objectively moral") is the analysis itself. For example, if you claim the right to coerce others, then it's "objectively moral" for me to conclude that I have a duty to prevent you from exercising your right since I respect the right to not be coerced, and also that I have a right to use coercion against you at my own discretion since you have forfeited your right to not be coerced by claiming your right to coerce.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jan 20, 2023 12:12 pm 2 Your explanation begins in a state before morality, with the claiming of a right. So the right claimed has no moral significance - it isn't morally right (good) or wrong (bad). And yet you've stated that you use the word 'right' to mean 'moral right' - which is an equivocation. If the claiming of rights precedes and informs moral rights, those must be different things. Otherwise, your argument begs the question.
In this analysis, we reached the correct conclusions on the basis of the rights & duties logic, we didn't mix-up objective and subjective contexts, and we avoided contradictions. As such, this analysis can be considered "objectively moral", in the sense of validly-descriptive.
It's also important to note that we can't extract any absolutely-prescriptive propositions from this, such as "you ought not coerce". This informs us that absolutely-prescriptive propositions are essentially nonsense, as they require an "ought" in the absence of a subject. Only objectively-descriptive propositions are coherent, i.e. "you have a right to not be coerced by following your duty to not coerce"