Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

[FlashDangerpants]

It should be fairly obvious to everyone, and it saddens me to have to bother to mention it, but surely there should be some requirement at least within the Ethical theory sub for reasonable good faith argument?

The debate between realism and antirealism on any subject is about the logical status of propsitions uttered within that subject category. you don't beome more real than your oponent if he is antirealist about time and space, because the matter under discussion is not whther he is a real person who exists.

It is time for Henry to stop fucking about and fooling himself that he is morally superior to the rest of us merely on the basis that he thinks moral statements qualify as facts, and we dispute that logical status.

The fact that he insists on that line of bad faith arguent demonstrates that he is nobody's moral superioir at all.

[Skepdick]

It should be fairly obvious to everyone, and it saddens me to have to bother to mention it, but surely there should be some requirement at least within the Ethical theory sub for reasonable good faith argument?

The debate between realism and antirealism on any subject is about the logical status of propsitions uttered within that subject category. you don't beome more real than your oponent if he is antirealist about time and space, because the matter under discussion is not whther he is a real person who exists.

It is time for Henry to stop fucking about and fooling himself that he is morally superior to the rest of us merely on the basis that he thinks moral statements qualify as facts, and we dispute that logical status.

The fact that he insists on that line of bad faith arguent demonstrates that he is nobody's moral superioir at all.

That's a clear indicaiton that you don't understand how the game works.

Everyone believes that they are morally superior to everyone else. It is precisely this belief that drives you to hold other people accountable. To "correct" their arguments, their behaviour, their language, their thoughts.

Holding sanctimonious pricks such as hentry to account is no exception to this rule - it's an act of even greater sanctimony.

[henry quirk]

A whole thread about me?

And you say insults won't get me anywhere...

[FlashDangerpants]

A whole thread about me?

And you say insults won't get me anywhere...

Well it could be about many people, but one or two of the more obvious ones exhibit obvious autistic traits, so there's kind of a limit to how much you can in reality expect them to see the other guy's point of view on anything. And the other main one is so broken by his religion that there's no point, he will just have to be like that until the sweet release of death.

You are the one who uses that form of argument that is actually operating below the expected standard.

[Iwannaplato]

The fact that he insists on that line of bad faith arguent demonstrates that he is nobody's moral superioir at all.

Can you link to the post?

And then: to a moral anti-realist there is no such thing as moral superiority or inferiority.
There are terrible arguments and arguers. There are people who are unpleasant (to many, some, most) others.

(terrible as in fallacious, distracting, not an actual response to your post, failing to be an intelligent on point post, etc. Not morally terrible.)

[FlashDangerpants]

And then: to a moral anti-realist there is no such thing as moral superiority or inferiority.

Why would that be the case? Moral antirealism doesn't leave out any of the moral stuff that we have in our lives, it merely describes the logical basis differently.

We still engage in moral debate, we make normative judgements and we rationalise about arguments, some of which work better than others. We are as likely to try and maintain a coherent set of ethics and standards as anybody else, it's the human condition to try that. We just are more likely to recognise that there is a little bit of inherent irrationality therein.

The only impact that it has is on whether we claim to take the whole thing back to some bedrock single observation that makes all the others True or False.

[Age]

It should be fairly obvious to everyone, and it saddens me to have to bother to mention it, but surely there should be some requirement at least within the Ethical theory sub for reasonable good faith argument?

The debate between realism and antirealism on any subject is about the logical status of propsitions uttered within that subject category. you don't beome more real than your oponent if he is antirealist about time and space, because the matter under discussion is not whther he is a real person who exists.

It is time for Henry to stop fucking about and fooling himself that he is morally superior to the rest of us merely on the basis that he thinks moral statements qualify as facts, and we dispute that logical status.

The fact that he insists on that line of bad faith arguent demonstrates that he is nobody's moral superioir at all.

But "henry quirk" is the least moral person here. "henry quirk" actually believes that it has a 'right' to shoot human beings dead if they just touch a toothpick, which "henry quirk" claims is 'its property'.

From what I have seen here "henry quirk" is the least moral person here, let alone being moral superior to any one else here.

[Age]

It should be fairly obvious to everyone, and it saddens me to have to bother to mention it, but surely there should be some requirement at least within the Ethical theory sub for reasonable good faith argument?

The debate between realism and antirealism on any subject is about the logical status of propsitions uttered within that subject category. you don't beome more real than your oponent if he is antirealist about time and space, because the matter under discussion is not whther he is a real person who exists.

It is time for Henry to stop fucking about and fooling himself that he is morally superior to the rest of us merely on the basis that he thinks moral statements qualify as facts, and we dispute that logical status.

The fact that he insists on that line of bad faith arguent demonstrates that he is nobody's moral superioir at all.

That's a clear indicaiton that you don't understand how the game works.

Everyone believes that they are morally superior to everyone else.

Do you really believe that absolutely EVERY one believes that they are morally superior to absolutely every one else?

It is precisely this belief that drives you to hold other people accountable. To "correct" their arguments, their behaviour, their language, their thoughts.

Holding sanctimonious pricks such as hentry to account is no exception to this rule - it's an act of even greater sanctimony.

[Iwannaplato]

]Why would that be the case? Moral antirealism doesn't leave out any of the moral stuff that we have in our lives, it merely describes the logical basis differently.

I think it's misleading to use the word when evaluating people. I don't think it's meaningful because if you and the other person have different morals, which seems to be the case with HQ, on what ground do you declare, as an anti-realist, that he is not morally superior or really that the whole scale has any meaning.

Obviously we can discuss how we want people to relate to each other. We can come to agreements about behavior etc. But what would morally superior mean.

If the other person agrees on the rules we live by and the values undergirding them, then we can argue they are breaking the rules and going against the values they have agreed to and claimed to have.

We still engage in moral debate, we make normative judgements and we rationalise about arguments, some of which work better than others. We are as likely to try and maintain a coherent set of ethics and standards as anybody else,

I am not arguing that anti-realists will behave in ways that moral realists think are bad, or that anti-realists are chaotic or cannot come up with guidelines and rules or fight for society to be organized in certain ways. That's absurd.

it's the human condition to try that. We just are more likely to recognise that there is a little bit of inherent irrationality therein.

I don't think that a good evaluation. I would say that we MUST as an antirealist recognize that the foundation of whatever normative agreements we have or champion is subjective values. That's not irrational, it's non-rational. It has to do with likes and dislikes, preferences, empathy, interests and so on.

IN this specific case i am being fussy. You are mainly arguing in the negative. But it makes more sense to me to say he hasn't demonstrated that he is morally superior and his argument is fallacious. To say he isn't morally superior implies that someone might be. And I don't see how a moral antirealist can say that statement can make sense. How does one demonstrate it? Especially given a context, like this forum, where different norms are clashing and interacting.

Can I have that link? I'll try to integrate in this discussion.

[Iwannaplato]

double

[FlashDangerpants]

But "henry quirk" is the least moral person here.

If I agreed I wouldn't have bothered with the thread. He's generally about as good as anybody else because unless somebody has some outstandingly awful traits, there isn't anything real that can be used to distinguish us.

[Peter Holmes]

]Why would that be the case? Moral antirealism doesn't leave out any of the moral stuff that we have in our lives, it merely describes the logical basis differently.

I think it's misleading to use the word when evaluating people. I don't think it's meaningful because if you and the other person have different morals, which seems to be the case with HQ, on what ground do you declare, as an anti-realist, that he is not morally superior or really that the whole scale has any meaning.

Obviously we can discuss how we want people to relate to each other. We can come to agreements about behavior etc. But what would morally superior mean.

If the other person agrees on the rules we live by and the values undergirding them, then we can argue they are breaking the rules and going against the values they have agreed to and claimed to have.

We still engage in moral debate, we make normative judgements and we rationalise about arguments, some of which work better than others. We are as likely to try and maintain a coherent set of ethics and standards as anybody else,

I am not arguing that anti-realists will behave in ways that moral realists think are bad, or that anti-realists are chaotic or cannot come up with guidelines and rules or fight for society to be organized in certain ways. That's absurd.

it's the human condition to try that. We just are more likely to recognise that there is a little bit of inherent irrationality therein.

I don't think that a good evaluation. I would say that we MUST as an antirealist recognize that the foundation of whatever normative agreements we have or champion is subjective values. That's not irrational, it's non-rational. It has to do with likes and dislikes, preferences, empathy, interests and so on.

Can I have that link? I'll try to integrate in this discussion.

Just a sidebar on labels, which can come with unhelpful baggage.

For example, I think moral realism is the claim that moral things and properties exist, so that moral assertions can have truth value. So moral realists think the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' is factually true or false. And I reject that claim, for the reasons we've been discussing.

But to me, moral anti-realism is nothing more than the rejection of moral realism, just as atheism is nothing more than the rejection of theism. And the 'nothing more than' is critical. To reject a claim is not to make a counter claim. So moral anti-realism isn't the rejection of morality tout court - the standard travesty straw man that moral realists, such as VA and Henry sometimes invent.

The same misunderstanding can arise from the 'cognitivism' and 'non-cognitivism' labels. For example, I resent being labelled a moral non-cognitivist, as though to reject moral realism or objectivism is to abandon moral thought altogether. To say that moral assertions have no truth-value is not to say we don't or can't think deeply about moral questions. That's another straw man: moral non-cognitivists must be emotivists or intuitionists or irrationalists.

I'm spurred to say this by one thing you said: 'I would say that we MUST as an antirealist recognize that the foundation of whatever normative agreements we have or champion is subjective values. That's not irrational, it's non-rational. It has to do with likes and dislikes, preferences, empathy, interests and so on.'

I don't think moral subjectivism is 'non-rational'. To be rational is to have or seek good reasons for what we believe and do. And we can and often do have good reasons for our moral beliefs, judgements and opinions. 'Likes and dislikes, preferences, empathy, interests, and so on' need not be non-rational.

Moral subjectivism is nothing more than the rejection of moral objectivism.

[Age]

But "henry quirk" is the least moral person here.

If I agreed I wouldn't have bothered with the thread. He's generally about as good as anybody else because unless somebody has some outstandingly awful traits, there isn't anything real that can be used to distinguish us.

Obviously there are no good nor bad human beings, but there are, just as obviously, good and bad things human beings do.

If 'morality' is about what is good and bad in Life, which can only be in relation to what human beings do, or do not do, then it could be said and argued that the actual views, which human beings individually have, which is also what controls how they behave or misbehave, is what could be said to make human beings less superior or more superior, morally, to one another.

Now, if one had the view that they had the right to shoot a human being dead, just because they 'touched a tooth pick', and no one else in that group held such a view or any such lesser moral view, than that one, it could be said and concluded, was less moral than all the others in that group.

It could also be said and argued that one believing that they had the right to shoot human beings for just 'touching tooth picks' is some very outstandingly awful trait.

Furthermore, if individual views or beliefs are not real things, which could be used to distinguish human beings apart, then I do not know what more real thing one could be looking for.

[FlashDangerpants]

]Why would that be the case? Moral antirealism doesn't leave out any of the moral stuff that we have in our lives, it merely describes the logical basis differently.

I think it's misleading to use the word when evaluating people. I don't think it's meaningful because if you and the other person have different morals, which seems to be the case with HQ, on what ground do you declare, as an anti-realist, that he is not morally superior or really that the whole scale has any meaning.

I'm not sure you got my point. It's an observable feature of morality as part of our human society that people clearly DO offer rational justification for specific positions based on a mix of universally and locally agreed moral beliefs.

It is a matter of overinterpretation to suppose that because we dispute that the underlying structure is a scientifically valid substrate of facts, that we therefore do not, can not, or even should not engage in moral reasoning. If you as a particular moral antirealist are so skeptical as to suppose that our moral vocabulary is bankrupt and that the phrase "stealing is wrong" amounts to nothing more than a waggled eyebrow while saying "boo to stealing", that is a position you can take, it has been taken before, but the boo/hurrah argument is not a general requirement for moral antirealists and I don't endorse it.

Honesty and the general telling of truth is a moral virtue on the whole and this is I believe universally agreed. I believe you agree it is a virtue, I would expect a member of any religion to agree even if they all reckon some different God tells them to. All atheists would agree. There is nothing that stops a moral antirealist from agree as well

If somebody is dishonestly calling me, you and Pete amoralists - which we are not unless you've been keeping a bit of a big secret - and suggesting that we are morally inferior to himself by virtue of the amoralism he is lying about, then he is self sabotaging in that moment and universally agreed moral principles would recommend he stops.

Obviously we can discuss how we want people to relate to each other. We can come to agreements about behavior etc. But what would morally superior mean.

That looks like a case of overthinking tbh. It may be colloqouial by nature, but there is nothing wrong with saying Hitler is morally inferior to the guy who runs the chip shop at the end of my street whose name I don't know. His chips (fries in your words) are nasty and greasy so I don't go there, and thus I don't know his name, but he's still better than Hitler, I am quite sure of that.

If the other person agrees on the rules we live by and the values undergirding them, then we can argue they are breaking the rules and going against the values they have agreed to and claimed to have.

We have ways of agreeing certain standards that are agreed with or without the consent of any particular individual, and those individuals who are raised within that structure are commonly held to those standards. You can say "I didn't agree to this no murder rule" on your way to the electric chair if you like but nobody is goimng to check in the book and say "He's got us there lads, we have to let him go".

Obviously those law of the land situations are always unfair, that's kind of the point of moral sketpiticism as practised by myself, that you cannot intelligibly form a set of principles that will be fair in all the ways there are to be fair in; just in all the ways justice can apply; giving and generous but sensibly thrifty; and all the other possible concerns all at once. Morality and judgment in general works by picking out the currrent concern from the pile of innumerable options. It's another overinterpretation to suppose that we therefore cannot judge at all.

We still engage in moral debate, we make normative judgements and we rationalise about arguments, some of which work better than others. We are as likely to try and maintain a coherent set of ethics and standards as anybody else,

I am not arguing that anti-realists will behave in ways that moral realists think are bad, or that anti-realists are chaotic or cannot come up with guidelines and rules or fight for society to be organized in certain ways. That's absurd.

it's the human condition to try that. We just are more likely to recognise that there is a little bit of inherent irrationality therein.

I don't think that a good evaluation. I would say that we MUST as an antirealist recognize that the foundation of whatever normative agreements we have or champion is subjective values. That's not irrational, it's non-rational. It has to do with likes and dislikes, preferences, empathy, interests and so on.

I'm not absolutely disagreeing, just as a point of order you are tinking it further than it needs to go. Rationality works within limits in all situations. VA's obsession with antirealism in the broader sense is based on what he understands of the limits of meataphysical reason. Skepdick's obsession with the excluded middle is based on his understandin of the limits of reasoning about reason itself. They are a pair of loons, but they aren't wrong to look at those limits, they jsut don't interpret the findings very sensibly.

This is another time in which the reasoning is operational and fit for purpose, but not strictly founded on any solid foundations, the foundations of all logics are convention not discovery. Why would moral reasoning be different from that?

Can I have that link? I'll try to integrate in this discussion.

You can pick any thread where he has used the word amoralist, here's one. I'd say it unambiguously demonstrates his take that we are all moral ghosts in comparison to him.

Got any good jokes?

Well, it's not a joke as such, just an observation: when an amoralist tells you to do the right thing, that tickles me.

[henry quirk]

Can I have that link? I'll try to integrate in this discussion.

I believe what's here...

viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35464

...is what got flash's panties twisted.