Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

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Iwannaplato
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by Iwannaplato »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Aug 13, 2022 1:53 pm Just a sidebar on labels, which can come with unhelpful baggage.

For example, I think moral realism is the claim that moral things and properties exist, so that moral assertions can have truth value. So moral realists think the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' is factually true or false. And I reject that claim, for the reasons we've been discussing.

But to me, moral anti-realism is nothing more than the rejection of moral realism, just as atheism is nothing more than the rejection of theism. And the 'nothing more than' is critical. To reject a claim is not to make a counter claim. So moral anti-realism isn't the rejection of morality tout court - the standard travesty straw man that moral realists, such as VA and Henry sometimes invent.
Well, if you make an assertion in a philosophy forum (or elsewhere) then I am assuming you are making an assertion of what you are thinking is true, is the case.

So, if someone said they were an atheist, but then said they were closer to God, I would find that very confusing.

If a moral anti-realist says, I think you are being immoral, I also find that odd. Especially when we are dealing with people who have different values and have no agreed on a norm.

I can absolutely understand a moral anti-realist pushing for norms, for codes of behavior, for trying to make society, a friendship, a workplace and so on, follow their values and the behaviors and attitudes they like and prefer and think help other humans thrive (if that's one of their values) I think it is working against their position or a contradiction.
The same misunderstanding can arise from the 'cognitivism' and 'non-cognitivism' labels. For example, I resent being labelled a moral non-cognitivist, as though to reject moral realism or objectivism is to abandon moral thought altogether. To say that moral assertions have no truth-value is not to say we don't or can't think deeply about moral questions. That's another straw man: moral non-cognitivists must be emotivists or intuitionists or irrationalists.
I am not saying we can't think about how we want people to interact, the rules and guidelines we want. Nor am I saying that moral anti-realism entails not caring, means it doesn't matter (to whom?) or anything of the like. But making moral judgments of other people, especially if they have not agreed to your norms, seems fallacious if one is an anti-realist. One can point out contradictions in their values. One could point out that someone who has proclaimed a certain value is now going against (and in the inciting case here point out the fallacious conclusion they are making.

But if one says (and this is explicit whereas FDP was half implicit in the OP) 'you are immoral or immoral on this issue' to me seems a direct contradiction. Statements like I don't like it. I think it leads to X which I dislike.
seem more at home in antirealism.
I'm spurred to say this by one thing you said: 'I would say that we MUST as an antirealist recognize that the foundation of whatever normative agreements we have or champion is subjective values. That's not irrational, it's non-rational. It has to do with likes and dislikes, preferences, empathy, interests and so on.'
I don't think moral subjectivism is 'non-rational'.
But I didn't say that. I said that the foundation is. But I could have been clearer. What I meant was that any morals that an anti-realist comes up with he or she knows have a non-rational foundation. It is based on preferences, desires, likes, dislikes, empathy and a host of non-rational things. On top of those subjective things, we can be very rational. But those are non-rational. I did not decide through reason to have the preferences, likes and dislikes, empathy etc. I have at base. I may be convinced later that behavior X leads to harming things, people I value. And dislike, now, rationally on top of my non-rational or subjective foundation. But the root is non-rational. This is inherent. So, if an anti-realist pushes for norm A or norm B, these are at root based on non-rational processes: emotions, desires, wants, likes, etc.

I don't see the sense however in a moral anti-realist saying Mr. X is immoral or even not morally superior, with the implication that someone could be. One could dislike their behavior. One could try to argue that it leads to consequences X and Y that I don't like or that I think most of us don't like, but that's a diferent can of beets.

If the roots are rational. Then you can have an objective set of morals. And I don't believe you can.

I am not saying that moral subjectivism entails certain things. I am saying that that certain assertions become problematic if one is a moral antirealist.

An obvious example, which I hope we can agree on, would be something like....
I am a moral anti-realist.
I am morally better than you and this can be demonstrated scientifically.

My problem with the OP is that I think, certainly taken as a whole, but even some of the parts, is making a similar type of assertion. It is going in the negative, yes. It is not as blunt.

I do think there are practical reasons to avoid using certain language that sure looks objective. But I am focused on what I think are the direct problems with making assertions that look like objective moral claims.

Both you and FDP have reacted as if I am saying that a moral antirealist cannot engage in the making of norms and rules and guidelines. I haven't asserted that, nor do I believe that is entailed at all.

Nor am I remotely asserting that we cannot be rational and use reason to try to achieve our values through affecting the way we interact with eachother.

I am just asserting those things I have.

In a way it seems to me you are both reacting to me as if I was a moral realist and have the same kinds of judgments of moral antirealists.

I'm not and I don't.

Ithink you both realize that I am an anti-realist, but it seems like you are projecting traditional judgments that moral realists make onto my posts.

Further I think there is a practical problem with, beyond the logical one, with labeling people less or more moral when one is arguing against moral objectivism. And that is that you are walking and talking like a duck. I think it is vastly better, tactically and strategically to use different language.

That it is an assertion that looks like an objective claim is a logical problem. I mean, what it really means is 'I don't like that' but this is couched in objective language.

One can of course, try to show it goes against their morals, but I think i said that.
Peter Holmes
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Iwannaplato wrote: Sat Aug 13, 2022 8:29 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sat Aug 13, 2022 1:53 pm Just a sidebar on labels, which can come with unhelpful baggage.

For example, I think moral realism is the claim that moral things and properties exist, so that moral assertions can have truth value. So moral realists think the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' is factually true or false. And I reject that claim, for the reasons we've been discussing.

But to me, moral anti-realism is nothing more than the rejection of moral realism, just as atheism is nothing more than the rejection of theism. And the 'nothing more than' is critical. To reject a claim is not to make a counter claim. So moral anti-realism isn't the rejection of morality tout court - the standard travesty straw man that moral realists, such as VA and Henry sometimes invent.
Well, if you make an assertion in a philosophy forum (or elsewhere) then I am assuming you are making an assertion of what you are thinking is true, is the case.

So, if someone said they were an atheist, but then said they were closer to God, I would find that very confusing.

If a moral anti-realist says, I think you are being immoral, I also find that odd. Especially when we are dealing with people who have different values and have no agreed on a norm.

I can absolutely understand a moral anti-realist pushing for norms, for codes of behavior, for trying to make society, a friendship, a workplace and so on, follow their values and the behaviors and attitudes they like and prefer and think help other humans thrive (if that's one of their values) I think it is working against their position or a contradiction.
The same misunderstanding can arise from the 'cognitivism' and 'non-cognitivism' labels. For example, I resent being labelled a moral non-cognitivist, as though to reject moral realism or objectivism is to abandon moral thought altogether. To say that moral assertions have no truth-value is not to say we don't or can't think deeply about moral questions. That's another straw man: moral non-cognitivists must be emotivists or intuitionists or irrationalists.
I am not saying we can't think about how we want people to interact, the rules and guidelines we want. Nor am I saying that moral anti-realism entails not caring, means it doesn't matter (to whom?) or anything of the like. But making moral judgments of other people, especially if they have not agreed to your norms, seems fallacious if one is an anti-realist. One can point out contradictions in their values. One could point out that someone who has proclaimed a certain value is now going against (and in the inciting case here point out the fallacious conclusion they are making.

But if one says (and this is explicit whereas FDP was half implicit in the OP) 'you are immoral or immoral on this issue' to me seems a direct contradiction. Statements like I don't like it. I think it leads to X which I dislike.
seem more at home in antirealism.
I'm spurred to say this by one thing you said: 'I would say that we MUST as an antirealist recognize that the foundation of whatever normative agreements we have or champion is subjective values. That's not irrational, it's non-rational. It has to do with likes and dislikes, preferences, empathy, interests and so on.'
I don't think moral subjectivism is 'non-rational'.
But I didn't say that. I said that the foundation is. But I could have been clearer. What I meant was that any morals that an anti-realist comes up with he or she knows have a non-rational foundation. It is based on preferences, desires, likes, dislikes, empathy and a host of non-rational things. On top of those subjective things, we can be very rational. But those are non-rational. I did not decide through reason to have the preferences, likes and dislikes, empathy etc. I have at base. I may be convinced later that behavior X leads to harming things, people I value. And dislike, now, rationally on top of my non-rational or subjective foundation. But the root is non-rational. This is inherent. So, if an anti-realist pushes for norm A or norm B, these are at root based on non-rational processes: emotions, desires, wants, likes, etc.

I don't see the sense however in a moral anti-realist saying Mr. X is immoral or even not morally superior, with the implication that someone could be. One could dislike their behavior. One could try to argue that it leads to consequences X and Y that I don't like or that I think most of us don't like, but that's a diferent can of beets.

If the roots are rational. Then you can have an objective set of morals. And I don't believe you can.

I am not saying that moral subjectivism entails certain things. I am saying that that certain assertions become problematic if one is a moral antirealist.

An obvious example, which I hope we can agree on, would be something like....
I am a moral anti-realist.
I am morally better than you and this can be demonstrated scientifically.

My problem with the OP is that I think, certainly taken as a whole, but even some of the parts, is making a similar type of assertion. It is going in the negative, yes. It is not as blunt.

I do think there are practical reasons to avoid using certain language that sure looks objective. But I am focused on what I think are the direct problems with making assertions that look like objective moral claims.

Both you and FDP have reacted as if I am saying that a moral antirealist cannot engage in the making of norms and rules and guidelines. I haven't asserted that, nor do I believe that is entailed at all.

Nor am I remotely asserting that we cannot be rational and use reason to try to achieve our values through affecting the way we interact with eachother.

I am just asserting those things I have.

In a way it seems to me you are both reacting to me as if I was a moral realist and have the same kinds of judgments of moral antirealists.

I'm not and I don't.

Ithink you both realize that I am an anti-realist, but it seems like you are projecting traditional judgments that moral realists make onto my posts.

Further I think there is a practical problem with, beyond the logical one, with labeling people less or more moral when one is arguing against moral objectivism. And that is that you are walking and talking like a duck. I think it is vastly better, tactically and strategically to use different language.

That it is an assertion that looks like an objective claim is a logical problem. I mean, what it really means is 'I don't like that' but this is couched in objective language.

One can of course, try to show it goes against their morals, but I think i said that.
Thanks. There's a lot here I need to think about. And I apologise if you felt attacked - that wasn't at all my intention. But for now, what do you think of these assertions?

1 To reject a claim is not to make a claim. To say it is is to try to shift the burden of proof, which is always with the claimant - here, the moral objectivist, who claims there are moral facts.

2 If there are no moral facts, then a moral assertion doesn't and can't make a factual claim with a truth-value. So these two assertions - 'there are no moral facts' and 'slavery is morally wrong' are not logically contradictory.

3 If there are no moral facts, then a moral assertion can only express a value-judgement - a belief or opinion.

4 Value-judgements, beliefs and opinions need not be merely based on likes and dislikes, preferences, and so on.

PS On reflection, I appreciate what you're getting at. What I disagree with is the description of moral subjectivism as necessarily founded on non-rational things. And that's primarily because it seems to concede that moral objectivism, by contrast, is not founded on non-rational things - not that you think that, I know.

Your point about tactics is well-taken. And certainly, talk of moral superiority and inferiority doesn't fit well with the rejection of moral objectivity - though it may make sense in specific cases involving competing moral claims,

Having said that, I've just re-read this: 'If a moral anti-realist says, I think you are being immoral, I also find that odd. Especially when we are dealing with people who have different values and have no[t] agreed on a norm.'

Would it be 'odd' for a moral subjectivist to say to a slave-owner: 'I think you are being immoral'?
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

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Would it be 'odd' for a moral subjectivist to say to a slave-owner: 'I think you are being immoral'?
Kinda, yeah.

He'd ask why?

What answer could the subjectivist offer other than I don't like it or lots of folks think slavery is wrong or the slaves don't like it.

I don't he'd be moved to set his slaves free.

Granted, an objectivist answer -- becuz you're violating the lives, liberties, and properties of folks who have an inalienable right to those -- probably wouldn't move him either (*though, mebbe, it might get him to thinkin' about why he himself, the slaver, would never willingly accept the leash).




*but probably not...it's a feature of man's psyche: he can turn his fellows into other than human or less than human lickety-split and commit atrocities against them (interesting the predator always has to recast his prey as other-than or less than to justify the murder, the rape, the theft, the slavin', etc....it's almost as though, even in his depravity, the predator knows it's wrong to violate other men and so other men must be reduced to meat first... 🤔)
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by FlashDangerpants »

There is nothing inherent to moral antirealism that prevents Pete or I from using all the normal moral concepts in all the normal ways.

If somebody else wishes to adopt a hair shirt and restrict themselves from using some word, that is an extended choice, antirealism plus some extra topping, but that topping isn't an entailment.

All that the moral antirealist does is explain exactly how the moral landscape we inhabit is founded on a continous process of social negotiation rather than bedrock fact.

It isn't about making people change the language they use to describe their world and its socvial order. It isn't about making you abandon the concept of right and wrong.

It also isn't about forcing you to try and concoct a painfully artificial new moral vocabulary with no mention of right and wrong at all, as VA does, or an eye wateringly uncomfortable notion that lying doesn't require dishonesty at all and is certainly not defined by it. Those pathetic fallacies are the product of moral realists who are willing to trash the language of morality for the sake of their base procrustean needs.
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by Peter Holmes »

henry quirk wrote: Mon Aug 15, 2022 2:09 pm
Would it be 'odd' for a moral subjectivist to say to a slave-owner: 'I think you are being immoral'?
Kinda, yeah.

He'd ask why?

What answer could the subjectivist offer other than I don't like it or lots of folks think slavery is wrong or the slaves don't like it.

I don't he'd be moved to set his slaves free.

Granted, an objectivist answer -- becuz you're violating the lives, liberties, and properties of folks who have an inalienable right to those -- probably wouldn't move him either (*though, mebbe, it might get him to thinkin' about why he himself, the slaver, would never willingly accept the leash).

*but probably not...it's a feature of man's psyche: he can turn his fellows into other than human or less than human lickety-split and commit atrocities against them (interesting the predator always has to recast his prey as other-than or less than to justify the murder, the rape, the theft, the slavin', etc....it's almost as though, even in his depravity, the predator knows it's wrong to violate other men and so other men must be reduced to meat first... 🤔)
On what grounds would a moral objectivist who thinks a person has an inalienable right to their property think it right to dispossess a slaver of his slaves, or an old-time patriarch of his wives and children?

Rights are granted, usually legally. The doctrine of natural rights is as made-up as the doctrine of god-given rights. And the fact of a granted right (a non-moral premise) can't entail a moral conclusion. Sjust the way it is. Look at these two non sequiturs:

People have the right to own slaves: therefore slavery is morally right.

People don't have the right to own slaves: therefore slavery is morally wrong.

Like all moral assertions, those conclusions are stand-alone. They don't and can't follow from anything other than another moral premise, which is also stand-alone.

The moral 'why?' goes on and on, and can only stop with a judgement, belief or opinion. Why is it wrong to deprive someone of her life, liberty and property? Or of her 'inalienable' right to decide what happens to her own body?

Like all moral realists and objectivists, you have no answer other than 'I think it's wrong'.
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Peter Holmes wrote: Mon Aug 15, 2022 3:10 pm On what grounds would a moral objectivist who thinks a person has an inalienable right to their property think it right to dispossess a slaver of his slaves, or an old-time patriarch of his wives and children?
Henry apparently believes he has this whole thing working from one principle and that this principle contains everything, so it can be "unpacked" and will answer all moral questions.

There's at least one more fundamental principle that he fails to ackowledge, namely one of reciprocity. So the whole self ownership thing is all very well, but there is am unexplained reciprocal duty to respect other persons property rights. Under prompting, he currently argues that hypocrisy is some sort of non deceptive lie, and that lies are thefts not deceptions, and that the wrongness of theft derives from the property rights. So as things stand he hasn't yet grasped the need for that reciprocity principle at all.

Also, no particular basis for establishing who has this self-ownership thing at all. So in the old days you would have property rights over your chioldren, your women and your negroes, on the basis that you simply didn't recognise their self ownership.

Today Henry doesn't admit most animals into the followship of the self owned, but does incorporate vegetablised coma patients, fetuses and possibly dolphins. But his reasoning isn't so different from that of predecessors who counted the black chaps as three fifths of a person for accounting purposes.
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by Peter Holmes »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Mon Aug 15, 2022 3:59 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Mon Aug 15, 2022 3:10 pm On what grounds would a moral objectivist who thinks a person has an inalienable right to their property think it right to dispossess a slaver of his slaves, or an old-time patriarch of his wives and children?
Henry apparently believes he has this whole thing working from one principle and that this principle contains everything, so it can be "unpacked" and will answer all moral questions.

There's at least one more fundamental principle that he fails to ackowledge, namely one of reciprocity. So the whole self ownership thing is all very well, but there is am unexplained reciprocal duty to respect other persons property rights. Under prompting, he currently argues that hypocrisy is some sort of non deceptive lie, and that lies are thefts not deceptions, and that the wrongness of theft derives from the property rights. So as things stand he hasn't yet grasped the need for that reciprocity principle at all.

Also, no particular basis for establishing who has this self-ownership thing at all. So in the old days you would have property rights over your chioldren, your women and your negroes, on the basis that you simply didn't recognise their self ownership.

Today Henry doesn't admit most animals into the followship of the self owned, but does incorporate vegetablised coma patients, fetuses and possibly dolphins. But his reasoning isn't so different from that of predecessors who counted the black chaps as three fifths of a person for accounting purposes.
Brilliant. Thanks. Love the dolphins.
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by henry quirk »

All that the moral antirealist does is explain exactly how the moral landscape we inhabit is founded on a continous process of social negotiation rather than bedrock fact.
Yes, as I say: What answer could the subjectivist offer other than I don't like it or lots of folks think slavery is wrong or the slaves don't like it(?)

*
lying doesn't require dishonesty
Seems to me...
henry quirk wrote: Sat Aug 13, 2022 3:54 amAt its most basic a lie is meant to get someone to think and do sumthin' that person wouldn't think and/or do otherwise. The theft, if we can call it that, is to that person's liberty. Even if no tangible property (car, money, house, etc) was lost, the person lied to has been misused, taken advantage of, misdirected to think and act or choose in a way, as I say, he might not otherwise.
...it does. But I ain't rehashin' that, with you, today. Believe what you like.

-----
On what grounds would a moral objectivist who thinks a person has an inalienable right to their property think it right to dispossess a slaver of his slaves, or an old-time patriarch of his wives and children?
Becuz the slaves, and those wives & children, have the same inalienable right to their lives, liberties, and properties as the slaver and patriarch have to theirs. But, if you reject natural rights (a free man has a natural right to his life, liberty, and property) then all you got is a continous process of social negotiation or I don't like it, or, lots of folks think slavery is wrong, or, the slaves don't like it.

*
Why is it wrong to deprive someone of her life, liberty and property?
Becuz it's her life, liberty, and property.

*
Or of her 'inalienable' right to decide what happens to her own body?
She can do with her body anything she likes. She cannot do with another's body anything she likes. (becuz that body isn't hers)

-----
in the old days you would have property rights over your chioldren, your women and your negroes, on the basis that you simply didn't recognise their self ownership.
You didn't have any more of a right to own people then than you do today. Then and now: there are a whole whack immoral folks layin' claim to other folks, thru force or thru legislative shenanigans, not becuz they can invalidate natural rights with either, but only becuz they can choose to violate them.

*
his reasoning isn't so different from that of predecessors who counted the black chaps as three fifths of a person for accounting purposes.
Again: interesting the predator always has to recast his prey as other-than or less-than to justify the murder, the rape, the theft, the slavin', etc....it's almost as though, even in his depravity, the predator knows it's wrong to violate other men and so other men must be reduced to meat first... 🤔

*
Henry doesn't admit most animals into the followship of the self owned
I'll glad to...which animals are persons?


Readin' over this post I see too many opportunities for me to get caught up in another worthless back & forth (they're my weakness; I'm tryin' to break the habit), so I'll close -- for now -- with this...

I am a free man with an inalienable right to my, and no other's, life, liberty, and property. It matters not one whit if you believe this to be (you can deny fire burns, but it still burns).

You gentlemen believe you are not free men beyond what can be negotiated with others, and you gentlemen believe you have no right to your lives, liberties, and properties beyond what can be negotiated with others. You're wrong and, one day, all that is gonna bite you and yours square on the keister.
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by Age »

Peter Holmes wrote: Mon Aug 15, 2022 3:10 pm
henry quirk wrote: Mon Aug 15, 2022 2:09 pm
Would it be 'odd' for a moral subjectivist to say to a slave-owner: 'I think you are being immoral'?
Kinda, yeah.

He'd ask why?

What answer could the subjectivist offer other than I don't like it or lots of folks think slavery is wrong or the slaves don't like it.

I don't he'd be moved to set his slaves free.

Granted, an objectivist answer -- becuz you're violating the lives, liberties, and properties of folks who have an inalienable right to those -- probably wouldn't move him either (*though, mebbe, it might get him to thinkin' about why he himself, the slaver, would never willingly accept the leash).

*but probably not...it's a feature of man's psyche: he can turn his fellows into other than human or less than human lickety-split and commit atrocities against them (interesting the predator always has to recast his prey as other-than or less than to justify the murder, the rape, the theft, the slavin', etc....it's almost as though, even in his depravity, the predator knows it's wrong to violate other men and so other men must be reduced to meat first... 🤔)
On what grounds would a moral objectivist who thinks a person has an inalienable right to their property think it right to dispossess a slaver of his slaves, or an old-time patriarch of his wives and children?

Rights are granted, usually legally. The doctrine of natural rights is as made-up as the doctrine of god-given rights. And the fact of a granted right (a non-moral premise) can't entail a moral conclusion. Sjust the way it is. Look at these two non sequiturs:

People have the right to own slaves: therefore slavery is morally right.

People don't have the right to own slaves: therefore slavery is morally wrong.

Like all moral assertions, those conclusions are stand-alone. They don't and can't follow from anything other than another moral premise, which is also stand-alone.
This is not correct, but because you wholeheartedly believe this to be true you are not open to being able to see and recognize this fact.
Peter Holmes wrote: Mon Aug 15, 2022 3:10 pm The moral 'why?' goes on and on, and can only stop with a judgement, belief or opinion. Why is it wrong to deprive someone of her life, liberty and property? Or of her 'inalienable' right to decide what happens to her own body?

Like all moral realists and objectivists, you have no answer other than 'I think it's wrong'.
Iwannaplato
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by Iwannaplato »

Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Aug 14, 2022 3:18 pm Thanks. There's a lot here I need to think about. And I apologise if you felt attacked - that wasn't at all my intention.
No, not attacked. I mean,my ideas or what my ideas might be, but not me. I felt these were missed a bit.
But for now, what do you think of these assertions?

1 To reject a claim is not to make a claim. To say it is is to try to shift the burden of proof, which is always with the claimant - here, the moral objectivist, who claims there are moral facts.
Generally yes, I agree. It depends on the rejection, which may include assumptions or openly make them. It is tricky with the post of FDP that I was reacting to. He rejected a claim, but he did it in a way that implied that in some situations Henry could be morally superior, as a person, just that this one was false. It accepted the general idea, but rejected this one on specific grounds.
2 If there are no moral facts, then a moral assertionI I can only express a value-judgement - a belief or opinion.
Yes.
4 Value-judgements, beliefs and opinions need not be merely based on likes and dislikes, preferences, and so on.
No, not merely, however they are utterly dependent on them. IOW if I want kids to feel good, in generally, about themselves and I value that vague state, I can from that value use scientific research, polls, and all sorts of fact-based information to inform guidelines, policies, rules etc. So, I can put reason on top of my value. But all that reasoning is meaningless without that underlying value.

And so when I said that moral subjectivism is non-rational at root, I was not communicating well. I meant this in the context of the moral subjectivist coming up with morals. He or she knows that at root his or her positions have a non-objective base. This need not at all stop the moral s. from going ahead and working towards his or her goals.

And there is no compulsion or entailment that such a person need be a nihilist (in the more pejorative senses) or a moral chaos factor. They can engage in town meetings, voting people into office, arguments in the family etc., and look very much like moral objectivists by striving to get things closer to how they want them.

If they agree on values with a moral objectivist, they can of course point out contradictions in the other's position. And even if they don't agree they can always point out fallacious arguments in support of certain moral positions or policies etc.
PS On reflection, I appreciate what you're getting at. What I disagree with is the description of moral subjectivism as necessarily founded on non-rational things. And that's primarily because it seems to concede that moral objectivism, by contrast, is not founded on non-rational things - not that you think that, I know.
Exactly, I would argue that both are, but a moral subjectivist knows it. They are not (or at least I think and hope they would not) think they were reasoning their way to conclusions about policies and this reasoning goes all the way down. Or that there is no absolutely key value at the base, one from which they extrapolate and reason their way to policies and behaviors they look for and so on.

I was not comparing it with moral objectivism when I said that. I mean, the democrats AND the republicans (to wax metaphorical) could both be wrong, incisive, divisive, confused, irrational, rational, nice dinner partners and so on.
Having said that, I've just re-read this: 'If a moral anti-realist says, I think you are being immoral, I also find that odd. Especially when we are dealing with people who have different values and have no[t] agreed on a norm.'

Would it be 'odd' for a moral subjectivist to say to a slave-owner: 'I think you are being immoral'?
Well, tactically I might do it myself. I assume the reasons for this are obvious. I want them to stop. INtroducing moral subjectivism (even implicitly) into that discussion is probably counterproductive in most instances. Though a more clearly consistant ' I hate what you are doing.' for example, with some strong emotion in the face and voice should be in the debate and might be tactically useful on occasion, especially if they had some respect for you. Also statements like 'I see human beings being tortured and treated as if they were not humans' 'I think the ideas in your head are keeping you from actually noticing that you are hurting other people'. And then of course if I was back in, say, the 1850s in the South, I would like go at them via Christianity. Not that i can clearly win with this, the Bible being what it is, there is no question I would ask them if they though Jesus would own slaves and whip them if they disobeyed.

But here in a philosophy forum, especially in a discussion with a moral realist, I think it would make sense not to imply that they are morally inferior and certainly not to say it. From what base?

I think it makes sense to say they are being immoral by their own standards, if this is the case.
If it is a fallacious argument, I would focus on the fallacies.

But in general to me the word 'moral' and other related words carry too much objectivist baggage. I'm a pragmatist, so out in the world, I might use them. Though I think in general one need not. And I am not sure it really helps to label a person immoral. And even their acts. I think we have a lot of swing room in arguing for what we want without either evaluation. Point to the reasons we like or dislike X. Explain. And then of course, one can use reasoning to lead to consequences (we don't like and perhaps they might not either) and counter their reasoning and so on.

I don't think we really need those words. We can engage in struggling for what we want without them, I think. And I am not sure there is a situation where I would think adding the value judgment like that leads to convincing people or getting what I want. As a pragmatist I probably would use them then. But now contradicting what I said above, I am not sure there is a situation where such an evaluation helps things move towards what I want. I mean, an expressed evaluation like 'you or that is immoral'.

And there is a kind of political bonus if one speaks from wants, goals, preferences and emotions (while using reasoning on top). We would then be bringing the dialogue closer, if only on our side, to NOT have objectivist positioning. We aren't implicitly validating or seeming to moral objectivism.

I am not sure what saying abortion bans (or abortions) are immoral adds to my struggle to get whichever position I have enacted.

Why not just avoid those words and their baggage?
Peter Holmes
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Iwannaplato wrote: Thu Aug 18, 2022 3:24 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: Sun Aug 14, 2022 3:18 pm Thanks. There's a lot here I need to think about. And I apologise if you felt attacked - that wasn't at all my intention.
No, not attacked. I mean,my ideas or what my ideas might be, but not me. I felt these were missed a bit.
But for now, what do you think of these assertions?

1 To reject a claim is not to make a claim. To say it is is to try to shift the burden of proof, which is always with the claimant - here, the moral objectivist, who claims there are moral facts.
Generally yes, I agree. It depends on the rejection, which may include assumptions or openly make them. It is tricky with the post of FDP that I was reacting to. He rejected a claim, but he did it in a way that implied that in some situations Henry could be morally superior, as a person, just that this one was false. It accepted the general idea, but rejected this one on specific grounds.
2 If there are no moral facts, then a moral assertionI I can only express a value-judgement - a belief or opinion.
Yes.
4 Value-judgements, beliefs and opinions need not be merely based on likes and dislikes, preferences, and so on.
No, not merely, however they are utterly dependent on them. IOW if I want kids to feel good, in generally, about themselves and I value that vague state, I can from that value use scientific research, polls, and all sorts of fact-based information to inform guidelines, policies, rules etc. So, I can put reason on top of my value. But all that reasoning is meaningless without that underlying value.

And so when I said that moral subjectivism is non-rational at root, I was not communicating well. I meant this in the context of the moral subjectivist coming up with morals. He or she knows that at root his or her positions have a non-objective base. This need not at all stop the moral s. from going ahead and working towards his or her goals.

And there is no compulsion or entailment that such a person need be a nihilist (in the more pejorative senses) or a moral chaos factor. They can engage in town meetings, voting people into office, arguments in the family etc., and look very much like moral objectivists by striving to get things closer to how they want them.

If they agree on values with a moral objectivist, they can of course point out contradictions in the other's position. And even if they don't agree they can always point out fallacious arguments in support of certain moral positions or policies etc.
PS On reflection, I appreciate what you're getting at. What I disagree with is the description of moral subjectivism as necessarily founded on non-rational things. And that's primarily because it seems to concede that moral objectivism, by contrast, is not founded on non-rational things - not that you think that, I know.
Exactly, I would argue that both are, but a moral subjectivist knows it. They are not (or at least I think and hope they would not) think they were reasoning their way to conclusions about policies and this reasoning goes all the way down. Or that there is no absolutely key value at the base, one from which they extrapolate and reason their way to policies and behaviors they look for and so on.

I was not comparing it with moral objectivism when I said that. I mean, the democrats AND the republicans (to wax metaphorical) could both be wrong, incisive, divisive, confused, irrational, rational, nice dinner partners and so on.
Having said that, I've just re-read this: 'If a moral anti-realist says, I think you are being immoral, I also find that odd. Especially when we are dealing with people who have different values and have no[t] agreed on a norm.'

Would it be 'odd' for a moral subjectivist to say to a slave-owner: 'I think you are being immoral'?
Well, tactically I might do it myself. I assume the reasons for this are obvious. I want them to stop. INtroducing moral subjectivism (even implicitly) into that discussion is probably counterproductive in most instances. Though a more clearly consistant ' I hate what you are doing.' for example, with some strong emotion in the face and voice should be in the debate and might be tactically useful on occasion, especially if they had some respect for you. Also statements like 'I see human beings being tortured and treated as if they were not humans' 'I think the ideas in your head are keeping you from actually noticing that you are hurting other people'. And then of course if I was back in, say, the 1850s in the South, I would like go at them via Christianity. Not that i can clearly win with this, the Bible being what it is, there is no question I would ask them if they though Jesus would own slaves and whip them if they disobeyed.

But here in a philosophy forum, especially in a discussion with a moral realist, I think it would make sense not to imply that they are morally inferior and certainly not to say it. From what base?

I think it makes sense to say they are being immoral by their own standards, if this is the case.
If it is a fallacious argument, I would focus on the fallacies.

But in general to me the word 'moral' and other related words carry too much objectivist baggage. I'm a pragmatist, so out in the world, I might use them. Though I think in general one need not. And I am not sure it really helps to label a person immoral. And even their acts. I think we have a lot of swing room in arguing for what we want without either evaluation. Point to the reasons we like or dislike X. Explain. And then of course, one can use reasoning to lead to consequences (we don't like and perhaps they might not either) and counter their reasoning and so on.

I don't think we really need those words. We can engage in struggling for what we want without them, I think. And I am not sure there is a situation where I would think adding the value judgment like that leads to convincing people or getting what I want. As a pragmatist I probably would use them then. But now contradicting what I said above, I am not sure there is a situation where such an evaluation helps things move towards what I want. I mean, an expressed evaluation like 'you or that is immoral'.

And there is a kind of political bonus if one speaks from wants, goals, preferences and emotions (while using reasoning on top). We would then be bringing the dialogue closer, if only on our side, to NOT have objectivist positioning. We aren't implicitly validating or seeming to moral objectivism.

I am not sure what saying abortion bans (or abortions) are immoral adds to my struggle to get whichever position I have enacted.

Why not just avoid those words and their baggage?
Once again, thanks for such detailed and careful reasoning. My immediate response is that there's a lot of wisdom here for the down-and-dirty moral tussles in the trenches. Morality in practice, as it were. And I agree that a 'there are no moral facts, but this is morally wrong' line won't work there.

Perhaps it's only in the rarefied atmosphere of philosophical debate that the objective/subjective issue even comes up or seems to matter. But I think the philosophical rubber hits the road when people say 'it's a fact that abortion is morally wrong - so there can be no argument - and we'll imprison or kill you if you do it'.

But I know you've covered this - how best to respond to it - above.

Thanks again.
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Re: Perhaps try arguing in some sort of good faith?

Post by Hermit Philosopher »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Sat Aug 13, 2022 11:44 am It should be fairly obvious to everyone, and it saddens me to have to bother to mention it, but surely there should be some requirement at least within the Ethical theory sub for reasonable good faith argument?
Dear FlashDangerpants,

Albeit that I do not know what the person mentioned in your OP is like and have no idea what the issue is/has been, but the title of your thread caught my eye because I find the presence of good faith to be rare in discussions on platforms like these and truly wish it were not so.

I often wonder how much more interesting and enriching philosophical discussions could be if, as participants, we approached each other in good and not bad faith!


Humbly
Hermit
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