Well, if you make an assertion in a philosophy forum (or elsewhere) then I am assuming you are making an assertion of what you are thinking is true, is the case.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Aug 13, 2022 1:53 pm Just a sidebar on labels, which can come with unhelpful baggage.
For example, I think moral realism is the claim that moral things and properties exist, so that moral assertions can have truth value. So moral realists think the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' is factually true or false. And I reject that claim, for the reasons we've been discussing.
But to me, moral anti-realism is nothing more than the rejection of moral realism, just as atheism is nothing more than the rejection of theism. And the 'nothing more than' is critical. To reject a claim is not to make a counter claim. So moral anti-realism isn't the rejection of morality tout court - the standard travesty straw man that moral realists, such as VA and Henry sometimes invent.
So, if someone said they were an atheist, but then said they were closer to God, I would find that very confusing.
If a moral anti-realist says, I think you are being immoral, I also find that odd. Especially when we are dealing with people who have different values and have no agreed on a norm.
I can absolutely understand a moral anti-realist pushing for norms, for codes of behavior, for trying to make society, a friendship, a workplace and so on, follow their values and the behaviors and attitudes they like and prefer and think help other humans thrive (if that's one of their values) I think it is working against their position or a contradiction.
I am not saying we can't think about how we want people to interact, the rules and guidelines we want. Nor am I saying that moral anti-realism entails not caring, means it doesn't matter (to whom?) or anything of the like. But making moral judgments of other people, especially if they have not agreed to your norms, seems fallacious if one is an anti-realist. One can point out contradictions in their values. One could point out that someone who has proclaimed a certain value is now going against (and in the inciting case here point out the fallacious conclusion they are making.The same misunderstanding can arise from the 'cognitivism' and 'non-cognitivism' labels. For example, I resent being labelled a moral non-cognitivist, as though to reject moral realism or objectivism is to abandon moral thought altogether. To say that moral assertions have no truth-value is not to say we don't or can't think deeply about moral questions. That's another straw man: moral non-cognitivists must be emotivists or intuitionists or irrationalists.
But if one says (and this is explicit whereas FDP was half implicit in the OP) 'you are immoral or immoral on this issue' to me seems a direct contradiction. Statements like I don't like it. I think it leads to X which I dislike.
seem more at home in antirealism.
I'm spurred to say this by one thing you said: 'I would say that we MUST as an antirealist recognize that the foundation of whatever normative agreements we have or champion is subjective values. That's not irrational, it's non-rational. It has to do with likes and dislikes, preferences, empathy, interests and so on.'
But I didn't say that. I said that the foundation is. But I could have been clearer. What I meant was that any morals that an anti-realist comes up with he or she knows have a non-rational foundation. It is based on preferences, desires, likes, dislikes, empathy and a host of non-rational things. On top of those subjective things, we can be very rational. But those are non-rational. I did not decide through reason to have the preferences, likes and dislikes, empathy etc. I have at base. I may be convinced later that behavior X leads to harming things, people I value. And dislike, now, rationally on top of my non-rational or subjective foundation. But the root is non-rational. This is inherent. So, if an anti-realist pushes for norm A or norm B, these are at root based on non-rational processes: emotions, desires, wants, likes, etc.I don't think moral subjectivism is 'non-rational'.
I don't see the sense however in a moral anti-realist saying Mr. X is immoral or even not morally superior, with the implication that someone could be. One could dislike their behavior. One could try to argue that it leads to consequences X and Y that I don't like or that I think most of us don't like, but that's a diferent can of beets.
If the roots are rational. Then you can have an objective set of morals. And I don't believe you can.
I am not saying that moral subjectivism entails certain things. I am saying that that certain assertions become problematic if one is a moral antirealist.
An obvious example, which I hope we can agree on, would be something like....
I am a moral anti-realist.
I am morally better than you and this can be demonstrated scientifically.
My problem with the OP is that I think, certainly taken as a whole, but even some of the parts, is making a similar type of assertion. It is going in the negative, yes. It is not as blunt.
I do think there are practical reasons to avoid using certain language that sure looks objective. But I am focused on what I think are the direct problems with making assertions that look like objective moral claims.
Both you and FDP have reacted as if I am saying that a moral antirealist cannot engage in the making of norms and rules and guidelines. I haven't asserted that, nor do I believe that is entailed at all.
Nor am I remotely asserting that we cannot be rational and use reason to try to achieve our values through affecting the way we interact with eachother.
I am just asserting those things I have.
In a way it seems to me you are both reacting to me as if I was a moral realist and have the same kinds of judgments of moral antirealists.
I'm not and I don't.
Ithink you both realize that I am an anti-realist, but it seems like you are projecting traditional judgments that moral realists make onto my posts.
Further I think there is a practical problem with, beyond the logical one, with labeling people less or more moral when one is arguing against moral objectivism. And that is that you are walking and talking like a duck. I think it is vastly better, tactically and strategically to use different language.
That it is an assertion that looks like an objective claim is a logical problem. I mean, what it really means is 'I don't like that' but this is couched in objective language.
One can of course, try to show it goes against their morals, but I think i said that.