PH: What is Your Philosophical Foundation?

[Age]

Also, REMEMBER, that you can ONLY BELIEVE...

What do you mean?

If you did NOT cut me of MID-SENTENCE, then you could SEE what I MEAN.

I believe that I have no beliefs.

The CONTRADICTION speaks for ITSELF.

[Age]

Fwell. I wish to apologise to anyone whom I may have characterised as a nutjob, dick troll, fuckturd, etc. No excuse, but I put it down to intemperance and two glasses of a reasonably-priced father's day merlot, plus the disappointment of getting only one pair of socks from one of my four children. Honestly, why do we bother? And why did our parents bother with us?

WHY would you feel the need to 'apologise' for 'that' what was just being felt or thought?

If you find 'me' a "nutjob", "fucktard", "dick troll", or absolutely ANY thing ELSE, then I prefer to HEAR thee Truth, then be kept HIDDEN from 'It'.

I do NOT care one iota how 'I' am 'characterised', by ANY one. I much prefer to HEAR thee Truth, INSTEAD.

[attofishpi]

If you find 'me' a "nutjob", "fucktard", "dick troll", or absolutely ANY thing ELSE, then I prefer to HEAR thee Truth, then be kept HIDDEN from 'It'.

I do NOT care one iota how 'I' am 'characterised', by ANY one. I much prefer to HEAR thee Truth, INSTEAD.

I am so relieved to hear that Age, as I am sure most people on the forum are, it does remove a large weight from one's conscience.

[Skepdick]

I believe that I have no beliefs.

The CONTRADICTION speaks for ITSELF.

That's not a contradiction. It's a paradox, but the fact that you think it's a contradiction speaks for itself - you have misinterpreted my words.

Naturally. Because you are wrong.

[Age]

I believe that I have no beliefs.

The CONTRADICTION speaks for ITSELF.

That's not a contradiction. It's a paradox,

Which definition of the 'paradox' word are you USING here?

The word 'paradox' is, LITERALLY, a 'paradox' in and of itself. AND, that is USING the word 'paradox' in BOTH of its OPPOSITE DEFINITIONS and MEANINGS.

but the fact that you think it's a contradiction speaks for itself - you have misinterpreted my words.

OR, have I just USED "your words" with DIFFERENT definitions that you are USING them in and with?

Naturally. Because you are wrong.

Okay. If that is what you SAY and BELIEVE, then that is how this MUST BE, correct?

[Skepdick]

Which definition of the 'paradox' word are you USING here?

I am not using a definition of "paradox". I am using "paradox" itself.

The word 'paradox' is, LITERALLY, a 'paradox' in and of itself. AND, that is USING the word 'paradox' in BOTH of its OPPOSITE DEFINITIONS and MEANINGS.

So what? I am using it precisely as I intend to be using it.

Okay. If that is what you SAY and BELIEVE, then that is how this MUST BE, correct?

If you drop the question mark at the end of that sentence we would come to an agreement.

[Age]

Which definition of the 'paradox' word are you USING here?

I am not using a definition of "paradox". I am using "paradox" itself.

Which has TWO OPPOSITE definitions.

The word 'paradox' is, LITERALLY, a 'paradox' in and of itself. AND, that is USING the word 'paradox' in BOTH of its OPPOSITE DEFINITIONS and MEANINGS.

So what? I am using it precisely as I intend to be using it.

Whis is how, PRECISELY?

Okay. If that is what you SAY and BELIEVE, then that is how this MUST BE, correct?

If you drop the question mark at the end of that sentence we would come to an agreement.

Agreement on 'what', EXACTLY?

Also, is it IMPOSSIBLE for you to just ANSWER and CLARIFY that QUESTION?

[Skepdick]

Whis is how, PRECISELY?

Yes. That is how. Precisely.

Also, is it IMPOSSIBLE for you to just ANSWER and CLARIFY that QUESTION?

I clarified it by turning it into a statement.

If that's not clear to you perhaps you should clarify what you mean by "clarify".

[Age]

Whis is how, PRECISELY?

Yes. That is how. Precisely.

I meant, 'Which' is how, PRECISELY?

Also, is it IMPOSSIBLE for you to just ANSWER and CLARIFY that QUESTION?

I clarified it by turning it into a statement.

If that's not clear to you perhaps you should clarify what you mean by "clarify".

You turned 'what' into a statement, EXACTLY?

What I mean by 'clarify' is; make a statement less confused and more comprehensible.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have given you the definition of philosophical realism a 'million' times,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
I am definitely NOT a realist in the above sense.
However, I am a realist in the Empirical Realism sense.

I claimed you are undeniably a philosophical realists [reality and things independent of opinions, beliefs and judgments] as defined above.
This is fundamentally what theists are grounding their theism.
Whilst you deny God exists, your philosophical grounding is the same as the theists'.

Btw, you have not support your claims with any reference nor alignment to any specific philosophy.
I have always state my philosophical stance clearly, i.e.
1. ANTI-Philosophical Realism
2. Kantian -Empirical Realism, Transcendental Idealism
3. Buddhism and other non-realist Eastern Philosophies.

My guess [you need to confirm] your philosophical stance is this;

1. Analytic Philosophy with the Linguistic Turn with the following background;

• In 1936, back from Vienna but not yet in the Chair, he [Ayer] announced an uncompromisingly formal version of linguistic philosophy:
  
  The Linguistic Turn:
  [T]he philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things.
  He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them.
  In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character — that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. (1936: 61-2).

Three Tenets of the Analytic School:

• Dummett gave a classic articulation of the Linguistic Turn, attributing it to Frege:
  Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established: namely,
  first, that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought;
  secondly, that the study of thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of thinking; and,
  finally, that the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of language.
  [...] [T]he acceptance of these three tenets is common to the entire analytical school (1978: 458).

I believe your philosophical stance lies somewhere within the above, BUT the above philosophies all has their "legs amputated" and refuted at present.

Can you confirm the above?

As for the stuff about analytic philosophy - mistaking what we say for what we think is as confusing as mistaking what we say for the reality outside language. There was a wrong-turn to language, in my opinion, beginning with Frege and the Tractatus.

If your focus is not on language, then your focus is on reality and things that exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. mind-independent which is Philosophical Realism.

There was indeed a Linguistic Turn [Rorty] where the whole meaning of reality and things is based on how language is used.

The Linguistic Turn was a major development in Western philosophy during the early 20th century, the most important characteristic of which is the focusing of philosophy primarily on the relations between language, language users, and the world.[1]

Very different intellectual movements were associated with the "linguistic turn", although the term itself is commonly thought to have been popularised by Richard Rorty's 1967 anthology The Linguistic Turn, in which he discusses the turn towards linguistic philosophy.
According to Rorty, who later dissociated himself from linguistic philosophy and analytic philosophy generally, the phrase "the linguistic turn" originated with philosopher Gustav Bergmann
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn

Based on your postings I am sure [my inference] your philosophical grounding is that of Philosophical Realism re your refutation that 'Morality is Objective'.

So far, you have not been specific on what grounds are your philosophical stances based on?
As such your rejection that 'Morality is Objective' is groundless and baseless.

[Veritas Aequitas]

So far, you have not been specific on what grounds are your philosophical stances based on?

viewtopic.php?p=665777#p665777
As I've explained, I begin with a methodological distinction between three things:
features of reality that are or were the case;
what we believe and know about them; and
what we say about them - which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given our contextual and conventional use of signs.

I think this taxonomy - rigorously applied - unlocks the potential in the later Wittgenstein's insight into meaning as use - the 'right turn to language'. For example, it exposes the mistake of thinking that philosophy's true business is the analysis of thought or concepts.

And as for ontology, I reject claims about the existence and nature of supposed abstract or non-physical things, which, pending evidence, I think are irrational.

[Veritas Aequitas]

"quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=672749 time=1697109804 user_id=15099"

"Dictionaries provide just a snapshot of usage. But here are two.

1 Objective: adjective: (of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts: Contrasted with subjective.

2 Fact: noun: a thing that is known to exist, to have occurred, or to be true.

Given these, my OP question is obviously confused - and confusing. But what matters - it seems to me - is the centrality of facts with regard to objectivity. That there are facts is assumed in the definition of objectivity.

So earlier I've tried to rephrase the OP as: 'Are there moral facts?' And that obviously resolves into the question: what constitutes a fact?

I've been pointing out that there's a fundamental difference - evident in the above definition - between a fact-as-feature-of-reality (known to exist or to have occurred) and a fact as a thing that is true. The point being that features of reality have no truth-value; they just are or were the case. In this context, only factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - are true or false - given the way we use the signs in context.

I maintain that most if not all philosophical confusion and disagreement arises from mistaking what we say - using factual assertions with truth-value - for the way things are or were. Outside language, reality is not linguistic - and features of reality aren't obliged to conform to our ways of talking about them. And I think that's one of the most profound consequences of Wittgenstein's profound insight - that meaning is use.

Needless to say, all this has a powerful bearing on VA's and other arguments for moral objectivity - for the existence of moral facts. And that's what I'm trying to get at by clarifying VA's argument."

[Veritas Aequitas]

.......

PH, every time I challenged you to prove your 'what is fact' is really real, you responded that that reality and "facts" can be referred to what scientists supposed 'what is real' in relation to their scientific conclusions.

I have problem tracing to your posts on the above.

Can you confirm the following of "what is really real" in relation to your "what is fact", i.e. a feature of reality, that is just-is, being-so, that is/are the case, states of affairs which scientists [naturalists in particular] are directing their attention at, represent your view;

Scientific Realism is, at the most general level, the view that the world described by science is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be.
Within philosophy of science, it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?"
The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories.
Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make reliable claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables.
Analytic philosophers generally have a commitment to scientific realism, in the sense of regarding the scientific method as a reliable guide to the nature of reality.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosoph ... ic_realism

Can you confirm the above represent your 'what is fact' as really real?
If not, give further explanation of your position.

The above scientific Realism is a sub of Philosophical Realism;

Philosophical Realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

If you don't agree with "mind-independence" then substitute it with 'independent of human conditions".

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA has taken to calling me a moral relativist.

But there are different kinds of moral relativism. And the central claim of one kind - descriptive moral relativism - is true: through time and space, people have had and have different moral opinions. Attitudes towards the subjugation of women, slavery, homosexuality and eating animals are obvious examples.

But to reject moral objectivism is not to embrace deontological moral relativism - or moral nihilism - much as VA and IC want that to be the case. To reject the existence of moral facts is to reject them wholesale - not to accept that moral facts are merely a matter of opinion.

I'm not a moral relativist. For example, I think that slavery was, is and will be morally wrong, anywhere. And I think that homosexuality wasn't, isn't and won't ever be morally wrong, anywhere. But that's just the nature of our moral opinions: we tend to apply them universally, because to do otherwise would be morally inconsistent.

If you are not a moral relativist, then logically via LEM [if you accept it] you're a moral realist, and that is the case in general.

You can't be a quasi-realist [Blackburn] because it is bias towards moral relativism.

• Moral relativism or ethical relativism (often reformulated as relativist ethics or relativist morality) is used to describe several philosophical positions concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different peoples and cultures. An advocate of such ideas is often referred to as a relativist for short.
  WIKI

You are definitely a moral relativist [by definition] because to you there are no objective moral facts but merely your personal subjective moral opinions and that of others. Everyone else is then entitled to their own personal moral opinions.

You are also a moral relativists because you accept there are various different ethical theories & models, each entitled to their moral practices.

Since you agree with the existence of moral elements, you cannot be a moral nihilist.
It is undeniable, you are a moral relativist by definition.

Note your "I think that slavery [homosexuality]] was, is and will be morally wrong, anywhere" presumably 'killing of humans' mass rapes and other evil acts perhaps;
the above are merely your opinions without proofs,
it mean that you can readily think and have the opposite opinions easily.
This make you a very dangerous person who could be easily turned to and act upon any of the above terrible evil acts.

If you insist on your claim [proof of your conviction], where is your proof that it is morally 'wrong'.
If no proof, then you are picking such an opinion from the air.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What's your opinion? Try thinking critically about this explanation. What does it actually say?

Can you produce a description that is the described - or could be called the described? Or a description that demonstrates an 'excluded middle' - subverting the 'binary framework': description/described?

Thought for the day. Antirealism isn't opposition to reality. So it must be something else.

Suggestion. Antirealism, in fact, is opposition to the claim that any one kind of description captures the actual nature or essence of reality - opposition to a monocular or blinkered way of thinking and talking about reality - the very source of talk about reality's fundamental nature or essence.

And that's either because we can never know what the fundamental nature or essence of reality is - or because reality has no fundamental nature or essence.

But if - as I think - reality has no fundamental nature or essence - or, as Wittgenstein jokingly put it, 'essence is grammatical' - then the claim that we can have no access to (can never 'know') reality's fundamental nature or essence is incoherent.

Or, to put it in Kantian terms, if there are no noumena, then the claim that all we can ever know are phenomena is incoherent.

(More thoughts pending. Of course.)

Your thoughts above are very messy.

What is in contention between yours and my philosophical position is this.

A: You believe 'what is fact' [thus objectivity to you] is a feature of reality that is just-is, being-so, states of affairs, that is/are the case, and the like, that is [absolutely*] independent of the human conditions, i.e. independent of the subject[s] opinion, beliefs, judgments and description.
* it absolute because, to the extreme the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exists even if humans are extinct.

From the above, you claimed a description is not the-described.

I claimed your above fit into the basic ideology of Philosophical Realism, i.e.

• Philosophical realism - is the view that a certain kind of thing has mind-independent existence [independent of the human conditions], i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

You cannot deny your view of reality and thing and 'what is fact' [objectivity] fit perfectly in the above basic principle of philosophical realism, regardless of your ignorance you are. [any counter to this?]

It is based on the above of your 'what is fact' [your realism based on human condition independence] that you deny morality is objective, because there are no moral facts [as you define it above in A].

Antirealism, to be precise is ANTI-philosophical_realism [not just 'antirealism' which is very vague.]
In my case, my ANTI-philosophical_realism is of the Kantian type.
My ANTI-Philosophical_Realism rejects your claim of 'what is fact' [reality and objectivity] re A above.

But if - as I think - reality has no fundamental nature or essence - or, as Wittgenstein jokingly put it, 'essence is grammatical' - then the claim that we can have no access to (can never 'know') reality's fundamental nature or essence is incoherent.

If you think reality no fundamental nature or essence, then what is reality to you?
How do you reconcile your non-essence reality to A above?

In view of the above, explain what is reality to you?

Or, to put it in Kantian terms,
if there are no noumena,
then the claim that all we can ever know are phenomena
is incoherent.

Note sure, what is the point re the above?

According to common sense of the laymen and basic reasoning,
it is absurd to claim there are phenomena without its corresponding noumena.
Note the qualification here, which is ONLY applicable to "common sense of the laymen and basic reasoning," but not based on higher reasoning.

On the basis of higher reasoning, Kant allow that one can think of the 'noumena' in the negative sense as an idea [intelligible thought] only in the Negative Sense.
We cannot think of the noumena in the Positive Sense, i.e. as fundamental nature or essence.
In this case, you are agreeing with Kant, there is no noumena as fundamental nature or essence.

But according to your A -what is fact, it is nevertheless by definition the noumena in the negative sense.
In this case, your 'what is fact' in A above as the noumena in the negative sense, is still illusory.
If you rely on science, it is scientific realism which is grounded on an illusion.

Atla on the other hand insist, there is the noumena in the positive sense as fundamental nature or essence, and that humans cannot know about it.
This is the worst case of clinging to an illusion.

Your only salvation of your of 'what is fact' is to deny it is human-condition independent, rather it is conditioned [not dependent] upon a human-based FSK, of which the scientific FSK is the most credible but it is intersubjective i.e. conditioned upon the consensus of a collective of subjects.

If you accept reality and things are conditioned upon a human-based FSK, [science most objectivity] then it is possible for Morality to be FSK-ed with a lesser objectivity, but nevertheless Morality is Objective.