If you did NOT cut me of MID-SENTENCE, then you could SEE what I MEAN.
The CONTRADICTION speaks for ITSELF.
If you did NOT cut me of MID-SENTENCE, then you could SEE what I MEAN.
The CONTRADICTION speaks for ITSELF.
WHY would you feel the need to 'apologise' for 'that' what was just being felt or thought?Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Jun 19, 2022 2:50 pm Fwell. I wish to apologise to anyone whom I may have characterised as a nutjob, dick troll, fuckturd, etc. No excuse, but I put it down to intemperance and two glasses of a reasonably-priced father's day merlot, plus the disappointment of getting only one pair of socks from one of my four children. Honestly, why do we bother? And why did our parents bother with us?
I am so relieved to hear that Age, as I am sure most people on the forum are, it does remove a large weight from one's conscience.
That's not a contradiction. It's a paradox, but the fact that you think it's a contradiction speaks for itself - you have misinterpreted my words.
Which definition of the 'paradox' word are you USING here?
OR, have I just USED "your words" with DIFFERENT definitions that you are USING them in and with?
Okay. If that is what you SAY and BELIEVE, then that is how this MUST BE, correct?
I am not using a definition of "paradox". I am using "paradox" itself.
So what? I am using it precisely as I intend to be using it.
If you drop the question mark at the end of that sentence we would come to an agreement.
Which has TWO OPPOSITE definitions.
Whis is how, PRECISELY?
Agreement on 'what', EXACTLY?
Yes. That is how. Precisely.
I clarified it by turning it into a statement.
I meant, 'Which' is how, PRECISELY?
You turned 'what' into a statement, EXACTLY?
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Sep 05, 2023 4:41 am I have given you the definition of philosophical realism a 'million' times,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
I am definitely NOT a realist in the above sense.
However, I am a realist in the Empirical Realism sense.
I claimed you are undeniably a philosophical realists [reality and things independent of opinions, beliefs and judgments] as defined above.
This is fundamentally what theists are grounding their theism.
Whilst you deny God exists, your philosophical grounding is the same as the theists'.
Btw, you have not support your claims with any reference nor alignment to any specific philosophy.
I have always state my philosophical stance clearly, i.e.
1. ANTI-Philosophical Realism
2. Kantian -Empirical Realism, Transcendental Idealism
3. Buddhism and other non-realist Eastern Philosophies.
My guess [you need to confirm] your philosophical stance is this;
1. Analytic Philosophy with the Linguistic Turn with the following background;
Three Tenets of the Analytic School:
- In 1936, back from Vienna but not yet in the Chair, he [Ayer] announced an uncompromisingly formal version of linguistic philosophy:
The Linguistic Turn:
[T]he philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things.
He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them.
In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character — that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. (1936: 61-2).
- Dummett gave a classic articulation of the Linguistic Turn, attributing it to Frege:
Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established: namely,
first, that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought;
secondly, that the study of thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of thinking; and,
finally, that the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of language.
[...] [T]he acceptance of these three tenets is common to the entire analytical school (1978: 458).
I believe your philosophical stance lies somewhere within the above, BUT the above philosophies all has their "legs amputated" and refuted at present.
Can you confirm the above?
If your focus is not on language, then your focus is on reality and things that exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. mind-independent which is Philosophical Realism.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Sep 05, 2023 12:53 pm As for the stuff about analytic philosophy - mistaking what we say for what we think is as confusing as mistaking what we say for the reality outside language. There was a wrong-turn to language, in my opinion, beginning with Frege and the Tractatus.
The Linguistic Turn was a major development in Western philosophy during the early 20th century, the most important characteristic of which is the focusing of philosophy primarily on the relations between language, language users, and the world.[1]
Very different intellectual movements were associated with the "linguistic turn", although the term itself is commonly thought to have been popularised by Richard Rorty's 1967 anthology The Linguistic Turn, in which he discusses the turn towards linguistic philosophy.
According to Rorty, who later dissociated himself from linguistic philosophy and analytic philosophy generally, the phrase "the linguistic turn" originated with philosopher Gustav Bergmann
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn
So far, you have not been specific on what grounds are your philosophical stances based on?
PH wrote:viewtopic.php?p=665777#p665777
As I've explained, I begin with a methodological distinction between three things:
features of reality that are or were the case;
what we believe and know about them; and
what we say about them - which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given our contextual and conventional use of signs.
I think this taxonomy - rigorously applied - unlocks the potential in the later Wittgenstein's insight into meaning as use - the 'right turn to language'. For example, it exposes the mistake of thinking that philosophy's true business is the analysis of thought or concepts.
And as for ontology, I reject claims about the existence and nature of supposed abstract or non-physical things, which, pending evidence, I think are irrational.
PH, every time I challenged you to prove your 'what is fact' is really real, you responded that that reality and "facts" can be referred to what scientists supposed 'what is real' in relation to their scientific conclusions.
Can you confirm the above represent your 'what is fact' as really real?Scientific Realism is, at the most general level, the view that the world described by science is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be.
Within philosophy of science, it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?"
The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories.
Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make reliable claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables.
Analytic philosophers generally have a commitment to scientific realism, in the sense of regarding the scientific method as a reliable guide to the nature of reality.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosoph ... ic_realism
If you don't agree with "mind-independence" then substitute it with 'independent of human conditions".Philosophical Realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
If you are not a moral relativist, then logically via LEM [if you accept it] you're a moral realist, and that is the case in general.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Oct 24, 2023 9:39 am VA has taken to calling me a moral relativist.
But there are different kinds of moral relativism. And the central claim of one kind - descriptive moral relativism - is true: through time and space, people have had and have different moral opinions. Attitudes towards the subjugation of women, slavery, homosexuality and eating animals are obvious examples.
But to reject moral objectivism is not to embrace deontological moral relativism - or moral nihilism - much as VA and IC want that to be the case. To reject the existence of moral facts is to reject them wholesale - not to accept that moral facts are merely a matter of opinion.
I'm not a moral relativist. For example, I think that slavery was, is and will be morally wrong, anywhere. And I think that homosexuality wasn't, isn't and won't ever be morally wrong, anywhere. But that's just the nature of our moral opinions: we tend to apply them universally, because to do otherwise would be morally inconsistent.
Your thoughts above are very messy.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Oct 27, 2023 8:19 am What's your opinion? Try thinking critically about this explanation. What does it actually say?
Can you produce a description that is the described - or could be called the described? Or a description that demonstrates an 'excluded middle' - subverting the 'binary framework': description/described?
Thought for the day. Antirealism isn't opposition to reality. So it must be something else.
Suggestion. Antirealism, in fact, is opposition to the claim that any one kind of description captures the actual nature or essence of reality - opposition to a monocular or blinkered way of thinking and talking about reality - the very source of talk about reality's fundamental nature or essence.
And that's either because we can never know what the fundamental nature or essence of reality is - or because reality has no fundamental nature or essence.
But if - as I think - reality has no fundamental nature or essence - or, as Wittgenstein jokingly put it, 'essence is grammatical' - then the claim that we can have no access to (can never 'know') reality's fundamental nature or essence is incoherent.
Or, to put it in Kantian terms, if there are no noumena, then the claim that all we can ever know are phenomena is incoherent.
(More thoughts pending. Of course.)
If you think reality no fundamental nature or essence, then what is reality to you?PH wrote:But if - as I think - reality has no fundamental nature or essence - or, as Wittgenstein jokingly put it, 'essence is grammatical' - then the claim that we can have no access to (can never 'know') reality's fundamental nature or essence is incoherent.
Note sure, what is the point re the above?PH wrote:Or, to put it in Kantian terms,
if there are no noumena,
then the claim that all we can ever know are phenomena
is incoherent.