Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

Moderators: AMod, iMod

Skepdick
Posts: 14347
Joined: Fri Jun 14, 2019 11:16 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Skepdick »

Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 12:24 pm It's an infantile stage that some people never move past, despite learning things like philosophy in the meantime. They wind up using philosophy to try to justify the infantile stage they're stuck in.
It's pretty infantile to insist that viewpoints which challenge your viewpoint are infantile.

Emotional manipulation and and social pressure/approval are precisely the persuasion tactics and strategy of spoiled brats throwing their toys out of the cot.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12241
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 11:13 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 9:44 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 9:02 am
Hence the gist of the criticism. You're knocking a view for being characteristic of a certain stage of "pre-analytic" development , but your view is characteristic of an even earlier stage of "pre-analytic" development.
Note my view re empirical realism [Kantian] is a later philosophical view of reality which is improved upon the older and other view of mind independent.

Kant called that his Copernican Revolution following Copernicus' turn from common and conventional sense to what is the realistic view.
The mind interdependent turn is after much and deep philosophical reflection;
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our Knowledge must conform to Objects.
But all attempts to extend our Knowledge of Objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of Concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in Failure.

We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of Metaphysics, if we suppose that Objects must conform to our Knowledge.
This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be Possible to have Knowledge of Objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being Given.

We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary Hypothesis. 1
Failing of satisfactory progress of explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. [..B xvii]

A similar experiment can be tried in Metaphysics, as regards the Intuition of Objects.
The claim that features of reality conform to our knowledge of them, and therefore our ways of describing them, is arse-about-face - cart-before-horseplay. And Kant's false analogy says it all. The Copernican revolution was about discovering the way things really are - not assuming they conform to our way of describing them.
I have to say you are very stupid and naive philosophically.

Strawmaning again.
Where did Kant state "they conform to our way of describing them."

Kant stated if we suppose that Objects must conform to our Knowledge and the term "knowledge" in this case is heavily laden to the context that is in the CPR.
The above quoted was merely a point from the preface, but to understand that point one has to understand his whole CPR thoroughly.

It is very embarrassing and insulting to your intelligence that you are so arrogant with your stupidity when you have not read Kant's work thoroughly.
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Thu Apr 08, 2021 5:55 am, edited 1 time in total.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12241
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 12:24 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 9:44 am Note my view re empirical realism [Kantian] is a later philosophical view of reality
It's an infantile stage that some people never move past, despite learning things like philosophy in the meantime. They wind up using philosophy to try to justify the infantile stage they're stuck in.
You are indeed very ignorant re the above philosophical issue.

Show me one reference within the philosophical community that support your view 'philosophical anti-realism' i.e. reality is not mind independent, is considered infantile?
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3710
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 5:50 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 11:13 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 9:44 am
Note my view re empirical realism [Kantian] is a later philosophical view of reality which is improved upon the older and other view of mind independent.

Kant called that his Copernican Revolution following Copernicus' turn from common and conventional sense to what is the realistic view.
The mind interdependent turn is after much and deep philosophical reflection;

The claim that features of reality conform to our knowledge of them, and therefore our ways of describing them, is arse-about-face - cart-before-horseplay. And Kant's false analogy says it all. The Copernican revolution was about discovering the way things really are - not assuming they conform to our way of describing them.
I have to say you are very stupid and naive philosophically.

Strawmaning again.
Where did Kant state "they conform to our way of describing them."

Kant stated if we suppose that Objects must conform to our Knowledge and the term "knowledge" in this case is heavily laden to the context that is in the CPR.
The above quoted was merely a point from the preface, but to understand that point one has to understand his whole CPR thoroughly.

It is very embarrassing and insulting to your intelligence that you are so arrogant with your stupidity when you have not read Kant's work thoroughly.
I have read the CPR, and it was one of the most painful reading experiences I've ever had.

But I think what matters is claims and arguments. We may disagree about what - if anything coherent - Kant actually wrote. And the raging debate among Kant scholars about much of it indicates that it wasn't clear at all.

Question: is there a distinction between phenomena and noumena? If so, what and where are noumena? This is what matters, because you invoke the supposed non-existence of things-in-themselves in order to support your argument for moral objectivity - though the connection is far from clear.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12241
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 6:40 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 5:50 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 11:13 am

The claim that features of reality conform to our knowledge of them, and therefore our ways of describing them, is arse-about-face - cart-before-horseplay. And Kant's false analogy says it all. The Copernican revolution was about discovering the way things really are - not assuming they conform to our way of describing them.
I have to say you are very stupid and naive philosophically.

Strawmaning again.
Where did Kant state "they conform to our way of describing them."

Kant stated if we suppose that Objects must conform to our Knowledge and the term "knowledge" in this case is heavily laden to the context that is in the CPR.
The above quoted was merely a point from the preface, but to understand that point one has to understand his whole CPR thoroughly.

It is very embarrassing and insulting to your intelligence that you are so arrogant with your stupidity when you have not read Kant's work thoroughly.
I have read the CPR, and it was one of the most painful reading experiences I've ever had.
True, note "no pain no gain."
I suffered similar pains as well but also experienced regular "intellectual orgasm" :D in the course of reading Kant's CPR and his other work.
But I think what matters is claims and arguments. We may disagree about what - if anything coherent - Kant actually wrote. And the raging debate among Kant scholars about much of it indicates that it wasn't clear at all.
I am aware of that. There are philosophers who spent a life time reading, researching and teaching Kant's philosophers and there are disagreement among them. Those in the analytic or anti-realists camps who read Kant will never agree with each other on certain main elements.
I believe I have got Kant's intended views which is coherent [triangulated] with my other views. Btw, I do not agree with Kant totally.
Question: is there a distinction between phenomena and noumena? If so, what and where are noumena? This is what matters, because you invoke the supposed non-existence of things-in-themselves in order to support your argument for moral objectivity - though the connection is far from clear.
What is phenomena are things per se that can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically as real within a credible FSK.
The concept of phenomena appear in the middle [B311] of Kant's whole argument [B884]. He still got 573 pages to get to this final conclusion.

Kant anticipated the realists will be impatient and will question, how can phenomena that appeared exist without 'that-which-appear'?

So Kant at that point in appeasing the realist question, implied, let's assume there is the 'that-which-appear' so that he can continue to argue the thing-in-itself is ultimately illusory [after another 573 pages].
He labelled this 'that-which-appear' as the noumena.

Note this is what Kant wrote [in the middle of his argument] about the 'noumena' aka thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves;
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility.
CPR - B311
What is positive the phenomena within the field of sensibility. If one were to insist the noumena is positive, it has to be within the field of sensibility thus cannot be independent of mind[sensibility].

If the concept of noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is merely a limiting concept, how can it be a real thing at all ultimately?

Note he went on to demonstrate why the noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is illusory and not real within the next 573 B-pages.

If you cherry pick to argue against Kant, you will not succeed and besides that is intellectual dishonesty.

Kant warned about cherry-picking in arguing against his work;
A philosophical work cannot be armed at all points, like a Mathematical treatise, and may therefore be open to objection in this or that respect, while yet the Structure of the System, taken in its Unity, is not in the least endangered.

Few have the versatility of mind to familiarise themselves with a new System; and owing to the general distaste for all innovation, still fewer have the inclination to do so.

If we take single passages, torn from their contexts, and compare them with one another, apparent contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in a work that is written with any freedom of expression.

In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others, such contradictions have the effect of placing the work in an unfavourable light; but they are easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the Whole.

CPR Preface B-xliv
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 4548
Joined: Wed Aug 03, 2016 7:18 pm
Location: NYC Man

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Terrapin Station »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 5:52 am
Terrapin Station wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 12:24 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Apr 07, 2021 9:44 am Note my view re empirical realism [Kantian] is a later philosophical view of reality
It's an infantile stage that some people never move past, despite learning things like philosophy in the meantime. They wind up using philosophy to try to justify the infantile stage they're stuck in.
You are indeed very ignorant re the above philosophical issue.

Show me one reference within the philosophical community that support your view 'philosophical anti-realism' i.e. reality is not mind independent, is considered infantile?
Because on your view it's illegitimate to say something unless other people have already said it in a particular context? Er, uh???
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3710
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 7:53 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 6:40 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 5:50 am
I have to say you are very stupid and naive philosophically.

Strawmaning again.
Where did Kant state "they conform to our way of describing them."

Kant stated if we suppose that Objects must conform to our Knowledge and the term "knowledge" in this case is heavily laden to the context that is in the CPR.
The above quoted was merely a point from the preface, but to understand that point one has to understand his whole CPR thoroughly.

It is very embarrassing and insulting to your intelligence that you are so arrogant with your stupidity when you have not read Kant's work thoroughly.
I have read the CPR, and it was one of the most painful reading experiences I've ever had.
True, note "no pain no gain."
I suffered similar pains as well but also experienced regular "intellectual orgasm" :D in the course of reading Kant's CPR and his other work.
But I think what matters is claims and arguments. We may disagree about what - if anything coherent - Kant actually wrote. And the raging debate among Kant scholars about much of it indicates that it wasn't clear at all.
I am aware of that. There are philosophers who spent a life time reading, researching and teaching Kant's philosophers and there are disagreement among them. Those in the analytic or anti-realists camps who read Kant will never agree with each other on certain main elements.
I believe I have got Kant's intended views which is coherent [triangulated] with my other views. Btw, I do not agree with Kant totally.
Question: is there a distinction between phenomena and noumena? If so, what and where are noumena? This is what matters, because you invoke the supposed non-existence of things-in-themselves in order to support your argument for moral objectivity - though the connection is far from clear.
What is phenomena are things per se that can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically as real within a credible FSK.
The concept of phenomena appear in the middle [B311] of Kant's whole argument [B884]. He still got 573 pages to get to this final conclusion.

Kant anticipated the realists will be impatient and will question, how can phenomena that appeared exist without 'that-which-appear'?

So Kant at that point in appeasing the realist question, implied, let's assume there is the 'that-which-appear' so that he can continue to argue the thing-in-itself is ultimately illusory [after another 573 pages].
He labelled this 'that-which-appear' as the noumena.

Note this is what Kant wrote [in the middle of his argument] about the 'noumena' aka thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves;
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility.
CPR - B311
What is positive the phenomena within the field of sensibility. If one were to insist the noumena is positive, it has to be within the field of sensibility thus cannot be independent of mind[sensibility].

If the concept of noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is merely a limiting concept, how can it be a real thing at all ultimately?

Note he went on to demonstrate why the noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is illusory and not real within the next 573 B-pages.

If you cherry pick to argue against Kant, you will not succeed and besides that is intellectual dishonesty.

Kant warned about cherry-picking in arguing against his work;
A philosophical work cannot be armed at all points, like a Mathematical treatise, and may therefore be open to objection in this or that respect, while yet the Structure of the System, taken in its Unity, is not in the least endangered.

Few have the versatility of mind to familiarise themselves with a new System; and owing to the general distaste for all innovation, still fewer have the inclination to do so.

If we take single passages, torn from their contexts, and compare them with one another, apparent contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in a work that is written with any freedom of expression.

In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others, such contradictions have the effect of placing the work in an unfavourable light; but they are easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the Whole.

CPR Preface B-xliv
Thanks for that - but it confirms my view of Kant's mistakes.

An argument consists of premises designed to justify a conclusion. To claim that 'the idea of the Whole' can be sound, even if an argument is unsound or not shown to be sound, is special pleading. And Kant's invention of noumena is an example of how things can go wrong. He inherited and recycled empiricist skepticism - a metaphysical delusion - and constructed an elaborate system designed to explain or account for it. And so-called noumena, as a 'limiting concept', play a critical role in the magnificent house of cards.

My question stands: what and where are noumena, or things-in-themselves? Are they anything more than fictions, like all so-called abstract things? If they're nothing more than concepts, what and where are concepts? If they're in minds, what and where are minds? Is the mind a concept? And so on.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12241
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 1:46 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 7:53 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 6:40 am
I have read the CPR, and it was one of the most painful reading experiences I've ever had.
True, note "no pain no gain."
I suffered similar pains as well but also experienced regular "intellectual orgasm" :D in the course of reading Kant's CPR and his other work.
But I think what matters is claims and arguments. We may disagree about what - if anything coherent - Kant actually wrote. And the raging debate among Kant scholars about much of it indicates that it wasn't clear at all.
I am aware of that. There are philosophers who spent a life time reading, researching and teaching Kant's philosophers and there are disagreement among them. Those in the analytic or anti-realists camps who read Kant will never agree with each other on certain main elements.
I believe I have got Kant's intended views which is coherent [triangulated] with my other views. Btw, I do not agree with Kant totally.
Question: is there a distinction between phenomena and noumena? If so, what and where are noumena? This is what matters, because you invoke the supposed non-existence of things-in-themselves in order to support your argument for moral objectivity - though the connection is far from clear.
What is phenomena are things per se that can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically as real within a credible FSK.
The concept of phenomena appear in the middle [B311] of Kant's whole argument [B884]. He still got 573 pages to get to this final conclusion.

Kant anticipated the realists will be impatient and will question, how can phenomena that appeared exist without 'that-which-appear'?

So Kant at that point in appeasing the realist question, implied, let's assume there is the 'that-which-appear' so that he can continue to argue the thing-in-itself is ultimately illusory [after another 573 pages].
He labelled this 'that-which-appear' as the noumena.

Note this is what Kant wrote [in the middle of his argument] about the 'noumena' aka thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves;
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility.
CPR - B311
What is positive the phenomena within the field of sensibility. If one were to insist the noumena is positive, it has to be within the field of sensibility thus cannot be independent of mind[sensibility].

If the concept of noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is merely a limiting concept, how can it be a real thing at all ultimately?

Note he went on to demonstrate why the noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is illusory and not real within the next 573 B-pages.

If you cherry pick to argue against Kant, you will not succeed and besides that is intellectual dishonesty.

Kant warned about cherry-picking in arguing against his work;
A philosophical work cannot be armed at all points, like a Mathematical treatise, and may therefore be open to objection in this or that respect, while yet the Structure of the System, taken in its Unity, is not in the least endangered.

Few have the versatility of mind to familiarise themselves with a new System; and owing to the general distaste for all innovation, still fewer have the inclination to do so.

If we take single passages, torn from their contexts, and compare them with one another, apparent contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in a work that is written with any freedom of expression.

In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others, such contradictions have the effect of placing the work in an unfavourable light; but they are easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the Whole.

CPR Preface B-xliv
Thanks for that - but it confirms my view of Kant's mistakes.

An argument consists of premises designed to justify a conclusion. To claim that 'the idea of the Whole' can be sound, even if an argument is unsound or not shown to be sound, is special pleading. And Kant's invention of noumena is an example of how things can go wrong. He inherited and recycled empiricist skepticism - a metaphysical delusion - and constructed an elaborate system designed to explain or account for it. And so-called noumena, as a 'limiting concept', play a critical role in the magnificent house of cards.

My question stands: what and where are noumena, or things-in-themselves? Are they anything more than fictions, like all so-called abstract things? If they're nothing more than concepts, what and where are concepts? If they're in minds, what and where are minds? Is the mind a concept? And so on.
It should be very embarrassing for you to be so arrogant when you are so ignorant.
Despite Kant's warning you are merely relying on a passage [out of 834 pages] to condemn Kant's view.

How come you are so blind and keep asking the question 'what and where are noumena?"
Also how can you be so conclusive when you have not understood the 884 pages of Kant's CRP thoroughly.
I don't think you understood my explanations above.

Note Kant's answer again as quoted above,
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility;
and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility.
CPR - B311
Explain how your,
PH: "And so-called noumena, as a 'limiting concept', play a critical role in the magnificent house of cards."
Your explanation above is important to understand where you are missing the point.

What is a limiting concept is merely an assumption.
  • For example,
    let say X and Y are disputing their land boundary.
    X claims the boundary of his land is at point-A [he named it noumena] and he had built a fence on it.
    But to Y, point-A is 500 meters into his boundary.
    To avoid getting into violence, Y allows point-A to be the limit of X's field but only temporary while they agree to settle the matter in court. [to be confirm by land titles and surveyor's report].

    In this example, that Y allow point-A [noumena] to the be limit of X's field temporarily is merely a limiting concept which does not represent reality at all.
    The reality in this case will be determined by the court.
Thus for Kant the noumena is merely a limiting concept to assume 'that with appear' is real but subject to his further arguments in the rest of his >500 pages.
His final conclusion is, the noumena aka things-in-themselves reified as real are illusory.

Note,
for every appearance [phenomena], by common sense, there should be 'that which appeared' [the referent].
What you are doing is, you as a realist is taking 'that which appear' as the real thing.
But Kant is not doing that, Kant merely assumed 'that which appeared' as a noumenon.
This assumed noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is merely a limiting concept, not a real thing.

Thereafter in the rest of the >500 pages of the CPR, Kant demonstrated the noumenon aka thing-in-itself [plural things-in-themselves] is an illusion.
The 'father' of all things-in-themselves is God.
Peter Holmes
Posts: 3710
Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Apr 09, 2021 6:25 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 1:46 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 7:53 am
True, note "no pain no gain."
I suffered similar pains as well but also experienced regular "intellectual orgasm" :D in the course of reading Kant's CPR and his other work.


I am aware of that. There are philosophers who spent a life time reading, researching and teaching Kant's philosophers and there are disagreement among them. Those in the analytic or anti-realists camps who read Kant will never agree with each other on certain main elements.
I believe I have got Kant's intended views which is coherent [triangulated] with my other views. Btw, I do not agree with Kant totally.


What is phenomena are things per se that can be verified and justified empirically and philosophically as real within a credible FSK.
The concept of phenomena appear in the middle [B311] of Kant's whole argument [B884]. He still got 573 pages to get to this final conclusion.

Kant anticipated the realists will be impatient and will question, how can phenomena that appeared exist without 'that-which-appear'?

So Kant at that point in appeasing the realist question, implied, let's assume there is the 'that-which-appear' so that he can continue to argue the thing-in-itself is ultimately illusory [after another 573 pages].
He labelled this 'that-which-appear' as the noumena.

Note this is what Kant wrote [in the middle of his argument] about the 'noumena' aka thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves;


What is positive the phenomena within the field of sensibility. If one were to insist the noumena is positive, it has to be within the field of sensibility thus cannot be independent of mind[sensibility].

If the concept of noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is merely a limiting concept, how can it be a real thing at all ultimately?

Note he went on to demonstrate why the noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is illusory and not real within the next 573 B-pages.

If you cherry pick to argue against Kant, you will not succeed and besides that is intellectual dishonesty.

Kant warned about cherry-picking in arguing against his work;

Thanks for that - but it confirms my view of Kant's mistakes.

An argument consists of premises designed to justify a conclusion. To claim that 'the idea of the Whole' can be sound, even if an argument is unsound or not shown to be sound, is special pleading. And Kant's invention of noumena is an example of how things can go wrong. He inherited and recycled empiricist skepticism - a metaphysical delusion - and constructed an elaborate system designed to explain or account for it. And so-called noumena, as a 'limiting concept', play a critical role in the magnificent house of cards.

My question stands: what and where are noumena, or things-in-themselves? Are they anything more than fictions, like all so-called abstract things? If they're nothing more than concepts, what and where are concepts? If they're in minds, what and where are minds? Is the mind a concept? And so on.
It should be very embarrassing for you to be so arrogant when you are so ignorant.
Despite Kant's warning you are merely relying on a passage [out of 834 pages] to condemn Kant's view.

How come you are so blind and keep asking the question 'what and where are noumena?"
Also how can you be so conclusive when you have not understood the 884 pages of Kant's CRP thoroughly.
I don't think you understood my explanations above.

Note Kant's answer again as quoted above,
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility;
and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility.
CPR - B311
Explain how your,
PH: "And so-called noumena, as a 'limiting concept', play a critical role in the magnificent house of cards."
Your explanation above is important to understand where you are missing the point.

What is a limiting concept is merely an assumption.
  • For example,
    let say X and Y are disputing their land boundary.
    X claims the boundary of his land is at point-A [he named it noumena] and he had built a fence on it.
    But to Y, point-A is 500 meters into his boundary.
    To avoid getting into violence, Y allows point-A to be the limit of X's field but only temporary while they agree to settle the matter in court. [to be confirm by land titles and surveyor's report].

    In this example, that Y allow point-A [noumena] to the be limit of X's field temporarily is merely a limiting concept which does not represent reality at all.
    The reality in this case will be determined by the court.
Thus for Kant the noumena is merely a limiting concept to assume 'that with appear' is real but subject to his further arguments in the rest of his >500 pages.
His final conclusion is, the noumena aka things-in-themselves reified as real are illusory.

Note,
for every appearance [phenomena], by common sense, there should be 'that which appeared' [the referent].
What you are doing is, you as a realist is taking 'that which appear' as the real thing.
But Kant is not doing that, Kant merely assumed 'that which appeared' as a noumenon.
This assumed noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is merely a limiting concept, not a real thing.

Thereafter in the rest of the >500 pages of the CPR, Kant demonstrated the noumenon aka thing-in-itself [plural things-in-themselves] is an illusion.
The 'father' of all things-in-themselves is God.
1 So I am arrogant, ignorant and blind. Lucky there are humble, knowing and far-sighted people like you, from whom we can learn.

2 So here is a summary of Kant on the supposed noumenon:

The noumenon is merely a limiting concept designed to curb the pretensions of sensibility, with therefore only negative employment. But it's not an arbitrary invention; it's bound up with the limitation of sensibility. But it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility.

And to cap it all, noumena - things-in-themselves - are illusions, whose father is God - whom Kant was trying to save from enlightened dissolution.

And you take this mystical, obfuscatory blather seriously? How can the sweet reason of 'the Whole' perfume this shit?

3 Please answer this question. Do you think everything that was, is and will be the case in the universe exists only if and because humans exist?

4 Please explain this argument: X is the case; therefore X ought to be the case. How can the conclusion ever follow from the premise, without begging the question?
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12241
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Fri Apr 09, 2021 6:55 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Apr 09, 2021 6:25 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Apr 08, 2021 1:46 pm
Thanks for that - but it confirms my view of Kant's mistakes.

An argument consists of premises designed to justify a conclusion. To claim that 'the idea of the Whole' can be sound, even if an argument is unsound or not shown to be sound, is special pleading. And Kant's invention of noumena is an example of how things can go wrong. He inherited and recycled empiricist skepticism - a metaphysical delusion - and constructed an elaborate system designed to explain or account for it. And so-called noumena, as a 'limiting concept', play a critical role in the magnificent house of cards.

My question stands: what and where are noumena, or things-in-themselves? Are they anything more than fictions, like all so-called abstract things? If they're nothing more than concepts, what and where are concepts? If they're in minds, what and where are minds? Is the mind a concept? And so on.
It should be very embarrassing for you to be so arrogant when you are so ignorant.
Despite Kant's warning you are merely relying on a passage [out of 834 pages] to condemn Kant's view.

How come you are so blind and keep asking the question 'what and where are noumena?"
Also how can you be so conclusive when you have not understood the 884 pages of Kant's CRP thoroughly.
I don't think you understood my explanations above.

Note Kant's answer again as quoted above,
The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility;
and it is therefore only of negative employment.

At the same time it [Noumenon] is no arbitrary invention; it is Bound up with the Limitation of Sensibility, though it [Noumenon] cannot affirm anything Positive beyond the Field of Sensibility.
CPR - B311
Explain how your,
PH: "And so-called noumena, as a 'limiting concept', play a critical role in the magnificent house of cards."
Your explanation above is important to understand where you are missing the point.

What is a limiting concept is merely an assumption.
  • For example,
    let say X and Y are disputing their land boundary.
    X claims the boundary of his land is at point-A [he named it noumena] and he had built a fence on it.
    But to Y, point-A is 500 meters into his boundary.
    To avoid getting into violence, Y allows point-A to be the limit of X's field but only temporary while they agree to settle the matter in court. [to be confirm by land titles and surveyor's report].

    In this example, that Y allow point-A [noumena] to the be limit of X's field temporarily is merely a limiting concept which does not represent reality at all.
    The reality in this case will be determined by the court.
Thus for Kant the noumena is merely a limiting concept to assume 'that with appear' is real but subject to his further arguments in the rest of his >500 pages.
His final conclusion is, the noumena aka things-in-themselves reified as real are illusory.

Note,
for every appearance [phenomena], by common sense, there should be 'that which appeared' [the referent].
What you are doing is, you as a realist is taking 'that which appear' as the real thing.
But Kant is not doing that, Kant merely assumed 'that which appeared' as a noumenon.
This assumed noumenon [aka thing-in-itself] is merely a limiting concept, not a real thing.

Thereafter in the rest of the >500 pages of the CPR, Kant demonstrated the noumenon aka thing-in-itself [plural things-in-themselves] is an illusion.
The 'father' of all things-in-themselves is God.
1 So I am arrogant, ignorant and blind. Lucky there are humble, knowing and far-sighted people like you, from whom we can learn.

2 So here is a summary of Kant on the supposed noumenon:

The noumenon is merely a limiting concept designed to curb the pretensions of sensibility, with therefore only negative employment. But it's not an arbitrary invention; it's bound up with the limitation of sensibility. But it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility.

And to cap it all, noumena - things-in-themselves - are illusions, whose father is God - whom Kant was trying to save from enlightened dissolution.

And you take this mystical, obfuscatory blather seriously? How can the sweet reason of 'the Whole' perfume this shit?

3 Please answer this question. Do you think everything that was, is and will be the case in the universe exists only if and because humans exist?

4 Please explain this argument: X is the case; therefore X ought to be the case. How can the conclusion ever follow from the premise, without begging the question?
Note I replied to 3 in another post and I have raised a specific thread for that.

Re 4, you are ignorant of what is circularity in the narrow sense and the broad sense which thus make your knowledge constipated.

I am seriously and very interested of your claim below;
PH: And you take this mystical, obfuscatory blather seriously?
How can the sweet reason of 'the Whole' perfume this shit?

Explain plainly how the above points from Kant ended up with being mystical?
DPMartin
Posts: 635
Joined: Tue Jan 10, 2017 12:11 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by DPMartin »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Apr 02, 2021 8:07 am
DPMartin wrote: Thu Apr 01, 2021 4:46 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Mon Mar 29, 2021 6:53 am Given there is no absolute 100% certainty.

Here are the arguments from Andrew D. Chapman on "Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True"
see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bo6OaOzuyLM
  • "In this lecture, I prove that moral realism is almost certainly true.
    After looking at two bad arguments against moral realism's truth and showing why these are bad arguments,
    I look at seven good arguments for moral realism's truth and show why these are good arguments."


Agree/Disagree?
moral realism? don't think so, morals are agreed to at the human level. in the case of morals no one is an island, it takes two or more to be moral or immoral which would be according to what is agreed to. the reality is morals are relative to the agreed. moral realism doesn't seem to apply.
You have to widen your perspective to understand what is morality-proper to what is inherent in ALL humans, i.e. human nature.

Just as there are various innate functions within ALL humans, there is an innate, inherent, intrinsic moral function that is "programmed" in all humans.
The difficulty here is the existence of a generic innate moral function is not as obvious as other innate functions, like, intelligence, eating, drinking, sex, breathing and the likes.

Just like the drinking function is not about what one or a group like to drink, the moral function is not about moral judgments, decisions, beliefs and opinions by the individual and group.

What is moral realism is grounded on the moral facts that are represented by the physical mechanisms of the moral function within the human brain. This moral facts are independent of the individuals' views.

The above arguments in the OP, i.e. "what matters" are directing our attentions to these moral physical mechanisms in the brain which need to be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible moral FSK.
you don't need morals to execute boldly functions, nor do animals. but for men to coexist peaceably, then an agreement is required, and that agreement is the set of morals for the agreed.

all your trying to say is if it feels good then do it, make it your set of morals personal morals (which don't exist) and then you are justified in your own sight.

one acts in the interest of what they love, and there is no morals involved in that either. a serial killer loves what he does, and he don't need a set of morals to do so. he may have reasons to justify to himself, but reasons are not morals either.

there can be reasons to come into an agreement that maybe totally in one's self interest, but the the agreement once agreed to becomes the morals to the agreed. reasons maybe personal, but they are not to be confused as "morals".
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12241
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

DPMartin wrote: Thu Apr 15, 2021 10:33 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Apr 02, 2021 8:07 am
DPMartin wrote: Thu Apr 01, 2021 4:46 pm
moral realism? don't think so, morals are agreed to at the human level. in the case of morals no one is an island, it takes two or more to be moral or immoral which would be according to what is agreed to. the reality is morals are relative to the agreed. moral realism doesn't seem to apply.
You have to widen your perspective to understand what is morality-proper to what is inherent in ALL humans, i.e. human nature.

Just as there are various innate functions within ALL humans, there is an innate, inherent, intrinsic moral function that is "programmed" in all humans.
The difficulty here is the existence of a generic innate moral function is not as obvious as other innate functions, like, intelligence, eating, drinking, sex, breathing and the likes.

Just like the drinking function is not about what one or a group like to drink, the moral function is not about moral judgments, decisions, beliefs and opinions by the individual and group.

What is moral realism is grounded on the moral facts that are represented by the physical mechanisms of the moral function within the human brain. This moral facts are independent of the individuals' views.

The above arguments in the OP, i.e. "what matters" are directing our attentions to these moral physical mechanisms in the brain which need to be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible moral FSK.
you don't need morals to execute boldly functions, nor do animals. but for men to coexist peaceably, then an agreement is required, and that agreement is the set of morals for the agreed.

all your trying to say is if it feels good then do it, make it your set of morals personal morals (which don't exist) and then you are justified in your own sight.

one acts in the interest of what they love, and there is no morals involved in that either. a serial killer loves what he does, and he don't need a set of morals to do so. he may have reasons to justify to himself, but reasons are not morals either.

there can be reasons to come into an agreement that maybe totally in one's self interest, but the the agreement once agreed to becomes the morals to the agreed. reasons maybe personal, but they are not to be confused as "morals".
You missed my point.

Actually you need bodily function to execute what should be inherently moral.

What people like to drink, eat or fuck, etc. is not the issue here.

What is critical to the issue is, all humans are "pre-programmed" with certain innate propensities, e.g. to survive, to eat, to breathe, to fuck, to drink, and other primal drives.
It is these innate propensities with its physical structures are the real physical things we are concern with.

What is no so obvious is the innate propensity for "good to prevail over evil" and this is related to morality-proper, most are ignorant of its underlying physical reality and function. But the intuitive drive for 'good' to prevail over evil is very common since humans emerged to the present. Note a clue to the innate moral function within humans studied in babies >12 month who are not yet influenced by nurture.
The Moral Life of Babies
Yale Psychology Professor Paul Bloom finds the origins of morality in infants
Morality is not just something that people learn, argues Yale psychologist Paul Bloom: It is something we are all born with. At birth, babies are endowed with compassion, with empathy, with the beginnings of a sense of fairness. It is from these beginnings, he argues in his new book Just Babies, that adults develop their sense of right and wrong, their desire to do good ..
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... of-babies/#:
So you are right that what is morally good [to be defined precisely] should not be related to what is preferred subjectively, loved and liked by anyone.

My view is what is morality is for every and each individual to recognize, understand, realize the nature of their inherent morality, then develop it so that they will flow spontaneously with what is inherently and naturally moral. There should be no forcing and pressure from any external parties.
DPMartin
Posts: 635
Joined: Tue Jan 10, 2017 12:11 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by DPMartin »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Apr 16, 2021 8:52 am
Yale Psychology Professor Paul Bloom finds the origins of morality in infants
Morality is not just something that people learn, argues Yale psychologist Paul Bloom: It is something we are all born with. At birth, babies are endowed with compassion, with empathy, with the beginnings of a sense of fairness. It is from these beginnings, he argues in his new book Just Babies, that adults develop their sense of right and wrong, their desire to do good ..
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... of-babies/#:
So you are right that what is morally good [to be defined precisely] should not be related to what is preferred subjectively, loved and liked by anyone.

My view is what is morality is for every and each individual to recognize, understand, realize the nature of their inherent morality, then develop it so that they will flow spontaneously with what is inherently and naturally moral. There should be no forcing and pressure from any external parties.
[/quote]

the Yale statement is horse dump,(unless of course you have taken it way out of context) where's the inherently evil? any parent of more than one child knows that crap is way off base.

you may find things in the world to support your claim, but it seems you disregard the overwhelming hard evidence in front of you. maybe this is just some attempt on your part to deny reality is what it is.
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 4548
Joined: Wed Aug 03, 2016 7:18 pm
Location: NYC Man

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Terrapin Station »

DPMartin wrote: Fri Apr 16, 2021 4:07 pm So you are right that what is morally good [to be defined precisely] should not be related to what is preferred subjectively, loved and liked by anyone.

My view is what is morality is for every and each individual to recognize, understand, realize the nature of their inherent morality, then develop it so that they will flow spontaneously with what is inherently and naturally moral.
Where do you figure "what is inherently and naturally moral" obtains or emerges from? Where is it found/what is it a property of?
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 12241
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Why Moral Realism Is Almost Certainly True

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Terrapin Station wrote: Sat Apr 17, 2021 12:22 am
DPMartin wrote: Fri Apr 16, 2021 4:07 pm So you are right that what is morally good [to be defined precisely] should not be related to what is preferred subjectively, loved and liked by anyone.

My view is what is morality is for every and each individual to recognize, understand, realize the nature of their inherent morality, then develop it so that they will flow spontaneously with what is inherently and naturally moral.
Where do you figure "what is inherently and naturally moral" obtains or emerges from? Where is it found/what is it a property of?
The above is not from DP Martin [he did not 'quote' properly in the above], they are my views.

I have discussed that with you before.

'Killing humans' is a moral element.

First, you can verify and justify within yourself, i.e. that you do not go about arbitrarily killing humans. Why?

Then note 99% of the nearly 8 billion people do not go about arbitrarily killing humans. Some 5% [soldiers, executors, and those permitted legally] may be willing to kill on duty and that is for various reason, not due to an inherent propensity to kill humans.

The above is a VERY STRONG inductive inference that there are real moral things that are inherent and natural in all humans.
Post Reply