One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

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Veritas Aequitas
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One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Here is one [among many] justification that moral facts exist as real within the human brain and whole physical self.

The general principle is, if we are programmed to do X, then there is an ought_ness to do X.
It is that 'oughtness' i.e. that existence of that state-of-oughtness that is a real fact as justified within a FSK.

If anyone do not agree with, don't want, do not comply with that oughtness that is their opinion but that will not extirpate that fact of oughtness in their brain and physical self.
If they don't comply with the "programmed" say "ought_ness to breathe", then they will die very soon thus proving that state of ought_ness with its own force is very real.

Where the state-of-oughtness relate to morality-proper within a moral FSK, then that is a moral fact, e.g. the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans".

If normal people do not comply with the real moral fact of the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans", their conscience will be triggered that will cause terrible mental pains to the extent that some murderers committed suicide. Such events validate that the moral fact of the state-of-ought_ness "not to kill humans" is very real.

The above, on the basis of conscience [evidently] validate and justify that moral facts exist as real within the human brain and whole physical self.

Note, I am not insisting the above is a main or THE argument to justify the existence of moral facts.

Whatever is a moral fact MUST be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible moral FSK, e.g. the moral fact 'no human ought to kill humans'.

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FlashDangerpants
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by FlashDangerpants »

That's the wrong side of the facts-values distinction. No need for further investigation. But luckily you have many others, so we can just discard this one.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 6:31 am That's the wrong side of the facts-values distinction. No need for further investigation. But luckily you have many others, so we can just discard this one.
Note the counter to your views;

Hillary Putnam: Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29759

Gerwith: IS/OUGHT Resolved Rationally
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=32069
Here is Gerwiths in his 1 Step of a 4 Steps Argument for Ought from Is;
The first step involves the point that
action as viewed by the [moral] agent has, in virtue of its purposiveness, a certain evaluative element.
...
the [moral] agent's relation to the action he brings about is conative [connected with a wish, intention, or effort to do something] and evaluative, for he acts for some purpose which seems to him to be good.
...
The presence of choice and purpose in action thus gives it a structure such that, from the standpoint of the agent,

"do X for purpose E"
entails
"X and E are good.”

Since the latter statement is a value judgment, or at least the function of such a judgment, to this extent from the standpoint of the agent the 'fact-value' gap, even if not the ‘is’-‘ought' gap [at this stage], is already bridged in action.
Even Rorty [..I am still reading with a fine-toothed comb] with Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre agreed the Fact-Value Distinction is philosophically amateurish and hindering progress, i.e.
But from the viewpoints of Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre, the trouble with the fact-value distinction is that it is contrived precisely to blur the fact that alternative descriptions are possible in addition to those offered by the results of normal inquiries. 10
It [fact-value] disguises the fact that to use one set of true sentences to describe ourselves is already to choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use another set of true sentences is to adopt a contrary attitude.

It [fact-value] disguises the fact that to use one set of true sentences to describe ourselves is already to choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use another set of true sentences is to adopt a contrary attitude.

Only if we assume that there is a value-free vocabulary which renders these sets of "factual" statements commensurable can the [corrupted] positivist distinction between facts and values, beliefs and attitudes, look plausible.

But the philosophical fiction that such a [value-free] vocabulary is on the tips of our tongues is, from an educational point of view, disastrous.
It forces us to pretend that we can split ourselves up into knowers of true sentences on the one hand and choosers of lives or actions or works of art on the other.

These artificial diremptions [of the positivists] make it impossible to get the notion of edification into focus.
Or, more exactly, they tempt us to think of edification as having nothing to do with the rational faculties which are employed in normal discourse.

So Gadamer's effort to get rid of the classic picture of man-as-essentially-knower-of-essences is, among other things, an effort -to get rid of the distinction between fact and value, and thus to let us think of "discovering the facts" as one project of edification among others.

pg 361-62 Phil and the Mirror of Nature
You disagrees with Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre, and Rorty on the above??

The fact-value distinction as with many others dichotomy only has limited uses within low grade [cheap skate] philosophical views but not at more refined levels of philosophy.
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Thu Mar 18, 2021 7:35 am, edited 4 times in total.
Peter Holmes
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Peter Holmes »

Please answer this question.

If humans were programmed to kill humans, ought we to do so?
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 7:27 am Please answer this question.

If humans were programmed to kill humans, ought we to do so?
IF humans were programmed to kill humans, it is not a question of "ought we to do so?"
The point is IF humans were programmed to kill humans, then, there is an inherent potential state of oughtness to kill humans within the brain and the human self.

In this case, IF humans were programmed to kill humans, then evil groups will exploit this as an evil fact and their standard of evilness within their evil FSK to influence their followers to kill humans. This is irrational in the natural sense.

But what is evil is anti-morality [as defined], thus the above evil fact is not for morality-proper [as defined] but evilness is against morality-proper.

The above is conditioned upon a big IF which is not of reality.

Within the reality of human nature, ALL humans are not 'programmed' to kill humans.
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FlashDangerpants
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 7:24 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 6:31 am That's the wrong side of the facts-values distinction. No need for further investigation. But luckily you have many others, so we can just discard this one.
Note the counter to your views;

Hillary Putnam: Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29759

Gerwith: IS/OUGHT Resolved Rationally
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=32069
Here is Gerwiths in his 1 Step of a 4 Steps Argument for Ought from Is;
The first step involves the point that
action as viewed by the [moral] agent has, in virtue of its purposiveness, a certain evaluative element.
...
the [moral] agent's relation to the action he brings about is conative [connected with a wish, intention, or effort to do something] and evaluative, for he acts for some purpose which seems to him to be good.
...
The presence of choice and purpose in action thus gives it a structure such that, from the standpoint of the agent,

"do X for purpose E"
entails
"X and E are good.”

Since the latter statement is a value judgment, or at least the function of such a judgment, to this extent from the standpoint of the agent the 'fact-value' gap, even if not the ‘is’-‘ought' gap [at this stage], is already bridged in action.
Even Rorty [..I am still reading with a fine-toothed comb] with Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre agreed the Fact-Value Distinction is philosophically amateurish and hindering progress, i.e.
But from the viewpoints of Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre, the trouble with the fact-value distinction is that it is contrived precisely to blur the fact that alternative descriptions are possible in addition to those offered by the results of normal inquiries. 10
It [fact-value] disguises the fact that to use one set of true sentences to describe ourselves is already to choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use another set of true sentences is to adopt a contrary attitude.

It [fact-value] disguises the fact that to use one set of true sentences to describe ourselves is already to choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use another set of true sentences is to adopt a contrary attitude.

Only if we assume that there is a value-free vocabulary which renders these sets of "factual" statements commensurable can the [corrupted] positivist distinction between facts and values, beliefs and attitudes, look plausible.

But the philosophical fiction that such a [value-free] vocabulary is on the tips of our tongues is, from an educational point of view, disastrous.
It forces us to pretend that we can split ourselves up into knowers of true sentences on the one hand and choosers of lives or actions or works of art on the other.

These artificial diremptions [of the positivists] make it impossible to get the notion of edification into focus.
Or, more exactly, they tempt us to think of edification as having nothing to do with the rational faculties which are employed in normal discourse.

So Gadamer's effort to get rid of the classic picture of man-as-essentially-knower-of-essences is, among other things, an effort -to get rid of the distinction between fact and value, and thus to let us think of "discovering the facts" as one project of edification among others.

pg 361-62 Phil and the Mirror of Nature
You disagrees with Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre, and Rorty on the above??

The fact-value distinction as with many others dichotomy only has limited uses within low grade [cheap skate] philosophical views but not at more refined levels of philosophy.
The short answer to all of those is that none of the works of actual philosophy that you are citing will support a transition into a "morality-proper" that supercedes commonly understood values and in which there are 'facts' of moral evaluative character that can be derivied by a method that simulates those of the natural sciences.

Evaluative statements and factual statements serve different purposes and operate in different ways, blurring the distinction doesn't have the outcome that you are aiming for.
Peter Holmes
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 7:48 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 7:27 am Please answer this question.

If humans were programmed to kill humans, ought we to do so?
IF humans were programmed to kill humans, it is not a question of "ought we to do so?"
The point is IF humans were programmed to kill humans, then, there is an inherent potential state of oughtness to kill humans within the brain and the human self.

In this case, IF humans were programmed to kill humans, then evil groups will exploit this as an evil fact and their standard of evilness within their evil FSK to influence their followers to kill humans. This is irrational in the natural sense.

But what is evil is anti-morality [as defined], thus the above evil fact is not for morality-proper [as defined] but evilness is against morality-proper.

The above is conditioned upon a big IF which is not of reality.

Within the reality of human nature, ALL humans are not 'programmed' to kill humans.
Answer the question. If humans were programmed to kill humans, ought we to do so? Start with yes or no.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 8:39 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 7:24 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 6:31 am That's the wrong side of the facts-values distinction. No need for further investigation. But luckily you have many others, so we can just discard this one.
Note the counter to your views;

Hillary Putnam: Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29759

Gerwith: IS/OUGHT Resolved Rationally
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=32069
Here is Gerwiths in his 1 Step of a 4 Steps Argument for Ought from Is;
The first step involves the point that
action as viewed by the [moral] agent has, in virtue of its purposiveness, a certain evaluative element.
...
the [moral] agent's relation to the action he brings about is conative [connected with a wish, intention, or effort to do something] and evaluative, for he acts for some purpose which seems to him to be good.
...
The presence of choice and purpose in action thus gives it a structure such that, from the standpoint of the agent,

"do X for purpose E"
entails
"X and E are good.”

Since the latter statement is a value judgment, or at least the function of such a judgment, to this extent from the standpoint of the agent the 'fact-value' gap, even if not the ‘is’-‘ought' gap [at this stage], is already bridged in action.
Even Rorty [..I am still reading with a fine-toothed comb] with Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre agreed the Fact-Value Distinction is philosophically amateurish and hindering progress, i.e.
But from the viewpoints of Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre, the trouble with the fact-value distinction is that it is contrived precisely to blur the fact that alternative descriptions are possible in addition to those offered by the results of normal inquiries. 10
It [fact-value] disguises the fact that to use one set of true sentences to describe ourselves is already to choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use another set of true sentences is to adopt a contrary attitude.

It [fact-value] disguises the fact that to use one set of true sentences to describe ourselves is already to choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use another set of true sentences is to adopt a contrary attitude.

Only if we assume that there is a value-free vocabulary which renders these sets of "factual" statements commensurable can the [corrupted] positivist distinction between facts and values, beliefs and attitudes, look plausible.

But the philosophical fiction that such a [value-free] vocabulary is on the tips of our tongues is, from an educational point of view, disastrous.
It forces us to pretend that we can split ourselves up into knowers of true sentences on the one hand and choosers of lives or actions or works of art on the other.

These artificial diremptions [of the positivists] make it impossible to get the notion of edification into focus.
Or, more exactly, they tempt us to think of edification as having nothing to do with the rational faculties which are employed in normal discourse.

So Gadamer's effort to get rid of the classic picture of man-as-essentially-knower-of-essences is, among other things, an effort -to get rid of the distinction between fact and value, and thus to let us think of "discovering the facts" as one project of edification among others.

pg 361-62 Phil and the Mirror of Nature
You disagrees with Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre, and Rorty on the above??

The fact-value distinction as with many others dichotomy only has limited uses within low grade [cheap skate] philosophical views but not at more refined levels of philosophy.
The short answer to all of those is that none of the works of actual philosophy that you are citing will support a transition into a "morality-proper" that supercedes commonly understood values and in which there are 'facts' of moral evaluative character that can be derivied by a method that simulates those of the natural sciences.
The point is the above argument proves the fact-value distinction while applicable for some limited perspectives does not exists within more realistic perspectives. This is like while Newtonian Physics is useful it is not realistic in terms of Einsteinian Physics or Quantum Mechanics.

In my case, I am not arguing for solely values [assertions, beliefs, opinions], what I am claiming is moral facts exist as moral oughtness within a moral FSK as real things. Such moral facts are represented and grounded to their physical referents i.e. real living and active neurons in the brain. [A]
Evaluative statements and factual statements serve different purposes and operate in different ways, blurring the distinction doesn't have the outcome that you are aiming for.
Within the linguistic perspective, if a statement is identified specifically as evaluative then it cannot be about facts within a specific FSK.
For example, 'the apple taste good' is evaluative and is distinct from the fact of the physical apple.

In my case, note point [A] above.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 10:25 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 7:48 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 7:27 am Please answer this question.

If humans were programmed to kill humans, ought we to do so?
IF humans were programmed to kill humans, it is not a question of "ought we to do so?"
The point is IF humans were programmed to kill humans, then, there is an inherent potential state of oughtness to kill humans within the brain and the human self.

In this case, IF humans were programmed to kill humans, then evil groups will exploit this as an evil fact and their standard of evilness within their evil FSK to influence their followers to kill humans. This is irrational in the natural sense.

But what is evil is anti-morality [as defined], thus the above evil fact is not for morality-proper [as defined] but evilness is against morality-proper.

The above is conditioned upon a big IF which is not of reality.

Within the reality of human nature, ALL humans are not 'programmed' to kill humans.
Answer the question. If humans were programmed to kill humans, ought we to do so? Start with yes or no.
I have already answer which I believe either 'yes' or 'no' is not necessary.

But if you insist,
IF humans were "programmed" to kill humans, then, YES, all humans ought to the kill humans."

Note my point of biological fact,
Within the reality of human nature, humans [generically] are NOT 'programmed' to kill humans.
Peter Holmes
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Peter Holmes »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Mar 19, 2021 4:30 am
Peter Holmes wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 10:25 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Thu Mar 18, 2021 7:48 am

IF humans were programmed to kill humans, it is not a question of "ought we to do so?"
The point is IF humans were programmed to kill humans, then, there is an inherent potential state of oughtness to kill humans within the brain and the human self.

In this case, IF humans were programmed to kill humans, then evil groups will exploit this as an evil fact and their standard of evilness within their evil FSK to influence their followers to kill humans. This is irrational in the natural sense.

But what is evil is anti-morality [as defined], thus the above evil fact is not for morality-proper [as defined] but evilness is against morality-proper.

The above is conditioned upon a big IF which is not of reality.

Within the reality of human nature, ALL humans are not 'programmed' to kill humans.
Answer the question. If humans were programmed to kill humans, ought we to do so? Start with yes or no.
I have already answer which I believe either 'yes' or 'no' is not necessary.

But if you insist,
IF humans were "programmed" to kill humans, then, YES, all humans ought to the kill humans."

Note my point of biological fact,
Within the reality of human nature, humans [generically] are NOT 'programmed' to kill humans.
Precisely. QED. Your criterion for 'oughtness' has no moral consistency or credibility. If there were moral facts, there could be no inconsistency.
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FlashDangerpants
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Mar 19, 2021 4:23 am The point is the above argument proves the fact-value distinction while applicable for some limited perspectives does not exists within more realistic perspectives. This is like while Newtonian Physics is useful it is not realistic in terms of Einsteinian Physics or Quantum Mechanics.

In my case, I am not arguing for solely values [assertions, beliefs, opinions], what I am claiming is moral facts exist as moral oughtness within a moral FSK as real things. Such moral facts are represented and grounded to their physical referents i.e. real living and active neurons in the brain. [A]
Evaluative statements and factual statements serve different purposes and operate in different ways, blurring the distinction doesn't have the outcome that you are aiming for.
Within the linguistic perspective, if a statement is identified specifically as evaluative then it cannot be about facts within a specific FSK.
For example, 'the apple taste good' is evaluative and is distinct from the fact of the physical apple.

In my case, note point [A] above.
So inside the FSK, there is a truth which asserts that a fact of DNA makes the FSK itself true.

And the reason why you still can't say that Henry is wrong is because his FSK has a thing inside itself which asserts that his FSK is True.

And nothing outside of either actually tells anyone which FSK is correct.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Mar 19, 2021 12:00 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Mar 19, 2021 4:23 am The point is the above argument proves the fact-value distinction while applicable for some limited perspectives does not exists within more realistic perspectives. This is like while Newtonian Physics is useful it is not realistic in terms of Einsteinian Physics or Quantum Mechanics.

In my case, I am not arguing for solely values [assertions, beliefs, opinions], what I am claiming is moral facts exist as moral oughtness within a moral FSK as real things. Such moral facts are represented and grounded to their physical referents i.e. real living and active neurons in the brain. [A]
Evaluative statements and factual statements serve different purposes and operate in different ways, blurring the distinction doesn't have the outcome that you are aiming for.
Within the linguistic perspective, if a statement is identified specifically as evaluative then it cannot be about facts within a specific FSK.
For example, 'the apple taste good' is evaluative and is distinct from the fact of the physical apple.

In my case, note point [A] above.
So inside the FSK, there is a truth which asserts that a fact of DNA makes the FSK itself true.
That is not my point.

What is inside a FSK, e.g. the scientific FSK is its implied constitution, the scientific method, the processes, the principles, the assumptions, defined limitations, peer review and whatever supporting elements and conditions necessary to ensure the scientific FSK is credible.

Scientific truths which are generated from the scientific FSK in compliance with its conditions. The scientific FSK the standard bearer of the credibility of truths, albeit they are only polished conjectures.
I believe you will NOT insist scientific truths are false and not objective.

How is the scientific FSK credible?
see my post,
viewtopic.php?p=489333#p489333
I am claiming the credible moral FSK I proposed is very similar to the scientific FSK in the above features and thus has a high degree of credibility.

And the reason why you still can't say that Henry is wrong is because his FSK has a thing inside itself which asserts that his FSK is True.
As far as the moral fact 'no human ought to enslave another' I agree with Henry since his intuition on this agrees with the verified and justified moral fact from the moral FSK.

I do not agree with Henry re his claim on "killing humans".
What he intuited in this case do not agree with the verified and justified true moral fact re 'no human ought to kill humans' period!
Henry did not claim to have a FSK but it can be implied he has a very crude and unreliable FSK on this matter.
And nothing outside of either actually tells anyone which FSK is correct.
As I had stated above the most credible facts or truths, i.e. scientific facts from the scientific FSK are merely at best 'polished conjectures' and we have to accept this limitation.

It is not a question of which FSK is "correct" but which FSK is relatively more credible than others.
Note the criteria above on what determine the scientific FSK as the most credible 'polisher' of conjectures.

In Henry's case, he is relying on his own personal intuition and he never claimed he has a credible FSK to support his claim. So he is depending on luck that his intuition will align with reality.
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FlashDangerpants
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Mar 20, 2021 7:26 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Mar 19, 2021 12:00 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Fri Mar 19, 2021 4:23 am The point is the above argument proves the fact-value distinction while applicable for some limited perspectives does not exists within more realistic perspectives. This is like while Newtonian Physics is useful it is not realistic in terms of Einsteinian Physics or Quantum Mechanics.

In my case, I am not arguing for solely values [assertions, beliefs, opinions], what I am claiming is moral facts exist as moral oughtness within a moral FSK as real things. Such moral facts are represented and grounded to their physical referents i.e. real living and active neurons in the brain. [A]


Within the linguistic perspective, if a statement is identified specifically as evaluative then it cannot be about facts within a specific FSK.
For example, 'the apple taste good' is evaluative and is distinct from the fact of the physical apple.

In my case, note point [A] above.
So inside the FSK, there is a truth which asserts that a fact of DNA makes the FSK itself true.
That is not my point.

What is inside a FSK, e.g. the scientific FSK is its implied constitution, the scientific method, the processes, the principles, the assumptions, defined limitations, peer review and whatever supporting elements and conditions necessary to ensure the scientific FSK is credible.

Scientific truths which are generated from the scientific FSK in compliance with its conditions. The scientific FSK the standard bearer of the credibility of truths, albeit they are only polished conjectures.
I believe you will NOT insist scientific truths are false and not objective.
The truths of science aren't inside the scientific activity. Somebody with an alternative FSK can say that world is flat and that NASA is a conspiracy and so on. There is not a seperate but equal truth of the Flat Earth FSK which claims such things though, the world itself, independently of all human action has a shape that is its shape.

Science has no issue there. Science derives ISes not OUGHTs. So if some competing idea comes along which says that science is wrong about the shape of the Earth, we don't compare how many peers have reviewwed each claim to decide how believable one is compared to the other. Nor do we say that it is true that the Earth is round if science says so and it is also true that the Earth is not round if Youtube says so. We look at the object itself, and that tells us the shape.

But your thing doesn't have that luxury. You need a rule within your FSK of a sort that science does not need. Namely this thing where the derivation of ought as a fact comes from inside the FSK.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Mar 20, 2021 7:26 am
And the reason why you still can't say that Henry is wrong is because his FSK has a thing inside itself which asserts that his FSK is True.
As far as the moral fact 'no human ought to enslave another' I agree with Henry since his intuition on this agrees with the verified and justified moral fact from the moral FSK.

I do not agree with Henry re his claim on "killing humans".
What he intuited in this case do not agree with the verified and justified true moral fact re 'no human ought to kill humans' period!
Henry did not claim to have a FSK but it can be implied he has a very crude and unreliable FSK on this matter.
And nothing outside of either actually tells anyone which FSK is correct.
As I had stated above the most credible facts or truths, i.e. scientific facts from the scientific FSK are merely at best 'polished conjectures' and we have to accept this limitation.

It is not a question of which FSK is "correct" but which FSK is relatively more credible than others.
Note the criteria above on what determine the scientific FSK as the most credible 'polisher' of conjectures.

In Henry's case, he is relying on his own personal intuition and he never claimed he has a credible FSK to support his claim. So he is depending on luck that his intuition will align with reality.
Your FSK is only credible to you. Without already believing the FSK, nobody has any reason to take it seriously, because you need to agree with said FSK to accept that DNA is source of truth about what is good.

Henry's FSK is no less credible than yours.
Veritas Aequitas
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Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Sat Mar 20, 2021 2:13 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Mar 20, 2021 7:26 am
FlashDangerpants wrote: Fri Mar 19, 2021 12:00 pm

So inside the FSK, there is a truth which asserts that a fact of DNA makes the FSK itself true.
That is not my point.

What is inside a FSK, e.g. the scientific FSK is its implied constitution, the scientific method, the processes, the principles, the assumptions, defined limitations, peer review and whatever supporting elements and conditions necessary to ensure the scientific FSK is credible.

Scientific truths which are generated from the scientific FSK in compliance with its conditions. The scientific FSK the standard bearer of the credibility of truths, albeit they are only polished conjectures.
I believe you will NOT insist scientific truths are false and not objective.
The truths of science aren't inside the scientific activity. Somebody with an alternative FSK can say that world is flat and that NASA is a conspiracy and so on. There is not a seperate but equal truth of the Flat Earth FSK which claims such things though, the world itself, independently of all human action has a shape that is its shape.

Science has no issue there. Science derives ISes not OUGHTs. So if some competing idea comes along which says that science is wrong about the shape of the Earth, we don't compare how many peers have reviewwed each claim to decide how believable one is compared to the other. Nor do we say that it is true that the Earth is round if science says so and it is also true that the Earth is not round if Youtube says so. We look at the object itself, and that tells us the shape.

But your thing doesn't have that luxury. You need a rule within your FSK of a sort that science does not need. Namely this thing where the derivation of ought as a fact comes from inside the FSK.
Point is your thinking is too conventional and rigid, i.e. as systematic philosophers do in contrast to edifying philosophers who see things from different and new perspectives. [Rorty].

Yes, science justify ISes within reality [comprising ALL ISes]
But 'oughtness' is an "is" within reality [comprising ALL ISes]

All humans are "programmed" to breathe else they die.
That "program" thus generate an "oughtness", a force of compulsion that the human must act accordingly else death awaits.
This oughtness is represented by neurons, chemicals in the brain and body generating potentials and physical tensions.
That 'ougtness' is an "is" which is real and objective.

When the above scientific 'oughtness' [scientific fact] is input within a moral FSK, and after processing with other inputs, what emerges from inside the moral FSK is a moral fact.

I have given an analogy from the legal FSK which get its input from scientific facts and other inputs to be processed via the legal FSK and the output is a legal fact, e.g.
X is convicted of the murder of Y and is sentenced to death.
Surely you cannot deny this is a legal fact qualified and valid only within the legal FSK.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sat Mar 20, 2021 7:26 am
And the reason why you still can't say that Henry is wrong is because his FSK has a thing inside itself which asserts that his FSK is True.
As far as the moral fact 'no human ought to enslave another' I agree with Henry since his intuition on this agrees with the verified and justified moral fact from the moral FSK.

I do not agree with Henry re his claim on "killing humans".
What he intuited in this case do not agree with the verified and justified true moral fact re 'no human ought to kill humans' period!
Henry did not claim to have a FSK but it can be implied he has a very crude and unreliable FSK on this matter.
And nothing outside of either actually tells anyone which FSK is correct.
As I had stated above the most credible facts or truths, i.e. scientific facts from the scientific FSK are merely at best 'polished conjectures' and we have to accept this limitation.

It is not a question of which FSK is "correct" but which FSK is relatively more credible than others.
Note the criteria above on what determine the scientific FSK as the most credible 'polisher' of conjectures.

In Henry's case, he is relying on his own personal intuition and he never claimed he has a credible FSK to support his claim. So he is depending on luck that his intuition will align with reality.
Your FSK is only credible to you. Without already believing the FSK, nobody has any reason to take it seriously, because you need to agree with said FSK to accept that DNA is source of truth about what is good.

Henry's FSK is no less credible than yours.
I have already explained a "1000" times, the moral FSK I proposed is similar to the scientific FSK.

see this repeat;
viewtopic.php?p=503400#p503400
Peter Holmes
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Joined: Tue Jul 18, 2017 3:53 pm

Re: One [of many] Justification of Moral Facts as Real

Post by Peter Holmes »

If there are chemistry facts - chemical features of reality - the 'chemistry FSK' is credible, because we can use it to describe those facts. If there were no chemistry facts, a chemistry FSK would be nothing more than empty speculation.

For example, there are no astrology facts - astrological features of reality - so the 'astrology FSK' is nothing more than empty speculation. Even calling it a framework and system of knowledge is ridiculous. (I should say: pending evidence.)

So, an FSK provides a means to investigate and describe features of reality - such as the chemical composition of water. But the FSK doesn't and can't create the features of reality that it describes. Those features of reality either do or don't exist, full stop.

VA just claims there is a 'morality FSK' within which so-called moral facts are 'verified and justified empirically and philosophically'. (The big and important-sounding words in this mantra are like a comfort-blanket, which is why they have to be ritually intoned.)

But VA has never produced evidence for the existence and methodology of this fantasy 'morality FSK'. And challenged to demonstrate empirically and philosophically the existence of even one supposed moral fact - 'no human ought to kill humans' is the go-to example - VA fails every time, merely falling back on repeating the mantra.

So the challenge to moral realists and objectivists remains what it has always been: please demonstrate the existence of even one moral fact - one moral feature of reality that is or was the case. One concrete and testable description - like 'water is H2O' - will do the trick.

(Moral objectivists who deny there are such things as facts in the first place are obviously confused, but perhaps marching out of time to a different drummer.)
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