There is no 'Matter of Fact' [Analytic].

[FlashDangerpants]

The implications aren't Earth shattering.

It just means that if you want somebody to stop doing a bad thing such as holding their ice cream with the forbidden-food-hand, you need to use tools of persuasion to bring them round to your point of view rather than being able to whip out a goodnessometer to measure their wrongness. You already know this.

It's Earth-shattering in as much as you think that "IF one disagrees with another's way of holding ice cream one OUGHT to persuade them to do otherwise"

Exactly as Earth shattering as "IF you want to get some effect X you OUGHT to use a tool that is capable of inflicting X".

You really have been working below even your own standards recently with your wishful attempts to expose the hypocrisies that aren't there.

[Skepdick]

Exactly as Earth shattering as "IF you want to get some effect X you OUGHT to use a tool that is capable of inflicting X".

You really have been working below even your own standards recently with your wishful attempts to expose the hypocrisies that aren't there.

We DO want to get some effect X. That's as uncontroversial fact as any.

Why does that imply that we OUGHT to use a tool that is capable of inflicting X?

You just derived an ought from an is. No hypocrisy there.

[FlashDangerpants]

Exactly as Earth shattering as "IF you want to get some effect X you OUGHT to use a tool that is capable of inflicting X".

You really have been working below even your own standards recently with your wishful attempts to expose the hypocrisies that aren't there.

We DO want to get some effect X. That's as uncontroversial fact as any.

Why does that imply that we OUGHT to use a tool that is capable of inflicting X?

You just derived an ought from an is. No hypocrisy there.

No I didn't. And that's not a moral ought anyway, it's a practical one.

You're being too stupid for me to bother further with this. Go and annoy terrapin.

[Skepdick]

No I didn't. And that's not a moral ought anyway, it's a practical one.

That's special pleading. Apparently it's a fallacy.

Moral oughts are a subset of all oughts.

If you can derive any ought (in general) then there can be no issue with deriving a moral ought (in particular).

Because (apparently) you believe in deduction.

You're being too stupid for me to bother further with this. Go and annoy terrapin.

Translation: Stop pointing out all my inconsistencies, so I can pretend that the rules of the language games don't apply to me.

[Peter Holmes]

'This colour patch is red' - true or false, independent from opinion. If the colour patch is blue, the assertion is false, regardless of opinion.

'Abortion / capital punishment / eating animals is morally wrong' - not true or false, independent from opinion. The moral rightness or wrongness of abortion, capital punishment and eating animals aren't properties in the way that colour is a property. So there's nothing in reality, such as the colour of the patch, to settle the matter.

Simples. Accept no obfuscation.

[Skepdick]

'This colour patch is red' - true or false, independent from opinion. If the colour patch is blue, the assertion is false, regardless of opinion.

Uhuh. So if the red colour patch is blue, the assertion is false, regardless of opinion.
If wrong is right, then the assertion "murder is wrong" is false independent of opinion.

+10 points for stupid.

[FlashDangerpants]

No I didn't. And that's not a moral ought anyway, it's a practical one.

That's special pleading. Apparently it's a fallacy.

Moral oughts are a subset of all oughts.

If you can derive any ought (in general) then there can be no issue with deriving a moral ought (in particular).

Because (apparently) you believe in deduction.

You're being too stupid for me to bother further with this. Go and annoy terrapin.

Translation: Stop pointing out all my inconsistencies, so I can pretend that the rules of the language games don't apply to me.

Like I said: "No I didn't."

I derivied a paractical ought from another ought (in the form of a desire) which you clumsily relabelled as an is.

This falls far beneath the level of discourse I can possibly be bothered with. We are done here.

[Skepdick]

I derivied a paractical ought from another ought (in the form of a desire) which you clumsily relabelled as an is.

Translation: I label some sense-data as "ought" and other sense-data as "is" and I accidentally do it in such a way so it always agrees with my argument.

This falls far beneath the level of discourse I can possibly be bothered with. We are done here.

OK, your towering intellectual majesty.

[attofishpi]

I think u both deserve one of these--->LMFAO

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is fundamentally wrong. The fact that a law exists does not mean that 'legal oughtness' exists - that we ought to obey the law. We don't use the word 'ought' in that way. We can always choose to obey or disobey a law - even if disobedience incurs punishment - so the claim that we ought to obey it expresses an opinion.
'We ought to obey the law' can never be a factual assertion with a truth-value independent from opinion.

And the same goes for the claim that we ought to follow our neural 'programming' - if such there is - to behave in certain ways.

The claim that, just as legal facts exist, so do moral facts - that there's a 'moral FSK' just as there's a 'legal FSK' - is false.

You are SO ignorant and dogmatic that you refuses to see the truth.

Leaving aside the moral FSK temporarily, how come you are so ignorant of the so obvious existence of a specific legal framework and system of reality [FSR] and knowledge [FSK].
The specific legal FSK of a country is grounded on its constitution and supported by the political FSK via its legislatures, police, courts and legal fraternity.
I have to say you are stupid in deny a specific legal FSK exists.

That the laws of any country exist is a legal fact within the legal FSK, note only within the legal FSK.
Once the laws are passed there is an inherent and intrinsic 'oughtness' within them that obligated all citizens to comply with the law.
In the case of the legal FSK, it is more than 'oughtness' rather the strong modal verb applies, i.e. MUST obey the law or else.
In this case, the legal machineries and forces are engaged in generating the 'MUST' [oughtness] as a fact, i.e. an active state [of affairs] within the community.

People can of course choose to comply or not comply, that is their opinion, but such opinions to do extirpate the factual existence of the laws legislated, enforced and in force.
Surely what is legislated as a legal fact can be verified to various evidences of its confirmation as an active law of the country.

The existence of the legal fact within the legal FSK can be tested,
say you refused to obey the law of your country or other countries, i.e.
'no citizens or other humans can kill citizens'
and then you kill the citizens of a country,
that country will surely persecute you by imprisonment or death depending on the legal facts of the law.

It would then also be a legal fact within a legal FSK, i.e. "Peter Holmes is a convicted murderer in country X."

One thing you cannot realize and is dogmatically denying is the existence of a Framework and System of Reality [FSR] and Knowledge [FSK] is grounding its specific fact.
To you a 'fact' is a fact because it is a fact as worded.

I can only repeat what I wrote - so that you can ignore it again.

The fact that a law exists does not mean that 'legal oughtness' exists - that we ought to obey the law. We don't use the word 'ought' in that way. We can always choose to obey or disobey a law - even if disobedience incurs punishment - so the claim that we ought to obey it expresses an opinion.
'We ought to obey the law' can never be a factual assertion with a truth-value independent from opinion.

And the same goes for the claim that we ought to follow our neural 'programming' - if such there is - to behave in certain ways.

The existence of laws is not in dispute, and nor is the existence of moral codes from various sources. Societies have both laws and moral codes. No argument. But whether societies ought to have and follow both laws and moral codes - and what those laws and codes should stipulate - those are matters of opinion.

As always, you seem unable to see and understand the gap between any fact and any moral conclusion. The one can never entail the other - though we can appeal to facts to explain and try to justify our moral judgements.

You are the one who is so dogmatic with confirmation bias that you cannot see the 500 pound gorilla right in front of you.

Note I stated the fact is the existence of the legal ought_ness [IMPERATUVE and MUST] within the legal framework and system [FSK].
You deny there is a legal FSK.
According to Searle, this is a institutional fact not brute facts.

Citizens of course can choose to obey or disobey the ought_ness of the law, but their opinions do not extirpate that real existing legal fact of legal oughtness because the law will take effect upon them if they do not comply.
That legal ought_ness within a legal FSK is very real as evident by the real legal fact that murderers are sentenced to death for murdering another human.

You can deny the legal oughtness [imperative, must_ness] to comply the law within yourself, i.e. you ought not to obey the law, but that real oughtness is a reality regardless of what you think and if you murder someone you will die [legally].

The same principles above apply to moral facts within a moral FSK.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If it's not about right and wrong it's not morality at all. Morality-garbage is what you are peddling. You are the purveyor of pseduo-morality.

This is what you and your predecessor Prof do all the time. You fail to analyse the phenomenon in question using the tools you desire because those tools are inapproriate to the task. So you simply substitute the phonemenon for whatever your tool can do instead.

Hey, note Wittgenstein's "meaning of a word is in its use" which must be verified and justified to its utilities.

WHO ARE YOU to insist "it is not morality at all?"

Everyone. Find anyone who knows neither of us, tell them you have this theory that morality doesn't really include any right or wrong. They will politely inform you that this cannot be so because morality is exactly about right and wrong.

Note the ad populum fallacy.

I am aware SOME people [vulgar aka common public] relate 'right' or 'wrong' to morality in general. (However, note my point re theists at the end of this post.)
But this is a philosophy forum, thus we have to be more precise. Note this definition from Wiki;

• Morality (from Latin: moralitas, lit. 'manner, character, proper behavior') is the differentiation of intentions, decisions and actions between those that are distinguished as proper and those that are improper.
  
  Morality may also be specifically synonymous with "goodness" or "rightness"
  -wiki

I have done very extensive research into morality and morality-proper, the terms 'right' and 'wrong' are not commonly used by serious philosophers in a discussion re Philosophy of Morality and Ethics.

The absurdity of going about Wittgenstein for that nonsense is amazing. Morality exists as a language game about rightness and wrongness, who are you to tell everyone that to act immorally means deviation from a pattern, not wrongness.

Wittgenstein is right on target re "meaning of a word is its use".

Note at present >80% of the world's population are theists and thus >80% of supposed-morality is theistic morality [pseudo-morality].
To act immorally to these >80% people mean to sin [deviate from] against God's moral standards.
The usual practice is to repent, ask for forgiveness and promise to improve to comply with God's standards.

My moral FSK model is no different in principles with what >80% of people are doing with 'morality' except I don't rely on God's standards but justified true moral facts as standards for improvements.

You might note that he also said that concepts are not right or wrong, just useful or not. So telling the whole world that their concepts of morality, being that part of our language that discusses rightness and wrongness, is faulty and should be about something else entirely, won't get you anywhere.

I believe instead of wrong or right, the majority of people [>80%] will agree with me, i.e. morality means complying with some standards, i.e. God standards for theists.

I am not saying the use of 'right' or 'wrong' is faulty, rather it is too crude to be used for the purpose of morality-proper especially in the discussion of the Philosophy of Morality within a Philosophy Forum.

Here is what Rorty said of Edifying Philosophers;

• He [edifying philosopher] is, so to speak, violating
  not just the rules of normal philosophy (the philosophy of the schools of his day)
  but a sort of meta­rule:
  the rule that one may suggest changing the rules only because one has noticed
  -that the old ones do not fit the subject matter,
  -that they are not adequate to reality,
  -that they impede the solution of the eternal problems.

I am imitating the edifying philosopher,
i.e. polishing the definition of 'morality-proper'
because,
-that the old ones do not fit the subject matter,
-that they are not adequate to reality,
-that they impede the solution of the eternal problems.

[Veritas Aequitas]

No I didn't. And that's not a moral ought anyway, it's a practical one.

That's special pleading. Apparently it's a fallacy.

Moral oughts are a subset of all oughts.

If you can derive any ought (in general) then there can be no issue with deriving a moral ought (in particular).

Because (apparently) you believe in deduction.

You're being too stupid for me to bother further with this. Go and annoy terrapin.

Translation: Stop pointing out all my inconsistencies, so I can pretend that the rules of the language games don't apply to me.

I derived a practical ought from another ought (in the form of a desire) which you clumsily relabeled as an is.

You seem to have missed the fact that 'desire' is a state of affairs within a person i.e. a feature of reality, thus is an "is".
Generally "is" means exists.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/be

• 1. Reality is "is" i.e. all-there-is - all the 'is'es.
  2. A desire exists within reality.
  3. A desire is an "is".
  
  i. A desire entails 'oughtness'
  ii. A desire is an 'is' [3]
  iii. Oughtness is an 'is'.

Your thinking in this case of 'no ought from is' is based on Hume's ignorance [1700s] of neuroscience and neuro-psychology. It is now 2021!

[Peter Holmes]

Let's try again.

The claim 'this colour patch is red' is true or false, in context, given the way we English speakers use those words. And the truth or falsehood of the claim is independent from opinion, because there's a real thing that is or isn't what we call red. But if a colour patch is what we call blue, then the claim 'this colour patch is red' is false, because there's a real thing that is blue and not red.

This is how we English speakers use the words 'true' and 'false' to refer to factual assertions. And words can mean only what we use them to mean. For example, what we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case - such as a colour patch being red or blue.

Now, children, a moral assertion, such as 'abortion is morally wrong' doesn't function in the way that a factual assertion, such as 'this colour patch is red' functions. And why is that the case? Well, it's because moral rightness and wrongness aren't properties of things in the way that colours are. We can settle the question of what colour the patch is by checking if it's what we English speakers call red or blue. And given the way we use those words, there can be no argument: the patch is either red or not red, or blue or not blue - independent from opinion.

But we can't do the same with abortion. Its moral 'status' - whether it's morally right or wrong - isn't a property identifiable independent from opinion, in the way that the colour of the colour patch is. And this is why it's possible for one person to think abortion is morally wrong, and another person to think abortion is not morally wrong. There's nothing in the nature or abortion itself that can settle the matter.

So a moral assertion is different from a factual assertion. A moral assertion isn't factually true or false, because it has no truth-value at all. And for that reason, there can be no moral facts. So morality isn't and can't be what we call objective.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Let's try again.

The claim 'this colour patch is red' is true or false, in context, given the way we English speakers use those words. And the truth or falsehood of the claim is independent from opinion, because there's a real thing that is or isn't what we call red. But if a colour patch is what we call blue, then the claim 'this colour patch is red' is false, because there's a real thing that is blue and not red.

This is how we English speakers use the words 'true' and 'false' to refer to factual assertions. And words can mean only what we use them to mean. For example, what we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case - such as a colour patch being red or blue.

Now, children, a moral assertion, such as 'abortion is morally wrong' doesn't function in the way that a factual assertion, such as 'this colour patch is red' functions. And why is that the case? Well, it's because moral rightness and wrongness aren't properties of things in the way that colours are. We can settle the question of what colour the patch is by checking if it's what we English speakers call red or blue. And given the way we use those words, there can be no argument: the patch is either red or not red, or blue or not blue - independent from opinion.

But we can't do the same with abortion. Its moral 'status' - whether it's morally right or wrong - isn't a property identifiable independent from opinion, in the way that the colour of the colour patch is. And this is why it's possible for one person to think abortion is morally wrong, and another person to think abortion is not morally wrong. There's nothing in the nature or abortion itself that can settle the matter.

So a moral assertion is different from a factual assertion. A moral assertion isn't factually true or false, because it has no truth-value at all. And for that reason, there can be no moral facts. So morality isn't and can't be what we call objective.

Creating your own strawmen again!

A moral assertion [e.g. whether killing humans is right or wrong] by any subject is not a fact itself, such a moral assertion is an opinion.

A moral fact within a moral FSK is that 'oughtness' [inhibition] "programmed" and existing as real in the brains of ALL humans via evolution and is represented by its physical referent, potentials and manifesting activities.

The truth of the existence of the above inhibition, i.e. 'no human ought to kill humans' as a moral fact within a moral FSK is supported by the fact that the majority of the 7+ billion do not have a loose and willy-nilly impulse to kill humans.

Where this inhibition is weakened or damaged as in malignant psychopaths, their inhibition 'no human ought to kill humans' failed, they evidently kill humans.

[Peter Holmes]

Let's try again.

The claim 'this colour patch is red' is true or false, in context, given the way we English speakers use those words. And the truth or falsehood of the claim is independent from opinion, because there's a real thing that is or isn't what we call red. But if a colour patch is what we call blue, then the claim 'this colour patch is red' is false, because there's a real thing that is blue and not red.

This is how we English speakers use the words 'true' and 'false' to refer to factual assertions. And words can mean only what we use them to mean. For example, what we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case - such as a colour patch being red or blue.

Now, children, a moral assertion, such as 'abortion is morally wrong' doesn't function in the way that a factual assertion, such as 'this colour patch is red' functions. And why is that the case? Well, it's because moral rightness and wrongness aren't properties of things in the way that colours are. We can settle the question of what colour the patch is by checking if it's what we English speakers call red or blue. And given the way we use those words, there can be no argument: the patch is either red or not red, or blue or not blue - independent from opinion.

But we can't do the same with abortion. Its moral 'status' - whether it's morally right or wrong - isn't a property identifiable independent from opinion, in the way that the colour of the colour patch is. And this is why it's possible for one person to think abortion is morally wrong, and another person to think abortion is not morally wrong. There's nothing in the nature or abortion itself that can settle the matter.

So a moral assertion is different from a factual assertion. A moral assertion isn't factually true or false, because it has no truth-value at all. And for that reason, there can be no moral facts. So morality isn't and can't be what we call objective.

Creating your own strawmen again!

A moral assertion [e.g. whether killing humans is right or wrong] by any subject is not a fact itself, such a moral assertion is an opinion.

A moral fact within a moral FSK is that 'oughtness' [inhibition] "programmed" and existing as real in the brains of ALL humans via evolution and is represented by its physical referent, potentials and manifesting activities.

The truth of the existence of the above inhibition, i.e. 'no human ought to kill humans' as a moral fact within a moral FSK is supported by the fact that the majority of the 7+ billion do not have a loose and willy-nilly impulse to kill humans.

Where this inhibition is weakened or damaged as in malignant psychopaths, their inhibition 'no human ought to kill humans' failed, they evidently kill humans.

If [it's a fact that] we're programmed not to kill humans, THAT IS NOT A MORAL FACT. It would just be a fact about human nature. And if instead we were programmed to kill humans, THAT WOULD ALSO NOT BE A MORAL FACT. It would not mean that we 'ought to kill humans'. Now, would it? Have a good hard think about it. Try out the idea. Stretch your mind just a little. Never know, the penny may drop.