Moral Drive = Moral Ought

[Terrapin Station]

You ignore my other points where I explained where the normative can be derived.

Because it's important for you to understand what the is/ought argument is traditionally about, and it turns out that you actually agree with it.

Arguing something else is fine, but we need to acknowledge that we're changing the subject then.

How is that I am agreeing with it?

You agreed that a fact such as "Joe shot Pete and killed him" does not imply any normative or moral maxim/edict.

That's all that the is/ought problem is about.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Because it's important for you to understand what the is/ought argument is traditionally about, and it turns out that you actually agree with it.

Arguing something else is fine, but we need to acknowledge that we're changing the subject then.

How is that I am agreeing with it?

You agreed that a fact such as "Joe shot Pete and killed him" does not imply any normative or moral maxim/edict.

That's all that the is/ought problem is about.

Nah, in general "Joe shot Pete and killed him" is merely a fact of criminality.

• imply = indicate the truth or existence of (something) by suggestion rather than explicit reference
  
  maxim = [in this case is] a general truth not a rule of conduct.

This fact of criminality is then contrasted with the normative, moral maxim or moral standard established via the moral FSK, i.e.
'no human ought to kill humans.'

Therefore, that "Joe shot Pete and killed him" do not imply any normative nor moral maxim/edict but will trigger only an association and relation to the moral standard, normative.

[Peter Holmes]

'Joe killed Pete' is a factual assertion with a truth-value: (classically) true or false. There is a fact of the matter.

'Humans are programmed not to kill humans' is a factual assertion with a truth-value: (classically) true or false. There is a fact of the matter.

'No human ought to kill humans' is NOT a factual assertion with a truth-value. It expresses an opinion with which we can agree or disagree. There is no fact of the matter.

It really is very, very simple.

[Veritas Aequitas]

'Joe killed Pete' is a factual assertion with a truth-value: (classically) true or false. There is a fact of the matter.

'Humans are programmed not to kill humans' is a factual assertion with a truth-value: (classically) true or false. There is a fact of the matter.

'No human ought to kill humans' is NOT a factual assertion with a truth-value. It expresses an opinion with which we can agree or disagree. There is no fact of the matter.

It really is very, very simple.

In the first there is 'No Fact of the Matter' in the real sense and 'matter of fact' is a term favored by the bastardized philosophers of the logical positivists and classical analytic philosophy.

See:
No Fact of the Matter
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713659756

Rorty referenced Quine re 'matter of fact'.

• See Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine, ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1 969), p. 303, where Quine says:
  Consider . . . the totality of truths of nature, known and unknown, observable and unobservable, past and future.
  The point about indeterminacy of translation is that it withstands even all this truth, the whole truth about nature.
  This is what I mean by saying that, where indeterminacy of translation applies, there is no real question of right choice; there is no fact of the matter even to within the acknowledged under-determination of a theory of nature.
  Rorty- Mirror of Nature pg. 194

Here is another counter against No Fact of the Matter,

• On What it Takes for There to Be No Fact of the Matter
  JODY AZZOUNI & OTAVIO ´ BUENO
  We’re not sure which philosopher should be credited with the first what we’ll call non-factualist claim. But one of the most famous (and influential) early claims of this sort, one of there being no fact of the matter—and you’ll know about this one, because of its fame and influence—is Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis.

As I had stated you are stuck within a dogmatic silo [with the bastardized philosophers of the logical positivists and classical analytic philosophy.] and is ignorant the world had moved on with a greater range of modern knowledge.

................................
Whatever is fact is conditioned upon its specific FSK with its inbuilt truth-value.
What is a moral fact is conditioned upon the moral FSK with its inbuilt truth-value.

The problem is you are stuck with the bastardized version of what is fact adopted from the logical positivists [not defunct] and classical analytical philosophy.

I have repeated a "million" times, the moral FSK is as credible as the scientific FSK, thus if you deny the moral FSK you are only your way to deny the scientific FSK and its scientific facts.

[Peter Holmes]

'Joe killed Pete' is a factual assertion with a truth-value: (classically) true or false. There is a fact of the matter.

'Humans are programmed not to kill humans' is a factual assertion with a truth-value: (classically) true or false. There is a fact of the matter.

'No human ought to kill humans' is NOT a factual assertion with a truth-value. It expresses an opinion with which we can agree or disagree. There is no fact of the matter.

It really is very, very simple.

In the first there is 'No Fact of the Matter' in the real sense and 'matter of fact' is a term favored by the bastardized philosophers of the logical positivists and classical analytic philosophy.

See:
No Fact of the Matter
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713659756

Rorty referenced Quine re 'matter of fact'.

• See Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine, ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1 969), p. 303, where Quine says:
  Consider . . . the totality of truths of nature, known and unknown, observable and unobservable, past and future.
  The point about indeterminacy of translation is that it withstands even all this truth, the whole truth about nature.
  This is what I mean by saying that, where indeterminacy of translation applies, there is no real question of right choice; there is no fact of the matter even to within the acknowledged under-determination of a theory of nature.
  Rorty- Mirror of Nature pg. 194

Here is another counter against No Fact of the Matter,

• On What it Takes for There to Be No Fact of the Matter
  JODY AZZOUNI & OTAVIO ´ BUENO
  We’re not sure which philosopher should be credited with the first what we’ll call non-factualist claim. But one of the most famous (and influential) early claims of this sort, one of there being no fact of the matter—and you’ll know about this one, because of its fame and influence—is Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis.

As I had stated you are stuck within a dogmatic silo [with the bastardized philosophers of the logical positivists and classical analytic philosophy.] and is ignorant the world had moved on with a greater range of modern knowledge.

................................
Whatever is fact is conditioned upon its specific FSK with its inbuilt truth-value.
What is a moral fact is conditioned upon the moral FSK with its inbuilt truth-value.

The problem is you are stuck with the bastardized version of what is fact adopted from the logical positivists [not defunct] and classical analytical philosophy.

I have repeated a "million" times, the moral FSK is as credible as the scientific FSK, thus if you deny the moral FSK you are only your way to deny the scientific FSK and its scientific facts.

1 Quine's indeterminacy thesis, like the post-structuralism of (for example) Derrida, was a lament for the loss of something we never had: fixed reference and meaning; a stable unity of signifier and signified in the sign. It was always magical thinking anyway. In my opinion, Quine never really grasped the significance of what the later Wittgenstein was doing.

2 What's puzzling is why you think the dead duck that is moral objectivism - the existence of moral facts - can be resurrected by appealing to indeterminacy. The whole idea of facts depends on a kind of determinacy.

[Skepdick]

1 Quine's indeterminacy thesis, like the post-structuralism of (for example) Derrida, was a lament for the loss of something we never had: fixed reference and meaning; a stable unity of signifier and signified in the sign. It was always magical thinking anyway. In my opinion, Quine never really grasped the significance of what the later Wittgenstein was doing.

2 What's puzzling is why you think the dead duck that is moral objectivism - the existence of moral facts - can be resurrected by appealing to indeterminacy. The whole idea of facts depends on a kind of determinacy.

The whole idea of determinacy depends on a determiner that determines determinacy or indeterminacy.

Any theory of facts (moral or otherwise) requires one of those determiner things. Humans.

Don't they teach you any of this when they steal your money at Philosophy school?

[Veritas Aequitas]

'Joe killed Pete' is a factual assertion with a truth-value: (classically) true or false. There is a fact of the matter.

'Humans are programmed not to kill humans' is a factual assertion with a truth-value: (classically) true or false. There is a fact of the matter.

'No human ought to kill humans' is NOT a factual assertion with a truth-value. It expresses an opinion with which we can agree or disagree. There is no fact of the matter.

It really is very, very simple.

In the first there is 'No Fact of the Matter' in the real sense and 'matter of fact' is a term favored by the bastardized philosophers of the logical positivists and classical analytic philosophy.

See:
No Fact of the Matter
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713659756

Rorty referenced Quine re 'matter of fact'.

• See Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine, ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht, 1 969), p. 303, where Quine says:
  Consider . . . the totality of truths of nature, known and unknown, observable and unobservable, past and future.
  The point about indeterminacy of translation is that it withstands even all this truth, the whole truth about nature.
  This is what I mean by saying that, where indeterminacy of translation applies, there is no real question of right choice; there is no fact of the matter even to within the acknowledged under-determination of a theory of nature.
  Rorty- Mirror of Nature pg. 194

Here is another counter against No Fact of the Matter,

• On What it Takes for There to Be No Fact of the Matter
  JODY AZZOUNI & OTAVIO ´ BUENO
  We’re not sure which philosopher should be credited with the first what we’ll call non-factualist claim. But one of the most famous (and influential) early claims of this sort, one of there being no fact of the matter—and you’ll know about this one, because of its fame and influence—is Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis.

As I had stated you are stuck within a dogmatic silo [with the bastardized philosophers of the logical positivists and classical analytic philosophy.] and is ignorant the world had moved on with a greater range of modern knowledge.

................................
Whatever is fact is conditioned upon its specific FSK with its inbuilt truth-value.
What is a moral fact is conditioned upon the moral FSK with its inbuilt truth-value.

The problem is you are stuck with the bastardized version of what is fact adopted from the logical positivists [not defunct] and classical analytical philosophy.

I have repeated a "million" times, the moral FSK is as credible as the scientific FSK, thus if you deny the moral FSK you are only your way to deny the scientific FSK and its scientific facts.

1 Quine's indeterminacy thesis, like the post-structuralism of (for example) Derrida, was a lament for the loss of something we never had: fixed reference and meaning; a stable unity of signifier and signified in the sign. It was always magical thinking anyway. In my opinion, Quine never really grasped the significance of what the later Wittgenstein was doing.

I am referring to Quine's indeterminacy thesis that counter the classical analytic philosophical idea of matter-of-fact which you are grasping and clinging onto.

2 What's puzzling is why you think the dead duck that is moral objectivism - the existence of moral facts - can be resurrected by appealing to indeterminacy. The whole idea of facts depends on a kind of determinacy.

My claim of moral fact is not dependent of Quine's indeterminacy.
My sort of empirical based moral facts is determined by the constitution of a specific moral FSK which is grounded on human conditions.

[Terrapin Station]

I am referring to Quine's indeterminacy thesis that counter the classical analytic philosophical idea of matter-of-fact which you are grasping and clinging onto.

??? That has nothing at all to do with a claim about facts being indeterminate. It's a thesis in philosophy of language, and it's specifically about translations.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am referring to Quine's indeterminacy thesis that counter the classical analytic philosophical idea of matter-of-fact which you are grasping and clinging onto.

??? That has nothing at all to do with a claim about facts being indeterminate. It's a thesis in philosophy of language, and it's specifically about translations.

Note Rorty's point above,
viewtopic.php?p=500804#p500804

[Terrapin Station]

Note Rorty's point above,
viewtopic.php?p=500804#p500804

What you're quoting there is still not about facts per se being indeterminate. It's a point about language in a theory of nature. The paragraph in question begins, "Though linguistics is of course part of the theory of nature . . ."

[Veritas Aequitas]

Note Rorty's point above,
viewtopic.php?p=500804#p500804

What you're quoting there is still not about facts per se being indeterminate. It's a point about language in a theory of nature. The paragraph in question begins, "Though linguistics is of course part of the theory of nature . . ."

I admit, I have not mastered Rorty's book yet, but the gist I gather is Rorty referencing Quine and Sellars, is he do not agree there are "matter-of-facts" of the classical analytic philosophy.

[Terrapin Station]

Note Rorty's point above,
viewtopic.php?p=500804#p500804

What you're quoting there is still not about facts per se being indeterminate. It's a point about language in a theory of nature. The paragraph in question begins, "Though linguistics is of course part of the theory of nature . . ."

I admit, I have not mastered Rorty's book yet, but the gist I gather is Rorty referencing Quine and Sellars, is he do not agree there are "matter-of-facts" of the classical analytic philosophy.

Well, the Quine quote is from the Davidson and Hintikka-edited book. That's what Rorty is quoting.

But sure, Rorty would have some community-oriented definition of "fact."

If only Rorty's philosophy wasn't a mess.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What you're quoting there is still not about facts per se being indeterminate. It's a point about language in a theory of nature. The paragraph in question begins, "Though linguistics is of course part of the theory of nature . . ."

I admit, I have not mastered Rorty's book yet, but the gist I gather is Rorty referencing Quine and Sellars, is he do not agree there are "matter-of-facts" of the classical analytic philosophy.

Well, the Quine quote is from the Davidson and Hintikka-edited book. That's what Rorty is quoting.

But sure, Rorty would have some community-oriented definition of "fact."

If only Rorty's philosophy wasn't a mess.

So you are aware there are philosophers who argued for community-oriented definition of "fact" i.e. which is based on the concept of the FSK.
Rorty is relying on Quine, Sellar, late-Wittgenstein, Dewey to support his point.

How is Rorty philosophy is a mess?
So far I noted Rorty's general idea on pragmatism is very realistic, practical and useful but I don't agree with Rorty totally in everything.
Express your views here;
Richard Rorty
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32188