The Bastardized Definition of 'Objectivity' and 'Mind'

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is Peter Holmes' bastardized version of what is objectivity and what is mind.

I suggest the standard phulosophical description of subjectivity as 'dependence on the mind' and objectivity as 'independence from the mind' comes from the metaphysical delusion that there are two substances: mind and matter (body) - and that therefore this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is misleading.

What we have is brains, which are physical things in which physical processes occur. Our venerable talk about minds containing thoughts, ideas, feelings, desires, wants, opinions, intentions - updated and given a technical gloss with talk of concepts, percepts, consciousness and so on - all the panoply of what can be called mentalism - is and has always been just that: ways of talking about ourselves and our experience.

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind', the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind. And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes. And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind, have a location and a boundary separating 'inside' from 'outside'? The conceptual mess deepens into a mire.

Fortunately, an ordinary (non-philosophical) description of objectivity usually avoids talk of minds: 'independence from opinion when considering the facts'. And subjectivity is 'dependence on opinion, belief or judgement'. Sometimes, 'subjective' is also assumed to mean 'personal' or 'individual' - but this is confusing, because an individual can reason objectively - so this distinction isn't about who and how many people are involved.

My conclusion is that the subjective/objective distinction is about what we call facts, and whether and how much we use and refer to them. And, in terms of linguistic expression, this boils down to the function of an assertion: if it refers to or asserts the existence of a fact, then it's a factual assertion. If not, it's a non-factual assertion. So it follows that what we're arguing about is whether moral (and, as it happens, aesthetic) assertions are factual - with factual truth-value - or not.

(I'm also posting this at my other OP: Is morality objective or subjective?)

Your above views of what is objectivity and what is mind is archaic and inherited from the bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists [now defunct] and classical analytic philosophy which had be debunked gradually by Wittgenstein then with Quine and Sellars hitting the last nails into its coffin.

Your insistence on your definitions of the above are merely ideological and psychological as a therapy for your own mental disturbances.

The current understanding of what is philosophical objectivity is this;
What is Philosophical Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31416
What is objective truths are conditioned upon a credible FSK/FSR and the principles thereby extracted has been put into practice and had benefited humanity tremendously.

What is mind
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind
the principles also has been put into practice had benefited humanity tremendously.

Views?

[Veritas Aequitas]

One point supporting the existence of the human mind is the very extensive coverage within the Philosophy of Mind.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind

Modern philosophers do not contend and squabble over whether there is mind or not.
The contention is whether the mind exists independent of the body or is it part and parcel of the body [e.g. embodied].

Note:

The embodied mind thesis challenges other theories, such as cognitivism, computationalism, and Cartesian dualism.[1][2] It is closely related to the extended mind thesis, situated cognition, and enactivism.

The modern version depends on insights drawn from recent research in psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, dynamical systems, artificial intelligence, robotics, animal cognition, plant cognition and neurobiology.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embodied_cognition

[Peter Holmes]

Here is Peter Holmes' bastardized version of what is objectivity and what is mind.

I suggest the standard phulosophical description of subjectivity as 'dependence on the mind' and objectivity as 'independence from the mind' comes from the metaphysical delusion that there are two substances: mind and matter (body) - and that therefore this distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is misleading.

What we have is brains, which are physical things in which physical processes occur. Our venerable talk about minds containing thoughts, ideas, feelings, desires, wants, opinions, intentions - updated and given a technical gloss with talk of concepts, percepts, consciousness and so on - all the panoply of what can be called mentalism - is and has always been just that: ways of talking about ourselves and our experience.

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind', the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind. And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes. And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind, have a location and a boundary separating 'inside' from 'outside'? The conceptual mess deepens into a mire.

Fortunately, an ordinary (non-philosophical) description of objectivity usually avoids talk of minds: 'independence from opinion when considering the facts'. And subjectivity is 'dependence on opinion, belief or judgement'. Sometimes, 'subjective' is also assumed to mean 'personal' or 'individual' - but this is confusing, because an individual can reason objectively - so this distinction isn't about who and how many people are involved.

My conclusion is that the subjective/objective distinction is about what we call facts, and whether and how much we use and refer to them. And, in terms of linguistic expression, this boils down to the function of an assertion: if it refers to or asserts the existence of a fact, then it's a factual assertion. If not, it's a non-factual assertion. So it follows that what we're arguing about is whether moral (and, as it happens, aesthetic) assertions are factual - with factual truth-value - or not.

(I'm also posting this at my other OP: Is morality objective or subjective?)

Your above views of what is objectivity and what is mind is archaic and inherited from the bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists [now defunct] and classical analytic philosophy which had be debunked gradually by Wittgenstein then with Quine and Sellars hitting the last nails into its coffin.

Your insistence on your definitions of the above are merely ideological and psychological as a therapy for your own mental disturbances.

The current understanding of what is philosophical objectivity is this;
What is Philosophical Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31416
What is objective truths are conditioned upon a credible FSK/FSR and the principles thereby extracted has been put into practice and had benefited humanity tremendously.

What is mind
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind
the principles also has been put into practice had benefited humanity tremendously.

Views?

What empirical evidence do you have for the existence of any so-called non-physical or abstract thing?

[Veritas Aequitas]

What is mind
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind
the principles also has been put into practice had benefited humanity tremendously.

What empirical evidence do you have for the existence of any so-called non-physical or abstract thing?

Note this section within the link to 'What is Mind' above.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind#Scientific_study
  8.0 Scientific study
  8.1 Neuroscience
  8.2 Cognitive Science
  8.3 Psychology

All the above are of the scientific FSK, thus rely on empirical evidence to infer their conclusions with reference to the real mind or non-physical things in existence.

I believe you are stuck with archaic ideas, e.g.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-physi ... dy_dualism
  In ontology and the philosophy of mind, a non-physical entity is a spirit or being that exists outside physical reality. Their existence divides the philosophical school of physicalism from the schools of idealism and dualism; with the latter schools holding that they can exist and the former holding that they cannot.
  This is the Cartesian Mind-Body Dualism.

My views are not related to an independent spirit or entity that exists outside physical reality.
Note in contrast to your beliefs that there are no abstract objects;

• Philosophers generally do agree on the existence of abstract objects. These include concepts such as numbers, mathematical sets and functions, and philosophical relations and properties. ibid.

And note this modern thinking;

• While older Cartesian dualists held the existence of non-physical minds, more limited forms of dualism propounded by 20th and 21st century philosophers (such as property dualism) hold merely the existence of non-physical properties. ibid

And,

• Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties.
  In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) exist in, or naturally supervene upon, certain physical substances (namely brains).
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism

It is within property dualism that scientists rely on empirical evidences to infer the existence of real non-physical things and mental properties.

You need to find a way out of your SILO and explore the real wide world.

[Peter Holmes]

What is mind
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind
the principles also has been put into practice had benefited humanity tremendously.

What empirical evidence do you have for the existence of any so-called non-physical or abstract thing?

Note this section within the link to 'What is Mind' above.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind#Scientific_study
  8.0 Scientific study
  8.1 Neuroscience
  8.2 Cognitive Science
  8.3 Psychology

All the above are of the scientific FSK, thus rely on empirical evidence to infer their conclusions with reference to the real mind or non-physical things in existence.

I believe you are stuck with archaic ideas, e.g.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-physi ... dy_dualism
  In ontology and the philosophy of mind, a non-physical entity is a spirit or being that exists outside physical reality. Their existence divides the philosophical school of physicalism from the schools of idealism and dualism; with the latter schools holding that they can exist and the former holding that they cannot.
  This is the Cartesian Mind-Body Dualism.

My views are not related to an independent spirit or entity that exists outside physical reality.
Note in contrast to your beliefs that there are no abstract objects;

• Philosophers generally do agree on the existence of abstract objects. These include concepts such as numbers, mathematical sets and functions, and philosophical relations and properties. ibid.

And note this modern thinking;

• While older Cartesian dualists held the existence of non-physical minds, more limited forms of dualism propounded by 20th and 21st century philosophers (such as property dualism) hold merely the existence of non-physical properties. ibid

And,

• Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties.
  In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) exist in, or naturally supervene upon, certain physical substances (namely brains).
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism

It is within property dualism that scientists rely on empirical evidences to infer the existence of real non-physical things and mental properties.

You need to find a way out of your SILO and explore the real wide world.

What empirical evidence do you have for the existence of any so-called non-physical or abstract thing?

Is your evidence nothing more than that people have been talking about non-physical or abstract things for a very long time?

Talk about being stuck in a silo.

[FlashDangerpants]

One point supporting the existence of the human mind is the very extensive coverage within the Philosophy of Mind.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind

If that point had any merit it would also justify things you don't want to believe in, such as God, which is another subject that has been given extensive coverage.

[Atla]

• Philosophers generally do agree on the existence of abstract objects. These include concepts such as numbers, mathematical sets and functions, and philosophical relations and properties. ibid.

That's why seeing philosophers as authorities isn't just a fallacy, it's downright insane.

[Terrapin Station]

I don't agree with Peter on this:

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind',

First I disagree with this. The mind is a subset of brain functions (at least; if substratum independence turns out to be the case, then it can be sets of processes of other sorts of things, too). So there is a thing we call the mind.

the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind.

No need for it to be confusing. It's thus basically a way of denoting about brain independence. Or rather, it's a way of denoting locations other than the brain

Depending on the context, we can broaden it to bodies--not just brains.

And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes.

This is very confused. The brain processes that are mental processes aren't outside of the brain processes in question. They're located in the same place, since the mental phenomena in question are identical to those brain processes.

And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind,

Minds aren't nonphysical. They're physical.

[Terrapin Station]

Re abstract objects see this survey:

https://vexingquestions.wordpress.com/2 ... ominalism/

Only 39% accepted or leaned towards platonism.

38% accepted or leaned towards nominalism, and the rest had a different view than both.

So it's not the case that most philosophers are realists on abstract objects.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What empirical evidence do you have for the existence of any so-called non-physical or abstract thing?

You missed my point from the above, i.e.;

• The embodied mind thesis challenges other theories, such as cognitivism, computationalism, and Cartesian dualism.[1][2] It is closely related to the extended mind thesis, situated cognition, and enactivism.

What I interpret as 'mind' is not of Cartesian Dualism which postulate the mind is independent of the body, as a non-physical entity, spirit and the likes.

When you insist on the 'mind' as defined within Cartesian Dualism, I will agree, since it does not exist at all, there is no empirical evidence for such a bastardized version of the mind.

What I defined as mind is this which I had linked above;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

• The mind is the set of faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, intelligence, judgement, language and memory, as well as noncognitive aspects such as emotion and instinct. Under the scientific physicalist interpretation, the mind is produced at least in part by the brain.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

The above is defined with Physicalism & Property Dualism and not Cartesian Dualism.

• Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) exist in, or naturally supervene upon, certain physical -substances (namely brains).
  -wiki

I have already answered you earlier

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind#Scientific_study
  8.0 Scientific study
  8.1 Neuroscience
  8.2 Cognitive Science
  8.3 Psychology
  
  All the above are of the scientific FSK, thus rely on empirical evidence to infer their conclusions with reference to the real mind [as defined] or non-physical things in existence.

DO NOT impose your bastardized definition of mind [Cartesian Dualism] and its counter onto my definition of 'what is mind' as above.

[Belinda]

What is a quale(plural qualia)?

Is it mental or is it physical? Or both?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

[Peter Holmes]

I don't agree with Peter on this:

Since there is no thing that we call 'the mind',

First I disagree with this. The mind is a subset of brain functions (at least; if substratum independence turns out to be the case, then it can be sets of processes of other sorts of things, too). So there is a thing we call the mind.

the claim that subjectivity is mind-dependence is incoherent - or, rather, we can be misled by talk of things being 'inside' and 'outside' the mind.

No need for it to be confusing. It's thus basically a way of denoting about brain independence. Or rather, it's a way of denoting locations other than the brain

Depending on the context, we can broaden it to bodies--not just brains.

And this confusion can inform what we mean by the words fact and objectivity. If 'objective' means 'outside the mind', then everything is objective, including our brains and their processes.

This is very confused. The brain processes that are mental processes aren't outside of the brain processes in question. They're located in the same place, since the mental phenomena in question are identical to those brain processes.

And anyway, how can a supposed non-physical thing, such as the mind,

Minds aren't nonphysical. They're physical.

Thanks, TS. That's very helpful. I want to make sure I understand your position and its implications.

You say that what we call the mind is a physical thing, and that what we call subjectivity refers to that physical thing and its processes - what goes on 'in the mind' - which means in the brain. And it follows that what we call objectivity refers to everything that's not 'in the mind' - which means not in the brain. Have I got that right? If so, it seems to me we agree there's nothing non-physical or abstract about the situation. Is that right? (I certainly think there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical things or processes.)

If this is your position, then I'm puzzled by a couple of its implications.

By your definition of objectivity, everything outside my brain is objective, including all other brains and their processes. It seems to make no sense to call what goes on in other brains 'subjective' - and so, by the same argument, it seems to make no sense to call what goes on in my brain 'subjective'. The words 'subjective' and 'objective' seem to have 'relativistic' meanings, because what's inside one brain is always outside all other brains.

On the other hand, if 'subjectivity' refers to what's inside not 'my' brain, but rather a brain, and therefore all brains, the nature of objectivity seems problematic. If what's objective is what's outside all brains, what meaning can be given to the expression 'an objective decision' (or argument, and so on)? What does objectivity amount to if all perceptions and reasoning about what's outside all brains occurs in brains - and therefore subjectively?

I'm genuinely unsure about your view of subjectivity and objectivity, though I find it interesting and attractive. Finding my way, really. Just not sure how physicalism relates to the distinction - at the moment.

[FlashDangerpants]

Does it not make more sense to view subjective and objective statements in terms of how we use them?

So if I say "that is a tree" and I intend that as an objective statement of a fact, I am by implication saying that I know how to identify a tree, and hoping that so do you, and we have a more or less agreed way to look at trees and determine whether we are correctly using the term today.

But if you say "I have a fear of trees", this is a fundamentally subjective statement, even if we observe your behaviour or chop up your brain, that fear you feel when you encounter shrubbery of terrifying proportions is something ultimately have to ask you about if we want to understand it as is.

At risk of sounding like Skepdick during his even less lucid moments ... When we talk about mind independence, are we not really discussing this basic choice of how to go about confirming/agreeing things, and what competencies are assumed of people correctly describing these two types of claim?

[Peter Holmes]

Does it not make more sense to view subjective and objective statements in terms of how we use them?

So if I say "that is a tree" and I intend that as an objective statement of a fact, I am by implication saying that I know how to identify a tree, and hoping that so do you, and we have a more or less agreed way to look at trees and determine whether we are correctly using the term today.

But if you say "I have a fear of trees", this is a fundamentally subjective statement, even if we observe your behaviour or chop up your brain, that fear you feel when you encounter shrubbery of terrifying proportions is something ultimately have to ask you about if we want to understand it as is.

At risk of sounding like Skepdick during his even less lucid moments ... When we talk about mind independence, are we not really discussing this basic choice of how to go about confirming/agreeing things, and what competencies are assumed of people correctly describing these two types of claim?

I sort of agree. But I see it as a matter of the function of assertions: whether they're factual (claiming something about reality) or non-factual (expressing an opinion, judgement or belief). My problem with your 'I have a fear of trees' example is that it seems to me that is a factual assertion - so confirmability doesn't conclusively decide the subjective/objective distinction. But 'trees are beautiful' is clearly a subjective assertion. And that's why 'this action is good' is subjective. It's not to do with inside/outside brains - VA's position - or confirmability.

[Terrapin Station]

Thanks, TS. That's very helpful. I want to make sure I understand your position and its implications.

You say that what we call the mind is a physical thing, and that what we call subjectivity refers to that physical thing and its processes - what goes on 'in the mind' - which means in the brain. And it follows that what we call objectivity refers to everything that's not 'in the mind' - which means not in the brain. Have I got that right? If so, it seems to me we agree there's nothing non-physical or abstract about the situation. Is that right? (I certainly think there's no evidence for the existence of non-physical things or processes.)

Right, there's nothing nonphysical or abstract in that sense. (Re "in that sense," brains, a la mental phenomena, do something called "abstraction," but abstractions are concrete, physical processes.)

By your definition of objectivity, everything outside my brain is objective, including all other brains and their processes.

No. "subjective" refers to brains/mental phenomena in general--regardless of whose brain and/or mental phenomena we're talking about.

You're thinking of it as if it would be indexical, as terms like "you" and "I" are. It's not indexical. It's rather a term like "person." That is, if I'm talking, I'm "I" and you're "you," but if you're talking you're "I" and I'm "you." "I" and "you" change their reference depending on who is speaking. They're indexical. But "person" doesn't change depending on whether you or I are talking. We're both persons in both cases. "Person" isn't indexical. "Subjective" and "objective" are like "person."

It seems to make no sense to call what goes on in other brains 'subjective' - and so, by the same argument, it seems to make no sense to call what goes on in my brain 'subjective'. The words 'subjective' and 'objective' seem to have 'relativistic' meanings, because what's inside one brain is always outside all other brains.

I don't know why you're thinking this, but the way I use the terms, and this is pretty much a traditional way to use the terms, is that "subjective" refers to mental (brain or personal) phenomena regardless of the mind/brain/person, whereas "objective" is stuff that's "outside" of minds/brains/persons.

On the other hand, if 'subjectivity' refers to what's inside not 'my' brain, but rather a brain, and therefore all brains, the nature of objectivity seems problematic. If what's objective is what's outside all brains, what meaning can be given to the expression 'an objective decision' (or argument, and so on)? What does objectivity amount to if all perceptions and reasoning about what's outside all brains occurs in brains - and therefore subjectively?

Right, so decisions, arguments, etc. can't be objective, but they can be about objective things. The colloquial "make an objective decision" amounts to taking objective things into consideration in a way that one might avoid otherwise.