Gerwith: IS/OUGHT Resolved Rationally

[Terrapin Station]

I am generally observing that what you are attacking is the structure fo Gewirth's argument, not the content.

So first, re this whole tangent, it's trying to get a clarification. It's not even an attack.

[Skepdick]

So first, re this whole tangent, it's trying to get a clarification. It's not even an attack.

Oh, you don't like the metaphorical use of "attack". OK. I'll Aspie-proof it for you.

Did you not counter-argue? Challenge? Disagree? with the arguments presented.

[Terrapin Station]

So first, re this whole tangent, it's trying to get a clarification. It's not even an attack.

Oh, you don't like the metaphorical use of "attack". OK. I'll Aspie-proof it for you.

Did you not counter-argue? Challenge? Disagree? with the arguments presented.

What arguments presented?

[Skepdick]

What arguments presented?

So now you are forgetful too? Or are you going to nit-pick (like an Aspie) that it "wasn't an argument" ?

[Terrapin Station]

What arguments presented?

So now you are forgetful too? Or are you going to nit-pick (like an Aspie) that it "wasn't an argument" ?

I'm trying to clarify what arguments you're referring to. Again, I was trying to get a clarification of Gewirth's argument. Are you referring to arguments presented a la Gewirth's argument?

[Skepdick]

I'm trying to clarify what arguments you're referring to. Again, I was trying to get a clarification of Gewirth's argument. Are you referring to arguments presented a la Gewirth's argument?

I'll simplify...

Do you agree or disagree with Gewirth? In the most general sense of agreement and disagreement.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm trying to clarify what arguments you're referring to. Again, I was trying to get a clarification of Gewirth's argument. Are you referring to arguments presented a la Gewirth's argument?

I'll simplify...

Do you agree or disagree with Gewirth? In the most general sense of agreement and disagreement.

It seemed to me that Gewirth's argument was hinging on the notion that P and X are different, where this is a universal situation. If that's the case, then there is a problem with the argument (and I'd disagree with the argument), because in reality, P and X aren't different in every scenario.

Veritas seemed to suggest that P and X aren't necessarily different in Gewirth's argument. So I was trying to clarify that Veritas was saying that Gewirth's argument would still work even if P and X are the same, and then I wanted him to explain how the argument would work if they're the same.

That's as far as we got, before (a) Veritas kept stalling with claims that I was misquoting Gewirth when I wasn't quoting him at all, and (b) you got involved and decided to entertain yourself with a bunch of irrelevant tangents.

[FlashDangerpants]

Hume's point was that there is NEVER a necessary connection, and that moralists tend to assume a connection between is and ought without thinking they need to make the connection explicit.

Dear Retard,

Your fellow Moron Flash Dangerdork has recently conceded (reluctantly) that oughts are recovered from goals

Dear Slurpdick, I did not reluctanly concede such a thing. The presentation of oughts derived from goals posing as those derived from ISes has been a primary reason I have given for rejecting stupid is/ought arguments that Vestigial Aquafresh has been presenting for years.

Now seriously, fuck off.

[Skepdick]

The presentation of oughts derived from goals posing as those derived from ISes has been a primary reason I have given for rejecting stupid is/ought arguments that Vestigial Aquafresh has been presenting for years.

So what's good for the goose isn't good for the gander?

Because you are doing the exact same thing!

You have a goal.
You have derived oughts from it.
And you are treating your ought as normative.

So what makes your oughts special?

[Terrapin Station]

The presentation of oughts derived from goals posing as those derived from ISes has been a primary reason I have given for rejecting stupid is/ought arguments that Vestigial Aquafresh has been presenting for years.

So what's good for the goose isn't good for the gander?

Because you are doing the exact same thing!

You have a goal.
You have derived oughts from it.
And you are treating your ought as normative.

So what makes your oughts special?

No one is claiming that we don't subjectively produce oughts--from goals as well as from other things.

The issue is over whether any facts logically imply any oughts (which as mentioned earlier, is another way of saying that they necessarily follow from those facts), so that (a) it can be a fact that a particular ought follows from a particular is, and (b) we can get normatives wrong, in the sense of being informationally incorrect/inaccurate.

[Skepdick]

It seemed to me that Gewirth's argument was hinging on the notion that P and X are different, where this is a universal situation. If that's the case, then there is a problem with the argument (and I'd disagree with the argument), because in reality, P and X aren't different in every scenario.

This claim requires justification.

The notion of "every scenario" suggests different points in spatiotemporal space.

By your very own definition that's sufficient for difference.

Veritas seemed to suggest that P and X aren't necessarily different in Gewirth's argument.

How is this any different from what YOU suggested literally in the paragraph above?

So I was trying to clarify that Veritas was saying that Gewirth's argument would still work even if P and X are the same, , and then I wanted him to explain how the argument would work if they're the same.

The way the argument would work is by direct implication of the Duhem-Quine thesis. By Confirmation holism

Any statement or argument can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.

And IF you can envisage what needs to change in the semantics of the system to make the argument true then you would be that much closer to understanding Gewirth.

That's as far as we got, before (a) Veritas kept stalling with claims that I was misquoting Gewirth when I wasn't quoting him at all, and (b) you got involved and decided to entertain yourself with a bunch of irrelevant tangents.

When you understand my "irrelevant" tangents are actually relevant (come what may) you will have understood my point.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hold_come_what_may

[Skepdick]

No one is claiming that we don't subjectively produce oughts--from goals as well as from other things.

So whatever we produce oughts from, those are not "IS-es"?

OH. Kay.

What are they?

There's about to be some woo woo mystery shit.

The issue is over whether any facts logically imply any oughts (which as mentioned earlier, is another way of saying that they necessarily follow from those facts), so that (a) it can be a fact that a particular ought follows from a particular is, and (b) we can get normatives wrong, in the sense of being informationally incorrect/inaccurate.

That entirely depends on whether you think mental states are facts or not.

[Terrapin Station]

This claim requires justification.

I explained what I meant by it way back at the beginning, before you sidetracked us with all of this nonsense.

What I'm referring to is this: As an example, say that the moral action in question (X in Gewirth) is helping an elderly person cross an intersection. Well, on some occasions where a person does that (or any example we might come up with), the reason behind it (P in Gewirth) is the same as the action--helping an elderly person cross an intersection in this case. In other words, in some cases, individuals have no reason behind a moral action aside from the action itself.

[Skepdick]

What I'm referring to is this: As an example, say that the moral action in question (X in Gewirth) is helping an elderly person cross an intersection. Well, on some occasions where a person does that (or any example we might come up with), the reason behind it (P in Gewirth) is the same as the action--helping an elderly person cross an intersection in this case. In other words, in some cases, individuals have no reason behind a moral action aside from the action itself.

So the psychological gratification of helping people is not a reason?

[Terrapin Station]

So whatever we produce oughts from, those are not "IS-es"?

The "is" doesn't logically imply the "ought." That is, the "ought" doesn't necessarily follow from the "is." It's not the case that we can get the "ought" wrong (in the sense of informationally incorrect or inaccurate).