Fact [re Analytic] [re Morality]

[Skepdick]

The word "fact" is used many ways depending on context. But when the question is "what can make morality objective?", we are dealing with "objective moral facts", which expression has a pretty clear-cut, singular meaning.

OK, but what does the word "objective" add to your rant?

All facts are objective, by definition. Least you could give us an example of a subjective fact.

1 more point goes to PH et. al. I guess, the score is about 167:0.
The referees tried to deem the match a technical KO two years ago, but the loser still refuses to stop fighting and leave the ring.

Last I checked, boxing has three referees. You counted 167:0, but the other two refs counted 0:167...

you got the red and blue shorts mixed up.

[bahman]

The word "fact" is used many ways depending on context. But when the question is "what can make morality objective?", we are dealing with "objective moral facts", which expression has a pretty clear-cut, singular meaning.

1 more point goes to PH et. al. I guess, the score is about 167:0.
The referees tried to deem the match a technical KO two years ago, but the loser still refuses to stop fighting and leave the ring.

Similarity, therefore equity. Equity, therefore equality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' did not mark a radical departure from his ideas in 'Philosophical Investigations' and other later writings. On the contrary, in 'On Certainty', he was extending and developing his insights into the autonomy of grammar and the nature of language games - for example the expression of doubt against the background of certainty.

I agree, the title 'On Certainty' in general is about the question of certainty.

One of the main focus of 'On Certainty' was to counter Moore's taking up Kant's challenge of the Scandal of Philosophy re the certainty of the independent external world.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand

Here is where W veered towards Philosophical Anti-Realism as a neo-Kantian.

I just wanted to point out VA's misunderstanding of the later Wittgenstein. And the monotonously repeated charge that my thinking is aligned with the Tractatus and the mistakes made by the logical positivists, partly because of their misinterpretation of the Tractatus - demonstrates VA's ignorance. The claim that the later Wittgenstein became an anti-realist is a gross and farcical misrepresentation.

I admit I was not very clear with the Tractatus earlier.
Now that I had zoomed in the Tractatus in more detail, I noted the Tractatus was W transition to philosophical anti-realism.

My intention was, your sense of 'what is fact' are in alignments with the elements of philosophy of early-W when he was with Russell and Frege who had contributed to Analytic Philosophy.

Btw, I did not claim you are fully with the Logical Positivists, but your sense of facts has certain [not all] similar elements from the defunct LP philosophy.

The claim that the later-Wittgenstein became an anti-realist is a gross and farcical misrepresentation.

Even in the Tractatus and PI where W has mixed-views there are already signs W was transitioning into a philosophical realist. I learned this from Robert Hanna re the 'death of Analytic Philosophy.'
It is definite he was an P-anti-realist in his writings in 'On Certainty'.

Explain why W is not a philosophical realist in the Neo-Kantian sense?

Btw, I claimed you were ignorant and conflated "fact in the Humean Sense" with "fact in the Functorial Sense," thus has no grounding and credibility to your claim of what is fact.
What say you?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Peter Holmes et. al. has always insisted there are NO moral facts where he insists "facts" are "states of affairs", 'features of reality', 'that is the case', and the likes.
This I take it are the common elements of Analytic Philosophy

Plenty of analytic philosophers think that there are moral facts.

Yes, I have no issues with them on that matter in general. However there are variations in their views which I do not agree.

inherited from the bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists.

What does "bastardized" amount to there, by the way? What does it mean in general to "bastardize" philosophy?

I had replied on the question in an earlier post and linking the dictionary meaning of 'bastardize'.

That the philosophies of the logical positivists are now defunct, condemned and thrown into the ash heap of history is a clue their philosophies were a bastardized form. The term 'bastardized' is more so relevant for the logical positivists due to their arrogance, condemnation of others and attempt to dominate philosophy as a whole.

While PH throws around the term 'fact' as if it is of something credible within philosophy, actually his term 'fact' has no groundings to reality at all.

And what is that supposed to refer to? What does it amount to for a term to have "a grounding in reality"?

As an example,
the scientific FSK has the more solid and credible grounding in reality for their scientific facts.
Why and How?
see this;
viewtopic.php?p=489333#p489333

As for PH's claims of what-is-fact, he has no solid grounding to justify his claims.
PH's claims is merely all talk and no solid reference to reality i.e. tantamount to,
"a fact is a fact iff and only if it is a fact."

I believe your views are the same as with PH, i.e. no solid groundings to your claim as to what-is-fact.

[Terrapin Station]

And what is that supposed to refer to? What does it amount to for a term to have "a grounding in reality"?

As an example,
the scientific FSK has the more solid and credible grounding in reality for their scientific facts.
Why and How?
see this;
viewtopic.php?p=489333#p489333

You're not answering the question I'm asking you.

Try this, start your answer with, "What it amounts to for a term to have a 'grounding in reality' is ______" and then fill in the blank.

[Peter Holmes]

Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' did not mark a radical departure from his ideas in 'Philosophical Investigations' and other later writings. On the contrary, in 'On Certainty', he was extending and developing his insights into the autonomy of grammar and the nature of language games - for example the expression of doubt against the background of certainty.

I agree, the title 'On Certainty' in general is about the question of certainty.

One of the main focus of 'On Certainty' was to counter Moore's taking up Kant's challenge of the Scandal of Philosophy re the certainty of the independent external world.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand

Here is where W veered towards Philosophical Anti-Realism as a neo-Kantian.

I just wanted to point out VA's misunderstanding of the later Wittgenstein. And the monotonously repeated charge that my thinking is aligned with the Tractatus and the mistakes made by the logical positivists, partly because of their misinterpretation of the Tractatus - demonstrates VA's ignorance. The claim that the later Wittgenstein became an anti-realist is a gross and farcical misrepresentation.

I admit I was not very clear with the Tractatus earlier.
Now that I had zoomed in the Tractatus in more detail, I noted the Tractatus was W transition to philosophical anti-realism.

My intention was, your sense of 'what is fact' are in alignments with the elements of philosophy of early-W when he was with Russell and Frege who had contributed to Analytic Philosophy.

Btw, I did not claim you are fully with the Logical Positivists, but your sense of facts has certain [not all] similar elements from the defunct LP philosophy.

The claim that the later-Wittgenstein became an anti-realist is a gross and farcical misrepresentation.

Even in the Tractatus and PI where W has mixed-views there are already signs W was transitioning into a philosophical realist. I learned this from Robert Hanna re the 'death of Analytic Philosophy.'
It is definite he was an P-anti-realist in his writings in 'On Certainty'.

Explain why W is not a philosophical realist in the Neo-Kantian sense?

Btw, I claimed you were ignorant and conflated "fact in the Humean Sense" with "fact in the Functorial Sense," thus has no grounding and credibility to your claim of what is fact.
What say you?

1 In as much as I understand it, I think the Humean/functorial distinction is incoherent. I reject its premises.

2 The claim that, in discussing Moore's problem - of what can we be sure? - and exposing what Fergus Kerr called the 'assurances of realism', Wittgenstein was espousing anti-realism (if such a position is even vaguely coherent) is false. The later W's aim was to circumvent philosophical theories, such as realism and anti-realism, because they're mistakes - misfiring answers to incoherent questions.

[Veritas Aequitas]

And what is that supposed to refer to? What does it amount to for a term to have "a grounding in reality"?

As an example,
the scientific FSK has the more solid and credible grounding in reality for their scientific facts.
Why and How?
see this;
viewtopic.php?p=489333#p489333

You're not answering the question I'm asking you.

Try this, start your answer with, "What it amounts to for a term to have a 'grounding in reality' is ______" and then fill in the blank.

I am very surprise you have a problem with the need for solid groundings in any claim.

"What it amounts to for a term to have a 'grounding in reality' is so that it is not unreal, illusory, a bullshit and the likes."

For example the claim, God exists has no solid grounding to reality.
God is an Impossibility to be real
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

Perhaps this will help you to get any idea of what is grounding;
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grounding/

I am not expecting any ultimate final grounds, but reasonable groundings which I have stated above, i.e.
"the scientific FSK has the more solid and credible grounding in reality for their scientific facts."

[Veritas Aequitas]

Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' did not mark a radical departure from his ideas in 'Philosophical Investigations' and other later writings. On the contrary, in 'On Certainty', he was extending and developing his insights into the autonomy of grammar and the nature of language games - for example the expression of doubt against the background of certainty.

I agree, the title 'On Certainty' in general is about the question of certainty.

One of the main focus of 'On Certainty' was to counter Moore's taking up Kant's challenge of the Scandal of Philosophy re the certainty of the independent external world.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand

Here is where W veered towards Philosophical Anti-Realism as a neo-Kantian.

I just wanted to point out VA's misunderstanding of the later Wittgenstein. And the monotonously repeated charge that my thinking is aligned with the Tractatus and the mistakes made by the logical positivists, partly because of their misinterpretation of the Tractatus - demonstrates VA's ignorance. The claim that the later Wittgenstein became an anti-realist is a gross and farcical misrepresentation.

I admit I was not very clear with the Tractatus earlier.
Now that I had zoomed in the Tractatus in more detail, I noted the Tractatus was W transition to philosophical anti-realism.

My intention was, your sense of 'what is fact' are in alignments with the elements of philosophy of early-W when he was with Russell and Frege who had contributed to Analytic Philosophy.

Btw, I did not claim you are fully with the Logical Positivists, but your sense of facts has certain [not all] similar elements from the defunct LP philosophy.

The claim that the later-Wittgenstein became an anti-realist is a gross and farcical misrepresentation.

Even in the Tractatus and PI where W has mixed-views there are already signs W was transitioning into a philosophical realist. I learned this from Robert Hanna re the 'death of Analytic Philosophy.'
It is definite he was an P-anti-realist in his writings in 'On Certainty'.

Explain why W is not a philosophical realist in the Neo-Kantian sense?

Btw, I claimed you were ignorant and conflated "fact in the Humean Sense" with "fact in the Functorial Sense," thus has no grounding and credibility to your claim of what is fact.
What say you?

1 In as much as I understand it, I think the Humean/functorial distinction is incoherent. I reject its premises.

I believe you found it incoherent due to ignorance.
The ascribed features of Humean and Functorial facts are so obvious.
You cannot conflate what is Humean facts with Functiorial facts.
If you disagree, explain why?

2 The claim that, in discussing Moore's problem - of what can we be sure? - and exposing what Fergus Kerr called the 'assurances of realism', Wittgenstein was espousing anti-realism (if such a position is even vaguely coherent) is false. The later W's aim was to circumvent philosophical theories, such as realism and anti-realism, because they're mistakes - misfiring answers to incoherent questions.

Moore's proof [which failed] was he took up Kant's challenge re the greatest scandal of philosophy where Philosophical Realists claim there is an external world that is independent of the mind.

In his paper 'Proof of an External World', Moore referred to Kant's accusation in Kant's CPR Bxxxix, i.e.

In the Preface to the second edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason some words occur, which in professor Kemp Smith's translation, are rendered as follows;

• it still remains a scandal to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of Knowledge, even for our Inner Sense) must be accepted merely on Faith,
  and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their Existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.
  Kant's CPR Bxxxix

As such the original contention and Moore's proof is a case of Philosophical Realism versus Philosophical Anti-Realism [Kant's position].

In W's 'On Certainty' W made reference to Moore's 'Proof of an External World', thus in this case when W countered Moore's view, W is taking a Philosophical anti-Realist' stance.

Note my point;
A Philosophical Realist is an Empirical Idealist
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32009

There is a lot of nuance to the above, thus while the later-W was seemingly a realist to you, he was a philosophical anti-realist in the ultimate sense.

At present I am reading Robert Hanna
THE FATE OF ANALYSIS: Analytic Philosophy From Frege To The Ash-Heap of History
where he discussed extensively on W.
I have not fully grasp the details of the book YET, but the direction is the later-W is ultimately a Philosophical anti-Realist in the very late part of his life.
I will get to the references on that matter later.

[Terrapin Station]

"What it amounts to for a term to have a 'grounding in reality' is so that it is not unreal, illusory, a bullshit and the likes."

For example the claim, God exists has no solid grounding to reality.
God is an Impossibility to be real
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

This seems like you don't understand the difference between terms and what terms are referring to.

Or do you want to say that the term "God" is an impossibility? That would be weird to say right after you used the term in a sentence.

[Skepdick]

This seems like you don't understand the difference between terms and what terms are referring to.

I thought we already established that you don't have a referent for the term "undrerstanding"?

[Veritas Aequitas]

"What it amounts to for a term to have a 'grounding in reality' is so that it is not unreal, illusory, a bullshit and the likes."

For example the claim, God exists has no solid grounding to reality.
God is an Impossibility to be real
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

This seems like you don't understand the difference between terms and what terms are referring to.

Or do you want to say that the term "God" is an impossibility? That would be weird to say right after you used the term in a sentence.

You seem to have your own independent dictionary and is making too much fuss.

Note the meaning of 'term',

• term = a word or expression that has a precise meaning in some uses or is peculiar to a science, art, profession, or subject.
  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/term

As per the above meaning of the term 'God,'
'God' is a word that has a precise meaning in some uses or is peculiar to a subject, i.e. theism.
The term 'God' according to theists is referring to a real God that created the universe, listens to and answers their prayers.

But my view is, the term 'God' has no real referent and grounding.
God is an Impossibility to be real
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

This is what I mean with reference to the need for grounding for whatever claim of reality.

Show me precisely what is wrong with the above?

[Terrapin Station]

"What it amounts to for a term to have a 'grounding in reality' is so that it is not unreal, illusory, a bullshit and the likes."

For example the claim, God exists has no solid grounding to reality.
God is an Impossibility to be real
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

This seems like you don't understand the difference between terms and what terms are referring to.

Or do you want to say that the term "God" is an impossibility? That would be weird to say right after you used the term in a sentence.

You seem to have your own independent dictionary and is making too much fuss.

Note the meaning of 'term',

• term = a word or expression that has a precise meaning in some uses or is peculiar to a science, art, profession, or subject.
  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/term

As per the above meaning of the term 'God,'
'God' is a word that has a precise meaning in some uses or is peculiar to a subject, i.e. theism.
The term 'God' according to theists is referring to a real God that created the universe, listens to and answers their prayers.

But my view is, the term 'God' has no real referent and grounding.
God is an Impossibility to be real
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

This is what I mean with reference to the need for grounding for whatever claim of reality.

Show me precisely what is wrong with the above?

I already told you precisely what's wrong with it. You're not understanding the difference between terms and what terms are referring to.

That it turns out that there's no God in the world doesn't make the term an impossibility. We'd not be able to use the word, to talk about this, to know what we're talking about if the term were an impossibility. You're confusing the term--the word, its definition, its connotation, etc. with something that wouldn't at all be a word or a definition or connotation or anything like that--the (supposed) "thing in the world" that the term "points to" or "picks out."

[Skepdick]

I already told you precisely what's wrong with it. You're not understanding the difference between terms and what terms are referring to.

And I told you that the relationship between terms and referents is arbitrary and is contingent upon a normative taxonomy/ontology and you didn't care.

In order to establish any such relationship one must first separate a referent from the broader context of experience. This is what phenomenologists call eidetic reduction.

When you refer to Peter Holmes are you referring to the collection of atoms; or the collection of organic molecules? Are you referring to Peter Holmes' world-line?

Creating a relationship between references and referents is the process of Semiosis. It's meaning-making.

So why should anyone listen to you?

[Terrapin Station]

I already told you precisely what's wrong with it. You're not understanding the difference between terms and what terms are referring to.

And I told you that the relationship between terms and referents is arbitrary and is contingent upon a normative taxonomy and you didn't care.

Skepdick's "remarkably stupid #6198"

My post hinges on absolutely nothing to do with that.

At any rate, I'm not bothering to respond to you again for a while at least. It's a waste of my time to point out the new and unusual ways that you exhibit idiocy in post after post, especially because you're incapable of learning anything from it, and I doubt anyone else is really paying much attention to it.

[Skepdick]

Skepdick's "remarkably stupid #6198"

My post hinges on absolutely nothing to do with that.

Unless you have confidence in the ruler's reliability, if you use a ruler to measure a table you may also be using the table to measure the ruler.

(a.k.a Terapin Station may be an idiot #6198)

So the strawman obtains then. You misrepresented my argument for my own understanding. In the direction away from charity.

It's not your fault though.

A stupid man's report of what a clever man says can never be accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something he can understand.--Bertrand Russel.